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ŠM AS A DEITY

Meir Lubetski

Come let us build us a city and a tower with its top in the sky and we will make us a *šēm* (Gen. xi 4). Thus Genesis delineates the presumptous undertaking of the ancient community to build a city, a heavenly tower, and make a *šēm*.

We are quite familiar with the usual translation of this verse, and particularly with the way *šēm* is rendered.[1] The word is generally understood as 'name' or 'fame'. The King James Version, the Revised Standard Version, the Jewish Publication Society translation and the Soncino edition, all chose the word 'name' for *šēm*.[2] The inference of the above translations, as well as the critical commentaries that will be cited below, is that 'name' means the fame that will be won from their stupendous accomplishment. The Anchor Bible translates: 'Come, let us build ourselves a city, and a tower with its top in the sky, to make for ourselves a name', thus suggesting that the purpose of building a city and a tower was for the sake of glorifying the builders.[3] In the same vein, the International Critical Commentary notes that 'And we will make us a *šēm*' means 'acquire lasting renown'.[4]

The Bible relates that the Generation of Dispersion was severely punished for its undertaking. It is, however, hard to understand what the grevious offense was according to those who explain *šēm* as name, i.e. fame. Why was it sinful to build a city and a tower and thereby gain repute?

The Sages, faced with this question, provided a totally different approach to the verse. The School of Rabbi Yishmael was of the opinion that *šēm* refers to an idol. They say:

> *ʾyn šm ʾl ʾbwdh zrh*
> *šēm* means nought but idolatry[5]

They deviated from the commonly accepted explanation of *šēm*. Rather, they interpreted it in this case as a word connoting an epithet of a pagan god. The same view of *šēm* is seen in Rabbi Nathan's comments on the verse in Exodus xxiii 13, *wʿ šēm* ʾělōhîm ăḥērîm lō tazkîrû. He quotes Genesis xi:4 and then says:

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> *hšm hzh' yn' nw ywd'yn mh hw' n'mr k'n šm wn'mr lhln šm mh lhln bʿbwdh zrh 'p k'n bʿbwdh zhr.*
> This *šēm* we would not know what it meant; the expression *šēm* is used here (Ex.xxiii 13) and the expression *šēm* is used there (Gen.xi 4). Hence, just as there it refers to idolatry so also here it refers to idolatry.[6]

The Targumim to the Pentatuch, which are not only translations, but also amplifications of the text, add quite a few words and phrases to the Hebrew verse. Targum Yonatan as well as Targum Yerushalmi say:

> *Wa 'ămāru hābû nibnê lānā' qartā' ûmigdʿlā' w rêšêhh mʿtê ad ṣêt sʿmayā' wʿna ʿbêd lānā' sigdû bʿrēšēhh.*
> And they said 'Let us build for ourselves a city and a tower with its head stretching towards heaven and we will make us an idol on top of it.[7]

The Targumim must have had a tradition that the word *šēm* refers to an idol and, therefore, they depict a threefold plan of the 'Generation of Dispersion': to build a city, a tower and an idol. The Rabbis' view may seem homiletical, but their comments are more illuminating than is at first apparent. The Sages of the Talmudic period were scholars who drew upon all sources of knowledge in order to interpret the text. They did not live in religious isolation but they were aware of the general environment and culture in which they lived. Moreover, there were those who were proficient in languages and linguistic concerns. Indeed, the antecedents of their approach to *šēm* can be found in ancient near-eastern literature, not only in one Semitic dialect but in many.

The use of *šēm* (vocalized *šum* in Akkadian and Aramaic)[8] appeared in conjunction with divine appellations or as a name for a god in the early Bronze Age tablets of Ebla. This anticipates similar usages in various northwest Semitic dialects: Amorite, Ugaritic, Phoenician and Biblical Hebrew.[9] *Šum* appears in the Ebla bilingual vocabularies which list Sumerian words with their counterpart in Eblaite. There we find the equation:[10]

> *d̲um̲u-z̲i* = *šu-um.*

The *Šumerisches Lexikon* lists *d̲um̲u-z̲i(d)-da* with a DINGIR sign and adds the Akkadian counterpart *Ta-mu-zu*, providing the equation:[11]

> Sumerian *D̲um̲uz̲i* = Akkadian *Tammuz.*

Accordingly, the equation of the Eblaite *šu-um* with *d̲um̲u-z̲i* teaches us that *šum* could designate the god Tammuz at Ebla.[12] Indeed, Dahood also proposed that *šum* represented a deity. He asserted that *šum* serves as the divine element in the Eblaite names *tùbí-šum* and *iš-má-šum*[13] which he explained as 'my good is the Name' and, 'the Name has heard', respectively.[14] This, then, has ramifications for other Eblaite names. The administrative texts mention the name *šum-damu.*[15] Archi and Biga place it under the grouping of theophorous names where *damu* stands for the divine element while *šum* is thought to serve as the descriptive part.[16] However, in light of the above, it is also possible that *šum-damu* is a compound name, with two divine parts. Similarly, Pettinato's assumption that *šum* is the descriptive element in *šumia* and *šumia-ù*[17] must be reassessed. It may be that *šum* in these names is a divine element and that they are compound names, where both components serve as independent appelatives for the deity such as in the Ugaritic *Qdš-Amrr* and the Egyptian *Amon-Raᶜ*.

In tracing the ancestry of *šēm* we find it evidenced in Amorite personal names as *śum.*[18] The Amorite glossary renders the word *śumum*: 'name', '(male) progeny'.[19] At the same time, however, the *Computer-Aided Analysis of Amorite* designates *śum* as a deity by prefixing the DINGIR sign before it.[20] Thus we find the name ^{d}*śu-mu-a-bu-um* 'Sumu-Abu' (the name of the founder of the First Dynasty of Babylon), meaning '(god) *śum* (is) father'; or ^{d}*śu-muʾil* 'śumu-ilu', meaning '(the god) *šum* (is) god'.[21] The Amorite royal names reflect the usage of *śum* as a divine element. In certain cases *šum* is linked with *ʾil* through the asseverative particle *la.* We find the names *śu-mu-li-ʾel*[22] and *śu-mu-la-ʾel,*[23] which are divided into three components: *śumu*, *la* or *li* and *ʾel*. The '*la*' element could be construed as the asseverative proclitic meaning 'verily'.[24] Placing '*la*' in the middle between *śumu* and *el* constructs an equation whose meaning is '*śumu* is surely *ʾel* (*ilu*)'.[25] It is interesting to note that some of the above names are borne by kings of the First Dynasty of Babylonia.[26] The Dynasty is Amorite and the royal names are generally described as Amorite.

Close contacts among ethnic groups using different Semitic dialects, who developed diverse traditions even though worshipping via similar cults, provided the backdrop for the borrowing of deities, albeit with some changes. Ugarit, which flourished in the late Bronze Age, preserved a large number of divine names. These fertile sources of north-western Semitic names may help us shed further light on *šm* among the ancient Near-East inhabitants. *Šm* is attested in the Ugaritic onomasticon as part of a name in *šmlbu.* Gordon hints that the formation of this name may be of the *šmbᶜl* 'Name-of-bᶜl' type.[27]

An analysis of the two components of the name will, perhaps, help us to understand it. Ugaritic Text 77 introduces *lbu* as a god parallel to *ᶜṯtr.*[28] By viewing *šm* as a deity rather than as 'name of', we can explain the combination as a compound name, of which both parts refer to deities. This asyndetic combination is treated grammatically as singular, and employs the nominative case ending -u. Had the name meant *šm* in the meaning of 'name of' then the second element should have required the genitive formation ‘*lbi*’ rather than ‘*lbu*’.[29] In fact, *šmlbu* becomes *šmlbi* in the *status constructus*, where the name is written as *bn·šmlbi*[30] and the word *bn* in the construct state precedes its genetive *šmbli*. Thus *šmlbu* is a compound name comprised of two elements. However, because we have not thus far found such an entity in the Ugaritic pantheon, we cannot determine if this is truly a divinity or just a combination of divine names given by a father to his child. On the other hand, another grouping *ʿṯtrt-šm-bʿl*[31] which includes *šm* as a component is recognized as the name of a deity. It is asyndetical and treated grammatically as a singular. The amalgam is translated as Astarte-Name-of-Baal[32] and is explained by Gordon as ‘name of Goddess with epithet’.[33] In light of our understanding of *šm*, we could offer a different analysis of the name.

Alternatively, we might view this name as a triad, a divine couple plus a divine child, a combination found in the Egyptian deity system. Divine triads, however, show up in Egyptian sources before, during and after the Ugaritic period.[34] We find, for example, a group of hieroglyphs (Figure 1) known as the Theban Triad which is composed of **1** *Ḫnsw* (Khons) the ‘moon god’,[35] son of the god, **7** *ʾImn* (Amon) (the father) and the goddess **2**



Figure 1. Theban Triad and Memphis Triad heiroglyphs.

Mwt (Mut) (the mother).[36] Furthermore, in the Memphis Triad, **3** *Nfrtm* (Nefertem) forms a triad with the divine couple **5** *ptḥ* (Ptah) and **6** *sḫmt* (Sakhmet).[37] Ugarit seems to employ the triad combination in a text which describes how *bʿl* impregnates a heifer who bears him a child.[38a] While it is not unusual for gods to copulate with beasts, it is also possible that the heifer with whom *bʿl* cohabits represents the goddess *ʿṯtrt*.[38b] The Bible refers to *ṯtrt* and *b l* as a couple worshipped by the Israelites.[39] There also seems to be a connection between *ʿṯtrt* and heifer. In a Ugaritic list of gods, the reconstructed name of the deity *[ʿṯt]rt* appears with *šgr* the divinity responsible for the increase of the herds of cattle.[40] The relationship of *ʿṯtrt* to sheep or cattle is evident also in Biblical passages where the Hebrew noun for 'flock' appears as a genitive following with the Canaanite goddess *ʿaštōrēt* which in this case is demythologized and transformed into a common noun connected with the blessing of herds of cattle and flocks of sheep.[41] In the same Ugaritic text, *bʿl* and the heifer are blessed with a child named, *mṯ*, whose meaning in Ugaritic is 'the lad'.[42] Thus the couple becomes a triad, comprised of a father (*bʿl*) a mother (the heifer), who has affinity to *ʿṯtrt*, and *mṯ* their progeny. The name *ʿṯtrt-šm-bʿl* is strikingly similar to the above triad. *Bʿl* and *ʿṯtrt* are the couple and *šm*, a general Semitic noun which connotes an offspring and a divinity,[43] is the progeny. Thus, a parallel is formed: **prt-mṯ-bʿl*//*ʿṯtrt-šm-bʿl*. We may therefore surmise that the three-part name is not a coincidental association of three gods but specifically a family, where the goddess *ʿṯtrt* appears as the mother, the god *bʿl* 'the maker'[44] functions as the father and *šm* is the divine son/god.

With the waning of Ugarit, the triad *ʿṯtrt-šm-bʿl* was spared extinction. Its very tenacity supports the fact that it was not just a haphazard combination but rather a purposeful aggregation as it surfaced in the pantheon of the Phoenicians. It is attested in the Eshmunazar inscription as *ʿštrt-šm-bʿl*.[45] Just as scholars had difficulty in explaining the Ugaritic name, it is difficult to give a satisfactory interpretation of *ʿštrt-šm-bʿl*.[46] It has been known that *ʿštrt* is a goddess and *bʿl* is a god, but the combination of the two with *šm* was baffling. However, if we perceive the Phoenician configuration as emanating from the Ugaritic triad, the enigma is solved. The very same Phoenician inscription further supports the assumption that *ʿštrt-šm-bʿl* is a single (though tripartite) divine entity.[47] It lists the temples built for various gods and includes a temple specifically for *ʿštrt-šm-bʿl* in the city of Sidon, whereas separate temples were built for *ʿštrt* and *bʿl*.[48]

We can now return to our biblical verse, 'let us make a *šēm* for ourselves'. Viewed from the perspective of both Sages' comments and the ancient Near-Eastern usage of the word *šēm*, we conclude that the Generation of Dispersion did not merely want to make a 'name' for themselves. There was no sin in eternalizing achievements. Rather, they undertook a monumental project which was to have culminated with the construction of an idol, *šēm* a deity who presumably would help them achieve unity and supremacy over the world. The transgression, therefore, was in attempting to usurp the powers of God, to violate the laws of Creation. God creates man but man is not allowed to create a god. Kaufmann, in his book *The History of the Israelite Faith*, says that this account reflects the beginning of idolatry. He surmizes that idol worship is implicit in the building of a tower.[49] We can agree with his basic thesis but our verse is much more explicit than he realized. 'Let us make us a *šēm*' unequivocally states, 'Let us make a god, an idol', and thus tangibly articulates the sin of the Generation of Dispersion.[50]

Furthermore, the use of *šēm* in this Biblical passage has other ramifications, particularly in terms of an historical appreciation of the Bible. God called a halt to the ambitious project by disrupting the means of communication and dispersing the community. Perhaps this narrative reflects the twilight of the Sumerian language as lingua franca of the ancient Near-East, and the advent of Semitic speech, of which Eblaite is so far the earliest on record in Syria–Palestine. Is it just a coincidence that the Bible introduces the pagan god *šēm* in a story immediately following the Deluge, at the beginning of 'proto-history', in a period when the Eblaites are using the word *šum* as a name for a god? If the correlation does exist, then the foregoing shows that Scripture illuminates Ebla as much as Ebla sheds light on the Bible. This view of *šēm* helps us understand a Biblical phrase whose meaning has never been satisfactorily delineated.

Amos the prophet excoriated the inhabitants of the Northern Israelite Kingdom for taking an oath by *ʾăšmat šômrôn*. Translators rendered the phrase as the 'sin of Samaria' or the 'guilt of Samaria'.[51] Yet these translations are hardly satisfactory; it is inconceivable that an oath would utilize such phraseology. Modern commentators, aware of the difficulty inherent in the verse, suggested various possibilities.[52] Some substituted the goddess Asherah, for *ʾšmt*. Others, in attempting to make the translation acceptable, suggested that *ʾšmt* refers to Ashimah, the divinity of Hamath whose cult was introduced into Samaria after the northern Israelite Kingdom fell into the hands of the Assyrians. While the first interpretation proposed only an emendation, the second one added the historical anachronism of a goddess appearing in the prophecy of Amos when the cult was imported into Samaria long after the epoch of Amos.[53]

The verse therefore remained without a definitive textual explication. There was, however, a common denominator; all the commentators felt that the verse dealt with idolatory. This view has its antecedents in Rabbinic literature where the Sages ascribed the whole verse to pagan worship.[54] St Jerome, who learned a great deal from the Palestinian Rabbis, cites this view. In his comments on Amos 8:14, he notes:

> . . . et ab Hebraeis vocatur ASAMATH (sic) idolum significant quod principium peccatorum est.
> . . . and what Hebrews call ASAMATH means *idol*, because it is the beginning (origin) of all transgression.[55]

While not identifying the specific divinity, Jerome preserved a tradition that *ʾšmt* connotes an idol worshipped by Israelites.

It is this very view that can be supported by philological analysis. *ʾŠmt* contains within it the word *šm*, and, as we have seen above, *šm* in northwest Semitic languages has the connotation of a deity. Indeed, we even find *šm* used as a divine element in Samaria during the period of Amos the prophet. The name *sᶜmîdā* was found on some of the 1910 Samaria ostraca attributed to ca. 8th century B.C.[56] Gibson interprets the name as being composed of the theophoric Amorite element *śumu* plus part of the Hebrew verb 'to know'.[57] Accordingly, the use of *šm* as a divine element in the northern Israelite community was not unusual.

It is possible, therefore, to view the word *ʾšmt* in the following manner: *Šm* is the stem of the word; the prefix is the *alef protheticum* used to avoid an initial cluster of consonants[58] and the suffix *-t-* marks the feminine gender.[59] Indeed, Aramaic and Canaanite inscriptions yield names of divinities and mortals where a prothetic *alef* is quite frequent. For example, *ʾršp*, the Syrian god of pestilence worshipped at Carthage, appears on a Punic inscription from Ibiza as *ʾʾršp*.[60] This phenomenon is also found in the Punic name of an individual, *ʾbrkt* where the name is usually known as *brkt*.[61] The suffix *-t-* does not necessarily place the word in the construct state. Harris points out that in the northern Hebrew dialect the word denoting year in *status absolutus* is *št* = *šatt* (from šan+t). This form, found on a Samarian ostraca, is identical to the Phoenician versus the Judean *šānāh* (from *šan+at*).[62] The linguistic alliance that existed among related languages allowed for the incorporation of the word **šmt* = *ʾšmt* and its use in the northern Hebrew dialect. Indeed, in Semitic inscriptions the name *Šmt* is quite prevalent. For example:

> *lšmt bn mdᶜ bn šmt bn hlʾl*
> To *Šmt* son of *Mdᶜ* son of *Šmt* son of *Hlʾl*.[63]

It is obvious from the position of *Šmt* in this inscription that it is a name of a male,[64] even though it ends with a *-t-* which generally connotes the feminine gender. Yet this does not preclude the possibility that *Šmt* may also denote a female. There are in fact names that serve a dual purpose: *ᶜnt* is a prominent goddess in the Ugaritic pantheon, while in the Bible *ᶜnt* is the father of the Judge Shamgar. The similarity between *ᶜnt* and *šmt* leads one to hypothesize that a parallelism exists, albeit reversed. *Šmt* is a masculine name in a Phoenician inscription whereas in the Bible it appears to be a divinity, with the likelihood of being feminine. If we accept the fact that *'āsmat* refers to the divinity *Šmt* (i.e. *šmt* > *'šmt*) of *šômrôn*, the phrase becomes far more comprehensible without changes. As my professor and mentor, Cyrus H. Gordon taught me that it is not necessary to emend obscure verses. The more that we explore the Bible, especially in its ancient Near-Eastern context, the better we are able to understand the text as written. The principle is *lectio difficilior praeferenda est*.

Until now we have proposed that *šēm*, which means name in most Biblical verses, leaves in the Scriptures traces of its former identity as a heathen deity. We have seen the evolution of *šēm* in ancient Near-Eastern literature and its impact on later tradition as reflected in the words of the Sages. However, there is yet another facet to *šēm* in the Bible. There are instances when *šēm* does not mean 'name' or refer to a pagan deity; *šēm* in these cases is used as an epithet for the God of Israel. When David plans the transfer of the holy ark to Jerusalem the Bible says:

> *'ăšer niqrā šēm šēm*
> tetragrammaton *ṣ'bā'ōt yōšēb haqqrubîm ālāw*
> whereupon is called *šēm šēm*
> lord *ṣ'bā'ôt yōšēb haqqrubîm 'ālāw*[65]

The commentaries, perplexed with the doubling of *šēm* recommended either to delete one *šēm* completely or to emend it to *šām* meaning 'thither', or to translate the verse freely.[66] The Sages were also challenged by the same problem, but they rejected the changes and offered a solution. Rabbi Simeon Bar Yohai says in answer to the question why does it say 'whereupon is called *šēm šēm*?':

> *mlmd šhšm wkl kynwyw mwnḥyn b'rwn*
> This teaches us that 'The Name' and all the epithets of God were deposited in the ark.[67]

The Sage provides us with the clue to interpreting the passage by observing that *šēm* refers to appelatives of God associated with the holy ark.

Accordingly, one can read the text as follows:

> *l'hă'ălôt miššām ēt ărôn hā'ĕlōhîm*
> *'ăšer niqrā' šēm;*
> *šēm* tetragrammaton *ṣ'ba'ôt yōšēb haqqrubîm 'ālāw.*

The verse relates that *'ĕlōhîm* was called (for short) *šēm* meaning God, and then goes on to recount the various epithets of God, including *šēm* as one of them.

A syntactical analysis of the verse lends credence to this view. The passage commences with a statement followed by two relative clauses. The first is a relative clause, introduced by *ʾăšer* and the initial *šēm* is used for the definition of the substantive *hāʾĕlōhîm*. The latter part of the verse beginning with the second *šēm* is also a relative clause modifying the same substantive, *hāʾĕlōhîm*; however, *ʾăšer* is omitted. This is an occurrence that is found in prose, although infrequently.[68] Furthermore, the assumption is corroborated by noting the cantillation which separates the two *šēm*'s; the first *šēm* belongs to the beginning of the verse, and the second is part of the list of appellatives of God used in conjunction with the holy ark.[69] Indeed, in I Chron. xiii 6, the same story is repeated, and the passage is quite similar both in content and idiom, however, the rearrangement of the segments clarifies the meaning of both texts. It says:

> *lᵉhăʿălôt miššām ēt ʾăron hāʾĕlōhîm* tetragrammaton *yôšēb haqqrubîm ăšer niqrā šēm*
> To bring from there the ark of God, Lord, *yôsēb haqqrubîm* who is called *šēm*.

The above rendition first lists the appellatives of God related to the ark and then cites an abridged or succinct expression by which God is known: *ʾăšēr niqrāʾ šēm* 'who is called, *šēm*' thus epitomizes all the preceeding epithets of god. In this way both verses which have confounded Biblical scholars for so long become intelligible and clear.

In sum, we see that the word *šēm* in the Bible is multi-faceted; besides the meaning of 'name', it also designates a pagan deity and the God of Israel.[70] This view of *šēm* highlights the role of the Rabbis in expounding Biblical passages. While the meaning we attribute to the verses was inherent in the words and the text did not have to be emended or restructured in order to accommodate the interpretation, nevertheless, we would not have been aware of such an approach had the Sages not enlightened us. Accordingly, the archeological texts and the testimony of the Sages complement and supplement one another in supporting the thesis that an ancient usage was molded and adapted by the Biblical writers to enrich their vocabulary of divine appelations.

It is interesting that the Jewish commentators ignored the definition of *šēm* as another name for a deity, even though it is plainly recorded in the Rabbinic commentaries and the Targumim, and that Christian scholarship failed to pick it up from Chronicles while translating the Biblical text into many languages.[71]

I wish to express my appreciation to Dean Martin Stevens, of Baruch College, for granting me Released Time to work on this article.

NOTES

1 The only opinion that I have found that does not accept the translation as 'name' or 'fame' in this verse is that of I. Rapaport. He devoted an entire book to the discussion of the word *šēm* where he suggests that it corresponds to the Akkadian and means 'offspring in the sense of posterity'. See I. Rapaport, *The Hebrew Word Shem and its Original Meaning* (Melbourne, 1976), pp. 79–83.

2 *Šēm* in the LXX, the Vulgate as well as the Syriac and Samaritan translations of the Bible is rendered '*nomen*'. Brian Walton, ed. *Biblia Sacra Polyglotta* (Graz, Austria, 1963).

3 E. A. Speiser, *Genesis* (The Anchor Bible, NY, 1964), p. 74.

4 John Skinner, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis* (International Critical Commentary, Edinburgh, 1910), p. 226.

5 *Midrash Rabbah* 38:8. Julius Theodor and Chanoch Albeck, eds, *Midrash Rabbah* (Jerusalem, 1965).

6 *Mekilta de Rabbi Ishmael* (Philadelphia, 1949), p. 180–181. See Notes 20–22 to the Hebrew text and Note 5 to the English translation. See also Meir Ish-Shalom, ed., *Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael* (New York, 1948), p. 101.

7 Moses Ginsburger, *Targum Yonatan*, Gen.xi 4. *Trgwm ywntn bn ʿwzyʾl* (Berlin, 1903), p. 19. See also *Targum Yerushalmi* which expresses the same idea with minor textual variations. Moses Ginsburger, *Trgwm yrw̆slmy ltwrh* (Berlin, 1899; Reprinted Jerusalem, 1969), p. 8.

8 Indeed, Gordon already noted that the *šm* element in the personal name *šu-um-a-na-ti* (PRU III 257) from Ugarit is vocalized with the 'U' like the Akkadian and Aramaic but unlike the Hebrew, thus suggesting an Ugarit isogloss with Akkadian and Aramaic. See Cyrus H. Gordon, *Ugaritic Textbook*, (Rome, 1967), 19.2426.

9 The post-Biblical meaning of *šm* attested in Aramaic, Graeco-Egyptian, liturgical works and Greek magic papyri will be dealt with separately. For the role of *šm* in the Mishnaic period see Gedalia Alon, '*bʿšēm*' (*Tarbiz*, 21:1, Tishrei, 1950), pp. 30–39.

10 Giovanni Pettinato, *Testi Lessicali Bilingui della Biblioteca L.2769* (Naples, 1982), Part I, p. 317.

11 P. Anton Deimel, *Šumerisches Lexikon* (Rome, 1930) Vol. II, p. 352. *Hattammuz* in Ez. viii 14 designates a common noun for a group or class of deities rather than a proper name for a specific deity.

12 *Šum* is also the Eblaite form of 'name'. See Giovanni Pettinato, *The Archives of Ebla* (Garden City, NY, 1981), p. 25.

13 TM.75G1474 and TM.75G1352 VIII 24 obv. Pettinato, *Archives*, pp. 128, 156, 211. Dahood equated *tù-bí-šum* with *tù-bí-da-mu*. Since the latter means 'my good is Damu' and Damu is recognized as a deity, therefore, *tù-bì-šum* means 'my good is Šum' (*Ibid.* p. 283) and hence *šum* is also a deity. In the same vein, it is possible to draw a parallel between *iš-má-šum* and *iš-má-da-mu*. Just as *iš-má-da-mu* means 'Damu has heard', and *Damu* is known as a god, therefore in *iš-má-šum*, 'Šum has heard', *šum* must also be the divine element.

14 Ibid., p. 283.

15 Alfonso Archi and Maria Giovanna Biga, ARET III: *Testi Amministrativi di Vario Contenuto* (Rome, 1982), p. 312.

16 Ibid.

17 Pettinato, *Archives*, pp. 248–249.

18 For the proto-Semitic confluence of *ś *and* *š and its impact on the development of later Semitic dialetics, see Gordon, *UT*, pp. 28–30.

19 Ignace J. Gelb, *Computer-Aided Analysis of Amorite* (Chicago, 1980), p. 33. *Śum* which is recorded in cuneiform texts is written in Akkadian but linguistically belongs to the Amorite language, a Western Semitic dialect.

20 Ibid., p. 190.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., p. 191, for the formation *śu-mu-li-el-duri* and p. 6 for his explanation of the name.

23 Ibid., p. 191. See also p. 1 Note 4.

24 This is also attested in late Bronze Age Ugaritic texts. See Gordon, *UT*, 9.16; 19.1339. It prevails in Arabic until now. See Hans Wehr, *Arabic-English Dictionary* (Ithaca, NY, 1976) p. 851.

25 In a letter to me dated 30 May 1984, Prof. Gelb agreed that *šumu*, like so many other terms designating relationship, was semi-deified. The original name *Śumu+la +il* means '*Śumu* is truly god' and he added the possibility of equating the Hebrew name Samuel with *Śumu+la +il*. Prof. Marvin Pope cites the Akkadian name *ili-ma-ilu* which he explains as 'my god' (i.e. my protecting deity) is truly God'. Marvin H. Pope, *El in the Ugaritic Texts* (Leiden, 1955) p. 83. The Akkadian *ma* corresponds to Amorite *la* in the meaning of 'surely'. *The Assyrian Dictionary* (Chicago, 1977), vol. M, p. 1.

26 Prof. Benjamin Mazar asserts that the first Babylonian dynasty is known also as *palê MAR TU*^{ki} a title that points to the Western origin of the dynasty. Benjamin Mazar, '*ʾmwry*' *Encyclopaedia Biblica* (Jerusalem, 1950) p. 445 (Hebrew).

27 Gordon, *UT*, Text 2085 lines 13–14. See also 19.2435; 19.1347.

28 *yǵpr. ʿṯtrt*
rh lk ybrdmy. bt [a]
bh lbu y rr. (Gordon, *UT*, Text 77 lines 28–30)
'Athtar would *agree* to marry off to thee *Ybrdmy*
The daughter of his *[fa]ther*
The *Lion* may be appealed to'
Cyrus H. Gordon, 'Poetic Legends and Myths from Ugarit', in *Berytus: Archeological Studies* XXV (1977), p. 66.

29 Gordon, *UT*, 8:71.

30 Gordon, *UT*, 321:VI:13.

31 Gordon *UT*, Text 127: lines 55–57:
55 . . . *ytbr·hrn*
56 *rišk·ʿṯtrt·šm·bʿl*
57 *qdqdk* . . .
May Horon break thy head
Astarte-Name-of-Baal, thy pate. (Gordon, *Berytus*, p. 58).
Svi Rin renders the translation of *ʾštrtʿšmwb l*. In his commentary, he renders 'Astarte the goddess of abundance and fertility'. He explains the formation as a construct state "*ʿṯtrt* of *šmbʿl*'. Further he intimates that *šmbʿl* cannot be understood as 'name of *bʿl*'. It does not have parallels in Scripture or other sources. Furthermore, he asserts that there is no connection between *šm* in *šmbʿl* and the word *šm*. In his opinion it is derived from the stem 'be lofty', a stem of which the noun *šāmayim* is a survival. He suggests, in conclusion, that names which employ the *šmu* element be perceived as the verb *šmu* + a deity name. Svi Rin and Shifra Rin, *Acts of the Gods*: The Ugaritic Epic Poetry (Jerusalem, 1968), p. 52. (Hebrew).

32 Gordon, *Berytus*, pp. 58, 69.
33 Gordon, *UT*, 19.2426.
34 For a divine triad in south Arabia see Ditlef Nielsen, *Ras Samra Mythologie und Biblische Theologie* (Leipzig, 1936), p. 6.
35 See Adolf Erman and Hermann Grapow, *Wörterbuch der aegyptischen Sprache:* (Berlin, 1982), vol. III, pp. 299–300. See also Erik Hornung, *Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt* (Ithaca, NY, 1982), p. 278.
36 It is interesting to note that the Egyptian word *mwt* besides being the chief mother goddess, is the common word for 'mother'. See Alan Gardiner, *Egyptian Grammar* (London, 1973), pp. 469, 568.
37 *Nfrtm* is described as a god in a shape of a lotus flower (Erman-Grapow, vol. II, p. 257) or as a child-sun-god with a lotus. *Ptḥ* is the god of Memphis and serves as the father in the triad. *Sḫmt* is the lioness-headed goddess who appears as the mother in the triad. (Hornung, p. 280).
38*a* Gordon, *UT*, Text 67 V lines 17–22.
38*b* Zeus assumes the shape of a bull in the well-known legend of Zeus and Europa. This Greek myth is a survival of a Cretan legend.
39 Baal and Astarte are found in the Bible in the plural and used with the definite article. They seem to designate generic terms for pagan worship. See Jud. ii 13, x 6; I Sam vii 3–4, xx 10.
40 Loren R. Fisher, ed., *Ras Shamra Parallels* (Rome, 1972), p. 305; *Ugaritica V* (Paris, 1968), p. 584.
41 Deut. vii 28, xxviii 4, 18, 51.
42 Gordon, *UT*, 19.1579. In pronunciation *mṯ* is related to the Egyptian *m̈* which is a determinitive for a child, (Gardiner, p. 570) and because Egyptian *ms* corresponds in meaning to Ugaritic *mṯ*, an Egyptian loan seems likely.
43 Wolfram von Soden, *Akkadisches Handwörterbuch* (Weisbaden, 1981), vol. III, p. 1274, 1275. See Gelb, p. 33 and Deimel, vol. II, p. 352.
44 *Bʿl* is not only an 'owner' but also a 'maker'. The word is used in the meaning of 'to make': *tn·lktr·whss·ybʿl·qst ln* (2 *Aqht* VI: 24) *UT* p. 248. Give to Kothar-and-Hasis so that he will make a bow for her. See *bʿl* in Isa Liv. 5: *ki bōʿălayik ʿōśayik* where *bōʿel* = *ʿōśeh*.
45 H. Donner and W. Röllig, *Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften* (Weisbaden, 1971) vol. I, p. 3, No. 14, lines 14–18.
46 Harris raises the question as to whether or not it should be construed as 'Name of Baal' or 'Heavens of Baal'. Zelig S. Harris, *A Grammar of the Phoenician Language* (New Haven, 1936), pp. 136, 151. Avishur, in discussing the various opinions, summarizes by saying that it is an unsettled matter for the time being. Yitshak Avishur, *Phoenician Inscriptions and the Bible* (Jerusalem, 1979), p. 197 (Hebrew). Donner and Röllig compare the Phoenician construction with its antecedent formation in the pantheon of Ugarit. They suggest a comparison with the Punic epithet *tnyt pn-bʿl*. 'Tinit of the face of Baal'. Donner and Röllig, vol. III (1973), p. 23. One might think that *šm-bʿl* is similiar to *pʿnûʾēl*, meaning 'the face of god'. The appellation focuses on an aspect of god rather than verbalizing god's name. This is not so in our case. *Šm* does not represent an aspect of god but rather is the divine offspring in both the Ugaritic and Phoenician triads. The fact that the Ugaritic and Phoenician triads are identical indicates that there was specific borrowing rather than the use of a common literary device.
47 See also G. A. Cooke, *A Textbook of North-Semitic Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1903), p. 37.

48 Donner and Röllig, vol. I, p. 3 No. 14, lines 14–18.

49 Yehezkiel Kaufmann, *History of the Israelite Faith* (Tel Aviv, 1955), vol. III, Book 1, pp. 202–205 (Hebrew).

50 While verse 5 notes that God inspects only the city and the tower which the people built, the following verse clearly relates *wᵉzeh haḥillām laʿăśôt*, that it was only what they began to do. Furthermore, the verse continues that there was no impediment to all that they contrived to do. Hence, it is before their three-pronged plan is fully executed that God terminates the project.

51 See translations of KJ and JPS (1978) to Amos viii 14.

52 For a discussion of this phrase see: D. Kellerman, 'Asham' in G. Johannes Botterwick and Helmer Ringgren, eds, *Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament* (Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1978), vol. I, p. 437. See also J. Milgrom, 'The Cultic *āšām*: A Philological Analysis', *Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Jewish Studies* (Jerusalem, 1977), vol. I, pp. 299–308. See also: William Rainey Harper, *Amos and Hosea* (The International Critical Commentary, Edinburgh, 1905), p. 184; Amos Hacham, 'Amos' in *Minor Prophets* (Jerusalem, 1973), vol. I, p. 88; James Luther Mays, *Amos* (Philadelphia, 1969), p. 149.

53 This anachronism was settled by various scholars as being an addition by a later editor who wanted the prophecy to refer to the future gods worshipped in Samaria after the destruction of the Israelite kingdom. See Mays, pp. 149, 150; Hacham, vol. I, p. 88.

54 See Shabbat 67b; Talmud Yerushalmi, 6:9; Genesis Rabbah 70:4.

55 St Jerome, *Commentariolum in Amos* in Jacques P. Migne, ed., *Patrologiae Cursus Completus . . . Series Latina* (Paris, 1844–1904), vol. III, p. 1083. St Jerome, who commented on this verse provided two different translations. In the LXX he translated 'qui jurant per *propitiationem* Samariae' and in the Vulgate Jerome used 'qui jurant in *delicto* Samariae'.

56 John C. L. Gibson, *Textbook of Syrian Semitic Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1971–82), vol. I, pp. 8–11.

57 Ibid., p. 12, *šᵉmidaʿ* is also the name of a district close to the capital of Samaria. The place was named after the original inhabitants of the family of *šᵉmidāʿ* from the tribe of Menashe who inherited the area during the time of Joshua's conquest. It is interesting to note that there are a number of names in the Bible that have the same suffix as *šᵉmidāʿ* such as *bᵉʿelyāʿ*, *elyādāʿ* and *yhoyādāʿ*. All have a common theophoric element plus the verb 'to know'. In the case of David's son, *bʿelyādāʿ* became *elyādāʿ* (II Samuel 5:16; I Chronicles 14:7;I Chronicles 3:8). The foreign deity appellative was removed and exchanged for the Judean name of God. *Sᵉmidāʿ*, however, remained unchanged. This may be attributed to the double role of the word '*šm*' among the Israelites and Judeans where it connoted a pagan divinity as well as the true god of Israel, as will be shown below.

58 Harris, p. 33. An example of the prothetic *alef* in the Bible is *ʾezrôaʿ* for *zᵉrôʿa* Jer. xxxii 21 and Job xxxi 32. See also Johannes Friedrich and Wolfgang Röllig, *Phönizisch-Punische Grammatik* (Rome, 1970), No. 95 a,b,c. The word for 'name' (in Semitic) is not *śim* or *šum* but *šm-* (nominative *šmu*, accusative *šma*, genetive *šmi*). In Arabic *-*šm-* is treated like *-bn-* 'son'; the word is not *ısm-* (with hamza) but *ísm* (without the hamza) and in Sandhi no aleph is written; thus *hādā-smī* 'this is my name'. The 'Proto-Semitic' form is **šm-*: Arabic keeps this in Sandhi: *-šm-*. Hebrew adds the anaptyctic vowel *i* (*šm*; *šim-ka*)

Akkadian and Aramaic add *u* (*šum*; *šumu*) but note that Hebrew drops the vowel in a near open syllable *šmi*.

59 See Lam ii 18 *pûgat*; see also II Kings ix 17. Ez. xviii 13. This occurs more frequently in proper names especially such as *êlat*.

60 Gibson, vol. II, pp. 70–71; Donner and Röllig, vol. i, p. 16, No. 72, A1.

61 Harris, p. 33.

62 Harris, pp. 58–59.

63 *Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum* (Paris, 1881–1937), Part V, vol. I, No. 1188. See also: Nos 1219; 2470 and Part II, vol. I, 2466.

64 It should be noted that a feminine ending of a name does not always distinguish its gender. For example, *gʿnubat* is the son of Hadd the Adomite (I Kings xi 20) and *ʾaḥuzzat* is the male friend of Abimelech (Gen. xxxvi 26.).

65 II Sam. vi 2.

66 See Moses H. Segal, *Books of Samuel* (Jerusalem, 1964), p. 270 (Hebrew), N. H. Tur Sinai, (Jerusalem, 1965), vol. ii, p. 196. *Interpreter's Bible* (Nashville, 1953), vol. II, p. 1076, 1077.

67 Baba Bathra 14b.

68 E. Kautzsch and A. E. Cowley, eds, *Gesenius Hebrew Grammar* (Oxford, 1910) pp. 485, 486.

69 During the era of Eli the Priest, the Israelite nation designates the Ark as *ʾăron bʿrit* tetragrammaton *ṣʿbaʾôt yōšeb haqqrubīm* (I Sam. iv 4). The Philistines called it the *ʾăron hāʾĕlōhīm* or *ʾăron ʾĕlōhê yiśrāʾēl*. (I Sam. v 2; v 7) citing only the most general term of divinity. During the time of David, *šēm* was added as an appellative to form the fullest list of epithets of God juxtaposed to the Ark.

70 Dahood noted the possibility of *šēm* in (Lev. xxiv 11–16) as a counterpart of Eblaite *šum*, and as an appellative of the sacred God. (Pettinato, *Archives*, p. 283.) However, he did not see the twofold meaning of *šēm* in the Bible.

71 Ryle was aware that the Rabbis perceived *šēm* as the sacred God although, in his comments to Gen. xi 4, he dismisses it increduously. See Herbert E. Ryle, *The Book of Genesis* (Cambridge Bible for School and Colleges, Cambridge, 1914).

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SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF BUDDHIST PSYCHOLOGY

N. Ross Reat

If, rather than accepting uncritically the traditional commentarial interpretation of the Pāli *suttas*, one looks to Upaniṣadic terminology for an insight into some of the fundamental concepts of Buddhist psychology, a more integrated and satisfying interpretation of some of the ancient material is possible. This is particularly true in the case of the term *nāma-rūpa*, which is routinely understood by many as a twofold classification of the five aggregates as comprising mind and body. If, however, *nāma-rūpa* is construed in the Upaniṣadic sense as denoting the conceptual and apparitional aspects of a given object, the Buddhist use of the term in the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula becomes more coherent and considerably more sophisticated than in the traditional exegesis. Such an interpretation also makes possible an interpretation of the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula which is consistent with the ancient Pāli texts, which bears much in common with the *Mādhyamika* and *Vijñānavāda* understandings of essential Buddhist doctrine, and which anticipates some modern trends in Western psychology and philosophy.

While the Pāli commentarial literature is clearly invaluable in understanding the ancient *suttas*, a consideration of the terms and concepts of contemporary and antecedent psychological thought in India is also historically imperative. For the purposes of such an investigation, the ancient *Upaniṣads* are the most useful surviving material. Admittedly, it probably would be even more useful to have a clear picture of the early doctrines of the various heterodox schools, such as the Jains and *Ājīvikas*, with whom the early Buddhists were in more intimate contact than with representatives of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Unfortunately, the early *Upaniṣads* and some *Brāhmaṇa* and *Āraṇyaka* material are all we have in the way of psychologically significant literature preceding the early Buddhist *suttas*. Psychologically speaking, the *Upaniṣads* are by far the more relevant of these sources. It is not clear how much access the Buddha had to the Upaniṣadic tradition, which, though orthodox, must not be imagined to represent the standard Brāhmaṇism which the Buddha often criticized on the basis of caste discrimination, ritualism and dogmatism. Nonetheless, it seems safe enough to assume that Upaniṣadic

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terminology represents more or less the prevalent verbal conventions of the age contemporary with and immediately prior to the time of the historical Buddha, and that the Buddha did not deviate from these conventions without a compelling cause.

The obvious place to begin this study of the fundamental concepts of Buddhist psychology and their antecedents is with the term *viññāṇa* (consciousness). The best initial approach to *viññāṇa* is at the basal level of mere vitality. The most detailed of the early Buddhist treatments of human life at its basal level occur in the *Mahā* and *Cūḷa Vedallasuttas* of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, where Sāriputta says:

> With regard to this body (*kāya*), sir, when three things leave—vitality (*āyu*), heat (*usmā*) and consciousness (*viññaṇa*)—then does this body lie cast away, flung aside like a senseless log.
>
> M1:296

On the basis of the characteristics of *vijñāna* as described in the *Upaniṣads*, Sāriputta's location of *viññāṇa* at the basal level of mere life is not surprising. In the *Upaniṣads*, *vijñāna* is often associated with deep sleep, and in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* it is identified as the second most basic essence of the person.[1]

The similar Buddhist association of *viññāṇa* with basal consciousness is also apparent in the importance of *viññāṇa* in the mechanism of rebirth, which in several passages is described as the descent (*avakkanti*) of *viññāṇa* into the womb.[2] In the *Upaniṣads*, the departure at death of the soul (*ātman* or *puruṣa*), the breath (*prāṇa*) and *vijñāna* is described in similar terms with various modifications of the verbal root *kram*.[3] The Buddha, possibly because of a widespread association of basal consciousness with the *ātman*, took pains to emphasize that *viññāṇa* must not be thought of as a soul. In addition to his frequent characterization of the five aggregates, including *viññāṇa*, as non-soul he sternly rebukes the monk Sati for teaching that *viññāṇa* survives death as an entity.[4] Elsewhere, the Buddha observes that it would make more sense to think of the body as soul since it may persist for some time.

> But this, monks, which is called thought (*citta*), mind (*manas*), consciousness (*viññāṇa*), that arises as one thing, ceases as another, night and day.
>
> S2:95

This continual arising and ceasing of *viññāṇa*, this perpetual changing which prevents it being construed as a soul, is described in considerable detail in the Pāli *suttas*. Somewhat like a stream, *viññāṇa* is said to change in relation to its environment. In the case of *viññāṇa*, this environment is comprised of the objects of consciousness. Without an object (*ārammaṇa*), *viññāṇa* does not arise or 'become established' (*patiṭṭha*).[5] Given an object, it arises conditioned by that object. The nature of *viññāṇa* at any given time is determined by the nature of its object, in the absence of which there is no *viññāṇa*. The most general designation for the necessary objective counterpart of *viññāṇa* is *nāma-rūpa* (name and form). This term is employed in early Buddhist literature in much the same way that it is used in the *Upaniṣads*, as the conceptual and apparitional aspects of any individual object.

There is a tendency, however, among scholars of early Buddhism, to construe *nāma-rūpa* as a general designation for mind and body.[6] Interpreted thus, the intriguing term is oversimplified and glossed, often with the dubious assertion that *nāma* represents the four non-material aggregates (*vedanā*, *saññā*, *sankhāra* and *viññāṇa*), and that *rūpa*, the fifth aggregate, represents the body. Even Buddhaghosa, who is normally careful to avoid this over-simplification of *nāma-rūpa*, does at one point in the *Visuddhimagga* suggest that *nāma-rūpa* is a twofold designation of the five aggregates.[7] His usual care in this matter is probably a result of the fact that at no point in the early *Nikāya* literature is *nāma* defined as the four non-material aggregates. Instead, it is defined as, or more properly, said to involve, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *cetanā*, *phassa* and *manasikāra*; while rūpa is consistently defined as the four great elements.[8] *Rūpa*, moreover, means 'form' in general, not specifically 'body'. *Kāya* is the standard term for 'body', which, of course, is one type of 'form', and as such is said to be composed of the four great elements. When the physical and conscious aspects of the individual are specifically intended, *kāya* indicates body and either *citta*[9] or *viññāṇa*[10] indicate consciousness in general.

If *nāma-rūpa* is taken to mean 'consciousness and body', the *paṭicca-samuppāda* formula may be, and often is, interpreted as simply an explanation of rebirth. The phrase '*viññāṇa* conditions *nāma-rūpa*' seems then to mean simply that consciousness somehow enters or arises in the womb and that a mind and body start to develop. There is, however, no indication in the *suttas* that the first four links of the standard enumeration of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, culminating with the phrase '*viññāṇa* conditions *nāmarūpa*', are to be construed as confined to an explanation of rebirth. Instead, the conditioning of *nāma-rūpa* by *viññāṇa* refers to the arising of any instance of consciousness. The conditioning of *nāma-rūpa* by *viññāṇa* may describe the arising of consciousness in rebirth,[11] but this is only a specific instance of the general arising of consciousness. Rebirth is also described as the descent of *nāma-rūpa*.[12] One passage, which describes rebirth as being the result of *viññāna*, omits *nāma-rūpa* altogether and starts with the six senses, i.e. the six types of *viññāṇa*, as the condition for sensory contact (*phassa*).[13]

Many more general and specific inconsistencies result from interpreting *nāma-rūpa* as consciousness and body, and *paṭiccasamuppāda* as merely an explanation of rebirth. Suffice it to say that if the *Upaniṣads* are taken as the source of our understanding of the term *nāmarūpa*, the bulk of the psychological material in the early Buddhist *suttas* will be explained more satisfactorily and consistently than if the term is taken to mean consciousness and body.

The following discussion assumes what would appear obvious: that the Buddha chose to use the term *nāma-rūpa* because, in the common parlance of his age, it meant approximately what he wanted to say.

There is no doubt that the term literally means 'name and form'. At the time of the Buddha, however, and for several hundred years before and after his lifetime, the term implied 'individuality', a connotation which was based on the theory that names are inherent qualities of individual things. More abstractly, name is that which was thought to account for the relationship among different forms which are nonetheless similar enough to be given the same verbal designation. In this sense, the term *nāma* is similar to 'a concept'. When it is said in the *Upaniṣads* that creation consisted of the differentiation of the universe by means of *nāma-rūpa*, what is implied is that the myriad discrete entities thus produced were and still are related in an orderly fashion by virtue of the fact that they bear names, which makes possible the conceptual ordering of manyness.[14] Language was thought of as a discovery of the inherent conceptual relationships among things, so that from a very early period in Indian thought conceptualization was thought of as primarily a verbal phenomenon.

Early Buddhism, of course, rejected this and other orthodox linguistic notions. Nevertheless, the close association between verbalization and conceptualization is accepted in early Buddhism, for example in the definition of *vacisankhāra* ('volitional speech formation') as consisting of *vitakka* and *vicāra* ('deductive and discursive thought').[15] In general, then, the term *nāma-rūpa* is a comprehensive designation of the individuality of a perceived thing. It refers to both the appearance and the conceptualization of a given object of consciousness, and as such is employed in early Buddhism in much the same way that it is used in the *Upaniṣads*.

> There is just this body and external to it, name and form. This is a pair. Conditioned by this pair are (sensory) contact and the six (sense) spheres.
>
> S2:24
>
> A seeing man will see name and form. Having seen he will understand those (things). Let him at pleasure look at much or little, for the skillful do not say that purity is (attained) by that.
>
> Sn. 909

Adopting as a hypothetical definition of *nāma-rūpa* 'a comprehensive designation of the individuality of a perceived thing' yields some surprising and convincing results when plugged into the early Buddhist theory of the arising of consciousness in relation to its objects. The *suttas* express this theory in two ways, treatments based on (1) analysis of *viññāṇa* into six types, comprising the five senses and mind, and (2) the conditioned arising of *viññāṇa* according to various forms of *paṭiccasamuppāda*.

The former treatment provides the most common definition of *viññāṇa* as being of six kinds with reference to the five empirical senses and mind (*manas*).

It is said to be dependent upon them as fire is upon its fuel, and to be defined by them as fire is characterized according to the nature of its fuel.[16] The conditions governing the arising of consciousness are given briefly in the following formula in the *Madhupiṇḍika-sutta.*

> Conditioned by eye and form, sir, visual consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is (sensory) contact (*phassa*).
>
> M1:111

Elsewhere, it is made clear that sensory contact (*phassa*) does not refer to the mere juxtaposition of organ, object and consciousness. The object must be present *to* consciousness. There must be attention (*samannāhāra*, lit. 'bringing well along'). The following passage from the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* specifies that this attention must be 'appropriate' (*tajja*), in other words, effective in producing one of the six forms of consciousness. Clearly, *phassa* and *samannāhāra* are both necessary in making possible the arising of consciousness.

> If, sir, the internal eye is intact and external forms (*rūpa*) come within its range, but without appropriate attention (*samannāhāra*), then there is no appearance of the appropriate type of consciousness. But when, sir, the internal eye is intact, external forms come within its range and there is appropriate attention, then there is appearance of the appropriate type of consciousness.
>
> M1:190

Comparing the two preceding passages, two equations emerge: (1) faculty + object + *viññāṇa* = *phassa*/*sammanāhāra*, and (2) faculty + object + *phassa*/*samannāhāra* = *viññāṇa*. Sensory contact, accompanied by appropriate attention, is as necessary for consciousness as consciousness is for sensory contact and appropriate attention. Consciousness is neither an epiphenomenon nor is it independently existing.

The *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* continues its analysis by saying that, given faculty, object, appropriate attention and the appearance of the corresponding type of consciousness:

> Whatever is the form (*rūpa*) of what has thus come to be is called the grasping-aggregate of form (*rūpa-upādana-khanda*). Whatever is the feeling (*vedanā*) of what has thus come to be is called the grasping-aggregate of feeling. Whatever is the perception (*saññā*) . . . mental formations (*sankhāra*) . . . consciousness (*viññāṇa*) of what has thus come to be is called the grasping-aggregate of perception . . . mental formations . . . consciousness. Thus, one understands, 'Thus indeed, there is the collecting, the assembling, the coming together of these five grasping-aggregates'.
>
> M1:190

Note that *rūpa* first appears in this passage as the specific object of visual consciousness. It then reappears as the object of any type of consciousness, once it has actually become present to consciousness.

The fascinating point about the above is that *rūpa*, as a *khandha*, an aggregate, is said to come into existence on the basis of the functioning of consciousness, even though, as the specific object of vision, *rūpa* is a condition for the *arising* of consciousness. In either case, it is manifestly impossible to construe *rūpa-upādana-khanda* as the body. Nonetheless, in the opening statement of the above passage, *rūpa* is emphatically defined as a body, 'a space enclosed by bones and sinews and flesh and skin'. This must be a non-technical use of the term or a corruption in the text. Such a definition of *rūpa* is not characteristic of the *suttas* in general, and is absolutely inappropriate in either context in which the term is used in the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta*. These two contexts, again, are (1) as an aspect of that which arises when all of the conditions for any of the six types of consciousness are met, and (2) as the specific object of visual consciousness.

The common tendency in Indian psychology to substitute vision for all of the senses probably accounts for the two contexts in which *rūpa* is used here. When the arising of consciousness is being analysed, an appropriate object, *rūpa*, in the case of vision, is a condition. From the opposite point of view, the arising of consciousness is a condition for the arising of an object, glossed above in visual terms as *rūpa*. In any case, just as consciousness does not arise without an object, so does an object not arise without consciousness. This is borne out in many other passages, perhaps most specifically where it is said that the four great elements, which are the standard definition of *rūpa*, cease when *viññāṇa* ceases.[17]

The above considerations suggest that the five aggregate analysis is actually an analysis of consciousness as experienced. When sufficient conditions exist and consciousness arises, the five aggregates are brought into the picture as an analysis of that consciousness, and the *rūpa-khandha* is the apparently external, objective content of that consciousness. This is consistent with the general meaning of *rūpa*, which does not connote substance, but rather appearance. Thus, the four great elements, at least when they are enumerated as a definition of *rūpa-khandha*, are not necessarily a primitive periodic table, but rather an analysis of how 'matter' is experienced. It is well known that the four elements are construed in the *Abhidhamma* and commentarial literature as being representative of the various qualities of matter as experienced (i.e. solidity, fludity, heat and motion). There is little evidence of an abstract interpretation of the elements in the *suttas* themselves, but on the other hand, there is also little to suggest that they posit an independently existing material world.

In relation to this point, let us consider *paṭiccasamuppāda*, which, as noted at the outset of these observations, is the second means by which the conditions for the arising of consciousness are set forth. In this formula, the relationship between *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa* is very similar to what appears

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to be the relationship of *viññāṇa* and *rūpa* in the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta*, where *rūpa* is a condition for the arising of *viññāṇa* and the arising of *viññāṇa* is, in turn, a condition for the arising of *rūpa*. It is not uncommon to find the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula, minus the first two links in the standard chain, beginning with the reciprocal conditioning of *viññāṇa* by *nāma-rūpa* and *nāma-rūpa* by *viññāṇa*.[18]

The basic definition of *paṭiccasamuppāda* is the well-known phrase: 'When this is, that is. From the arising of this, that arises. When this is not, that is not. From the cessation of this, that ceases'.[19] Thus, the term may properly be applied to any set of results dependent upon necessary and sufficient conditions. The foregoing examined what is essentially a sixfold consideration of *paṭiccasamuppāda* with reference to the six types of consciousness which arise only under the condition of interaction with an appropriate object. The *Mahānidāna-sutta* lists a set of nine conditions and results which are entirely different from the standard twelvefold enumeration, but are dealt with using the standard terminology of *paṭiccasamuppāda*.[20] Thus, it is probable that the standard twelvefold formula developed over some time, though possibly within the Buddha's lifetime, as a result of the consolidation of various cause and effect relationships governed by the general formula 'When this is, that is, etc.'.

In this connection, it is no doubt significant that the entire twelvefold enumeration of *paṭiccasamuppāda* is not listed anywhere in the *Dīgha-nikāya*.[21] Moreover, the tenfold enumeration of *paṭiccasamuppāda* in the *Mahāpadana-sutta* treats the mutual conditioning of *nāma-rūpa* and *viññāṇa* in a way that would seem to preclude any further conditions beyond the ten commonly recognized in the *Dīgha-nikāya*.

> When there is consciousness, there is name-and-form. Consciousness is the condition of name-and-form . . . Where there is name-and-form, there is consciousness. Name-and-form is the condition of consciousness . . . Consciousness turns back from name-and-form, it does not go beyond. Only as follows can one be born, or age, or die, or pass away or arise, that is to say: consciousness conditions name-and-form; name-and-form conditions consciousness; name-and-form conditions the six (sense) spheres; the six (sense) spheres condition contact (*phassa*); contact conditions feeling (*vedanā*); feeling conditions desire (*tanha*); etc.
>
> D2:32

The *Mahānidāna-sutta* of the *Dīgha-nikāya* opens with an even shorter and no doubt archaic, ninefold enumeration of *paṭiccasamuppāda* which omits the 'six sense spheres' (*saḷāyatana*) from the standard tenfold *Dīgha-nikāya* formula. It thus has *nāma-rūpa* as the direct condition of sensory contact (*phassa*), as well as the reciprocal condition of *viññāṇa*.[22] Following this short list is an explanation of *nāma-rūpa* which is highly instructive and which proves that the omission of the sense spheres was not merely an oversight.

Actually the arising of the sense spheres is implied by the arising of *viññāṇa*. Even with regard to the more common tenfold and twelvefold enumerations of *paṭiccasamuppāda* it would be incorrect to think that first *viññāṇa* arises, then *nāma-rūpa*, then the six sense spheres, then contact. In fact, all of these necessarily arise simultaneously. The passages examined above, from the *Madhupiṇḍika-sutta* and the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta*, deal with the mutual interdependence of consciousness, faculty, object and sensual contact. The *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula paints a similar picture, with *nāma-rūpa* as a general designation for the object of consciousness.

As argued at the outset, however, the term *nāma-rūpa* indicates an expanded concept of the object as having two aspects, an apparitional aspect (*rūpa*) and a conceptual aspect (*nāma*). This is clearly stated in the *Mahānidana-sutta.*

> 'That name-and-form conditions contact should be understood in the following way. If, Ānanda, those qualities, characteristics, signs, and indications by which the name-group (*nāma-kāya*) is manifested . . . were absent, would there be the manifestation of verbal contact (*adhivacana-samphassa*) in (i.e. 'with regard to') the form-group (*rūpakāya*)?'
> 'There would not, venerable sir.'
> 'If, Ānanda, those qualities, characteristics, signs, and indications by which the form-group is manifested . . . were absent, would there be the manifestation of sensual contact (*paṭigha-samphassa*) in the name-group?'
> 'There would not, venerable sir' . . .
> 'And if, Ānanda, those qualities, etc. by which name and form are manifested were absent . . . would there by any manifestation of (any kind of) contact (*phassa*)?'
> 'There would not, venerable sir'.
> 'Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, the basis, the origin, the condition of contact, namely name-and-form.'
>
> D2:62

Recalling the association of name and conceptualization in the general Indian context, it appears that this passage also states the interdependence of concept (*nāma*) and thing conceptualized (*rūpa*), or name and named.

Significantly, the *Mahānidana-sutta's* analysis of *nāma-rūpa* specifies two types of contact (*phassa*) verbal (*adhivacana*) and sensory (*paṭigha*, lit. 'striking against'). It is this very contact which is said to be necessary for the arising of *viññāṇa*, although in the previous contexts, only one type of *phassa* was recognized, sensual contact involving faculty, object and consciousness. This expression of a twofold concept of contact may well relate to the fact that in the *arūpa-loka* or in the *arūpa-jhānas*, rūpa technically is not possible as a condition for the arising of consciousness. Consciousness is nonetheless present in these states, except possibly the fourth *arūpa-jhāna*. In these subtle states, consciousness is apparently conditioned by a verbal concept (*nāma*) such as 'space is infinite', 'consciousness is infinite', or 'there is nothing', but not by a form (*rūpa*).[23]

The *adhivacana*, verbal-conceptual aspect of *phassa* is of more immediate importance here with reference to the conditioning of feeling (*vedanā*) by *phassa*, and the implied conditioning of perception (*saññā*) by *vedanā*, in the normal course of human consciousness as described in the *paṭiccasamuppāda* series. Like *viññāṇa*, *vedanā* and *saññā* may be classified as sixfold with reference to the five senses and *manas*.[24] Therefore both *vedanā* and *saññā* have conceptual aspects in addition to their sensory aspects. Interestingly, *vedanā* is specifically said to have both a physical (*kāyikā*) and a mental (*cetasikā*) aspect, [25] and both *vedanā* and *saññā* are together said to comprise *citta-sankhāra* (volitional mental formations).[26] The conceptual nature of *vedanā* is evident in the standard enumeration of the three types of *vedanā*, painful (*dukkha*), pleasant (*sukha*) and neutral (*adukkhamasukha*), for these in themselves are minimal verbal-conceptual constructs. The *Satipaṭṭhana-sutta* notes too that these three minimal concepts may also occur with reference to non-material (*arūpa*) things, presumably on the basis of *adhivacana-samphassa*.[27] *Saññā* is characterized as a more developed verbal conceptualization than *vedanā*, as in the following definition, which obviously must be taken as exemplary rather than exhaustive.

> It is said, sir, 'One perceives, one perceives (*sañjānāti*)' therefore it is called 'perception'. And what does one perceive? One perceives what is blue . . . yellow . . . red . . . and white.
>
> M1:293

Though the three terms, *viññāṇa* as consciousness in general, *vedanā* as hedonic feeling and *saññā* as perception of specific features, may be differentiated for the purpose of analysing conscious experience, they do not denote separate things. They do not arise, each dependent on the former, in a temporal or even a logical causal sequence. Instead, they all occur together as interrelated aspects of the same thing, conscious experience in general.

> That which is feeling, sir, that which is perception, and that which is consciousness, these things are associated, not dissociated. Having analysed and analysed, it is not possible to declare a basis of differentiation. What one feels, sir, that one perceives. What one perceives, of that one is conscious.
>
> M1:293

Even though *saññā* does not occur in the standard enumeration of *paṭiccassamuppāda*, the relationship among these aspects of consciousness is described in the above passage as a type of conditioned arising. This relationship is further clarified by Mahākaccāna in the *Madhupiṇḍika-sutta* as follows.

> Conditioned by eye and form (*rūpa*), sir, visual consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact (*phassa*). Contact conditions feeling (*vedanā*). What one feels, that one perceives (*sañjānāti*); what one perceives, that one reasons about (*vitakketi*); what one reasons about, that one proliferates (*pappañceti*); what one proliferates, that is the source of the various perceptual proliferations which assail a person in the past, the future and the present with regard to forms of which the eye may be conscious.
>
> M1:111-112

Thus, the arising of *saññā* is implied in the standard formula of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, where the term itself is omitted, by the arising of *vedanā* conditioned by *phassa*.

Beyond this point, the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula deals with psychopathology, rather than theoretical psychology, by enumerating desire, grasping, etc. Leaving this part of the formula aside, the relationships noted thus far among the fundamental theoretical concepts of Buddhist psychology lend themselves to an integrated interpretation of the early Buddhist theory of consciousness that is remarkably consistent with later, Mahāyāna theories. Thus interpreted, it is also remarkably contemporary in outlook.

In the passages considered above, the initial stages of the interdependent arising of consciousness and object of consciousness reciprocally condition each other and form a self-contained process, as illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1. From MI:111–112, 190, 293; arrows show direction of influence.

When several versions of these relationships are considered, there is seen to be no starting point as such in the process diagramed above. Yet, in a sense, *viññāṇa* is the focus of these relationships in that, having arisen on the basis of contact with an object of consciousness, it recycles into itself, as it were, through *vedanā* and *saññā*. Consciousness is depicted as being like a dog chasing its own tail. It takes aspects of itself as objects and may arise on the basis thereof.

When *viññāṇa* arises on the basis of *vedanā* and *saññā*, the contact (*phassa*) said to be necessary for the arising of *viññāṇa* must be conceptual (*adhivacana*), rather than sensual (*paṭigha*). Such contact, it must be supposed, occurs on the basis of the sixth sense, *manas*. An interpretive diagram of the foregoing material, then, would appear as shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2. From D2:62.

The distinction between *nāma* and *rūpa* in the above diagram is justified in that the *Mahānidāna-sutta*, in its archaic ninefold treatment of *paṭicasamuppāda*, omits the six sense spheres as a separate casual link between *nāma-rūpa* and *phassa*. It simply states that name and form is the condition of contact, which, rather than being of six kinds, with reference to five senses and *manas*, is characterized as being of two kinds, verbal (*adhvacana*) and sensual (*paṭigha*). It would seem that *adhivacana-samphassa* is the specific privilege of *manas* while the senses 'strike against' (*paṭigha*) their grosser objects. In other words, it appears that in this archaic formula *adhivacana* (verbal) and *paṭigha* (sensual), as categories of *phassa*, are an alternative to the more commonly enumerated six kinds of *phassa*, and thus that *nāma-rūpa* is a dual categorization of the six types of objects of consciousness. This is precisely how the commentary construes the interpretation of this passage, supporting the conclusion that if *nāma-rūpa* is to be identified with any other set of terms in early Buddhist thought, it must be with the six 'external' sense spheres and not with the five aggregates. The present interpretation of the preceding passages also suggests the conclusion that the so-called 'external' object (*dhamma*) of *manas*, the sixth type of *viññāṇa*, is the conceptual content of previous consciousness as indicated by the terms *vedanā* and *saññā*.

Recalling the components of *nāma* listed in the early *Nikāya* literature as *vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phassa,* and *manasikāra*,[28] it will be recognized that this interpretation is borne out to a considerable degree in the terminology of early Buddhist literature. The enumeration of the components of *nāma* found in the early *Nikāya* literature seems to be an enumeration of the conditions surrounding consciousness of a name, i.e. a concept generated by previous consciousness. If this is so, then of these components of *nāma*, *phassa* is to be interpreted specifically as *adhivacana-samphassa*, based on the conceptual content of *vedanā* and *saññā* (for example, 'pleasant and red'), and its perception by *manas*. The term *manasikāra*, often translated as 'attention' but meaning literally 'making or doing in the mind', apparently refers to the specific functioning of *manas* in perceiving the conceptual (*nāma*) aspect of a given object (*rūpa*). It will be noted as well that since *vedanā* and *saññā* are invariably aspects of the arising of consciousness, there can be no actual instance of consciousness of a form without an accompanying verbal–conceptual content, in other words, no *rūpa* without a *nāma*. This situation is reflected no doubt in the status of *manas* as *sensus communis*. The five empirical senses 'resort to' *manas* in two ways. First, the mind as *sensus communis* sorts and arranges the information they convey. Second, as the faculty responsible for *adhivacana-samphassa*, 'verbal–conceptual contact' *manas* supplies the *nāma*, partly on the basis of previous consciousness, for the *rūpa* conveyed by the five senses.

The implication of the foregoing is that according to early Buddhist psychology, we never experience 'external' objects as such. We only experience apparent objects with an admixture of the objectivization of certain aspects of consciousness. On the other hand, consciousness is depicted as depending on the fulfilment of certain minimum conditions, one of which is an appropriate external object. From an overarching point of view, what is described is the mutual interdependence of object and consciousness, each determining the nature of the other.

Though a full historical account is beyond the scope of the present study, it is obvious that such ideas naturally generate, from their own dynamism, the fundamental concepts of both the *Mādhyamika* dialectic and *Vijñāvāda* metaphysics. The mutual interdependence of consciousness and its object precludes valid knowledge of any independent reality, whether objective or subjective. In terms of the Mādhyamika dialectic, there can be no self-existent knower, no self-existent thing known, and no self-existent act of knowing. Section three of Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika-kārikās* is dedicated to establishing this proposition.

> 1. Vision, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thought are the six senses faculties. The area of their concern is that which is seen [heard, smelled] and so forth . . .
> 4. When no vision occurs, nothing whatsoever is being seen. How, then, is it possible to say: Vision sees?
> 5. Therefore vision does not see, and 'no-vision does not see'. Nevertheless, it is explained that also the 'seer' is to be known only by his vision.
> 6. There is no 'seer' with vision or without vision; therefore, if there is no 'seer' how can there be vision and the object seen? . . .
> 9. [Likewise] hearing, smelling, tasting, touching and thought are explained as vision. Indeed, one should not apprehend the 'hearer', 'what is heard', etc., [as self-existent entities].[29]

As classically formulated by Dharmakīrti, Vijñānavāda metaphysics does not depend upon refutation of objective reality. It depends rather upon the inability of any opponent to establish such a reality, and its own ability to proceed without reference to any objective reality. In highlighting the necessary subjective component in any experience of an object, the Pāli *Nikāyas* pave the way for discarding the objective referent of consciousness altogether.

Though archaic in terminology and less than rigorous in empirical basis and deduction, the *Nikāya* treatment of consciousness and its objects is in some ways more contemporary in outlook than either the Mādhyamika or Vijñānavāda systems which superseded it in India. Rather than advancing an antiempirical metaphysical theory as such, it is merely critical of commonsense epistemology. It does not affirm or deny an independent, objective reality. It merely illustrates that the way in which reality is perceived is determined largely by subjective factors. This implicit critique of the possibility of objective knowledge, simultaneously recognizing the potency of objective reality, is in harmony with much contemporary philosophy. This same critique, couched as it is in psychological terms, also anticipates the fundamental tenet of modern psychotherapy, in that the way in which reality is perceived is determined largely by subjective factors, and therefore can be altered.

Traditionalist interpretations of the *paticcasamuppāda* formula which insist upon interpreting *nāma-rūpa* as 'mind and body' obscure both the contemporary relevance of early Buddhist psychology and the historical continuity in the development of Buddhist doctrine from early to later formulations.

ABBREVIATIONS

A,	*Anguttara Nikāya*, PTS vol. and page.
B.,	*Brhadāraṇyaka*.
C.,	*Chāndogya*.
D,	*Dīgha Nikāya*, PTS vol. and page.
M,	*Majjhima Nikāya*, PTS vol. and page.
Mt.,	*Maitrī*.
Mu.,	*Muṇḍaka*.
PTS,	Pali Text Society.
S,	*Samyutta Nikāya*, PTS vol. and page.
SBB,	Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
Sn.,	*Suttanipāta* with verse no.
T.,	*Taittirīya*.
U.,	*Upaniṣad*.
Ud.,	*Udāna* with verse no.
Vbh.,	*Vibhaṇga*.
Vsm.,	*Visuddhimagga*.

NOTES

1 T. U. 3:2–6.
2 S2:13, 91, 101, 104; M1:265; A1:176; D2:62. Cp. D3:103
3 See B. U. 4.3.8; 4.4.2
4 M1:256–59.
5 S2:65.
6 C. A. F. Rhys-Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, 1914, pp. 6–9. Rune Johansson, *The Psychology of Nirvana*, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1969, pp. 78–80. E. J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 2nd edn, 1951, pp. 63–70.
7 Vsm. 14.11. Normally he defines *nāma* as comprised of *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṁkhāra*, as at Vsm. 17.187. This definition may be based on an inference from S3:58, where it is stated that there can be no *viññāṇa* without *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṁkhāra*, while it is often said that there can be no *viññāṇa* without *nāma-rūpa*.
8 S2:3; M1:53.
9 M1:237, 276; M3:18; D1:20; D3:32; A2:137; S2:94; S3:2–5; S5:66, 74.
10 D2:335, 338; M1:296; M2:17; M3:18. Cp. M1:144; D1:176.
11 See D2:63; S2:91.
12 S2:89–90, 104.
13 S2:13.
14 B. U. 1.4.7; C. U. 6.3.2–3; C. U. 8.14.1.
15 M1:301.
16 M1:259; S2:86. Cp. Mt. U. 6.34.
17 D1:222–23.
18 D1:223; D2:32; S2:104, 113. Cp. D2:62–3; S2:6, 8, 12; S3:102.
19 M1:262; M2:32; M3:63; S2:28, 65, 95; Ud. 1. See L. Poussin, *Théorie des Douze Causes*, Luzac & Co., London, 1913, p. 50. Walpola Ruhala, *What the Buddha Taught*, 1967, p. 53.
20 D2:58–62.
21 See T. W. Rhys-Davids' 'Introduction to the *Mahā-nidāna-suttanta*', SBB, Vol. IIII, p. 42. Cp. S2:104.
22 D2:56.
23 See L. Poussin, *Théorie des Douze Causes*, Luzac & Co., London, 1913, p. 16, who cites: *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, 'Cosmology', Vol. IV, p. 137; Vbh:138, where *viññāṇa* is said to condition only *nāma*.
24 D3:244; M1:398; M3:281.
25 S4:231. Cp. M1:302, 398.
26 M1:301.
27 M1:59
28 S2:3; M1:53.

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THE PRELOGICAL MENTALITY REVISITED

D. Wiebe

INTRODUCTION

It is fairly clear, I think, that Lévy-Bruhl's views on primitive mentality, were they found to be true, would bear significantly on any reflection on method in the academic study of religion. According to Lévy-Bruhl, as everyone knows, there is a radical difference between the mythopoeic thinking that predominantly characterizes the thought of 'primitives' and the philosophic/scientific thinking that predominantly characterizes 'moderns'. Indeed, the two modes of thought are logically incompatible with only the latter considered cognitively legitimate, so to speak, by the academic community. Consequently, if 'religious thinking' (archaic, ancient, modern, or contemporary), conforms to the mythopoeic pattern rather than to that of science, the only *academically* respectable knowledge about religion will be that gained via the social sciences and not via that received by revelation or gained through religious experience and teaching. A thorough understanding of Lévy-Bruhl, therefore, could settle, once and for all, the 'tug-of-war' between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' for methodological control of research on religion in our academic institutions.[1]

However, it also appears to be widely 'known' that Lévy-Bruhl's thesis is simply unacceptable; that it has collapsed under the strain of incoherence and indubitable counter-evidence. Even E. E. Evans-Pritchard, for example, a sympathetic interpreter of Lévy-Bruhl, has maintained that '[t]here is no reputable anthropologist who today accepts this theory of two distinct types of mentality'.[2] It is also often maintained that Lévy-Bruhl gave up the theory under the fire of heavy and persistent criticism. Any attempt to resurrect the distinction—to rehabilitate Lévy-Bruhl—it seems, then, must be doomed to failure from the start. Nevertheless, I find myself quite unpersuaded of the truth of such a conclusion and shall in this paper attempt to show good reason for such scepticism. I find some encouragement in undertaking this exercise in the judgement of M. Douglas—though herself opposed to a primitive/modern dichotomy in anthropological thought—that Lévy-Bruhl has quite undeservedly suffered neglect[3] and C. R. Hall-

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pike's more recently expressed intention to give Lévy-Bruhl's theories detailed consideration because of their as yet unrecognized importance and illumination.[4] After a brief assessment of the prima facie grounds for reopening Lévy-Bruhl's case, so to speak, I shall proceed to an account and interpretation of his theory of the prelogical mentality of (primitive) humankind.

THE GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

There are several good reasons for championing Lévy-Bruhl's thought. First, despite some reports, Lévy-Bruhl himself, after much careful consideration of the claims of his critics, held to the theory, although with some modification, to the last. Second, much of the criticism directed against his position was simply beside the point, arising from a serious misunderstanding of his enterprise. Third, and somewhat ironically, the overwhelming extent of the reaction to his theory and the persistence of the attacks upon it from its initial publication to the present begs for analysis; why should a theory that is so obviously wrongheaded receive such attention? And finally, our present recognition of the problem that forced itself upon Lévy-Bruhl's attention leaves little room for deviation from his response. I shall comment on each of these reasons briefly.

(1) In a critique of Lévy-Bruhl's thesis in the mid/1920s, R. Allier noted: 'There is no ground for believing that M. Lévy-Bruhl is on the point of abandoning the main element of his theory'.[5] And J. Cazaneuve more recently has pointed out that, although Lévy-Bruhl did revoke his use of the term 'prelogical' in the *Carnets*, he nevertheless maintained that what he characterized as 'primitive mentality' was a permanent structure of the human mind.[6]

(2) Though Lévy-Bruhl paid close attention to his critics and modified his views in light of their findings and arguments, much of the reaction to his views was simply confused and misdirected, although not often perceived as such.[7] I have in mind here the criticism that was based on an understanding of Lévy-Bruhl's thesis as a biological-cum-psychological theory of the primitive mind. Such an individualist reading of his claim seemed to imply the stupidity of the primitive, i.e. the primitive's incapacity for conceptual thought and the inability of the individual primitive to reason. This misunderstanding, it seems to me, is still prevalent among both anthropologists and students of religion. C. Geertz, for example, seems to suggest that Lévy-Bruhl's theory implies that primitives do not even have the capacity for intellection[8] and J. Z. Smith maintains that such a 'dichotomy view' constitutes a 'mapping' of the human domain that has resulted in much mischief in that it excludes recognition of the primitive as human.[9] Yet nothing could be further from the truth for in calling primitives prelogical,

as I shall elaborate below, Lévy-Bruhl did not mean to suggest that they were unintelligent or stupid, i.e. unable to think conceptually. His theory does not concern the individual's ability to reason or to make use of ideas and concepts but rather focuses on the framework—the set of categories and concepts—within which such individuals reasoned. Lévy-Bruhl's approach, that is, was precisely not psychologistic; it was an attempt to replace the psychologistic theories of early English anthropologists who tried to explain social facts in terms of the psychological processes of individual minds with a sociological account of individual thought in terms of collective representations. As Evans-Pritchard has put it, for Lévy-Bruhl '[t]he mentality of the individual is derived from the collective representations of his society, which are obligatory for him; and these representations are functions of institutions'.[10] Different kinds of thinking, therefore, concern different social structures and not different brain physiologies. As Evans-Pritchard proceeds to explain: '. . . as social structures vary, so will the representations, and consequently the individual's thinking. Every type of *society* has therefore its distinctive mentality . . .'.[11]

It is criticism of this kind, taken at face value, that is in good measure responsible for the neglect Lévy-Bruhl has suffered.

(3) Given the widespread disagreement with Lévy-Bruhl and the apparent obviousness of the faults in his theory of primitive mentality it is most surprising that he is still the focus of a great deal of attention. That 'flogging of a dead horse' includes not only the apparently obligatory jibes at Lévy-Bruhl but also more elaborate repudiations of his proposals and new work designed to show their falsehood.[12] That Lévy-Bruhl still inspires that kind of reaction, I suggest, ought to raise our suspicions as to the real value of his work; his critics, that is, as it seems to me, protest overmuch. Furthermore, there is in much of the critical response to Lévy-Bruhl a profound ambiguity in that many of his critics themselves appear to espouse a kind of dichotomy view that simply echoes Lévy-Bruhl. M. Douglas, for example, talks of distinguishing undifferentiated from differentiated thought systems[13] in which thought dominated by subjective conditions (participation?) is contrasted with that wherein there is a conscious reaching for objectivity. Douglas, therefore, although repudiating talk of prelogical societies, does not hesitate to talk about pre-Copernican societies.[14]

E. E. Evans-Pritchard admits, with Lévy-Bruhl, that the thought patterns of primitive magic and religion confront us with a real problem and goes on to suggest a 'dichotomy approach' to resolving it. He insists on the validity of Lévy-Bruhl's essential insight but argues: 'It is not so much a question of primitive versus civilized mentality as the relation of the two types of thought to each other in any society, whether primitive or civilized, a problem of levels of thought and experience'.[15] Evans-Pritchard, therefore, recognizes two levels of thought but sees them as existent in all societies. However, unless one type characterizes primitive thought more than the other it is difficult to see how Evans-Pritchard can claim to be in agreement with Lévy-Bruhl's perception that the primitive presents us moderns with a peculiar problem.

C. Geertz, in an interview with J. Miller, repudiates the notion of two forms of thought that characterize different societies, yet still recognizes that in certain daily activities primitives not only invoke their practical (conceptual, scientific?) knowledge but supplement it with ritual activity that seems to constitute a different mode of thinking and a different knowledge; as he puts it, '. . . both of these ways of thinking have been there all along'.[16] In response to Miller's question that seems to contrast two distinctly different modes of thought Geertz seems to repudiate his critique of Lévy-Bruhl and to espouse a position not far different from his: '(Miller): Would you say that the recrudescence of mystical, occult practices that are going on in the West are the expression of a *flight* from rationality? Some attempt to reconceive the universe in terms other than the technological?' '(Geertz): Most certainly'.[17]

Jack Goody denies 'that any such simple [dichotomy] design provides an adequate framework for the examination of human interaction and development' yet refuses to adopt the opposing uniformitarian views.[18] He sees literate societies as radically different from oral societies and sees the former as the 'sources' of logic and philosophy.[19] Indeed, he suggests that literacy 'creates the possibility of what is almost a different kind of critical examination',[20] i.e. a different kind of thinking that clearly distinguishes it from that found in oral contexts. I shall return to Goody's work again later in this essay.

Further discussion of the ambiguity in the critiques of Lévy-Bruhl will emerge later in this discussion. However, it needs to be noted here that many of the critiques are themselves questionable.[21]

(4) Finally, it seems to me that we cannot but agree with Lévy-Bruhl that 'primitive thought', regardless of how we characterize it, is radically different from modern thought and that the difference demands explanation. As Evans-Pritchard puts it, he quite correctly recognized that thought patterns of primitive magic and religion confront us with a real problem.[22] And M. Douglas writes that it was Lévy-Bruhl '. . . who first posed all the important questions about primitive cultures and their distinctiveness as a class . . .'.[23] Douglas also points out that Lévy-Bruhl took up this stance over and against a contrary assumption taken up by British anthropologists. R. Allier refers to it as the assumption of the identity of mind, '. . . a perfect unity, everywhere and always the same from the logical standpoint . . .'[24] and quite correctly points out that they never proved it nor even discussed

it; '. . . they never even made a formal enunciation of it, [he continues], so unassailable did they regard it. They were content to take it for granted, looking upon it as indisputable'.[25] Yet this assumption, or at least variants of it, still seem to dominate anthropology. Indeed, C. Geertz refers to the assumption as the doctrine of the psychic unity of mankind and claims both that it is empirically substantiated and that it is unquestioned by any reputable anthropologist.[26] Lévy-Bruhl's perception of the problem, it would seem, therefore, is wrongly praised and his, and our, perception of the oddness of primitive thought and expression is illusory. I shall argue here, however, that the praise is well-deserved; that Lévy-Bruhl, as Malcolm Crick has suggested, recognized both unity and diversity in humankind and that he was clearly bent on examining the diversities within that unity; diversities that were, and still are, all too easily glossed.[27]

LÉVY-BRUHL'S THESIS RESTATED

Early English anthropology, since E. B. Tylor, had attempted to explain the differences of belief between primitives and moderns on the basis of the assumption of the identity of the human mind across all cultural boundaries. As Lévy-Bruhl put it:

> For lack of proceeding by a comparative method, philosophers, psychologists and logicians have all granted one common postulate. They have taken as the starting-point of their investigations the human mind always and everywhere homogeneous, that is, a single type thinker, and one whose mental operations obey psychological and intellectual laws which are everywhere identical.[28]

Given such a Kantian assumption, the explanation for divergence of primitive from modern thought could only be proffered in terms of concepts such as 'mental weakness', 'confusion', 'illusion', 'mental hallucination', 'childish trust in analogy', 'ignorant use of principles', etc.[29] And those following the lead of such scholars, Lévy-Bruhl complains, could only observe the new empirical data gathered 'with prejudiced eyes'.[30] He argues, however, that, if one does not assume that the question can be answered in only one way, an understanding of the anthropological data may in fact yield quite a different picture:

> Let us then, [he writes], no longer endeavour to account for these connections either by the mental weakness of primitives, or by the association of ideas, or by a naive application of the principle of causality, or yet by the fallacy *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*; in short, let us abandon the attempt to refer their mental activity to an inferior variety of our own.[31]

Lévy-Bruhl himself proceeds, then, with quite a different question in mind, obviously one which had not until then been seriously entertained:

'Do the collective representations of the communities in question arise out of higher mental functions identical with our own, or must they be referred to a mentality which differs from ours to an extent yet to be determined?'[32] He answers this question in the affirmative, maintaining that only a thesis of difference will do, although not implying thereby an absolute difference in the types of thought considered.[33] The immediately apparent differences of intellection between primitives and moderns arise because of two rather significantly different modes of thought, i.e. the primitives being possessed, so to speak, of a 'prelogical' or 'mystical' mentality. 'I have been able to show', writes Lévy-Bruhl, 'that the mental processes of primitives do not coincide with those which we are accustomed to describe in men of our own types . . .'.[34] He rejects, therefore, the notion of the 'savage philosopher'.[35]

Time does not permit a detailed accounting and illustration of the structure of primitive thought as Lévy-Bruhl perceived it.[36] We must, however, look at the two essential qualities that he suggested characterized primitive thought: namely, that it is prelogical, in that it takes little or no account of the 'law of noncontradiction' characteristic of modern thought; and that it is governed by the 'law of participation'.[37] Primitive thought, therefore, although it makes use of abstractions and concepts, is little given to critical reflection and analysis. Primitive mentality, with its acceptance of a supernaturalism, adopts an 'agentic' view of the world that stands in stark contrast to the 'causal' understanding of the modern mind. And primitive perceptions of space and time are qualitative and preclude the quantitative perceptions of modern (scientific) thought. Little doubt is left in Lévy-Bruhl's account, that the two modes of thought are, logically speaking, mutually exclusive.[38]

Lévy-Bruhl's work, as I have already indicated above, was attacked almost immediately, and under the pressure of attack he subjected his thesis to revision.[39] In the final analysis, it is true, he came to acknowledge that, like his colleagues in the English tradition, he too had made the facts speak a special language; that he had crammed the facts into a procrustean theoretical bed. Whereas he could boldly state in 1910 that 'Primitives see with eyes like ours, but they do not perceive with the same minds',[40] in 1938 he admitted that 'the logical structure of the mind is the same in all known human societies'.[41] Nevertheless, he still maintained, and I think correctly so, that 'there is a difference between the primitive mentality and ours: not only that of the cultured, scientific man with a critical mind, but also that of the average person . . .'.[42] For Lévy-Bruhl, then, the facts require recognition of a diversity in unity when it comes to providing a theoretical account for the prima facie differences of thought in archaic and modern societies. Not only does Lévy-Bruhl not deny the logical/physiological unity of mind in humankind, he also recognizes a continuity between the primitive and modern. Although seeing the modern mind (i.e.

modern thought) as a development 'beyond' the primitive, he nevertheless also sees the primitive mentality as still present, to a degree, in every human mind, only, as he puts it, '. . . more marked and more easily observable among 'primitive people' than in our own societies . . .'.[43]

Having rejected the notions of 'prelogical minds' and 'a *law* of participation' he did not, however, abandon the concept of participation itself. Rather than explicating it in terms of logic, he invoked the notion of the 'viewpoint of the knowledge of objects', as he put it. When knowledge involves participation, he suggested in his notebooks, the understanding achieved '. . . entails an important part of affective, not cognitive elements'.[44] In fact, it appears as if this notion is already hinted at in the last chapter of *How Natives Think* entitled 'The Transition to Higher Mental Types'. In this chapter he raises the question as to the origin of myths, surmising them to be the products of a primitive mentality '. . . which appear when this mentality is endeavouring to realize a participation no longer directly felt—when it has recourse to intermediaries, and vehicles designed to secure a communion which has ceased to be a living reality . . .'.[45] The differences in mode of thought between primitives and moderns for Lévy-Bruhl, therefore, is both real and very important, but they are clearly epistemological differences and not purely logical ones, nor differences of brain physiology or differences of ontology. And on that basis his position, I shall now argue, is quite plausible and has, indirectly at least, been perceived to be so. I shall show, that is, that Lévy-Bruhl did not stand alone in holding to a 'dichotomy view', if I may call it that, in accounting for the prima facie differences of thought between primitives and moderns. Indeed, for many of his critics, it will become apparent—even as I have already indicated above—that a similar view is readily adopted as being explanatory of those differences. Furthermore, I will also show that much contemporary anthropology similarly adopts the 'dichotomy view', but now more carefully and forcefully argued with auxiliary theories reinforced by confirming evidence not available to Lévy-Bruhl. The discussion of these matters here, it needs stating, will be merely indicative rather than exhaustive.

LÉVY-BRUHLIAN ECHOES

Lévy-Bruhl's hypothesis, although castigated in some respects by E. Cassirer, was, on the whole, virtually reproduced in Cassirer's own philosophy of symbolic forms. As early as *Language and Myth*, he insists that there are two modes of conception, mythic and discursive, which 'represent entirely different tendencies of thought'; tendencies, in fact, that are opposed.[46] Furthermore, the latter, referred to as reason by S. K. Langer in the introduction to this work, emerges out of the mythic and is not humankind's 'primitive endowment'.[47]

This theme is developed in full in Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms and is especially clear in his *Mythical Thought.* Like Lévy-Bruhl, Cassirer sees myth as a form of primitive thought that, although in one sense a preparation for modern thought and modern knowledge, is yet in tension with it; the two, that is, are incompatible. Unlike the English intellectualist tradition in anthropology, however, Cassirer did not see this mythic thought as a 'mode of misunderstanding' but rather as an 'archaic mode of understanding'.[48] His ambivalence toward that archaic mode of understanding is obvious, as it is in Lévy-Bruhl, for he sees reason's emergence from mythic thought as a triumph over a kind of immaturity and yet is grateful for mythic thought as the origin of reason. Futhermore, he could not really bring himself to believe that mythic thought was irrational and for that reason felt Lévy-Bruhl essentially in error, i.e. he argued, that if one really understood the basic premises and presuppositions of primitives, their utterances/claims would not really appear to be illogical and irrational. That Lévy-Bruhl is guilty of such a charge, however, is highly questionable as I shall point out below.[49]

Evans-Pritchard, to whose work I have already adverted above, seems to have directed his theoretical work on primitive culture to undermining Lévy-Bruhl's thesis of the prelogical mentality. He did not, however, thereby espouse the intellectualism of his anthropological forebears such as Tylor, Frazer, and others. Like Lévy-Bruhl, he rejected the intellectualist/rationalist focus on literal understanding of the apparently illogical expressions of primitives but unlike Lévy-Bruhl he invoked the notion of the symbolic. In this position he was more akin to Cassirer although without the latter's Hegelian concern for 'the progressive triumph of reason in history'.[50] Consequently, 'the symbolic' still stands in contrast, and, I suggest, in tension with 'the logical'.

Evans-Pritchard and the 'symbolic school' more generally, seem to affirm Lévy-Bruhl's later description/characterization of the primitive mind as one granting more importance to the affective meaning of symbols and concepts, and in so doing, implicitly recognize a radical contrast between primitive and modern thought. This becomes immediately obvious, for example, in M. Douglas who, contrary to intellectualist/rationalist presuppositions insists that anthropologists must 'remember that it is a practical interest in living and not an academic interest in metaphysics which has produced these beliefs . . .', for in that perception '. . . their whole significance alters'.[51] She continues:

> The anthropologist who draws out the whole scheme of the cosmos which is implied in these practices does the primitive culture great violence if he seems to present the cosmology as a systematic philosophy subscribed to consciously by individuals. We can study our own cosmology—in a specialised department

> of astronomy. But primitive cosmologies cannot rightly be pinned out for display like exotic lepidoptera, without distortion to the nature of a primitive culture.[52]

Other symbolist positions that focus attention on meaning more than on the function that primitive symbolic expression performs, also sit in the dichotomy camp in this debate. John Beattie, who shows some sympathy for Lévy-Bruhl in his quest to understand traditional societies 'on their own terms', argues:

> We do the grossest injustice to the subtle allusive and evocative power of language if we require all meaningful verbal expression to conform to the rules of syllogism and inductive inference. Coherent thinking can be symbolic as well as scientific, and if we are sensible we do not subject the language of poetry to the same kind of examination that we apply to a scientific hypothesis.[53]

Traditional cultural complexes, therefore, must not be read as cognitive structures but rather as structures of expression.[54] As Beattie puts it, the symbols express mankind's

> fundamental dependence in the natural world which he occupies and of which he is a part. We have seen that much ritual and religious behaviour translates uncontrollable natural forces into symbolic entities which, through the performance of ritual can be manipulated and dealt with. Ritual is a language for saying things which are felt to be true and important but which are not susceptible of statement in scientific terms.[55]

Not only is this symbolic gloss on Lévy-Bruhl's work not essentially different from his position, it is a variant of the dichotomy theory it criticizes but one that has less cogency than the original. That much is clearly established, I think, in Ernest Gellner's criticism of Evans-Pritchard in his 'Concepts and Society'. As Gellner points out, such a view is so charitable with respect to apparently contradictory statements in primitive contexts that it would also have to apply to the apparent absurdity of Lévy-Bruhl's theoretical claims. As Gellner sees it, 'If it be adopted as a principle that people cannot mean what at some level (e.g. implicitly through their conduct) they also know to be false or absurd, then this principle must be applicable to Lévy-Bruhl too'.[56] Such a principle, however, is then obviously too strong for it means, necessarily, 'that no reasonably viable society can be said to be based on or to uphold absurd or "prelogical" doctrines'.[57] It would be, that is, quite *a priori* and make nonsense of our original perception that some cultures make assertions which, prima facie, are quite contradictory and absurd. That kind of hermeneutic method, therefore, forgives too much and precludes our ever arriving at an understanding of 'the other'. He writes:

> I do not wish to be misunderstood: I am *not* arguing that Evans-Pritchard's account of Nuer concepts is a bad one. (Nor am I anxious to revive a doctrine of pre-logical mentality *à la* Lévy-Bruhl.) On the contrary, I have the greatest admiration for it. What I am anxious to argue is that contextual interpretation, which offers an account of what assertions 'really mean' in opposition to what they seem to mean in isolation, does not by itself clinch matters. It cannot arrive at determinate answers (concerning 'what they mean') without doing a number of things which may in fact prejudge the question: without delimiting just which context is to be taken into consideration, without crediting the people concerned with consistency (which is precisely what is *sub judice* when we discuss, as Evans-Pritchard does Lévy-Bruhl's thesis), or without assumptions concerning what they can mean (which, again, is precisely what we do not know but are trying to find out).[58]

Furthermore, a persuasive rebuttal to the symbolist approach to understanding primitive cultures is contained in the recent renaissance of the old intellectualist approach to be found in the 'neo-Tyloreanism', so to speak, of Robin Horton.[59] Horton, in 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science' argues that taking traditional systems of religious thought as they are understood by their sponsors is to understand them, in a serious sense, as theoretical thinking. Primitive religious myths, he maintains, originate as attempts to explain and control the environment in which the community concerned exists. And this, he insists, casts serious doubt on the dichotomy approaches to understanding primitive thought, for it can make much more sense of what has until now appeared quite senseless.[60] 'Like atoms, molecules and waves . . .', he writes, 'the gods serve to introduce unity into diversity, simplicity into complexity, order into disorder, regularity into anomaly'.[61] For Horton, then, primitive persons can quite legitimately be understood as philosphers and/or scientists. Using a Popperian distinction, he does admit that traditional cultures are 'closed' whereas scientific or modern cultures are 'open' but maintains that this dichotomy does not mimic those he criticizes because the distinction between 'open' and 'closed' is not an essential one since both types of cultures still seek explanations but differ merely 'in the idiom of the explanatory quest'.[62] There is, he suggests, an awareness of alternatives in the explanatory quest that characterizes post-traditional cultures and has contributed to the tremendous development and growth of science in modern times.

Although stressing continuity between primitive and modern thought, Horton's use of the Popperian 'open/closed' dichotomy seems to soften his critique of symbolist approaches. He draws back from any such suggestion in his later work however—or at least appears to do so. In 'Lévy-Bruhl, Durkheim and the Scientific Tradition', for example, he points out that Durkheim's work shows there to be a far more intimate connection between primitive and modern mentalities than Lévy-Bruhl had suspected,[63] and he insists that, in the light of recent empirical evidence, Durkheim's work has been far more prophetic and insightful.

In reviewing the treatment his own thesis has received in more than 10 years of debate and discussion, Horton, in fact, withdrew his own Popperian dichotomy, seeing it as 'far too contrastive to do justice to the facts'.[64] He further maintained that his continuity thesis, following Durkheim's lead, has remained virtually undamaged, although he does reformulate it to some degree. He admits, for example, that there are still contrasts between primitive and modern thought but sees the contrasts only in light of a 'common cognitive core' shared by both types of culture.[65] In a later work that 'common cognitive core' is identified, following the work of P. F. Strawson, with the 'everyday material-object framework' that is taken to be common to primitives and moderns alike.[66] He then argues, however, that *two levels of theory* emerge from that common framework, namely, 'primary theory' which is roughly equivalent to our commonsense, everyday discourse which is the same from community to community, and 'secondary theory' which is a theoretical formulation that differs from community to community. While the latter transcends the former it is still also dependent on it,[67] making the former the ultimate source of criteria of truth on both the everyday and theoretical levels.

Horton grants that on the level of secondary theory primitives are more 'consensual' whereas moderns are 'competative', but denies that that difference undermines the continuity thesis he has taken over from Durkheim. Similarly, he admits that at the level of secondary theory, primitives opt for personalistic understanding (interpretation) whereas moderns invoke impersonal (causal) explanations, but simply asserts that the contrast is insignificant because each '. . . is concerned above all to show order, regularity and predictability where primary theory has failed to show them'.[68] That contrast, however, as the discussion to follow here will show, is of considerably greater significance than Horton cares to recognize or acknowledge.

Horton's distinction between primary and secondary theory is, I think, reminiscent of a similar distinction of kinds of science in another representative of modern intellectualist anthropology, i.e. in Lévi-Strauss. In *The Savage Mind*[69] Lévi-Strauss argues that, like modern Western persons, primitives are also motivated by other than merely survival needs; that they are also motivated by purely theoretical interests; by a desire to construct conceptual frameworks and that, consequently, they have elaborate categorial systems of plants, trees, animals, etc., that are not simply tied to 'taming' the physical environment. As he puts it in a later volume, '. . . they [i.e. the primitives] are moved by a need or a desire to understand the world around them, its nature and their society. On the other hand, to achieve that end, they proceed by intellectual means, exactly as a philosopher, or even to some extent a scientist, can and would do'.[70]

Though Lévi-Strauss, like Horton, seems to reject the Lévy-Bruhlian dichotomy thesis, there are ambiguities in his own position that, as with Horton again, suggest a failure to succeed. For even Lévi-Strauss admits that this kind of 'primitive thinking' is 'scientific' only in a very limited sense since it differs radically from modern Western science as we commonly understand it. It is, he says, both different from it and inferior to it because of what he calls its 'totalitarian ambition' that requires everything to be understood if anything is to be understood. Consequently:

> . . . myth is unsuccessful in giving man more material power over the environment. However, it gives man, very importantly, the illusion that he can understand the universe and that he *does* understand the universe. It is, of course, only an illusion.[71]

As Robert Zimmerman has quite correctly observed, Lévi-Strauss has confused one element of science, namely that of classifying and ordering, with the essential aspect of science as explanatory and theoretical.[72] And abstract, theoretical, scientific thinking is characteristic of modern society but not of primitive societies. Consequently it appears that Lévi-Strauss has reintroduced the very distinction he set out to transcend by talking of a logic of the concrete, characteristic of primitives, and of a logic of abstract, theoretical science characteristic of moderns only.[73]

It is obvious from this discussion, I think, that the claims of Lévi-Strauss and Horton that the human mind is everywhere the same and operates in a similar fashion encounter serious problems. For each, a new dichotomy—two kinds of theory; two kinds of science—replaces the old but functions in the same way as the old.

An excellent general account of the intellectualist/symbolist debate, emerging from an encounter between Horton and the author,[74] can be found in John Skorupski's *Symbol and Theory: A Philosophical Study of Theories of Religion in Social Anthropology*.[75] Although Skorupski's original encounter with Horton was a defence of a symbolic (and therefore 'dichotomous') understanding of primitive religious thought, the later work is much more sympathetic to the 'new intellectualism'. Nevertheless, Skorupski's final verdict is a far cry from victory for that view: 'The 'Lévy-Bruhlian' character of religious thought', he writes, 'remains unaccounted for by intellectualism: the classic issues of interpretation and explanation it poses remain wide open'.[76]

CONTEMPORARY PARALLELS

Although recognizing the dissatisfaction with Lévy-Bruhl's understanding of primitive mentality I have also shown that much of the criticism he has suffered has been misdirected and that the perspectives on primitive thought proposed as alternatives to his have often been found to be even more seriously flawed than the original. However, pointing out the weaknesses of the opposition is not in itself a justification of Lévy-Bruhl's position. There is much recent work, however, that does lend weight to a 'modified' dichotomy view such as Lévy-Bruhl came to hold towards the end of his life.[77] I shall limit discussion here to the more interesting and persuasive aspects of this recent work.

Within a few years of Lévy-Bruhl's death several scholars working within a Lévy-Bruhlian inspired 'dichotomy framework' produced ground-breaking discoveries in understanding the cultural life of the ancient Near East, their results being published under the title *Before Philosophy: The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man.*[78] Even though some of the essays contained in the volume are critical of the stronger formulations of Lévy-Bruhl's thesis, they nevertheless maintain that there is an obvious and radical distinction between primitive and modern minds. H. Frankfort, for example, writes: 'Myth is a form of poetry which transcends poetry in that it proclaims a truth; a form of reasoning which transcends reasoning in that it wants to bring about the truth it proclaims; a form of action, of ritual behaviour, which does not find its fulfillment in the act but must proclaim and elaborate a poetic form of truth'.[79] Frankfort then sets out to provide a kind of anatomy of this mode of thought—which he refers to as 'mythopoeic'—and that structure clearly resembles Lévy-Bruhl's perception of the primitive mind for it involves, *inter alia*; (i) constant reference to supermundane powers and beings (agents); (ii) qualitative concepts of space and time; (iii) a radically different—personalistic/agentic—notion of causality; and (iv) a failure to distinguish clearly between appearance and reality. That mythopoeic and modern thought are mutually exclusive is clearly brought out by Frankfort: '. . . the cosmologies of mythopoeic thought are basically revelations received in a confrontation with a cosmic 'Thou'. And one cannot argue about a revelation; it transcends reason'.[80]

As is to be expected, the Frankfort group has come in for a good deal of criticism but the best and latest research on and interpretation of ancient Near Eastern cultures seems rooted in the same theoretical framework, although space does not permit a description of the evidence for the claim here.[81]

Jean Piaget's structuralism is another source of support for the dichotomy view, especially as it is used by C. R. Hallpike in his very impressive study of primitive cultures in his *The Foundations of Primitive Thought.*[82] Piaget's research on the cognitive development of the individual reveals an epigenetic series of levels of mental development from sensori-motor and pre-operational, through concrete-operational, to formal ways of thought. A detailed theoretical account of that structure is provided by Piaget in his *Biology and*

Knowledge.[83] The 'argument' it contains, especially as interpreted bt Hallpike suggests that primitive thinking is to be equated with the thinking of the child and, therefore, differs from modern thought to the same degree that the thinking of the child at the pre-operatory (or possibly at the concrete-operational) stage differs from the adult at the formal stage. And in this form much of the essential thrust of the Lévy-Bruhlian thesis is retained as even the harshest of critics is ready to admit: 'The theory may be too neat', writes G. S. Kirk, 'but it leads to a more than usually acceptable version of the "childhood of the race" idea'.[84]

Hallpike argues convincingly that it is only a clear theory of learning and of cognitive growth that will help resolve the question as to 'modes of thought'. Such a theory must attempt to understand how thinking develops in relation to the total environment. Cognitive growth, he maintains, is only one particular aspect of general organic adaptation to the environment and it is neither hereditary characteristics nor environmental structure but rather the *interaction* between the two complexes that can account for the patterns of growth in organisms, including cognitive growth. From such an 'interactionist' perspective it follows that since the environment of traditional societies is not as cognitively demanding as that of modern Western societies, individuals within them will 'stabilize', as he puts it, at a level of development below that of formal thought. In fact, he argues, primitives are usually found to be at the pre-operatory stage of thought.[85] This means, then, that primitive thought, although radically different from modern thought, is not 'absolutely' different: it is thought '. . . based on an incomplete logic rather than on a different logic from that which we know. . .'.[86] Such a view appears to account for the 'final' position that seems to have been adopted by Lévy-Bruhl in his notebooks, namely, that all persons, primitives and moderns alike, seem to operate, in varying degrees, in both modes of thought.[87] We have here, then, a theory of duality in unity that has a wide range of supporting evidence; the doctrine of the unity of the mind in regards to its potentiality/capacity is seen still to allow for radically different—even mutually (logically) exclusive—modes of thought. Indeed, Hallpike goes so far as to claim that '. . . it is worth observing that if we substitute the term 'pre-operatory' for 'pre-logical' in his [i.e. Lévy-Bruhl's] work, many of his observations on primitive thought have some justification'.[88] There is no doubt in Hallpike's mind, therefore, that Piaget's concepts and categories offer by far the best analytical tools in accounting for the differences of the ways of thinking between primitives and moderns. As he puts it in the conclusion to his study:

> It has been shown in detail that primitive thought generally conforms to Piaget's criterion of the advanced stages of pre-operatory thought at the level of collective representations. But it has been a consistent theme of this study that pre-opera-

> tory thought is not 'absurd' or 'mistaken', but rather of limited generality and much more restricted to the phenomenal appearance of things than our own.[89]

Recent attention to changes in what J. Goody has referred to as 'the technology of the intellect' seems to lend even further support to a Lévy-Bruhlian view of the primitive mind even though Goody's own views on that score are somewhat ambiguous. In *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* Goody takes up the Lévy-Bruhlian question as to how 'modes of thought' have changed, but he questions the categories in terms in which that question has been tackled by others. He does not wish to deny that there are differences in thought or mind between primitives and moderns but argues that 'great divide theories' use a binary we/they set of categories which are ethnocentric and misleading: 'we speak in terms of primitive and advanced', he writes, 'almost as if human minds themselves differed in their structure like machines of an earlier and later design'.[90] Despite the disclaimers, however, which, significantly, are frequently interjected into Goody's analysis, he does argue that the advent of literacy has brought about great changes in that it has, in fact, brought about changes of cognitive structures in human societies. Indeed, Goody even claims that literacy is responsible for the emergence of logic and philosophy[91] which, presumably, did not exist up to that point.[92] Goody, that is, himself has a dichotomy view, although he does not see a contrast between primitive and modern but rather between oral and literate societies.[93] Writing makes speech objective (i.e. depersonalized, abstract), in that it makes it a visual concern as well as an aural one and he admits that in doing this there is created the possibility of a different kind of rational/crticial examination of thought, i.e. the development of a kind of sceptical thinking not possible without writing.[94]

Goody is aware of the paradox of his verbal rejection of the grand dichotomy thesis and his continued invocation of dichotomies in his work, and particularly the dichotomy of his contrast between utterance and text,[95] but he does not see that as indicating a 'great divide' between types of cultures and modes of thought. His argument that the possibility of communication between literate and illiterate persons, however, is not sufficient to persuade us of the identity of the structures of thought in archaic/traditional/primitive societies on the one hand and modern/philosophic/scientific societies on the other.

Goody's later work, moreover, seems to support such a critical interpretation of his position, especially his essay on 'Thought and Writing' inspired, it appears, by the work of Soviet psychologists and ethnologists.[96] He acknowledges more freely here that changes of the means of communication subsequent to the adoption of speech may have important implications for the structure of ideas within a society; that such change may lead to the development of a special cognitive style.[97] Writing, that is, affects the cognitive processes in important ways that generate cultural differences that he sees as bearing a 'striking similarity' to earlier dichotomies (i.e. Lévy-Bruhlian dichotomies like primitive/advanced, simple/complex, etc.) assumed to exist between domesticated and savage thought.[98] The change is summed up adequately when he writes:

> If we presume some functional relation between language-using and the higher psychological functions, there is an *a priori* case for assuming that further changes in the mode of communication might affect internal cognitive processes. In terms of the development of human society, and hence of human potentialities as well as achievements, the most important subsequent change is from oral to written language, a shift which of course adds to rather than replaces the cultural equipment available to a society.[99]

In fact, Goody perceives the possibilities of affect on internal cognitive processes in the strongest possible terms in suggesting possible physiological correlates for the differences: 'The different implications of oral and written communication for cognitive development may also have important physiological correlates, arising out of the hemisphere differences in the brain which influence the processing of sensory material'.[100]

Others have, similarly, noticed radical differences between oral cultures and cultures built around the use of writing. Walter Ong's work, for example, and especially his *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*,[101] focuses attention on 'the modern discovery of primary oral cultures' that seems to echo Lévy-Bruhl's discovery of a prelogical mind. Ong argues that we are only now beginning to realize that '. . . it takes only a moderate degree of literacy to make a tremendous difference in thought processes'.[102] Ong's work is also replete with binary contrasts, including formulaic/non-formulaic thought patterns, and oral/literate noetic structures, although this does not constitute a naive reinstatement of the original Lévy-Bruhlian dichotomy of the prelogical and logical mind.

The work of Eric Havelock also recognizes a contrast of cultures and modes of thought generated by the birth of literacy and the concomitant revolution in what he calls 'the technology of education'. As early as *The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man* and *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*[103] Havelock writes about 'civil war' in Western culture, connecting that with 'the ascendancy of intellectual man', which in turn is linked to the emergence of literacy.[104] It is in his *Preface to Plato*,[105] however, that he stresses 'the great transition', as he puts it, *away* from the poetic and *toward* the conceptual. As he states it: 'The poetic experience is the function of a faculty which is the antithesis of science; it is a condition of opinion which accepts a constant wandering and contradiction in physical reporting; one which is alien to number and calculation'.[106] Consequently, for Havelock, the modern mind is the result of a conversion '. . . from the image-world of the epic to the abstract world of scientific description. . .'.[107] And this is a process that he sees coming to full fruition in Plato's theory of forms, the net effect of which is '. . . to dramatise the split between the image-thinking of poetry and the abstract thinking of philosophy'.[108] He concludes, therefore, that the new idiom of discourse in Plato, (although, admittedly, prefigured in earlier writing), ushered in a new development—the emergence of the non-mythic 'Greek and European mind'.[109]

The force of Havelock's claims finds even further support in the essays, written over a period of 20 years, in his *The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences*[110] which is devoted to analysing the effects of the introduction of the alphabet into early Greek culture. Time does not permit an analysis of that material here, but a brief mention of two claims made (and substantiated) in those essays is important for they seem fully to support a Lévy-Bruhlian approach to understanding the differences between traditional and modern societies. First, Havelock sees the development of the Greek alphabet as '. . . a piece of explosive technology, revolutionary in its effects on human culture, in a way not precisely shared by any other invention'.[111] It created, that is, 'the alphabetic mind'[112] which alone is the foundation for the emergence of philosophy and the modern sciences. Second, he sees that although a 'new mind' emerges, later antiquity never wholly discarded the 'oral habit' and, in consequence, never fully recognized the new emergent reality. Furthermore, although a revolutionary invention, the spread of the use and effects of the alphabet was drawn out over many generations and was simply too gradual for participants in the process to be aware of its significance. This said, a strong case for seeing the emergence of the modern mind in ancient Greece can be made although that must be left for another paper.[113]

A FURTHER REFORMULATION

It appears from this lengthy discussion that there is no unanimity as to how to account for the prima facie differences between primitive and modern patterns of thought although the fact of the manifest dissimilarity of those patterns is granted by all.[114] It also seems to be widely accepted that the early, and stronger, formulation of Lévy-Bruhl's thesis is a failure but it is also agreed that his critical questioning of long-standing assumptions in the study of primitive cultures was on target. Moreover, the devastating criticisms of the theories of the symbolists and the critiques of the neo-intellectualists (i.e. neo-Tyloreans) makes Lévy-Bruhl's revised thesis much more attractive. His view of modes of thought, not as two absolutely different enterprises, but rather as two kinds of activity of one mind, with different qualities of thought predominating in any particular society, seems to account for the ethnographic facts more persuasively than any of the alternative proposals. The emergence of one mode of thought from the other implies neither the (logical) compatibility of the two nor the necessary disappearance of the first upon the arrival of the second.[115] What does seem to be implied, however, is that their mutual coherence—should they both persist through time—can be maintained only by the one being made subordinate to the other. By dominance of one mode of thought over the other, then, it is obvious that both can co-exist even if they are logically incompatible, but only one 'controls' or 'organizes' the analysis and understanding of the majority of enterprises/practices within each specific culture/society.[116] The reformulated Lévy-Bruhlian thesis, furthermore, finds a good deal of empirical support, as I have shown above, in the work of psychologists like J. Piaget and in contemporary research into the discovery/emergence of writing and its cultural consequences. And, as I argue elsewhere, this Lévy-Bruhlian theory best accounts for (explains) the emergence of the Greek philosophic/scientific tradition that is the soil from which our modern scientific culture springs.[117] Philosophical support for that account is persuasively set out by E. Gellner in his 'The Savage and the Modern Mind',[118] a brief description of which is provided here.

According to Gellner there are four crucial distinctions between the primitive and the scientific mind. First, there is the use of idiosyncratic norms in primitive thought that is both cognitive and moral at the same time. 'A traditional belief-system contains at least one general vision of "what is normal"',[119] whereas in scientific society the cognitive base-lines are *not* at the same time the framework of a social and moral order. The scientific outlook, that is, is mechanistic and therefore is in conflict with traditional society's provision of a meaningful world-picture through its use of idiosyncratic norms—its '. . . bending of the regularity expectations in the interest of the local status-system . . .'.[120]

A second crucial distinction is to be found in the low cognitive division of labour in primitive societies, accompanied by a proliferation of roles for the individual in that society. Gellner argues that '. . . the enchanted vision works through the systematic conflation of descriptive, evaluative, identificatory, status-conferring, etc. role of language [and that] a sense of the separability and fundamental distinctness of the various functions, [originally and innocently introduced as a neutral analytical device], is the surest way to the disenchantment of the world'.[121] Once concepts have become tools for explanation they cannot be allowed, on pain of the loss of coherence and efficiency, to be tools for other purposes. Gellner illustrates this point by showing how empiricist thought has discouraged use, for example, of the same concept to be applied to matters in the world and to the transcendent. It discourages, that is, what he calls systematic boundaryhopping. 'Orderly and regular conduct', he writes, 'is exacted from concepts, as it is from people'.[122]

The diffuse and pervasive qualities of the 'entrenched clauses' of the intellectual constitution of the primitive mind, Gellner suggests, is a third crucial distinction between it and modern scientific consciousness. Gellner recognizes that *all* societies have such 'entrenched' or 'sacred' (i.e. untouchable/unquestionable) claims but also insists that they are much more extensive and numerous amongst primitives: 'Fewer hostages are given to fortune; or, looking at it from the other end, much less of the fabric of life and society benefits from reinforcement from the sacred and entrenched convictions'.[123]

The fourth and final distinction between the 'savage' and the 'modern' mind is what Gellner refers to as 'the diplomatic immunity of cognition', by which he means that ever greater areas of truth acquire autonomy from 'the social, moral and political obligations and decencies of society'. In primitive societies cognition is subject to the same kinds of obligations and sanctions as are other kinds of conduct whereas in modern society that is not so—truth and knowledge are *not* 'controlled' according to the effects they may have. Such autonomy, however, does not mean that they are philosophically neutral for they, (i.e. truth and knowledge), can and often do come into conflict with the entrenched clauses of older traditional belief-systems.

This 'description' of the 'chasm' between the primitive and the modern mind, I suggest, is entirely consistent with the 'general' conclusion about the nature of the primitive mind required of us after the foregoing discussion; and it is also, I think, philosophically persuasive.

The wider implications of the theory for the understanding of human nature and culture however is another matter (e.g. the question of rationality and especially the existence, or not, of a transcultural rationality[124]) and not one that can be dealt with exhaustively here. I have, in the introduction, however, adverted to an issue of particular concern. I can here present only the 'bare bones' (structure) of the problem, leaving its elaboration and the question of its resolution for a future paper.

CONCLUSION

The academic study of religion, as I have argued elsewhere,[125] seems to be at a crossroads in its development. The central problem it presently faces—and, it might be added, which concerns its identity—is the recent spate of attempts to find within it a role, (methodologically speaking), for theology. This is being 'argued', however, without clear analysis of the nature of the theological enterprise which, speaking historically, has been considered to lie beyond the boundaries of the descriptive and explanatory tasks of the academic student of religion. However, if it can be shown that mythopoeic (primitive) thought and religious/theological thought are all of a cloth, then the problem can readily be resolved. That is, if mythopoeic/primitive and philosophic-scientific (modern) thought can, *à la* Lévy-Bruhl, be shown to be mutually exclusive modes of intellectual/cognitive activity, and, if the *academic* study of religion is a philosophic-scientific enterprise, then theology, (as a method, an approach to understanding), cannot form an integral or essential element of that study.

NOTES

1 A convenient summary of the longstanding differences of approach to the study of religion referred to here can be found in N. Ross Reat's 'Insiders and Outsiders in the Study of Religious Traditions', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, vol. 51, 1983 (457–76). Georg Schmid's *Principles of an Integral Science of Religion*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), I think, best formulates the questions of concern between these two general approaches to the academic study of religion although I disagree with his approach to resolving them. It should be pointed out here that my concern in this paper is with 'the academic study of religion', i.e. that study 'legitimated' by our public institutions of higher learning.

2 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *A History of Anthropological Thought*, (New York: Basic Books, 1981; 128).

3 M. Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo*, (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1966; 74, 75).

4 C. R. Hallpike, 'Is There a Primitive Mind?', in *Man: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, vol. 11, 1976, (253–69); 269, n. 5. See also on this score, T. M. S. Evans's 'On The Social Anthropology of Religion', in *The Journal of Religion*, vol. 62, 1982; (376–91); 378. He maintains, and I think correctly so, that Lévy-Bruhl has been dismissed '. . . on the basis of grave misreadings of his work', (384). He writes: 'I should also mention that, as I will hint later, my own candidate for an early scholar whose work might profitably be resurrected but, for reasons of its alleged deprecation of the primitive's mind, has largely been dismissed, is Lucien Lévy-Bruhl', (378).

5 Raul Allier, *The Mind of the Savage*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1927; 25).

6 Jean Cazeneuve, *Explorations in Interpretive Sociology: Lucien Lévy-Bruhl*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1973; 20–22).

7 See T. M. S. Evans, *On The Social Anthropology of Religion* in note 4 above.

8 C. Geertz, 'The Growth of Culture and the Evolution of Mind', in his *The Interpretation of Cultures*, (New York: Basic Books, 1973*a*; 61) reiterated in 'Notions of Primitive Thought: Dialogue with C. Geertz' in J. Miller (ed.), *States of Mind*, (London: Methuen, 1983*b*; 198).

9 J. Z. Smith, 'Map Is Not Territory' (an inaugural lecture for the William Benton Professorship of Religion and the Human Sciences in the College, University of Chicago, 1974; published 1976) in his *Map Is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978*b* (289–309); 294, 298, 308). The force of his criticism, however, is weakened by his earlier paper 'I Am a Parrot (Red)'—in the same volume, (1978*a*; 265–88)—in his recognition that Lévy-Bruhl's problematic points give rise to an important and much

larger debate over rationality in general (285), i.e. as to whether there are universal, contextually invariable principles of logic, rationality and truth in addition to the contextual ones (287). He maintains that historians of religion have avoided raising these issues without realizing that in raising them 'charity' must be sacrificed, so to speak, to truth and recognition given, if the evidence so indicates, to perceptions of 'the other' that are less than flattering. However, as just indicated, this is precisely what he seems to castigate in the later essay.

10 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Theories of Primitive Religions*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965; 79).

11 Ibid., 79; my emphasis.

12 For example, see Richard A. Shweder, 'Likeness and Likelihood in Everyday Thought: Magical Thinking in Judgments About Personality', in *Current Anthropology*, vol. 18, 1977 (637–48), reprinted (abridged) in *Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, [446–67]). Much previous work seemed intent on showing the similarities of primitive thought to the rational/theoretical/scientific thought of modernity, (as the discussion of the intellectualists—neo-Tylorians—to follow will show), whereas more recent work, like Shweder's, aims at showing how much modern, so-called, scientific thought is like the thinking in traditional/archaic cultures, i.e. that '[m]ost of us have a "savage" mentality much of the time', (638*a*). He argues that: '. . . magical thinking is an expression of a universal disinclination of normal adults to draw correlation lessons from their experience, coupled with a universal inclination to seek symbolic and meaningful connections (likenesses) among objects and events. Magical thinking is no less characteristic of our own mundane intellectual activities than it is of Zande curing practices', (637*b*; see also 647*b*).

Edwin Hutchin's work (in his *Culture and Inference: A Trobriand Case Study*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980) takes a different tack in that he focuses on questions of similarity/dissimilarity in the processes of thinking rather than on the representation of the world which is thought about. On this score, the work of Russian scholars like L. S. Vygotsky (in *Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) and A. R. Luria, (in *Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) is relevant.

A contrary case made on philosophical grounds can be found in Terry Godlove, 'In What Sense Are Religions Conceptual Frameworks?', in *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, vol. 52, 1984; (289–305).

J. B. Casagrande's comment on Shweder (648*b*–649*a*) suggesting that Lévy-Bruhl might well be able to accept Shweder's conclusions seems to be sound, despite Shweder's objection (652*a*). And David F. Lancey's claims that '. . . while there may be a universal disinclination to use contingency information in making judgments, Westerners, as a result of formal education and circumstances related to involvement in various professional activities, probably reason correlationally more often than non-Westerners' (652*a*) is, I think, both correct and compatible with the later formulations of Lévy-Bruhl's thesis. Shweder is right to see the similarities and 'overlaps' in these two kinds of thought but he fails to see the real extent and significance of the differences between them.

Terry Godlove's 'neo-intellectualism', as it seems to me, rests on philosophical issues that are yet (and admittedly so) open to serious debate. Edwin Hutchin's work, however, does require analysis for it puts into serious question some aspects of Lévy-Bruhl's position.

13 M. Douglas, *op. cit.*, 1966; 78.

14 Ibid.; 80.

15 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *op. cit.*, 1981; 131. This point is also stressed by G. Barden ('Method and Meaning', in André Singer and Brian V. Street (eds), *Zande Themes*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972; [105–291]): 'There remains the question of the primitive mentality. Although to my knowledge he never denies the validity of the notion entirely, Evans-Pritchard never uses it analytically. He compares types of commonsense between themselves, i.e. Zande and British, and Zande commonsense with science. But he finds no need for the notion of primitive mentality. Yet there is the acknowledgement that among the Azande there is no science and this gives us a further clue; *science and common sense* are not the same but there is mutual interaction between them and as science develops one hopes and expects that the grosser superstitions of unenlightened common sense will fade. . .'. We should talk, then, not generally about mentalities but about specific congeries of viewpoints, interests and patterns of experience' (127–8). (See also: Barden's 'The Symbolic Mentality', in *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 15, 1966; [28–57]; Evans-Pritchard's 'Lévy-Bruhl's Theory of Primitive Mentality' in *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts*, Egyptian University, Cairo 2, 1934; [1–26]; and Lévy-Bruhl's 'A Letter to E. E. Evans-Pritchard', in *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 3, 1952; [117–23]).

16 C. Geertz, *op. cit.*, 1983*b*; 207.

17 Ibid.; 209–10.

18 J. Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; 226–27).

19 Ibid.; 235.

20 Ibid.; 240. See also 241: 'My point is that the oral mode makes this kind of self-deception easier to carry out and less easy to detect'.

21 M. Douglas, to whom I have already made reference, for example, talks of 'pre-copernican' rather than prelogical thought; D. Bidney, to whom I shall pay some attention below, prefers 'pre-scientific' to 'prelogical'; S. Arieti in a brilliant discussion of creativity (in *Creativity: The Magic Synthesis*, New York: Basic Books, 1976), persuasively makes the case for viewing primitive thought as 'paleological'; Bergounioux argues that traditional thought might well be referred to as 'sublogical' (in 'Notes on the Mentality of Primitive Man', in Sherwood L. Washburn (ed.) *Social Life of Early Man*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1961; [106–18]); and Z. Barbu, in *Problems of Historical Psychology*, (New York: Grove Press, 1960) talks of primitives as 'pre-individualistic'. Time does not permit discussion of each of these, and other, alternative formulations of an essentially dichotomous position. However, J. Goody's and E. A. Havelock's views of primitive thought as pre-literate will receive attention below.

22 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *op. cit.*, 1981; 131.

23 M. Douglas, *op. cit.*, 1966; 74, 75.

24 R. Allier, *op. cit.*, 1927; 20.

25 Ibid.; 20. There is, obviously, good justification for such an assumption having

been made, given that 'uniformitarian notions', so to speak, had contributed immensely in the development of other sciences in the 19th century, from Lyell's geology in the 1820s to Darwin's evolutionary biology. On this topic see J. W. Burrow, *Evolution and Society: A Study in Victorian Social Theory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

26 See C. Geertz, *op. cit.*, 1973*a* and 1983. However, see also his 'The Cerebral Savage: On the Work of Claude Lévi-Strauss' (1973*b*), in his *The Interpretation of Cultures*, (New York: Basic Books, 1973) and 'The Way We Think Now: Toward an Ethnology of Modern Thought' in his *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*, (New York: Basic Books, 1983*a*).

It seems that theories making sense of the assumption (doctrine) of the unity of the human mind fall into two classes. In the one the assumption is hard to distinguish from the original Lévy-Bruhlian formulation, for it grounds contemporary structural anthropology which denies vast intellectual differences amongst human persons, primitive or modern. Neo-intellectualists like R. Horton and structuralists like C. Lévi-Strauss will receive some attention below. Similar views, but with interesting variations, are expressed, however, by Dan Sperber in his 'Is Symbolic Thought Prerational?', (in M. Izard and P. Smith (eds), *Between Belief and Transgression: Structuralist Essays in Religion, History and Myth*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), where he argues that symbolic thought is built on a prior rational processing. Rationality is not progressively acquired by transcending symbolic thought, but rather overloading the rational device triggers the symbolic processing. (See also his 'Apparently Irrational Beliefs' in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds), *Rationality and Relativism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982). David Turner's views in his forthcoming *Life Before Genesis*, (New York: Lang), also argues against the notion that archaic/traditional thought is symbolic and therefore non- or irrational. (He castigates that view as ethnocentric, particularly in his review of a recent translation of Lévy-Bruhl's book on *Primitive Mythology*, in *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, vol. 22, 1985).

W. Dupré, in *Religion in Primitive Cultures: A Study in Ethnophilosphy*, (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1975), in a more philosophical vein, argues a similar point: 'When we spoke about mythic thinking we did not say that this mode of thinking is the expression of a pre-human form of life or that it prevents man from conceiving adequately the empirical world. On the contrary, we emphasized the fundamental character of mythic thinking as the foundation of mythopoetics as well as of all rational acts, including those of reflective thinking. Mythic thinking as it is understood here, is not a deficiency of man's reasoning processes but the enactment of mythicity as the foundational unity of mythos, logos and being at once'. (315, 316).

In its other form, the identity thesis is substantiated by arguing/showing that/how primitive modern thought really is; a line of argument, as I have already shown, taken up by scholars like Evans-Pritchard, R. A. Shweder, and E. Hutchins, amongst others. Although the arguments of such scholars are often persuasive on first reading, it seems to me that they are fundamentally misdirected for they seem to dissolve rather than (re)solve the original problem; i.e. they deny what seems, as E. Gellner suggests, the undeniable: 'The biggest, most conspicuous single fact about the human world is the Big Divide between what may roughly be called the industrial-scientific society and the Rest'. [See his 'An Ethic of Cognition'; in I. C. Jarvie and J. Agassi (eds), *Spectacles and*

Predicaments: Essays in Social Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979; 175)].

27 The glossing occurs out of 'charity', as E. Gellner puts it, (see his 'Concepts and Society', in *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology*, (London: 1962), vol. 1; (153–183), reprinted in D. Emmet and A. MacIntyre (eds), *Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis*, (New York: Macmillan, 1970, [115–149])—pagination is from the latter source), to 'the other' which will show 'the other' in the most flattering light possible; that will show apparent absurdities, ultimately, to be quite rational claims or activities. This may be inspired by a healthy criticism of the ethnocentric bias of the observer/scholar but it can, as Gellner points out, lead to error in interpreting/understanding 'the other'. He insists: '. . . that the over-charitable interpreter, determined to defend the concepts he is investigating from the charge of logical incoherence, is bound to misdescribe the social situation. To make sense of the concept is to make nonsense of the society. Thus the uncharitable may be contextual in the . . . deeper and better sense' (140). I have suggested that this is an error to which students of religion in particular are prone, as can be seen, for example, in J. Z. Smith (see note 9 above).

See also Malcolm Crick, *Explorations in Language and Meaning: Towards a Semantic Anthropology*, (London: Malaby Press; 164) regarding the matter of diversity in unity.

28 Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, *How Natives Think*, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966/1910; 346).

29 Ibid.; 35, 36, 45, 58, 61, *et. passim*. Evans-Pritchard, (*op. cit.*, 1965), refers to such interpretations of archaic thought as 'if I were a horse' theories.

30 Ibid.; 21. It is interesting to notice here how Lévy-Bruhl's comments anticipate the understanding of the role of theory in the sciences in T. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) and N. R. Hanson's *The Patterns of Discovery*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958).

31 Ibid.; 61.

32 Ibid.; 7.

33 An *absolute* difference would imply incomprehensibility between cultures which would be, as W. G. Runciman puts it, ('The Sociological Explanation of "Religious" Beliefs', in *Sociology In Its Place and Other Essays*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970, [59–101]), self-defeating, '. . . since it would mean that the anthropologist could not express, and therefore could not discover in the first place, what *is* the untranslatable belief which he claims the members of the alien culture to hold' (73). Malcolm Crick (*op. cit.*, 1976) makes the same point in an effort to show that Lévy-Bruhl was not concerned with absolute differences but rather with diversities in an assumed unity (164). 'A totally different mind', he writes, 'would just be unintelligible to us, so we could not have any warrants for recognizing it as a mind. . . . Completely different standards of reasoning simply could never show up. . . .' (164). Martin Hollis also argues that point in his 'The Limits of Irrationality' [in Bryan Wilson (ed.), *Rationality*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970; 216], showing that without that assumption, translation from one culture to another would not be possible. See also E. Gellner, *op. cit.*, 1970.

Terry Godlove (*op. cit.*, 1984) also argues this claim, intent on showing that it implies more than most of us have been willing to see, namely, that all dichotomy theories are misleading (see further discussion below).

34 Lévy-Bruhl, *op. cit.*, 1966/1910; 4. Lévy-Bruhl also shows how the practical activities and institutions of primitive society are more coherently accounted for in terms of his theory of primitive mentality; see especially the section on 'Institutions in Which Collective Representations Governed by the Law of Participation Are Involved'.

35 Ibid.; 66. F. Boas in *The Mind of Primitive Man*, (New York: Macmillan, 1919) challenged Lévy-Bruhl's thesis because, he claimed, there existed evidence to show the primitive mind to be capable of being like that of the philosopher (see 104, 114) and he, therefore, reiterated the doctrine of the unity of the human mind (122). His claim, however, is not wholly unambiguous for he also shows that there are considerable differences between primitive and civilized cultures that must be countenanced (see 122, 201, 202, 238, 240 and 243). Paul Radin, however, in *Primitive Man as Philosopher*, (New York: Dover, 1957/1927), is, as the title suggests, more forceful in his attack on Lévy-Bruhl, amassing evidence to support the notion of independent and critical thought by individuals within particular archaic cultures. [See also chapter 3, 'Psychological Types, the Man of Action and the Thinker' in his *The World of Primitive Man*, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1979/1953)].

And Clyde Kluckhohn talks of 'The Philosophy of the Navaho Indians' [in *Ideological Differences and World Order: Studies in the Philosophy and Science of the World's Cultures*, F. S. C. Northrop (ed.), (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963/1949)], seeing in their thought an 'implicit philosophy' (357). He seems fully to support Radin's writing: 'The publication of Paul Radin's *Primitive Man as Philosopher* did much toward destroying the myth that a cognitive orientation toward experience was a peculiarity of literate societies' (356). However, he does also admit that some thought forms amongst primitives look very much like Lévy-Bruhl's *participation mystique* (360). Malinowski, as David Bidney points out, seemed to have held a similar view but saw that mind as tied in tandem with 'another mind', so to speak, in other matters: 'Malinowski . . . seeks to combine the rationalistic theory of Frazer and Tylor with the mystical, prelogical interpretation of Lévy-Bruhl, and therefore holds that the native mind is both rational and irrational in different contexts of experience. The native is said to be empiricial and rational in his secular, everyday experience and practice, but irrational, emotional, and prone to wishful thinking in times of individual and social crisis when his rational knowledge proves to be inadequate'. ('The Concept of Meta-Anthropology and Its Significance for Contemporary Anthropological Science', in F. S. C. Northrop (ed.), *op. cit.*, 1963/1949; 330).

It must, I think, be admitted that all cultures/societies exhibit abstraction, a matter clearly shown by Walter A. Fairservice Jr. in his *The Threshold of Civilization: An Experiment in Prehistory*, (New York: Scribners, 1975; 21, 22). But, as even the title of his work suggests, Fairservice sees great transformations of society as a result of differences of degree of abstraction between what he calls enactive, ikonic and symbolic cultures (208). Given that the later stages grow out of those preceding them, there is no mystery as to why the evidence Boas and Radin find for the existence of the philosopher/intellectual in primitive society should be there: 'Civilization as culture at a symbolic level will include enactive citizens, and enactive culture will have citizens whose cognitive level reaches a degree of symbolic cognizance' (52). (See also here, J. Goody, *op. cit.*, 1977, especially chapter 2, 'Intellectuals in Pre-Literate Societies?'.) Furthermore, Radin's evidence can also be recognized without challenge in a Lévy-Bruhlian context if one recognizes that modern rational thought, as characteristic of modern (as opposed to mythopoeic/primitive) society is not something that is 'done' by the individual alone, but rather as a part of a critical communal activity. For the latter to emerge, the potentiality of Radin's primitive philosopher must be there. (I treat this matter in greater detail in another paper, 'In Two Minds: Religion and Philosophy in Ancient Greece', unpublished). The same point is made by Robert Redfield in his 'Thinker and Intellectual in Primitive Society' [in S. Diamond (ed.), *Primitive Views of the World: Essays from Culture In History*, (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1960]: 'It is the existential human individual who has the quality of mind that Radin has made us recognize in primitive society' (35). However, he is essentially in disagreement with Radin. Writing of the Dogon he says: 'If to think long and deeply about the nature of the world and its origins as tradition has proposed explanations to one, is to be a philosopher, Ogontêmmeli is a philosopher. He is not, if a philosopher is one who struggles with intellectual problems in abstract terms and offers situations of some originality' (39, see also 45).

36 A more extensive treatment of Lévy-Bruhl can be found in J. Cazeneuve, *op. cit.*, 1973/1963.

37 Lévy-Bruhl, *op. cit.*, 1966/1910; 323.

38 It would be helpful to the reader (and prudent for the writer) to point out that the discussion in this essay does not necessarily assume that the world of thought is exhausted by the types discussed here. There is evidence to suggest the possibility of intermediate types of thought between the two extremes of the primitive and the modern, and good theoretical reason for expectation of their existence. E. Gellner ['The Savage and the Modern Mind', in R. Horton and R. Finnegan (eds.), *Modes of Thought: Essays on Thinking in Western and Non-Western Societies*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1973; [162–181])], perhaps, is right to suggest that much of human history is occupied by civilizations whose thought patterns fall between these extremes; (see, e.g., note 81 below). Despite this, however, Gellner sees good analytical grounds for 'thinking away this enormous middle ground' but to do so wittingly and in this I agree with him. I also follow him in making use of a further tacit assumption, to the same end, namely '. . . that there is one homogeneous kind of modernity and one homogeneous kind of savagery' (163). These are not taken as self-evident truths and can—and should—be put under critical scrutiny in further assessments of the questions under consideration here.

It should be noted here as well that not everyone would agree with the conclusion stated in this paragraph; see, e.g., Evans-Pritchard, *op. cit.*, 1981, who claims: 'Lévy-Bruhl is also wrong in supposing that there is necessarily a contradiction between an objective causal explanation and a mystical one. It is not so. The two kinds of explanation can be, as indeed they are, held together, the one supplementing the other; and they are not therefore exclusive'. But this seems to be mere assertion; there are important philosophical and epistemological assumptions here that need full discussion, which Evans-Pritchard does not offer. Furthermore, it must be recognized that Lévy-Bruhl was quite aware that the two modes of explanation could, socially, supplement each other, even if they were logically incompatible which is a possibility to which Evans-Pritchard seems oblivious. E. Gellner brings this out clearly in a passage relevant to this essay, in his 'A Wittgensteinian Philosophy of (or

Against) The Social Sciences', [in I. C. Jarvie and J. Agassi (eds.), *Spectacles and Predicaments: Essays in Social Theory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; [65–102])], which is worth quoting at length: 'Quite unwittingly, Louch has provided us with a highly simplified ideal type of certain types of thought. I shall call it Traditional/Primitive thought, or TP for short. I do not wish to be credited with any crude theories, or any theories at all, concerning the historical or other distribution of TP, or with any assumption to the effect that TP, is wholly or permanently in possession of the thought of any group, or wholly and permanently absent. All I do require for my argument is that TP should be an ideal type recognisably approximated by many actual ways of thought, and be seen to be logically incompatible with another style, which I shall call the Generalising/Scientific, or GS for short. The two are logically but not socially incompatible. In other words, they can co-exist in the same person, at the same time, and even applied to the same phenomenon, but the contents of a TP explanation will be inconsistent with that of a GS one' (86, 87).

39 The Revision is documented in a further five volumes, plus a posthumous volume of notes: *Primitive Mentality*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966/1922); *The Soul of the Primitive*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1965/1927); *Primitives and the Supernatural*, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1935/1931); *Primitive Mythology: The Mythic World of the Australian and Papuan Natives*, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983/1935); *L'Expérience mystique et les Symbols chez les primitifs*, (Paris, Alian, 1938); and *The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975/1938).

40 Lévy-Bruhl, *op. cit.*, 1966/1910; 31.

41 Lévy-Bruhl, *The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality*, (1975/1938); 49. As will become obvious below, not all would agree with Lévy-Bruhl's 'capitulation' here.

42 Ibid.; 49.

43 Ibid.; 101. Certainly Evans-Pritchard noticed this (*op. cit.*, 1981; 130) pointing out that for Lévy-Bruhl Christianity and Judaism were also superstitious, i.e. prelogical and mystical.

44 Ibid.; 100.

45 Lévy-Bruhl, *op. cit.*, 1966/1910; 330. It is important to take notice here of the distinction between true pre-reflective primitive thought and the reflective, ordering primitive thought to be found in the 'structuring' of myths. On this matter see especially Jean-Pierre Vernant's essay 'The Reason of Myth' in his *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*, (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980). I discuss this matter further in my 'In Two Minds: Religion and Philosophy in Ancient Greece', referred to in note 35 above).

46 E. Cassirer, *Language and Myth*, (New York: Dover, 1946/1923; 90, 91).

47 S. K. Langer, 'Introduction' to *Language and Myth*, E. Cassirer, *op. cit.*, 1946/1923; ix. See also her essay 'On Cassirer's Theory of Language and Myth' in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, (LaSalle: Open Court, 1973). One might, given adequate time, fruitfully analyse Langer's own work on this and related subjects.

48 See Langer, *op. cit.*, 1973 and Ivan Strenski, 'Ernst Cassirer's *Mythical Thought* in Weimar Culture', in *History of European Ideas*, Vol. 5, 1984 (363–383).

49 However, on this score, see David Bidney, *op. cit.*, 1963/1949; 324; and Ernest Gellner, 'Concepts and Society', *op. cit.*, 1970; 132, 133.

50 See I. Strenski, *op. cit.*, 1984; 374. However, on this score, see also G. Barden,

op. cit., 1972; 127, 128, for a different assessment of Evans-Pritchard. See also note 15 above.

51 M. Douglas, *op. cit.*, 1966; 89.

52 Ibid.; 91.

53 John Beattie, *Other Cultures: Aims, Methods and Achievements in Social Anthropology*, (London: Cohen and West, 1964; 68, 69).

54 Ibid.; 71.

55 Ibid.; 239. It is obvious that such expressionism is a kind of instrumentalism and hence functionalistic. It is not, however, reductionistic in the same sense as the functionalist positions referred to above; see ibid.; 227.

56 E. Gellner, *op. cit.*, 1970; 133.

57 Ibid.; 133.

58 Ibid.; 136.

59 R. Horton has attacked this problem with persistence and no analysis of the issues concerned can ignore his treatment of it. I list here some of his major essays: 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science I', in *Africa*, Vol. 37, 1967; (50–71); 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science II. The "Closed" and "Open" Predicaments', in *Africa*, Vol. 37, 1967 (155–187); [the two papers, abridged, are reprinted as 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science', in Bryan Wilson (ed.), *Rationality*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970; [131–171])]; 'Neo-Tylorianism: Sound Sense or Sinister Prejudice?', in *Man*, NS, vol. 3, 1968; 'Lévy-Bruhl Among the Scientists', in *Second Order*, vol. 2, 1973*a*; 'Lévy-Bruhl, Durkheim and the Scientific Revolution', in R. Horton and R. Finnegan (eds), *Modes of Thought: Essays on Thinking in Western and Non-Western Societies*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1973*b* [249–305]), see also here his 'Introduction' with R. Finnegan (1973*c*); 'Material-Object Language and Theoretical Language: Towards a Strawsonian Sociology of Thought', in S. C. Brown (ed.), *Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences*, (Sussex: Humanities Press, 1979); 'Tradition and Modernity Revisited', (with a reply to a response by M. Hollis), in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds), *Rationality and Relativism*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982 [201–260]); and 'Social Psychologies: African and Westerns', a companion essay to the republication of Meyer Fortes's *Oedipus and Job in West African Religion*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

60 R. Horton, *op. cit.*, 1970; 152.

61 Ibid.; 134.

62 Ibid.; 152.

63 R. Horton *op. cit.*, 1973*b*; 267–68.

64 R. Horton, *op. cit.*, 1982; 211 and 226.

65 Ibid.; 228.

66 R. Horton, *op. cit.*, 1979.

67 Ibid.; 230.

68 R. Horton, *op. cit.*, 1982; 237.

69 C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968/1962).

70 C. Lévi-Strauss, *Myth and Meaning*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978; 16).

71 Ibid.; 17.

72 Robert L. Zimmerman, 'Lévi-Strauss and the Primitive', in Fred E. Katz (ed.), *Contemporary Sociological Theory*, (New York: Random House, 1971).

73 Jack Goody, for example, sees Lévi-Strauss as guilty of enthnocentrism, in his *The Domestication of the Savage Mind*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; 8). See also his work with I. Watt, 'Literate Culture: Some General Considerations', in P. W. Musgrave (ed.), *Sociology, History and Education*, (London: Methuen, 1970).

74 Skorupski's first parry is found in his 'Science and Traditional Religious Thought', in *Philosophy of the Social-Sciences*, vol. 3, 1973. Horton responded, in the same volume, with 'Paradox and Explanation: A Reply to Mr. Skorupski'.

75 John Skorupski, *Symbol and Theory: A Philosphical Study of Theories of Religion in Social Anthropology*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

76 Ibid.; 221.

77 I have already intimated above that not everyone agrees with Lévy-Bruhl's modifications to his theory; there are some, that is, who do not accept the 'doctrine of the unity of the human mind', and try to build a case for a more radical diversity. Rodney Needham, for example, (in *Belief, Language and Experience*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1972), maintains that the general intellectualist finds support only in an uncritical use of the interpretive concept of belief which takes for granted the existence of 'a human mind' which is the same in all periods of time and in all places. Such an 'axiomatic approach', he insists, further presumes that it is the Aristotelian thought processes of the European mind in their clearest embodiment that constitute 'the standard mind', whereas there may exist equally valid forms of ideation that are quite different and that may be the result of different minute genetic traits or of the development of different culture-related logics. To acknowledge this possibility in a genuine comparative study of cultures, he concludes, seriously weakens the claims of the intellectualists: 'The premises of an absolute conception of human experience against which cultural styles of thought and action can be objectively assessed, disintegrates; and its place is taken by an apprehension of conceptual relativity in which variant representations of man and his powers confusedly contend' (185). I have subjected Needham's views to examination in a review article in *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 22, 1974 (239–249). (A position similar to Needham's but concerned with 'religious thought' is to be found in the work of W. C. Smith—especially in his *Belief and History*, (Virginia University Press, 1978)—and in Robert N. Bellah, in *Beyond Belief: Essays in Religion in a Post-Traditional World*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). I have considered those positions in my 'The Role of Belief in the Study of Religion', *Numen*, Vol. 26, 1979 [234–249]).

Julian Jaynes, on the other hand, unhesitatingly argues a biological thesis. Crudely, there are radically different forms of thought, both in the evolutionary development of humankind as well as in individual persons, both past and present, and likely so in the future, as a result of brain 'malfunction'. These 'modes of thought' are, paradoxically, both complementary and work at cross-purposes. Although his thesis, as expressed in *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), makes for enjoyable reading, it is hardly persuasive. (A similar kind of argument, although not concerned directly with the matter here but which has some relevance, can be found in Arthur Koestler's 'Is Man's Brain an Evolutionary Mistake?', *Horizon*, vol. 10, 1968.) One might also consult Carl Sagan's *The Dragons of Eden: Speculations on the Evolution of Human Intelligence*, (New York: Random House, 1977). Views of this physical/physiological kind ought not, however, to be wholly abandoned—especially in light of split-brain research (see, for example, Paul D. Maclean's *A Triune Concept of Brain and Behaviour*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973);] and other interesting developments such as the holographic theory of mind—see, for example, K. Pribram, *Languages of the Brain*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1971); or Paul Pietsch, *Shuffle Brain: The Quest for the Holographic Mind*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981)]. See also, Ken Wilbur (ed.), *The Holographic Paradigm and Other Paradoxes*, (Boulder: Shambhala, 1982).

78 H. Frankfort, *et al.*, *Before Philosophy: The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1944).

79 Ibid.; 16.

80 Ibid.; 262.

81 The Frankfort thesis, it must be pointed out, was under heavy fire in the first years after its publication. The most severe and sustained attack was launched by S. N. Kraemer in a lengthy review in the *Journal of Cuneiform Studies*, vol. 2, 1948; 39–70. Kraemer's criticism of the thesis is still evident, although only implicitly, in his later *The Sumerians: Their History, Culture and Character*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963; especially chapter 4: 'Religion: Theology, Rite and Myth'). I have in mind here especially his use of phrases such as 'Sumerian thinker', his talk of the 'logical' and 'inferential' thought of the 'Sumerian theologian' (114) and of their 'metaphysical inference' (115). He does, however, late in this chapter, talk of the Sumerian mythographers and admits that their main literary tools were imagination and fantasy and not reason and logic (144, 145).

Not all the reviews of the Frankfort volume were critical. Although, for example, J. J. Meek (*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. 7, 1948; 123, 124) questions the claim that Hebrew thought did not entirely overcome the mythopoeic form of thinking, he sees the work as brilliantly conceived and likely to be very fruitful.

Later studies of the ancient Near East do not, I think, bear out the harsh criticism raised by Kraemer. A. Leo Oppenheim's *Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait of a Dead Civilization*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977/1964), for example, maintains that it is not possible to write a history of Mesopotamian religion because of the 'quality' of its thought; because of, as he put it, the '. . . problem of comprehension across the barriers of conceptual conditioning' (172). Of this conceptual barrier he writes: 'It is open to serious doubt whether we will ever be able to cross the gap caused by the difference in "dimensions". This conceptual barrier, in fact, is a more serious impediment [to the study of the Ancient Near East] than the reason usually given, the lack of data and specific information. Even if more material were preserved, and that in an ideal distribution in content, period and locale, no real insight would be forthcoming—only more problems. Western man seems to be both unable and, ultimately, unwilling, to understand such religions except from the distorting angle of antiquarian interest and apologetic pretenses' (182, 183). See also his 'Position of the Intellectual in Mesopotamian Society', *Daedalus*, vol. 104, 1975; 37–46, in which he sees an important contrast between the intellectual in Mesopotamia and in Greece in the lack of a polemic in cuneiform literature; 38 ff.

Certainly T. Jacobsen has not been moved by the criticism as can be seen in his more recent *The Treasures of Darkness: A History of Mesopotamian Religion*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976). At first glance one might, from the title alone, presume Jacobsen to be in agreement with Kraemer rather than with Oppenheim. However, the first chapter, and Jacobsen's use therein of the framework of analysis provided by R. Otto's phenomenology of religion will soon dispel that first impression. Furthermore, Jacobsen receives support over Kraemer in the work of Sabatino Moscati in his *The Face of the Ancient Orient*, (New York: Doubleday, 1962; especially 328–331). Moscati does add some qualification to his support of the Frankfort thesis, however. He writes: 'The description of the Oriental mentality as mythmaking seems defensible as a generalization, provided we exclude Israelite and Zoroastrian thought, which in the religious sphere unmistakably reacts against myth. But even granted this exclusion, the myth-making character is not to be understood as eliminating rational thought but as including it in a higher unity. The Oriental is not unable to think rationally, but he feels no need to isolate reason as an independent faculty and theorize it as such' (330). The higher unity of which the use of reason is a part is, however, the unity of the cultural myth which makes the myth superior to reason and so abrogates reason (Moscati's disclaimer notwithstanding). The Frankfort thesis, therefore is essentially undisturbed. [A somewhat similar line of argument to that of Moscati is taken by Herbert N. Schneidau in *Sacred Discontent: The Bible and Western Tradition*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), although there is no time to analyse his argument here].

Nor does time permit elucidating more specifically the differences in these various positions. This is done to some extent by G. S. Kirk in his *Myth: Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974). Kirk divides theories of myths into five classes: (i) Nature Myths, (ii) Aetiological Myths, (iii) Charter Myths, (iv) 'Creation' Myths (v) and the Myth/Ritual theory. Classes (i)–(iii) are but types of 'intellectualist' readings of myth after the fashion of English anthropologists opposed to Lévy-Bruhl; classes (iv) and (v) are symbolist readings of myth of the Lévy-Bruhl variety. Kirk's own position is a 'pluralist' one that attempts to cut across these boundaries and really requires more attention than can be paid to it here.

82 C. R. Hallpike, *The Foundations of Primitive Thought*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1979).

83 Jean Piaget, *Biology and Knowledge: An Essay of the Relations Between Organic Regulations and Cognitive Processes*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

84 See G. S. Kirk, *op. cit.*, 1970; 276 note 42.

85 C. R. Hallpike, *op. cit.*, 1979; 24.

86 Ibid.; 489. Silvano Arieti, in *Creativity: The Magic Synthesis*, (New York: Basic Books, 1976), uses the term 'paleological' to describe it. The term is, I think, for reasons explained elsewhere, apt; (i.e. in my 'In Two Minds: Religion and Philosophy in Ancient Greece', see note 35). The same notion is taken up by Kurt Goldstein in his 'Concerning the Concept of "Primitivity"', in Stanley Diamond (ed.), *Primitive Views of the World: Essays From Culture In History*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960; [1–19]).

87 Ibid.; 33.

88 Ibid.; 50. It is interesting to note here that Piaget in a conversation with Jean-Claude Bringuier [*Conversations With Jean Piaget*, (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1980/1977)], actually refers to the mode of thought of the child at the preoperational level of thought as prelogical. Bringuier is so surprised by Piaget's response that he remarks in a footnote: 'The very tranquillity of his comment, its matter-of-fact tone, were probably what brought me face to face with what it meant—brought it home to me. Clearly, the child's reasoning did not rest on an inarticulate or poorly formulated logic; it wasn't a clumsy attempt at adult logic. It owed nothing to that logic. It rested instead on something else, another world—a world that Piaget had been exploring for a long time. From what he said, I sensed the dimensions, the true perspective, of his research—or at least I believed that I did' (33). There is also some suggestion in the work of Piaget and his colleagues that what holds for the child moving into adulthood holds also for 'humankind'; see, for example, the ninth conversation entitled 'Games for Children and Scholars: Toward a Comparative History of Individual Intelligence and Scientific Progress'.

89 Ibid.; 489.

90 J. Goody, *op. cit.*, 1977; 1.

91 Ibid.; 44.

92 I think it worth remarking here that Goody gives credit for that emergence of philosophy and logic to Thales and the Milesians (i.e. to the presocratics generally, 47), because I argue in my 'In Two Minds' essay referred to above (note 35), that it is precisely in pinpointing a revolution of thought to a particular period in history that provides a kind of empirical support to the Lévy-Bruhlian thesis.

93 Ibid.; 43.

94 Ibid.; 37 and 43. Goody emphasizes that written language is not simply a visual representation of the oral, but rather a *different kind* of communication; (127, 128).

95 Ibid.; 151.

96 J. Goody, 'Thought and Writing', in Ernest Gellner (ed.), *Soviet and Western Anthropology*, (London: Duckworth, 1980; 119–133).

97 Ibid.; 120, 121.

98 Ibid.; 129, 130.

99 Ibid.; 120.

100 Ibid.; 130. See in this respect note 77 above.

101 Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*, (London: Methuen, 1982). See also his *The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History*, (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1970/1967); and his *Interfaces of the Word: Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).

102 W. Ong, *op. cit.*, 1982; 50.

103 Eric A. Havelock, *The Crucifixion of Intellectual Man*, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), and *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964/1957).

104 E. A. Havelock, *op. cit.*, 1951.

105 E. A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963; reprinted by Grosset and Dunlap, 1967).

106 Ibid.; 239.

107 Ibid.; 258, 259.

108 Ibid.; 266. In my above mentioned paper ('In Two Minds', note 35 above), I argue that the split emerges with the presocratics. Others who have argued

such a split see it coming much later (as Havelock sees it coming with Plato). Timothy J. Reiss, more recently, [in *The Discourse of Modernism*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982)], argues a radical difference between a 'discourse of patterning' (an episteme of resemblance) and an 'analytico-referential discourse' but sees it emerging only after the 17th century. He does, however, sees the presocratics as 'precursors' to that development.

109 Ibid.; 267.

110 E. A. Havelock, *The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). The essays here deserve close and detailed examination which cannot, however, be given them here.

111 Ibid.; 6.

112 Ibid.; 7.

113 See my 'In Two Minds' referred to above, (note 35).

114 E. Gellner refers to this fact as 'the biggest, most conspicuous simple fact about the human world'; (*op. cit.*, 1979; 175.) See also note 26 above.

115 See note 38 above.

116 According to Reiss (*op. cit.*, 1982) such a dominant 'mode of thought' or 'episteme' is always accompanied by a dominant occulted epistemic practice (11). His analysis suggests much, but examination of his claims and their implications cannot be taken up here.

117 I attempt to establish this claim in my (unpublished) essay, 'In Two Minds'; see note 35 above.

118 E. Gellner, 'The Savage and the Modern Mind', in R. Horton and R. Finnegan, *op. cit.*, 1973.

119 Ibid.; 170.

120 Ibid.; 172.

121 Ibid.; 174.

122 Ibid.; 176.

123 Ibid.; 178.

124 See here especially the essays in Bryan Wilson (ed.), *Rationality*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970). In particular, see S. Lukes, 'Some Problems About Rationality' (194–213) and Martin Hollis, 'The Limits of Rationality' (214–220).

125 See my 'The Failure of Nerve in the Academic Study of Religion', in *Studies in Religion*, Vol. 13, 1984; (401–422).

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110 E. A. Havelock, *The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). [illegible] and detailed [illegible] however, is given there [illegible]
111 Ibid., 6.
112 Ibid., [illegible]
113 See my 'Two [illegible]' referred to above [illegible]
114 E. Gellner points to this fact as the [illegible] about the [illegible] words (op. cit., 1976, 175). See also note [illegible] above.
115 See note 38 above.
116 According to Perry (op. cit., 1980) such a dominant mode of [illegible] epistemic [illegible] in a dominant [illegible]
117 [illegible]
118 E. Gellner, 'The Savage and the Modern Mind', in R. Horton and R. Finnegan (eds), op. cit., 1973.
119 Ibid., 170.
120 Ibid., 172.
121 Ibid., 174.
122 Ibid., 176.
123 Ibid., 178.
124 See here especially the essays in Bryan Wilson (ed.), *Rationality* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970). In particular, see S. Lukes, 'Some Problems About Rationality' (194–213) and Martin Hollis, 'The Limits of Irrationality' (214–220).
125 See my 'The Failure of Nerve in the Academic Study of Religion', *Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses* [illegible]

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EDUCATION IN MANLINESS: IDEALIST, IDEAL AND EXEMPLAR

A CENTENARY ESSAY: EDWARD THRING, 1821–87

Malcolm Tozer

> Whose life was work, whose language rife
> With rugged maxims hewn from life.

Tennyson wrote these words in 1852 of the Duke of Wellington; he might have written the same words of Edward Thring, who began his headmastership at Uppingham School in 1853 and died in harness in 1887. As with all great men, Thring's life was his work. When he came to Uppingham he found an obscure country grammar school of some 25 boys; by his death the number had been steady at the 300 mark for more than 20 years, and both the name of Thring and that of the school had gained national renown. Tennyson's words are particularly apposite for Thring, for the word 'Life' was his watchword, his maxim, his motto. To Thring, life, and in particular 'true life', was a principle of action, of thought, and of speech. The word appears in countless addresses, in over half his sermons, and it regularly punctuates the text of his books. If the boys wanted to mimic Thring, then they would most certainly choose a phrase that contained the word 'life'. But then, to Thring, education was a training for 'true life'; and true education was

> nothing less than bringing everything that men have learnt from God, or from experience, to bear first upon the moral and spiritual being by means of a well-governed society and healthy discipline, so that it should love and hate aright, and through this, secondly, making the body and intellect perfect, as instruments necessary for carrying on the work of earthly progress; training the character, the intellect, the body, each through the means adapted to each. This is the object of education . . .[1]

This then was the ethos of Uppingham, and 'true life' meant doing the work for Christ. Thus to examine Thring's educational thought, one has to study what he sought to achieve at Uppingham, and then to relate the product to the ideal. In this examination we shall find that Tennyson's second line is just as applicable to Thring as the first, for Thring was a great coiner of maxims. One

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of his favourites was 'Honour the work, and the work will honour you',[2] and an examination will indeed show that his work honours Thring.

'I see Thring plainest in the pulpit', recalled E. W. Hornung, 'no longer a little old man, but majestic, noble and austere'.[3] It was in his sermons, 'the true organ of his thought',[4] that Thring would explain to the boys the purpose of 'True Life', and the role that Uppingham was to play. The 'Almighty Wall' might be the body of the school, and the 'machinery' its life-blood, but the spirit came through in the headmaster's sermons. For the first few years of Thring's headmastership, the boys attended services in the parish church and Thring was denied access to the pulpit, yet on each Sunday evening he would deliver his sermon in the School House hall. In September 1860 Thring moved the services to the school-room adjacent to the parish church, and now made his sermon an integral part of the pattern of worship.[5] Thring long felt the need of a chapel of his own, free from 'party opinions';[6] and eventually, in 1865, his dream came true.

In 1858 Thring published a volume of the School House sermons. It was dedicated to the masters—'true fellow-workers and friends'—and prefaced in typical style:

> These sermons are sent into the world as part of a system, and as exponents, in some degree of the experience of working men, that it is possible to have a free and manly school life, complete in all its parts, neither lost in a crowd, nor shut up in a prison, nor reared in a hot-bed.[7]

Nearly 400 manuscripts of other Thring sermons are held in the Uppingham Archives, and of these about a third were published in 1886 in the two volume *Sermons preached at Uppingham School*. Some of these published sermons had already been printed for private circulation at the request of boys and masters. W. F. Rawnsley used to read out a Thring sermon each Sunday evening when he became housemaster of Fircroft, and after Thring's death Oswald Powell would use only slightly amended versions when he preached as second master at Bedales. Reading these sermons a century later, one is struck by the simple sincerity: they read as parables. They were neither intellectual nor theological, nor did Thring speak down to the boys.[8] Each sermon would seem to have been written out in one attempt; Thring might make a few amendments on reading over the manuscript, but here the main purpose was to insert the pause marks needed for his delivery. The delivery contained 'no art, no dexterity of phrase or of articulation'—he would merely speak straight from the heart, with rarely a movement except to turn the leaves. Each sermon had a biblical text, and most a title: the length, in an era notorious for prolixity was no more than ten minutes. Thring stood as a 'prophet' of God, and in his sermons he spoke as Moses to a 'chosen people'.[9] Over half the sermons are directed towards the explanation of 'True Life'.[10]

'What is truth?', Thring would ask, for this was the premier virtue. It was 'the knowledge of ourselves, and the humility springing from such a knowledge',[11] it was 'the doing of what we know to be right each moment that a thing we know to be right has to be done'.[12]

> Truth claims that your amusements shall be manly, and hearty, and honourable, that there shall be no cheating; neither the cheating which steals time and cheats God's working day of work, nor the cheating which in the game itself takes more than is right.[13]

'Never steal time' was almost a war-cry; it should not be wasted in idleness, self-indulgence, work that was self-seeking, or in taking the easy way out.[14] The boys were encouraged to 'take delight in all truly manly unselfish work, in every thing that demands patience and strength of mind'.[15] 'It is a manly choice that will not, cannot, see in living for self anything to compare with the service of Christ'.[16]

True bravery was the second virtue. 'It is strange', Thring argued, 'considering the admiration men have for courage, how very little as yet the manliness of Christ's service has been set up as the ideal of the young man'.[17] But 'let us not confound bravery with strength, as fools do',[18] for 'the lowest kind of bravery is animal bravery'.[19] 'True bravery wants no strength but its own life';[20] it was more likely to be the virtue of the poor, the weak and the oppressed than of the strong,[21] for it enlisted the power of the steadfast soul to withstand sneers and mockery and long periods of personal trial.[22]

> The truly brave strong man will face any danger that ought to be faced; the truly brave strong man will master any fear, fear of shame, and fear of ruin, as well as fear of danger; the truly brave strong man will not give way to mean temptations and fearful lusts.[23]

Self-mastery was an essential for 'true manliness', it completes the Platonic ideal:[24] 'Manliness means the cheerful bearing heat and cold, hunger and thirst, work and hardship, pain and weariness'.[25]

> If we train ourselves to be perfectly ready to bear hunger and cold then we have got rid of the main temptation. If we are able to have the hardy elastic feeling of not caring for hardship then is our own spirit strong within us, then are we beginning to be free indeed. Food and warmth and vanity soon pass into laziness and lust and a hatred of active life.[26]

In one of his earliest sermons Thring gave a detailed review of this 'self-denial':

> You are called upon to war against the flesh; that is, to learn not to care for any mere bodily feeling in comparison with higher things. If you bear hunger without ill-temper, that is being Christ's soldier; if you give up dainties and nice things to eat or drink, that is learning to be Christ's soldier; if you can work on when tired, or begin work when tempted to indulge the body in rest or play, that is learning to subdue the

> flesh. See, then, how well adapted our life here is to give this self-command, and how much that may perhaps have seemed tiresome, or want of freedom even, is in reality Christ's service and perfect freedom. For which is free, He who gives way to his own love of ease or impatience of control, or he who learnt thoroughly to master himself, and in obeying, to be lord of his own heart? Our set times, then, are most valuable assistances to freedom, training you not to care for your own fancies, but at any moment, what ever you are about, to be able to turn to what is right. Just as a war-horse is trained to turn, to charge, to stop, to wheel, to back, so that in the battle he and his rider may conquer, so we are trained never to think of self when there is a call to duty. And again, in their proper degree, how our very games and exercises strengthen the body and will do it right, and make the mere sitting idling by the fire, or lounging in the sun, childish and contemptible; or again, furnish opportunities for self-denial, by being given up readily at the calls of higher duties. All these things, then, are to make you free—and are freedom—breaking off from your necks, if rightly done, the slavery of selfish fleshy appetites.[27]

This was 'true fasting'—'an utter disregard for the body when it stands in the way of good work, and a careful regard for the body when regard means good work, and the power of good working'.[28] To aid the process there was early morning school to throw boys out into the cold on a winter's morning, and an hour of work before breakfast to make the stomach the servant of the mind.[29]

The cheerful bearing of pain, whether physical or emotional, was another important ingredient of self-mastery, 'the thing for a man to face with high heart, and rejoice in having faced'.[30]

> We have to strengthen and fashion the inward life into a state of fearless excellence; and to refer everything to this. And every day brings its contribution; every act, done or undone, plays its part. Difficulties become tests of willingness and strength: the character that can face a hard task is learning much beside the task itself. Pain is a teacher; the character that does not flinch from pain is being moulded for high work. Sorrow teaches; the patient spirit is learning the peace of God. Danger is a teacher; he who is fearless because God is with him, is one of those to whom it was said, 'In the world ye shall have tribulation, but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world'.[31]

The self-mastery of the 'manly effort of purity and truth' would prevent corruption and jealously guard the morality of the school.[32] 'Brethren', Thring called, 'be watchful, watch and cherish in holiness purity, and true righteousness, that seed of life to come, that present seed of immortality,—your body'.[33] 'What, know ye not that your bodies are the Temples of the Holy Ghost?'[34]

The 'joy of strength and movement' is evident in many sermons,[35] and 'the blessing of health' that came from games was often praised;[36] but always games were regarded as of secondary importance compared with the ideal of manliness,[37] and warnings against making games a 'science' span Thring's whole life at Uppingham:—

> Another making excellence in games his object and being put out by anything which interferes with that, because he is working for himself and not for Christ.[38] (1853)
>
> What a field there is for life. What scope for tenderness to the weak, for not putting difficulties in the way of the young. And in yourselves, what scope for doing the right and giving up hand and foot and eye, the love of power in games, the love of skill in lessons, for the sake of just doing at the time the distasteful task with friendly welcome.[39] (1875)
>
> I must think that to be known through England for true manliness is a better thing than to have a name for cricket.[40] (1884)

Denouncements on the 'idolatry of strength' were just as likely to be directed at the intellect as at the body.[41] There were two worlds, 'the world of knowledge and the world of character and feeling',[42] or 'power-worship' and 'True Life': you must choose to follow Caesar or Christ.[43] 'Instruments are not life', and 'the man, the life of the man, is judged by the use he made of the powers not by the powers he had'.[44]

> I would draw your attention to the barefaced heathenism which a school can, and does hold. The shameless way in which, as a matter of course, the strong body, or strong in brain, take advantage of the weak in common life . . . Abhor strength as a ruling power. Never do a thing because you are strong.[45]

The worship of success was the direct opposite of 'True Life', and the boys were encouraged to face with 'fearless acceptance' all forms of defeat.[46]

The tone throughout Thring's sermons is one of encouragement to greater endeavour, yet of forgiveness if the progress was not always maintained. Life was a battle of good against evil, and each boy had to fight his own way, not blindly like 'the slave heart', but with eyes open and using his own talents.[47] The sermons are messages of exhortation and hope; little time is wasted condemning sin and there is hardly any mention of hell.[48] The parable of the sower and the seed was a Thring favourite—

> A life made up of love of Christ and manly honest feeling, which may be tempted, which may fall, which may make many mistakes, but nevertheless whether tempted, or fallen, or making mistakes, like a plant never leaves off the upward push.[49]

How often a boy's life is compared by Thring to the 'growth of a plant'. The sower, sowing his seed of life, was depicted for all to see in the stain-glass of the most prominent window in the school-room.

Earth was a training-ground for the Kingdom of Heaven, and man was only put on it so that the whole business of his life could be 'active manly work and training and nothing else'.[50] The school was that training ground in a life's first years, and Thring thought it a disgrace that the schools of England 'presented more frequent instances of deceit, lying, oppression, lawlessness and wrong' when they were so capable of being the direct contrary'.[51]

> A school can realise in a way that is seldom found elsewhere, the bond of common life, of being, like the Israelites, a small yet a most highly endowed band in a great world, a brotherhood, able to act together, and throughout all our earthly life to feel the tie of brotherhood, to feel that the good of one is the good of all, the evil of one is the evil of all, to feel that all we do is not private, but part of a common honour, as I, at all events feel daily, hourly, with a ceaseless sense of peace at not working save for common good. What might you not do if every heart beat high for the common cause. But remember once more a life has to be lived. A life of manly power, of liberty, of strength, as was set before the Israelites . . .[52]

As 'was set before the Israelites . . .': the Book of Exodus was thus 'The Architect's Plan' for here could be found all the doctrine, all the facts, of the great Christian tradition.[53] Here could be found the true spirit of holiness– 'Holiness is the giving life to what has to be done, it is an everlasting present, a quiet spirit of daily, silent, patient, enduring work'.[54]

Jacob and Abram were two of Thring's heroes. How similar in many ways was the modern schoolboy's life to that of Abram—taken away from home to face lessons in manliness:

> The manliness of the hardy body, and free heart was the aim of God's first schooling. City power, knowledge power, luxury, and inventions were rejected in this first schooling, in favour of *manliness*; not mere bravery, but true manliness, the pure heart of the hardy shepherd life, the liberty of the wide pastures, the fields and the hills, the incessant care day and night of the flocks, gentleness to animals, simple food, the bearing heat and cold, the readiness to risk life against wild beasts in order to save their flocks, in a quiet righteous way, without the excitement in gain of war, and with no one looking in.[55]

The boys' work at school, as much as that at the mission or in strange lands, was true holiness.[56] The Chapel was the 'heart-life' of the school and the 'centre point of our life' and in later years the boys' memories would go back to it most fondly, and cling to it most enduringly.[57] The chapel was the heart of the ideal of manliness, the Uppingham 'machinery' was its life blood:

> Your daily life here is just planned out on such a plan as to try your courage in little things every day; to try your courage in good whether you have the life in you that can readily resist temptation in this way and be brave; to try your courage in body, in games and outdoor life whether you have the life in you to overcome weariness, laziness and pain and be brave in body; to try your courage in your main work, whether you have the life in you which can overcome the dislike of tasks, resist idleness, feel the brave spirit that hour after hour can do its work lovingly in spite of the pain of hard reading and the allurements of amusement, and be brave intellectually.[58]

'A great school is an army in the regiment of the brave and the true'[59] where the boys were to live 'the high and happy Christian life, the honour and the power of being a Christian, the wisdom, the bravery, the true nobility of being enrolled in the army of Truth and of Christ'.[60] The school was, like the ideal of chivalry, 'rough and imperfect' for 'some few are manly and true, the great majority perhaps mean well, but in a cowardly weak way; and there is simply little or no trace of the gallant united effort to do good work unflinchingly . . .'[61] Thring would ask if 'the idea of Christian Knighthood is beginning a new life?' . . . 'May it not begin here—even here?'[62] 'When you have acknowledged God as King you will feel with thankful sober trust the gain of having done honest work, the happiness of manly life, the joy of brave and patient endurance'.[63] A number of sermons refer to the School's mission in North Woolwich,[64] for Thring knew 'no more glorious gain than being able to understand the lives of the poor, of the great army of God's poor, and all the power of weakness that is life and truth'.[65] One Sunday he talked of his own year as a curate in the slums of Gloucester, and of Thomas Hedley:

> I remember the great man, for he was a great man, the quiet clergyman, under who I begun parish work, said in words I have never forgotten, said 'I never see a particularly disagreeable little boy come into my parish school without thinking here is some one I have to learn to love for Christ's sake'.[66]

Education was for 'True Life', and the purpose of a schooling at Uppingham was to enable each boy to make the fullest realisation of his abilities so that the life pledged to God's service was as valuable as possible.[67] The lessons learned at school would be tested on the battle-field of life:[68]

> God's hero, the man who bears and does all things easily, gently, lovingly—the hero, who may die without glory, but who has been felt to be a perfect pattern of manly power by every living being with the heart of life, whose life has been touched by the life. For life touches life, and passes on in silence, invisible, into other lives, even as rain that falls gently on the earth, and seems to pass away, till the harvest comes, and speaks of a hidden, wonderful spread of unseen goodness.[69]

'Manly earnest hearts' were to go out into the tumult of the world and play their part to bring peace and hope and help to others, and in so doing to bring peace and happiness to themselves.[70] Each boy was told that on leaving Uppingham he was not to remain 'in his own station', thus creating a gulf between the rich and the poor, but that he should join 'the manliness of Christ's service' and do God's work in the 'lost places of this Kingdom';[71] in the 'bare and dirty streets', and in the 'outcast settlements that skirt our great cities'.[72]

Thring's message was clear, so too is the portrayal of the true exemplar of the ideal of manliness—

> There is no more striking character stamped upon Christ's Gospel than the thorough manliness of its earthly practice. It is *the* character, in point of fact,—yea, *the* character of Christ Himself, as Pilate unconsciously proclaimed, 'Behold the Man!' The spiritual Adam, the second Father of this human race, who in His own person set forth all that was heroic, enduring, and brave; the *manliest* character that this earth has ever seen, who transmitted to His spiritual children the power of being truly men,—men in heart and not merely in outward form, gallant, brave, and wise; in its best sense, *manly*,—not like the brutes, in bodily lusts and unrestrained appetites, looking to bodily powers as manhood, instead of to the glorious exercise of the pure and strengthened spirit. For there is a growth of body which is in no sense true manhood; and there is a growth of the spirit which in its truest sense is so, though it be a child's body.[73]

Thring's last sermon was never preached, for on the day it was to have been delivered he was taken with a fatal illness. His text was 'knowing good from evil' (Gen iii, vv 4–5).

> I need not point out how completely God's plan is carried out in the plan of a School like this. What opportunities for manliness and self-denial there are in the work and in the games, in the in-door life and the out-door life. How much of the joy of manliness is here as well as its trials. What room there is for obedience. How your life together calls for gentleness and forbearance with one another.[74]

After writing these words Thring turned to his diary, and closed the day's entry almost in prophecy—'And now to bed, Sermon finished, and a blessed feeling of Sunday coming'.[75]

Were Thring's boys true to the ideal of manliness? To follow their careers after leaving Uppingham and to lay their triumphs at Thring's feet does not really answer the question, nor would it be in accordance with the principle of 'True Life'. Yet the question still needs to be answered—was the ideal put into practice? If what the boys chose as their future careers is an acceptable criteria, then the answer is a most definite yes. Taking the best Thring years as reference, that is 1853–70, the careers of Uppinghamians are decidedly at odds with those of boys from other public schools. Bamford has noted how Rugby in this period produced twice as many boys who followed careers in law or in the armed forces as those who entered the church, and at Harrow the church ranked fifth a long way behind the armed forces, administration and politics, and law. At all the schools Bamford researched there had been a steady decline in the number of boys taking holy orders since 1835—and this includes Rugby part way through Arnold's headmastership. At Uppingham from 1853–70 the church is clearly the most chosen career, well ahead of law and the armed forces. Two clergymen were produced to every soldier, and throughout the Thring years the percentage of boys entering the church is higher than at the schools cited by Bamford. In the years after 1870 the armed forces and business come to the top in agreement with the trend at the other schools, yet even here the growth in business as a career is much below that seen elsewhere. As a career choice in the whole of Thring's headmastership, the church ranks third.[76]

W. P. James proclaimed that Thring's boys were too straight for the 'crooked game' of politics,[77] and indeed no Members of Parliament figure in the lists before 1871. Thring was always against the army as a career, reckoning it to be a 'monotonous and unsatisfactory life'[78] and instead he directed the boys towards the professions, and in particular, especially in the early years, to the church. If we are to choose an 'average boy', then we must take a future clergyman. If the following of his career is an acceptable test of the ideals-into-practice question, then what other qualifications should the 'average boy' have? Certainly he should come in the first half of Thring's headmastership, for then the ideal of manliness was at its strongest. Cormac Rigby has shown how an 'average parent' of the first years chose to send his son 'to be under Thring', rather than 'to be at Uppingham', and he probably had some personal or professional connection with the headmaster or with the Thring family at Alford.[79] The 'average boy', then, should come from such a family. Several boys meet these criteria, but only two have left sufficient record of their lives for a biography to be traced. One, John Huntley Skrine, served later as a master at Uppingham and then Warden of Glenalmond, but he was too much a disciple and mystic to be an example of the ideal in practice. The choice then falls on Hardwicke Drummond Rawnsley.

Rawnsley was born in 1851 at Shiplake-on-Thames, and Edward Thring was his godfather. His father, Canon Drummond Rawnsley, a man of letters as well as a clergyman, was a close personal friend of Thring's. When Thring published *Education and School* in 1864 it was dedicated to Drummond Rawnsley—'The first personal friend who trusted me in his professional life'. Thring never forgot that here was the first friend to entrust a son to his care.[80] At the time of Hardwicke's birth Thring was also working in the Thames valley, and it was presumably then that the friendship began. Shiplake was the Rawnsley family home, and here the clergyman's children were reared alongside Alfred Tennyson, for Drummond Rawnsley's father was guardian of the Tennyson brothers. It was from Shiplake vicarage that, in 1850, the poet was married, and the eldest Rawnsley boy, Willingham Franklin, served as a page. At some stage in the 1850s the family moved to Halton Holgate in Lincolnshire, where Canon Rawnsley took on a larger parish.

Willingham Rawnsley was that first son to go to Uppingham, in 1855 at the age of ten. Hardwicke followed at the age of 11 in October 1862 and, in all, five of the six Rawnsley brothers came to Uppingham. Hardwicke was under the care of Edward and Marie Thring in School House for eight years during which he imbibed the ideal of manliness from its very fount. In lessons he was remembered best for his power in answering divinity questions in Thring's classroom; his intellect was such that he had secured a school scholarship in 1865.[81] On the games field and in the gymnasium he was plucky rather than talented: Willingham had been school champion but Hardwicke, despite enormous endeavours, had to be content with runner-up. In 1864 he was one of the smallest boys to finish the steeplechase (that test of manliness); he was nowhere near the front, but Thring offered another prize for a race between the two smallest boys. Rawnsley won.[82] A love of nature was naturally absorbed; and from his years of roaming the Rutland countryside and through his collection of stuffed birds and animals (boys used to complain at the perpetual smell emanating from his study), Rawnsley developed into a talented naturalist. Thring taught him to use his eyes in the countryside, and made him 'see some beauty in the least of God's creatures'. Back at school these impressions were 'knocked into rough verse'. In 1869 he won the school's prize for English verse, and in these years he absorbed Thring's love of Wordsworth's poetry.[83] Rawnsley completed his Uppingham career as captain of School House, an exemplary position if ever there was one, and in 1870 he left for Balliol College, Oxford.

R. L. Nettleship had gained the top Balliol Scholarship from Uppingham in 1864, now Rawnsley came as his tutee and the Thringian influence continued.[84] Jowett had just begun his mastership of the College, and it was already gaining in reputation for both scholarship and social conscience. John Ruskin was Slade Professor of Fine Art at this time, and Rawnsley joined the famed band of Ruskin's roadmakers who did much good for the Hinksey poor.[85] Sporting activity was maintained, and Rawnsley won the high jump in the Freshman's Sports of 1870, and came third in the 1872 University Championship.[86] Many contemporaries remembered him best as the 'Balliol troubador', composing songs and ballads by the yard, and singing them on any occasion which required musical entertainment.[87] Thring occasionally used to visit Oxford to see his old boys: here, away from Uppingham, the headmaster relaxed and frolic could begin—in 1871 Rawnsley wrote to another Uppinghamian, Edgar Powell:

> I got back yesterday and going about 10.50 p.m. to call on Nettleship who should I find but E.T. with a cigar in his mouth and a glass of 'something hot' by his side and talking in a very excited way about the coming Derby and the hash he had made with his book on the last boat race so that it was some time before I could in the debauched little gent in the chair recognize my old and once much esteemed friend the Headmaster. Of course you needn't show him this but I merely mention it to give you some insight into Thring at Uppingham and Thring at Oxford. By degrees he became more sober and with various hiccups like your minute guns he made me understand that Powell had jumped 5 ft. 2. Cameron and French had distinguished themselves greatly in the Athletics. Whereupon I rushed to a Magazine and having certified his semidrunken admissions I write at once to offer my humble congratulations . . .[88]

On gaining his degree in 1874, a third in Classical Moderations, Rawnsley impetuously jumped from one career possibility to another—chemistry, medicine and missionary work were all considered. Thring was obviously consulted and the reply Rawnsley received was typical of the man:

> You must learn to feel that this world and this life of ours is really, thoroughly and completely governed by a very present God . . . Don't get into the habit of thinking God cuts out the world with a pair of scissors and that you hold the handle of them, as so many do, or act as if they did. "His judgements are like the great deep". Your father's letter is a good and wise letter. God's work wants every power we can bring into play, and remember when once we begin the ceaseless conflict of modern working life there is no more storing up of material to work from; empty or full, one has to put out something. Your whole inside may feel like a scraped wall before whitewashing, so bare and empty and hopeless, and yet something must be produced. Well it is then if there is stock and stuff enough of old habit and old fulness to make it possible for the used-up powers to still do good work. Again, a knowledge of medicine is a wonderful gain to a missionary, and so far from the climate being more injurious as you get older, the more settled time of life is the best for endurance of that as for other things. But this is of small account, what is real is God's will, and it is God's will that you should have some more training first. Follow that will honestly however it may pain, and be sure you will live to bless it.[89]

For the period of 'more training' Rawnsley became a lay-chaplain in the Soho district of London, and gradually God's will was seen. He volunteered for missionary work in Madagascar, but was turned down on the advice of doctors; the interest in chemistry waned, and then he decided against medicine. The choice was then missionary work in this country.

Rawnsley maintained his contact with Ruskin, and through him he was introduced in London to Octavia Hill. She had been an ardent campaigner for many years for better social conditions for the poor, and in Rawnsley she found a keen fellow-campaigner. Their friendship and collaboration lasted until the end of her life, and when she died Rawnsley preached the sermon at her memorial service.[90] In December 1875 Rawnsley was ordained a deacon in Gloucester Cathedral, and then early in the following year he was appointed by John Percival to run the Clifton College Mission. Percival had heard of the Uppingham Mission and the idea obviously impressed him. In 1875 he formed a mission committee in the school, and then this in turn gave birth to the first mission to follow Uppingham's lead. Rawnsley was appointed curate, and some rooms in a cottage and the upper story of a carpenter's shed were provided in the Newfoundland Road district of Bristol.[91] The mission was situated in the heart of the dockland area, an area almost identical to the Gloucester parish of St James's where Thring began his curacy. Rawnsley spent two long hard years in Bristol, and in his reports to the *Cliftonian* his success can be traced. A night school was started, various clubs and activities were inaugurated, games and swimming were eagerly followed, and there were weekend expeditions to the surrounding countryside.

In December 1877 Rawnsley was ordained a priest in Carlisle Cathedral and took the living at the village of Wray in the Lake District. No decision as to why the Lake District was chosen is recorded, but the ordination in Carlisle may provide a clue. Thring's friend Harvey Goodwin was now Bishop of Carlisle and it is possible that Thring may have sung his godson's praise when the bishop was seeking to inject new blood into the diocese. Certainly Rawnsley and Goodwin were to be close friends, and on Goodwin's death Rawnsley was chosen to write his biography.[92] One month after taking the Wray living, Rawnsley was married in Brathay church: both his father and Thring performed the service, and Lewis Nettleship was best man. His future mother-in-law had previously written to Thring for a character reference on the young man. He replied—

> If H. had asked me for my daughter I should have given my consent—that is the best answer. I have a very high opinion of him from the most intimate knowledge . . . He is so far from commonplace, so original, so full of strange power . . . I have never known anything wrong or mean about him . . . I believe he is sincerely desirous of doing the right always.[93]

The couple stayed at Wray vicarage for five years, and then Goodwin presented Rawnsley to the living at Crosthwaite, just to the north of Keswick. Here many old friends were frequent visitors—the Thrings, the Skrines, the Davids, Nettleship—and new friends too, including Frederick Temple, now Bishop of London.[94] Rawnsley made Crosthwaite his 'Life's work' until his retirement in 1917; by then he had been appointed a Canon of Carlisle Cathedral, and he was a Chaplain to the King.[95] It is a strange coincidence, remembering his earlier zeal to do missionary work abroad, that in 1898 he was offered the Bishopric of Madagascar—but once more he was advised to decline for medical reasons.[96] He was a well-loved parish priest, and a forceful orator from the pulpit. He once sought Thring's advice on the composition and delivery of sermons:

> I don't believe with your pitching into your congregation. The only power in the spiritual world is νικοδομη—'orderly building'. The glory and happiness of
> doing good ought to be the preacher's sole theme, with a dash of how to do it. To paint a thrilling and touching heart-picture is a hard thing—so to draw a clear and striking path of holiness is a hard thing, but to knock a fellow on the head is easy; it merely wants a fist, the other wants heart and head. If clergymen spoke of the Heavenly Father's gift of love, and the happiness of the sons who receive and act, we should not have so much evil; but people get frightened at God, and repelled instead of attracted.[97]

The apprenticeship at Thring's Uppingham, with Ruskin in the Hinksey digging days, with Octavia Hill in Soho, and at the Clifton Mission, came to fruition in the Crosthwaite years. He took keen interest in the schools in his parish, and he would be a frequent visitor to them: singing, dancing, gardening and gymnastics were all encouraged. He would lecture to the children on the exhibits in Keswick museum, and he wrote them several school songs. He was closely involved with the foundation of Keswick Grammar School—and was keenly in favour of co-education. The temperance cause found him an ally, not through mere preaching but in encouragement for the provision of recreational and educational counter-attractions. He was closely involved with the National Home Reading Union, and with a holiday association that gave trips to the Lake District for the working classes of the industrial north. The Cumberland Nature Club elected him its president in 1904.[98] He was the founding father of the Keswick School of Industrial Arts, an innovation that gained considerable backing from Ruskin. This began as a night school in the parish room, and quickly expanded to buildings of its own with a full-time staff of teachers of arts and crafts. Rawnsley stated the aims of the school:

1. To counteract the pernicious effect of turning men into machines without possibility of love of their work.
2. To make it felt that hand-work did really allow the expression of a man's soul and self, and so was worth doing for its own sake, and worth purchasing even at some cost to the buyer.
3. To try to displace by hand-work the crude metal and wood ornaments that are now produced by steel dies and hydraulic presses.
4. To show that there was here in England . . . an abundance of skill of hand which is wasted, but which, if any education worth its name could be given to the whole working man—to his eye, to his hand, to his heart, as well as his head—could and would help England here and now.[99]

In 1883 the beauty of the Lake District was threatened by a proposed railway from Buttermere to Braithwaite; Rawnsley leapt to the defence of the country-side, and quickly gained the tag 'Champion of the Lakes'. At the annual meeting of the Wordsworth's Society, Rawnsley proposed that a Lake District Defence Society be formed 'to protect the Lake District from those injurious encroachments upon its scenery which are from time to time attempted from purely commercial or speculative motives, without regard to its claims as a natural recreation ground'.[100] Ruskin wrote sympathetically but despairingly—'It's all of no use—You will soon have a Cook's tourist railway up Scawfell, and another up Helwellyn, and another up Skiddaw, and then a connecting line all round'.[101] *Punch* joined the defence:

> What ho, my merry Philistines here's news and no mistake,
> They're going to run a railway round and spoil each pretty lake,
> And hear the famous cateract that Southey song of yore
> The locomotive's noise shall drown the murmur of Lodore.

In 1879 Octavia Hill and Richard Hunter had formed the Commons Preservation Society, and now they joined forces with Rawnsley.[102] Defence funds were launched, articles were published in journals,[103] footpaths were forcibly kept open, and the rallying cry 'The Lake District is in danger' sounded round the country. Then in 1893 the Falls of Lodore, the island on Grasmere, came on the market, and Rawnsley proposed that it be bought for the nation. He took the idea to Octavia Hill and Robert Hunter, and together they launched the 'National Trust for Places of Historic Interest and Natural Beauty', a movement known today simply as the National Trust.[104] For the next 20 years he served as the Society's honorary treasurer and leading 'advocate'. Whenever a piece of the Lake District was threatened the tactics were the same—Rawnsley would thunder; the public would be stirred; and the money would be found to buy the land for the National Trust.[105] John Bailey of the Trust could only gaze in wonder; 'you are the hardest unpaid worker in these islands'.[106] Rawnsley's main influence was in the Borrowdale region, and here over 80 properties were purchased.

There were quieter sides to the man too. Guide books on the lakes were to be written,[107] and innumerable sonnets were to be composed on commission to periodicals and newspapers. The flow from the pen was exhaustive: eventually *Punch* could stand it no longer—'Today is the thirtieth anniversary of the day on which Canon Rawnsley wrote his first sonnet; he has since written 30,000!' Yet even here there were causes to fight. In 1886 he proposed to the Wordsworth Society that a reading room be built as a permanent memorial to the Lake poets, then on Rawnsley's initiative Wordsworth's first home, Dove Cottage in Grasmere, was bought by public subscription and adapted as a Wordsworth museum. In 1900 Beatrix Potter was having difficulty in convincing publishers of the merits of her illustrated *The Tale of Peter Rabbit*. Rawnsley joined the attack, encouraging her to print it privately and even turned the whole story into verse in case that was preferred. It was not, and eventually Frederick Warne published the original.[108] The first two verses went as follows:

There were four little bunnies
—no bunnies were sweeter
Mopsy and Cotton-tail
Flopsy and Peter

They lived in a sand bank
as here you may see,
At the foot of a fir
—a magnificent tree

Forty-one pages later the moral was reached:

They sat down to tea
Too good mannered to cram
and ate bread and milk
and sweet blackberry jam.[109]

In Keswick Rawnsley was known as 'The Volcano';[110] there was always something to erupt into—a memorial on Helwellyn to a faithful dog; crusades against the massacre of birds for plumage; rights for persecuted Armenians; subscriptions for paintings for the National Gallery; the construction of Jubilee bonfires; vulgar comic postcards and low station literature; bleached white bread; Cumberland butter; and much, much more.[111] In June 1920 he died, and on his memorial in Crosthwaite Church are inscribed the words—'Who battled for the true, the just'. The National Trust dedicated Friar's Crag, Lord's Island and part of Great Wood on the shore of Derwentwater to his memory and a plaque records

> In honoured memory of Hardwicke Drummond Rawnsley, 1851–1920, who greatly loving the fair things of nature and of art set all his life to the service of God and man.

It is a memorial to the ideal of manliness.

J. H. Skrine wrote Rawnsley's obituary for the Uppingham School Magazine: he had no doubt at all that here was an exemplar of everything Thring stood for—

> He was in the fullest sense a son of the School that reared him. In his character and career he carried the Uppingham 'legend', which is not legendary but is living fact. His godfather, Edward Thring, was very truly father in God to this godson. That word which was ever on his great teacher's lips, 'true life', a mystic word and more clearly realised perhaps in the soul that in the mind of its speaker, has been nobly and luminously interpreted by the vivid career of generous social helpfulness which is the story of Hardie Rawnsley. In that life of vital service the master will have seen an answer to his prayer for a pupil that he should 'here or elsewhere still continue the living life which Christ has given us here'.[112]

NOTES

1 Edward Thring, *Education and School* (London, 1864), 21.
2 Edward Thring, *Theory and Practice of Teaching* (London, 1883), 253
3 E. W. Hornung, *Fathers of Men* (London, 1912/19), vii. Hornung, the author of the Raffles' stories, was at Uppingham in the 1880s when Thring was in his sixties.
4 J. H. Skrine, *A Memory of Edward Thring* (London, 1890), 79.
5 Thring's Diary, 29 September 1860. In Uppingham Archives (UA).
6 Diary, 6 March 1859. Thring, *Education and School*, 195.
7 Edward Thring, *Sermons Delivered at Uppingham School* (Cambridge, 1858), vii.
8 Oswald Powell, *Uppingham School Magazine*, (1953), 32.
9 *Uppingham School Magazine*, (1900), 63.
10 Skrine, *op. cit.*, 245.
11 Sermon iii, *Sermons Delivered . . .*, 13.
12 Sermon 203, January 1879. All manuscript sermons are in UA.
13 Sermon 122, February 1875.
14 Sermon 125, March 1875.

15 Sermon 70a, December 1872.
16 Sermon 107, July 1874.
17 Sermon cxxxiv, Edward Thring, *Sermons Preached at Uppingham School* (2 vols., London, 1886), II, 302.
18 Sermon 65, April 1872.
19 Sermon 155, December 1877.
20 Sermon 64, March 1872 and Sermon 66, April 1872.
21 Sermon 293, July 1883.
22 Sermon 155, December 1877.
23 Sermon 157, December 1877.
24 Sermon 299, March 1883.
25 Sermon cxliii, *Sermons Preached* . . ., II, 362.
26 Sermon 134c, October 1876.
27 Sermon xlii, *Sermons Delivered* . . ., 191–2.
28 Sermon 346, May 1885.
29 *Idem.*
30 Sermon 276, September 1882.
31 Sermon i, *Sermons Preached* . . ., I, 275.
32 Sermon 32, July 1870.
33 Sermon 373, May 1887.
34 Sermon 70, September 1872.
35 Sermon 134a, September 1876.
36 Sermon 276, September 1882.
37 Sermon 180, July 1878.
38 Sermon 1, September 1853. Thring's first sermon at Uppingham.
39 Sermon 124, March 1875.
40 Sermon cxliii, *Sermons Preached* . . ., II, 362. W. S. Patterson reports that Thring once preached on the text 'For He hath no pleasure in the strength of a horse, neither delighteth He in any man's legs', but no other record of this sermon exists. W. S. Patterson, *Sixty Years of Uppingham Cricket* (London, 1909), 50.
41 Sermon 126, March 1875.
42 Sermon 370, January 1887.
43 Sermon 76, September 1873.
44 Sermon 241, April 1881.
45 Sermon civ, *Sermons Preached* . . ., II, 138.
46 Sermon 163, April 1878 and Sermon lxxi, *Sermons Preached* . . ., I, 384.
47 Sermon 44, May 1871.
48 I owe this point to Cormac Rigby.
49 Sermon 44, May 1871.
50 Sermon 99, June 1874.
51 Sermon xlvi, *Sermons Delivered* . . ., 209.
52 Sermon 175, March 1878.
53 Sermon xl, *Sermons Preached* . . ., I, 224. See *Exodus* in volume one of Thring's three volume Bible. In UA.
54 Sermon xli, *Sermons Preached* . . ., I, 233.
55 Sermon 379, September 1887. The emphasis is Thring's.
56 Sermon xli, *Sermons Preached*. . ., I, 233.
57 Sermon x, *Sermons Preached* . . ., I, 47. This is the sermon from the first chapel commemoration service.
58 Sermon 63, March 1872.

59 Sermon 66, April 1872.
60 Sermon 33, September 1870.
61 Sermon cxlix, *Sermons Preached . . .*, II, 398.
62 Sermon cxxxiv, *Sermons Preached . . .*, II, 303.
63 Sermon 54, December 1871.
64 e.g. Sermon 74, December 1873.
65 Sermon 179, July 1878.
66 Sermon 83, May 1873.
67 Sermon 36, September 1870.
68 Sermon xvi, *Sermons Preached . . .*, I, 80.
69 Sermon lxxxviii, *Sermons Preached . . .*, II, 48.
70 Sermon 33, September 1870.
71 Sermon 36, September 1870.
72 Sermon 47, July 1871.
73 Sermon xlvii, *Sermons Delivered . . .*, 212–3. The emphasis is Thring's.
74 Sermon 360, October 1887. This sermon was not delivered.
75 Diary, 15 October 1887. The last entry.
76 The figures are extracted from Cormac Rigby, *The Life and Influence of Edward Thring* (unpublished D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1968), appendix B and T. W. Bamford, *Rise of the Public Schools* (London, 1967), 210ff.
77 W. P. James, *Thring and Uppingham*. Manuscript in UA.
78 Diary , 3 October 1879: G. R. Parkin, *Life and Letters of Edward Thring* (2 vols., London, 1898), II, 96. Only the first and last volumes of Thring's diaries survive: all other diary extracts are taken from Parkin.
79 Rigby, op. cit., ch. 8.
80 Diary, 17 October 1861.
81 Eleanor Rawnsley, *Canon Rawnsley* (Glasgow, 1923), 13.
82 Ibid., 11.
83 Ibid., 12–18.
84 Ibid., 20.
85 Ibid., 26.
86 Ibid., 23.
87 Ibid., 24.
88 Ann Donelly, *Bisham Abbey Village School; Uppingham School; Bedales School: A Family Connection* (typescript, 1974), 15. In UA.
89 Eleanor Rawnsley, op. cit., 27–8.
90 C. Edmund Maurice, *Life of Octavia Hill* (London, 1913), 481, 582; and E. Moberly Bell, *Octavia Hill* (London 1942), 237.
91 William Temple, *Bishop Percival* (London, 1921), 39.
92 H. D. Rawnsley, *Harvey Goodwin* (London, 1896). Goodwin was Bishop of Carlisle from 1869–91: he was a frequent visitor to Uppingham.
93 Eleanor Rawnsley, op. cit., 39.
94 Ibid., 42, 75. Nettleship was killed in a climbing accident on Mont Blanc in 1892. Rawnsley visited the grave there in 1897. Ibid., 75; and H. D. Rawnsley, *Sonnets in Switzerland and Italy* (London, 1899), 149–50.
95 Rawnsley became an Honorary Canon in 1893, Second Canon in 1909, and a Chaplain to the King in 1912.
96 Eleanor Rawnsley, op. cit., 60.
97 Ibid., 156.
98 Ibid., 65–6, 107, 121, 156, 162.

99 Ibid., 65–6.
100 Ibid., 51.
101 Ibid., 49.
102 W. T. Hill, *Octavia Hill* (London, 1956) 125–6.
103 e.g. H. D. Rawnsley, 'Public Land—Footpaths', *Contemporary Review*, (September 1886), 373. This is followed by an article by Robert Hunter, 'Public Land—Commons'.
104 Robin Fedden, *The National Trust—Past and Present* (London, 1974), 18.
105 Ibid., 156. Robert Hunter was 'the backbone', and Octavia Hill was 'the inspiration'.
106 Eleanor Rawnsley, op. cit., 200.
107 His guide books include: *A Coach-drive at the Lakes* (1890); *Life and Nature at the English Lakes* (1899); *A Rambler's Notebook at the English Lakes* (1901); *Sketches at the English Lakes* (1903); *Months at the Lakes* (1906); *Round the Lake Country* (1909); *By Fell and Dale at the English Lakes* (1911); *Chapters at the English Lakes* (1913); *Past and Present at The English Lakes* (1916); *A Nation's Heritage* (1920).
108 His volumes of poetry include: *Moral Rhymes for the Young* (1879); *Lake Country Sonnets* (1881); *Sonnets at the English Lakes* (1882); *Valete, and Other Poems* (1893); *Ballads of Brave Deeds* (1896); *Sonnets in Switzerland and Italy* (1899); *Ballads of War* (1900).
109 Leslie Linder, *A History of the Writings of Beatrix Potter* (London, 1971), 94–5: Margaret Lane, *The Tale of Beatrix Potter* (London, 1968), 46–7.
110 Information received from Geoffrey Simpson of Keswick.
111 Rawnsley's first wife, Edith, died in 1916. He married his second wife, Eleanor, in 1918: she died in 1959, and most of Rawnsley's papers were destroyed soon after.
112 *Uppingham School Magazine*, (1920), 123.

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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTES

Geshe Kelsang Gyatso, *Buddhism in the Tibetan Tradition: A Guide.* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984. pp. 132. £4.95.

Geshe Kelsang Gyatso is one of the Geshes ('Doctors') resident at the Manjushri Institute in Cumbria, and the spiritual director of the Madhyamaka Centre in York. In recent years he has gained a considerable reputation for his published teachings, combining a strict adherence to the traditional Tibetan textual interpretations as presented in his dGe lugs tradition with the oral teachings given in a clear and practical way for Western Buddhists. His previous books in English include a valuable and comprehensive commentary to the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (based on that by rGyal tshab rje) and an exposition of dGe lugs Mahāmudrā, both published by Wisdom Publications. The present text consists of a series of lectures given in York as an introduction to Buddhist theory and practice. Although many of the teachings and meditations could be of benefit to followers of any religion or none, and the book will be of value to anyone who wishes to know what goes on in Dharma Centres of the Tibetan tradition, nevertheless the general flavour of the book is that of 'spiritual reading' for Buddhists, particularly those who have recently started on the dGe lugs path. As such, the title is rather misleading and ambiguous. The book is not a guide to Buddhism in the Tibetan tradition, in the sense of an objective, academic study of Tibetan Buddhism, its historical and intellectual origins, its development, the differences between the Tibetan traditions, and so on. It is rather a guide to practising Buddhism for beginners (and those requiring a refresher course). As His Holiness the Dalai Lama puts it in his Foreword, 'Geshe Kelsang Gyatso has attempted to present the basic teachings of Lord Buddha in a manner that people can relate to and put them into practice in their daily lives'. Having said this, within such an area of concern, the book is quite excellent and will surely be of great benefit to those coming to the tradition with a genuine concern to orientate themselves towards it and put the teachings into practice. At first glance the text may appear to be another *lam rim* work intended for Westerners (cf. works by Geshe Rabten and Geshe Ngawang Dhargyey), but although it includes elements of the *lam rim* teachings (excellent meditations on impermanence and death, discussions of *karma* and rebirth, *bodhicitta*, and a very clear account of emptiness), nevertheless the book is not in itself a systematic step-by-step manual of the *lam rim* type. Rather its principal concern is with presenting basic teachings and meditations within the context of understanding the nature of the mind and transforming it in order to remove unhappiness and generate what H. H. the Dalai Lama has called the 'Good Heart'. Thus Geshe Kelsang Gyatso devotes some time to discussing the nature of the mind, consciousness and mental activity on a model familiar from the Abhidharma texts. Basic meditation instruction ranges from mindfulness of breathing to techniques from the Tantras for purifying defiled energy winds as a contribution towards cutting negative thoughts. The traditional nature of the Geshe's teachings, and the dGe lugs emphasis on debate and reasoning, is particularly in evidence in his discussion of reincarnation. Unlike some Tibetan and Western teachers of

Buddhism who (perhaps out of skill-in-means) de-emphasise the importance of reincarnation to Buddhism, Geshe Kelsang Gyatso states quite clearly that 'true Buddhists' believe in reincarnation, it is fundamental to Buddhism, and to disbelieve in reincarnation is to hold a wrong view which could be a hindrance to further progress in Buddhist practice. He then gives reasons for accepting reincarnation. Some of the arguments are open to question, but the point is that only by genuinely considering the issue, by actually reasoning and searching, can a genuine conviction (or otherwise, of course) occur in the mind of the practitioner. And without a genuine conviction (belief, not necessarily knowledge!) there can be no genuine Buddhism. But spiritual reading is rarely philosophy! Elsewhere it is important to remember the difference between genuine argument and concealed exhortation. On p. 19 we are told that there is no way to increase one's lifespan, as it stands a highly debatable assertion since if I stop smoking, change from beefburgers to bran, and from television to tennis there is a good chance that I will increase my lifespan. Only when one's life is looked at in its entirety might it make sense to say that the lifespan couldn't *then* be increased. That is, when one actually dies then there is no way to increase one's lifespan. And that is a tautology—when you're dead you're dead! Nevertheless the meditation within which this occurs is an extremely powerful practice exhorting one to give genuine meaning to one's life, and practise the Dharma as if there were no tomorrow.

Since this book was originally delivered as lectures, the audience presumably had a chance to ask questions. As Plato pointed out, arguing for the superiority of face-to-face tuition, we can question a teacher whereas we cannot question a book. At one point Geshe Kelsang Gyatso gives what appears to me a rather misleading account of *karma*, a perfect statement of the 'spiritual bank account' so beloved of Buddhism's critics: "If our positive karma is greater than our negative karma, then wherever we will be reborn we will have a joyful life with one pleasure after another. Our present life as well as our future lives will be pleasant. But if we have a greater store of negative karma, our present life will be unhappy and our future lives will also be full of misery') (p. 35). The implication seems to be that so long as the *balance* is in one's favour one will have continual happiness—in other words, although not purified, negative deeds will not in fact have their unpleasant results. But it is *each* deed which has a result of the appropriate type. So if one has done a preponderance of virtuous deeds so one will have a *preponderance* of happiness in exact measure. And I am sure this is what Geshe Kelsang Gyatso meant.

Sanskrit names are sometimes misspelt, and at one point the translator changes from 'root mind' to 'primary mind' for what must surely have been the same Tibetan expression, '*gtso sems*'. The translator also gives us three kinds of 'meaning' to be achieved through Dharma practice; full Enlightenment, self-liberation, and higher rebirth. Dharma Centres and their associated texts are rapidly generating the jargon of any 'in-group'. Strange uses of 'meaning' and 'meaningful' are already becoming established. But again, the Tibetan here must have been '*don*', which indicates the goal, referent, intentional object (Skt. '*artha*') and, through 'concern' and 'referent', sometimes 'meaning' as it is understood in grammar. There would have been no problem in translating here 'three kinds of goal'.

So, generally Dharma Centres will find this a very, very welcome book, which will also be of great use to others who, in the wake of H. H. the Dalai Lama's visit to Britain, wish to know more about practising the Tibetan Buddhist Dharma, and developing within themselves the great goal of compassion and the Good Heart.

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Dermot Killingley, (ed.), *A Handbook of Hinduism for Teachers.* Grevatt and Grevatt, 9 Rectory Drive, Newcastle upon Tyne NE3 1XT. £7.45.

Teaching the kaleidoscope that is Hinduism at any level in schools is a daunting and formidable task even for the small minority of teachers who have had the opportunity of studying Hinduism as part of their training. For the vast majority of teachers (particularly those in primary schools but also that disturbingly high percentage of part-time, non-specialist secondary teachers), who over the last fifteen years have been urged to introduce World Religions into their work, the baffling complexity of Hinduism undermines their confidence and leaves them as non-starters. Yet we now have a considerable number of Hindus in schools throughout Britain who are no longer new arrivals but established members of our community life and all our children have a regular and an extraordinarily rich contact with India through a variety of sources not least the huge amount of beautiful television material shot in the subcontinent. Despite this, very little has been published in Britain to help teachers in any real, practical way to introduce Hinduism into their classrooms.[1]

In 1980, teachers in Newcastle upon Tyne, with the expert guidance of Dr Killingley at Newcastle University, produced a cyclostyled handbook of guidelines on Hinduism as a supplement to their Agreed Syllabus in Religious Education and this aroused such interest outside their authority as to cause their work to be extensively revised, enlarged and published for a much larger national readership and so fill a yawning gap. In its unprepossessing cover, this handbook is a splendid piece of work: short, concise, accurate and clear, so obviously a product of experience and practice, free of high flown theory.

The first fifteen pages on 'Hinduism in the Earlier Years' which forms Part 1 of the book is far too brief according to all those teachers who have borrowed my copy, yet this criticism is a compliment for it is the purpose of handbooks of this kind to start teachers out pursuing their own questions and ideas using the extensive resource lists supplied. Stress is rightly placed on introducing younger children to the 'feel' of Hinduism as well as giving factual background to India and Indian life. Actually most of Part 2, on 'Hinduism in the Later Years', can and will be adapted and used by teachers of younger children, especially the excellent, simple line drawings which capture the style and spirit of the Hindu gods so successfully. Children of all ages find a tremendous fascination in drawing the Hindu gods and it is an activity which breeds time for thoughtful and valuable reflection.

The glossary and pronunciation guide which forms Part 3 of the handbook is most helpful but the guide to resources in Part 4, whilst providing a useful bibliography, largely ignores film and video materials in the audio-visual section although the 'Where to find resources' address list provides most of the sources. In my experience, film and video resources best present the sights and sounds of Hinduism and not to have directed teachers to the better recent materials is regrettable.[2]

This handbook, along with the *British Journal of Religious Education*'s Summer 1984 edition on 'Teaching Hinduism Today', provides British teachers with the sound support and positive encouragement they need to set about enriching and enlarging the quality and quantity of their presentation of Hinduism in the classroom. With its varied, colourful and stimulating tradition, Hinduism has enormous appeal to children at all levels and this handbook will serve both as a resource in itself as well as a guide to resources and should enable teachers using it to introduce and share the delights of the Hindu kaleidoscope with more young people than ever before.

NOTES

1 The only useful pieces I have found are: D. G. Butler, Teaching Hinduism in Secondary Schools, in *Hinduism* (Hinnells and Sharpe, eds) Oriel Press, 1972; and S. C. R. Weightman, Hinduism in Religious Education, in *Perspectives on World Religions*, SOAS, 1978.

2 An American publication catalogues the audio visual material available to teachers of Hinduism in the U.S.A. but almost all the sources quoted are in America: D. Dell, D. M. Knipe, R. A. McDermott, K. W. Morgan, H. D. Smith, *Focus on Hinduism: Audio Visual Resources for Teaching Religion*. Council for Intercultural Studies and Programs, 60 East 42nd Street, New York NY10017. There is a need for an equivalent British publication.

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Haneda Nobuo (trans.), *December Fan. The Buddhist Essays of Manshi Kiyozawa*. Kyoto, Higashi Honganji Publication Department, 1984, 98 pp.

These essays are from the later period of the life of Manshi Kiyozawa (1863–1903), an influential thinker in the Shin Buddhist tradition. Although Kiyozawa drew in the main on the thought of Shinran he was also cognizant of various western philosophers and was well-known in his day as a strenuous intellectual and a leading educator. His work *Outline of a Philosophy of Religion* was published in 1893 in time to be introduced at the World Conference of Religions held that year in Chicago. The presently translated essays however issue from the last few years of his life during which, although he died aged forty, he had experienced numerous tribulations. They reflect a penetrating simplicity in the understanding of both practical and religious matters which stems from deep conviction of the importance of relying absolutely on other-power (*tariki*, here interestingly translated as Power Beyond Self). At the same time the intellectual standard is uncompromising, and this is matched by the sharp clarity of the translation into English. The collection contains essays of particular importance in the further discussion of Kiyozawa's thought in Japan, such as 'My Religious Conviction', taken up later by Tsuneya Wakimoto, and 'Buddhists, Why Do You Lack Self-Esteem?' which was a call to Buddhist renewal. Running through several of the essays but dealt with especially in 'Peace Beyond Ethics' is material relevant to the quietism and moral responsibility in Shin Buddhism, with its rejection of any kind of reliance on self-effort. The difficulty in identifying a universal ethic within Buddhist thinking is here seen in its most radical form. In Kiyozawa's case, the flight to Power Beyond Self may be partly understood in the light of organisational frustrations and personal bereavements which he faced. However the acceptance of prevailing moral convention, in the absence of a specifically Buddhist ethic, seems a high price to pay for the religious freedom achieved.

Sensibly, the book contains a brief introduction to the ideas which influenced Kiyozawa and also a useful summary account of his life. Thus it is a good reader, eminently accessible, in the ideas of a modern representative of Japanese Buddhism who deserves to be better known.

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D. J. Bartholomew, *God of Chance.* London, S.C.M. Press, 1984, pp. ix + 181. £5.95.

This book may be regarded partly as a reply to Jacques Monod's *Chance and Necessity*. The author, who is Professor of Statistical and Mathematical Science at the London School of Economics, argues that the appeal to chance events, so significant in contemporary physics and evolutionary genetics, can be accommodated within a theistic framework. Unlike some other writers (W. G. Pollard, for instance), however, Bartholomew does not see such an appeal as a way of describing our ignorance when in reality all events are determined by the will of God; he dismisses this view as 'neo-determinism'. Rather, he gives chance a positive role, seeing it as a tool employed by God to achieve his purposes, by creating a richer world than would be possible otherwise. For chance in our environment provides the stimulus and testing to promote our spiritual development; and in the reproductive system it ensures the continual appearance of variant forms. Such a view, he claims, does not limit God's ability to achieve his ultimate purposes, for it is possible for random processes to lead to determinate ends, even though the route leading to them is unspecified beforehand. After all, we often make use of chance in human affairs: in games, in devices to ensure fair procedures, and in random sampling. Of course, this view entails that God does not intend or cause every single happening: for Bartholomew has argued that He has chosen to limit His power, knowledge and control over events, because only in a world with real uncertainty can people grow into free and responsible children of God. But it does not preclude His Providence, for besides God's having created the overall system Bartholomew also allows for His working through particular events; though whereas W. G. Pollard saw the sub-atomic world as the primary sphere of God's actions, he sees God as working especially through human creative endeavour, persuading and influencing rather than controlling us.

The strength of the book lies in the lucid and thorough way in which it shows how recent scientific discoveries can be viewed from a theistic perspective. Its weakness lies in its occasional philosophical and theological naivity. Bartholomew assumes for instance, that human freedom entails indeterminacy, and so he fails to discuss compatibilism, i.e. the view that human acts may be caused and yet be free choices. The last chapter in the book is perhaps the weakest, for there Bartholomew tries to cover a large number of theological issues, and ends up in superficiality. His handling of the problem of Evil is typically scrappy: it hinges on the claim that the random events which lead to mutation in the gene and therefore to the advancement of life can also lead to deformity and suffering. But it is unclear how much of human suffering this solution might cover. How many forms of illness could it explain? Bartholomew's discussion is too brief to cover even the obvious questions here. But perhaps others with more philosophical and theological expertise will now build on his valuable contribution.

PATRICK SHERRY
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David C. Fowler, *The Bible in Middle English Literature*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1984, pp. xiii + 326. $25.00.

It is rather difficult to see for whom this book is meant. The dust cover speaks of 'scholars and students of medieval literature and religion and general readers interested in the varied and intriguing ways that the Bible has influenced vernacular literature'. Quite a lot of the text consists of paraphrase interspersed with critical comment and Professor Fowler does this extremely well, just as he is good at summarising background material; for example, Mary Magdalene in both the gospels and the apocryphal tradition where she is fused with other biblical Marys, the woman taken in adultery and the woman of Samaria in John iv. But if the general reader needs the paraphrase—which cannot alert him to the poetry—the scholar will need little more than a reminder. Some of this may be less troublesome for anyone who has read the companion book, *The Bible in Early English Literature* (Sheldon Press) which contains discussions of typology, compendia like the *Cursor Mundi* and the *Polychronicon*, and a lengthy treatment of the stained glass windows in the church of Fairford (Gloucestershire), all of which are simply mentioned here.

We begin with drama and with the Cornish plays. But these, as appears from the later brief discussion of the major cycles, cannot be used as 'a general example of the medieval drama in England' (p. 4) for a variety of reasons: there are three long plays, not a whole cycle; they are possibly by one author, not several; performance was spread over three days, not one; and it was theatre-in-the-round, not on pageant waggons. Nevertheless, the Cornish plays have not been much studied, and Professor Fowler illustrates several of their excellences, such as the creative theatrical use of the legend of Seth to link Old Testament events with the Redemption (the other cycles use the messianic prophecies). The author's explanation of the growth of medieval drama as reflecting the increasing popularity of universal histories is at least as likely as the usual evolutionary theory. Occasionally enthusiasm seems to get the better of exactness: the Brome play of Abraham and Isaac is not *obviously* non-cyclical, nor has it demonstrably discarded typology in the interests of pathos and psychological realism which it certainly has; Mak's claim that his stealing brings him 'More than they that swink and sweat / All the long day' *might* recall the workers in the vineyard, but this drama is full of colloquial alliterative phrases. And can we be sure that the Cornish *Ordinalia* is the earliest of the cycles?

The attempt, in the second chapter, to fit the medieval religious lyrics to the Church calendar seemed to me only partially successful, although it does reveal the surprising paucity of English lyrics on the period between Holy Week (with very few on the Resurrection) and Midsummer Day. In a book of this kind Professor Fowler was obviously correct to focus on content rather than on style. But his discussion of one of those lyrics in which the 'maid' at the beginning becomes the Virgin later on (p. 55) illustrates the danger of a perceived initial ambiguity too easily turning into a cluster of 'latent biblical allusions': the Virgin as a well of mercy 'recalls' the rock in the wilderness from which water poured out and also the waters of Shiloah, while the thorn tree is symbolic of the Redemption, Aaron's rod, the rod of Jesse and the flowering rod of Joseph. To be fair, this is not Professor Fowler's usual manner, but it is strange that he misses tne parallel with the dew on Gideon's fleece in 'I sing of a maiden'. But if the writers had access to the gloss, did all their readers?

'Chaucer's *Parliament of Fowls* and the Hexameral tradition' is the weakest chapter in the book and the author seems uneasily conscious of this. This postulated 'Creation' poem, with its organising principles derived from commentaries on the first chapter of Genesis, a body of exegesis known as the hexameral tradition, is simply not the Chaucer poem we have. There may be a few correspondences, but certainly none of the overt Christian moralisation of (say) Ambrose, and even Fowler admits (p. 134) that the influence is 'so deep that it governs its structure while scarcely ever showing itself on the "surface" of the text'. But the final two chapters are much more relevant and the best in the book. 'The *Pearl* poet' shows clearly how closely these poems follow the biblical account, expanding it imaginatively when Jonah is inside the whale's belly and suggesting Belshazzar's delight in his own wickedness as the motivation for his great feast, a feast of the damned graced by the single clean man, Daniel, just as the rich man's feast at the beginning of *Cleanness* is that of the chosen and marred by one unclean guest. The theological discussion of *Pearl*, which at first might seem excessive for an elegy, in fact produces the emotional reconciliation between father-dreamer and daughter.

Those who know Professor Fowler's earlier work will not be surprised that the final chapter is a sensitive discussion of '*Piers the Plowman* as History', an aspect of the poem which has certainly not been given full and proper emphasis. But history depends on dates and those given here are not (as Fowler readily admits since his interpretation depends on it) those commonly accepted, especially for B. He envisages dual authorship, the A-text by one man and completed before the Peasants' Revolt of 1381, and the B- and C-texts by another, with B perhaps begun c. 1378 but finished only after the Revolt, in 1383. The A-text, concerned for the plight of labourers but not idealising them, expresses 'the ideology that provided the foundation' for the Revolt. Odd phrases from the poem were indeed used as rallying cries, but it seems unlikely that the rebels had any conception—however misguided—of the whole poem. The B-continuation, according to Fowler, shows its reviser's horrified reaction to the violence of 1381. He therefore modified A's anti-intellectual and anti-clerical views, produced a more reasoned criticism of the friars and (an interesting suggestion) modified the roles of Piers and the Dreamer. In B, Piers is removed from centre stage and becomes a symbol of the poet's ideal christian life, while the Dreamer's allegorical questioners and no longer the Dreamer himself often express the poet's own views. All this is persuasive but far from convincing, mainly because sufficient corroborative detail is not (cannot be?) given; in particular we are informed that B's references to the Revolt are 'encoded' and their interpretation here seems forced. Other suggestions are ingenious. Truth promises a pardon to those who really have no need of a pardon, so *a poena and a culpa* is not excessive so much as ironic. The ending of A is contrived, rather than (as usually thought) the result of Langland's confused theology. The B-continuation proceeds, like the drama, from Genesis (passus xi) via patriarchs, prophets, the life, Passion and Resurrection of Christ to the coming of Antichrist and the threat of Doom (xix–xx); the poem is then indeed 'an extension of the Bible'.

This book is the culmination of a lifetime's interest in the Bible and its influence on Middle English literature. It contains several illuminating, occasionally provocative remarks. But it is 'influence' of a general sort, mostly of course from the Vulgate. (Could it sometimes be from the Liturgy or even from the Wycliffite translation? We are seldom told.) When the author quotes the apparent contradiction between Mark xvi 16 and Psalm xxiv 3–4 as the genesis of the problem of the salvation of the righteous heathen, he produces a *source*. When he talks of the poet of *Piers Plowman* crying like Amos for justice in the gate, he is citing a parallel.

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Barry Reay, *The Quakers and the English Revolution*. London, Temple Smith, 1985, pp. 184 + xii. £12.95.

This is a brisk, efficient, clear and readable book about important aspects of the 1650s and 60s. It is too short to do justice to some of its themes and shows distinct signs of being written, if not researched, hurriedly, without sufficient checking of material, perhaps by friendly colleagues, so as to avoid repetitions.

Reay approaches his subject a little detachedly, not being in the tradition of Quakercentric historiography. This helps him all the more readily to locate the origins of the Society of Friends in the 'world turned upside down' of the 1650s—rather than in the internal rythms of 'religious history'. He is, however, unfair to two empathetic historians of Quakerism, Barbour and Nuttall, in claiming that a sole 'concern with the spiritual rather than the social' permeates their work. This, though, is only the fairly harmless practice of advertising one's wares by dumping knocking copy on one's predecessors.

Amongst the snarks hunted by Reay is George Fox. The issue here for historians of Quakerism is the familiar one of Great Man versus rank and file. One careless adjective—Fox as 'the acknowledged founder of the movement'—and the reader's worst fears are aroused that we are about to be treated to a re-run of Fox the lone creative genius. Not so. Dr Reay has been too well brought up, perhaps by Christopher Hill who contributes a forward to the volume, to forget that movements are made by masses. If anything, then, Reay downgrades Fox in favour of an image of collective leadership the rest of whose members Fox out-ranked by out-living them. In this Reay overlooks the fact that longevity can itself be an act of will, and that in any case Fox imposed himself on the movement not through survival alone but through a combination of energy, travel, bullying and organisational as well as spiritual prowess.

Another old chestnut for students of early Quakerism is the emergence of the peace testimony. Clearly, some people cannot for the life of them see how a movement can be revolutionary without being violently revolutionary. Cole, with his 'Pacificism was not a characteristic of the early Quakers', did not help matters much, since pacificism clearly was *a* characteristic, apparent in Fox himself as early as 1650. Reay gets bogged down. He cites Fox' complaint that some 'Quakers' foolish rash spirits' took up arms as evidence of revolutionary militancy: it is just as much evidence that the leadership successfully dismissed the militants as an anti-party faction. Similarly, with Burrough's kind offer to lay down Quaker lives for the Good Old Cause, there is all the difference between laying down lives and taking up arms. In the end, perhaps with the aid of the perceptive remark by Tolles—'there is no such thing as a Quaker attitude' [to politics]—Reay hits about the right note with regard to the peace issue: 'Quaker always believed that the ultimate battle was spiritual'.

In an important and fascinating chapter, Reay discusses and analyses popular hostility to Quakers. He considers the roots of this hostility in village xenophobia, superstition and class enmity. But either the chapter is too short to complete the discussion, or Reay is too mesmerised by the image of the first Friends as deviants, for he seems to forget that they were also proponents of the culture of godliness (which he discusses skillfully in his last chapter) so hated by the lumpenproletariat, as John Walsh's Wesleyan missionaries were to find a century or so after the early Quakers.

This chapter and Reay's chapter 5, on the Quakers and 1659, offer to a wider audience than the readership of learned journals the opportunity to examine the author's stimulating thoughts on the way Quakers were the spearhead of an aborted radical revolution in the late 1650s, one whose real effect was to create a backlash whose beneficiaries were the Stuart monarchy and the Anglican Church. We read of the fatal divisions amongst the godly, with even Baptists preferring the Stuarts to the Quakers; we learn of the *trahison des presbytériens* and of how these guardians of the orthodox Calvinist tradition, in their fear of toleration and its consequences, brought down upon themselves the terrible nemesis of the years after 1660; we see also, however, how at least some of the features of the Clarendon Code were already apparent in England in the late 1650s and we are once again convinced that the Restoration must be dated back to at least 1658.

Apart from the well trod avenues of Fox and his personal contribution, and the inception of Quaker pacificism, writers on Quaker history also like to wander around the topic of the deterioration of the Society of Friends. Both the main schools of thought are pessimist: Quakerism definitely went to the bad. The ultra-pessimists—those who believe that hardly had Quakerism been born than it went to the dogs—subscribe to the view that persecution is bad for religious bodies because it leads to organisation, formalism, all that sort of thing. The moderate pessimists—those who think that the Society declined after 1689—incline to the opinion that toleration is bad for religions, in that it encourages 'bourgeois merchants', the rise of capitalism, ease, affluence and all those other evils that we can never forgive our ancestors for pursuing. Reay belongs to both schools of thought: the rot set in gradually from 1660 to 1700. There is little awareness of his part of the continuance of mission, and of persecution, into the 18th century, or of the fact that, as the long-running Affirmations controversy indicates, there were alternatives to the leadership of the grey-clad *importants* of Bristol and London.

The besetting sin of this book is the tendency to make anecdotes do double or multiple duty. This must be the new frugalism at work: good housekeeping even with data. One could lose count how often Monck dismisses Quakers from the Army of Scotland, always, though, most economically proving something or other. Robert Lilburne's mutinous regiment keeps popping up, Justice Fell protects Quakers with commendable regularity, the former music master turned Quaker Solomon Eccles ignites and re-ignites bonfires of his musical instruments.

There is some carelessness, as seen above, with words: the antique (and Quakerish) 'deny' for 'repudiate', 'Unwilling' when the meaning is 'compulsory'; the Friends certainly didn't 'appropriate' 'Quaker' and one doubts now if they ever will. There are some delightful phrases. Nayler's adherents would certainly have accepted 'The Passion of Nayler'; in the discussion of somnolence in 18th century meetings, it is only slightly inexcusable to write that 'The Seekers had become sleepers.' Less happy is the evening-surgery descripton of Fox's early problems: 'the usual puritan doubts and despairs'. Keep taking the tablets?

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Diane Choquette, *New Religious Movements in the United States and Canada. A Critical Assessment and Annotated Bibliography*, London, Greenwood Press, 1985, pp. xi + 235. £39.95.

The study of new religious movements has progressed by leaps and bounds during the last decade or so. But enter a decent library and it is soon apparent that literature is hard to track down. Books are classified in different subject categories; articles are in journals belonging to a range of disciplines; articles in the popular press might well not be found in even the most well-stocked institutions. Diane Choquette's compilation is thus to be welcomed. Introducing academic approaches (historical, cultural, psychological, psychiatric, theological, religious studies and legal) as well as popular studies and various kinds of reference material, the annotated bibliography is especially useful for researchers outside the USA. With so few American books on the subject advertised or distributed in this country, here is a way of keeping up to date and deciding what to obtain.

But does Choquette provide readers with the information they most require? Choquette's experience is that users of the research collection on which the bibliography is based 'most often inquire after materials on individual cults, issues, or the perspective of a single academic discipline' (p. x). The book is organised accordingly. However, the goal of catering for this variety of readership is only partially met. Tending to concentrate on theoretical contributions, Choquette directs the reader to material which can be readily found by following up references in academic journals and the like. With this emphasis, attention is directed away from where many readers will want to begin—with ethnographic material on particular movements. And it is precisely this more descriptive material that most requires being brought to the attention of interested parties.

The reason for this is that such material is in the main provided by participants of new religious movements, participants who use what are very often the little known presses of the organizations to which they belong. Choquette is perfectly aware of material of this variety. Indeed she writes that 'publications of new religious groups now constitute a vast body of literature, deserving of its own bibliography' (p. x). And she is also aware of its importance, this probably explaining why a number of participant accounts (such as Bharti's *Death Comes Dancing*) are in fact included. Given this one wonders why so many other excellent participant 'ethnographies' (e.g. Rhinehart's *The Book of est*) are not mentioned.

Those paying forty pounds for an annotated bibliography should not receive something so unrealistically abbreviated. There is little or nothing on some of the most important movements (Gurdjieffian 'Work', Rebirthing, for example). And even more academic and theoretical contributions are not systematically covered. Berger is not mentioned (and there is a section on the 'cultural background of new religious movements'); *Influencing Attitudes and Changing Behavior*, by Zimbardo *et al.* is not included; and there is very little on the psycho-spiritual tradition (where are Vitz's *Psychology as Religion* and the Bcbgan's *The Psychological Way/The Spiritual Way*?).

Criticisms aside, Ellwood's 'Introduction' is excellent, few readers will not find avenues to explore, and the annotations are judicious. Most of all, the critical assessments are spot on.

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Michael Newton, *The Concept of Purity at Qumran and in the Letters of Paul*. SNTS Monograph Series, 53, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 171.

Both the Qumran community and earliest Christianity, the latter recorded in Paul's epistles, have as a common factor their existence as two Jewish sects of the pre-70

C. E. period which found expression outside the Jerusalem Temple cult. It is the way in which these two sects apply the purity concept of the cultic system outside the walls of the Temple precinct and interpret it in terms of their own communities that provides Michael Newton with a means of comparison between the two. The claim that the community of believers takes the place of the physical Temple is examined in the Qumran and Pauline literature, and the ideal of ritual purity, containing within it the notion of ethical behaviour, is shown to be an expression of the Spiritual manifestation of the Temple.

In reference to the Pauline material, this comparative study is valuable in elucidating the place of ethics within the scheme of justification by faith. By stressing that the Jewish notion of ritual purity contains in its essence moral imperatives, Paul's call to the faithful to see the community of the church as the Temple of God *has* to mean ethical behaviour for the individual in the light of justification. The Temple is the place of the divine presence and as such it has to remain in a state of purity. One main contrast between the Qumran and Pauline literature which this study brings to light is that in the Pauline scheme the condition of purity comes as a result of entry into a community, whereas in the case of Qumran entrance into the community demands purity as a prerequisite.

This study will not only be an asset to scholars of Qumran and the New Testament, it will be useful also to scholars of early Judaism providing clues to the development of Judaism after the destruction of the second Temple when purity laws had to be applied entirely outside the physical contours of the Temple walls. The theory that this had already begun to happen before 70 C. E. within the Pharisaic movement may reveal that even closer comparisons can be made between Pharisaism, Qumran and the New Testament. This book is a welcome addition to a growing library of New Testament material which is sensitive to the Jewish context of the earliest records of the Christian movement.

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DISCOURSE AND DICHOTOMIES: THE STRUCTURE OF RITUAL THEORY

Catherine Bell

Scholars formulate the interrelationships of religion, society and culture in a variety of ways, yet few contest the primacy of ritual as a clear and definitive component of the processes these terms are meant to describe. Certainly since Robertson Smith's study of ritual sacrifice and community in *The Religion of the Semites*, ritual has had a central role in the theoretical depiction and interpretation of religion.[1] Recently it has become less common to focus on ritual in exploring religion, and more scholars have begun to address ritual as an independent phenomenon with greater scope and wider relevance. However, despite this shift in focus and the variety of methodological perspectives employed, there is a surprisingly consistent tendency to describe ritual in the same way—that is, as a type of critical juncture wherein some pair of opposing social, or cultural, forces come together. Examples include the ritual integration of tradition and change, order and chaos, the individual and the group, subjectivity and objectivity, nature and culture, the real and the imaginative ideal. Whether based on ascribed features such as 'enthusiasm' or 'formalism', ritual is depicted as a mechanistically discrete and particularly paradigmatic means of socio-cultural integration, appropriation or transformation.

Given such consistency, we might join Staal in asking, 'why has it proved so difficult to define the meaning, goals and aims of ritual?'[2] Staal concludes that ritual must be considered fundamentally meaningless. Penner in turn suggests that questions about meaning might well be the wrong questions.[3] With regard to another controversy, Mary Douglas strikes an even more basic note when she observes that 'the more intractable puzzles in comparative religion arise because human experience has been thus wrongly divided'.[4]

This article will address the theoretical depiction of ritual, sort out its divisions of human experience, and attempt to make explicit the questions that have been asked and those that have not. More specifically, it will show theoretical discourse on ritual to be highly structured by the differentiation and subsequent reintegration of two particular categories of human

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experience, thought and action. An exploration of the internal logic of this differentiation and reintegration of thought and action in ritual theory suggests that the role of ritual as an issue in the study of religion and culture is inextricably linked to the construction of a specifically 'cultural' methodology, a theoretical approach that defines and addresses 'cultural' data. That is, the problems we face in analyzing ritual, as well as the impetus for engaging these particular problems, have less to do with interpreting the 'raw' data and more to do with the manner in which we theoretically constitute ritual as the object of a cultural method of interpretation. The argument will subsequently show that the implicit structure of ritual theory, while effective in identifying a distinctive phenomenon for cultural analysis, imposes a powerful limit on our theoretical flexibility, our divisions of human experience, and our ability to perceive the logical relations inscribed within these divisions. The questions raised in this article are meant to be a first step in exploring the place of cultural models in scholarship and their effect on the formulation of issues in the study of religion.

In a classic monograph published over 25 years ago, Goody criticized studies that deploy the terms 'ritual', 'religion' and 'ceremonial' as universal categories of human experience.[5] He argued that the usefulness of such terms lies solely in their application as analytical tools, not as data or assumptions about the nature of the data. He was fully aware, however, that analytical tools tend to slip out of the theorist's hand and come to be identified as the very object he or she wishes to analyze. Such 'slippage', as Bourdieu calls it, led Goody to assert the absolute necessity of challenging the adequacy of our categories.[6] Failure to do so, he stated, would be 'at the expense of the development of the study of human institutions'.[7]

In the last quarter of a century, however, scholars have discovered that theoretical categories are more than mere tools that can be variously wielded with control or arrogance or carelessness. Kuhn's reappraisal of paradigms in scientific inquiry, for example, began to reveal that analytical categories are in the service of more embracing models of the universe and knowledge.[8] More recently, Foucault's historical archeology of discontinuous discourses suggests that analytical tools do not simply 'slip' from a state of objectivity to which they can be returned, but that the nature of objectivity itself rests on particular historical paradigms, or strategies, of human inquiry effective within a specific milieu.[9] Subsequent attempts to 're-legitimate' knowledge have made even more apparent the dynamics involved in the production of particular bodies of knowledge that are based on particular relationships between subject and object.[10] Thus, it is no longer so easy to establish adequate categories by merely defining them as neutral analytical tools.[11] They will not stay neutral, but will conform to whatever purposes the larger analysis serves. We have learned that such categories are merely the most visible of those pieces put into play within discourses whose boundaries, objectives and rules retreat from any conscious grasp. To challenge or even confront the adequacy of our categories today, scholars must attempt to track the dynamics of the discourse in which they operate.[12] We must attempt to recover, that is, some sense of the discursive logic by which these analytical tools function.

This article will focus only on theoretical discussions of ritual. Ethnologies, field studies and truly 'thick descriptions' of particular rites rarely succumb to any significant degree to the systematic division of human experience evidenced in theoretical studies. Yet the very divergence in this regard between theoretical formulations and descriptive studies is germane to the issues raised here.[13] Ultimately, such a divergence may well support the recent contention that anthropology and ethnology constitute two distinct disciplines.[14]

The argument is laid out in several sections: Sections 1 and 2 introduce and describe two ways in which the thought–action dichotomy comes to structure ritual theory. In the first type of structural pattern, for example, ritual is simply assumed to be activity and thereby distinguished from thought. In the second pattern, however, ritual is cast as a formal mechanism for the reintegration of thought and action. Sections 3 and 4 present a third permutation of the dichotomy, the existence of which testifies to a homology in which the opposition and resolution of the thought–action dichotomy, depicted within ritual, sets up an opposition and resolution between the theorist and the ritual actor. The generation of this type of homology makes the study of ritual appear to provide a special entré into the social life of other communities. Section 5 looks at some aspects of the influence of this approach to ritual on the development of 'performance' theory in recent years. Finally, the roles and ramifications of ritual theory in cultural studies are addressed in the final section.

1. *THOUGHT AND ACTION*

Theoretical descriptions of ritual generally regard it as activity, and thus automatically distinguish ritual from the conceptual aspects of religion, such as beliefs or myths. In some cases, added qualifications may soften the distinction, but rarely do such descriptions question the immediate differentiation of their object. These descriptions assume the usefulness of distinguishing what is thought from what is done. Likewise, beliefs, creeds and myths emerge as forms of mental content or as conceptual blueprints: they direct, inspire or promote activity, but they are not activities themselves.[15]

Sometimes, typological clarity will push such differentiations to the extreme. Ritual is then described as particularly *thoughtless* action—routinized, habitual, obsessive or mimetic—or as the purely formal, secondary, and mere physical expression of logically prior conceptual orientations. That is, ritual acts out, expresses or performs the beliefs, world view or values of a group.

This initial structural pattern differentiates ritual from mental categories as readily as we are apt to distinguish action from thought. However, there is a second structural pattern in theoretical discussions of ritual as well. This second pattern describes ritual as a type of functional or structural mechanism to reintegrate the thought–action dichotomy, which usually appears in the guise of a distinction between belief and behavior or any number of other homologous pairs. These two structural patterns are apparent in the following representative approaches to ritual.

Durkheim, for example, states that religion is composed of beliefs and rites, rites being secondary and merely expressing beliefs.[16] In his important discussion of cult at the end of *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, however, Durkheim shows the need to reintroduce ritual as the means by which collective beliefs and ideals are simultaneously generated, experienced and affirmed by the community and, therefore, as the means by which individual perception and behavior are socially conditioned.[17] In this model, ritual activity constitutes the necessary interaction between the collective representations of social life (as a type of mental or meta-mental category) and individual experience and behavior (as a category of activity).

In another, loosely structural, model employed with sophistication by Tambiah and, perhaps, more simplistically, by Peacock among others, ritual is provisionally distinguished as the synchronic, continuous, traditional, or ontological in opposition to the diachronic, changing, historical, or social. Yet ritual is subsequently portrayed as the arena in which such pairs of forces interact, that is, as the mediating process by which the synchronic comes to be re-expressed in terms of the diachronic and vice versa.[18]

A third model, presented most fully in the early work of Turner, initially describes ritual as the affirmation of communal unity in contrast to the frictions, constraints and competitiveness of social life and organization.[19] Rite affords a creative 'anti-structure' that is distinguished from the rigid maintenance of social orders, hierarchies and traditional forms. However, when subsequently portrayed as embodying both aspects of structure and anti-structure, rituais are those special, paradigmatic activities that mediate or orchestrate the necessary and opposing demands of both *communitas* and the formalized social order.

Each of these examples employs the two structural patterns described above: ritual is first differentiated as a discrete object of analysis by means of various dichotomies that are analogous to thought and action; subsequently, ritual is elaborated as the very means by which these dichotomous categories are reintegrated.

These structural patterns are rarely explicit. And the first, in particular, in which ritual is differentiated from conceptual categories, is routinely taken for granted. However, the relationship that develops between these two patterns when they are simultaneously operative in a theoretical description of ritual is even less acknowledged and thus all the more powerful. In effect, the dichotomy that isolates ritual on the one hand and the dichotomy that is mediated by ritual on the other become loosely homologized with each other. Ultimately, as we will see, the underlying dichotomy between thought and action continues to push for a loose systemization of these homologized dichotomies, including among them the relations between the ritual observer and the ritual actor. Indeed, it is this invisible process of 'homologization', driven by the implicit presence of an opposition between conceptual and behavioral categories, that begins to construct a persuasive and apparently logical body of discourse.

2. *DICHOTOMIES AND DIALECTICS*

Jameson has analyzed a type of logical structure within theoretical discourse that is similar to the patterns sketched out above for ritual theory.[20] It is useful to contrast the structure he isolates with the one being recovered here.

Jameson points to a logical structure in which an initial differentiation, originally proposed to enable the theorist to concentrate on just one of the differentiated terms, surfaces again and again within the subsequent analysis of that term. Specifically addressing Saussure's system of linguistics, Jameson shows that an initial distinction between structure and history (synchrony and diachrony) enables Saussure to focus upon and systematically elucidate one aspect of language, the synchronic or structural aspect. However, Saussure never resolves or transcends the dichotomy between synchrony and diachrony, but reproduces it even in the final terms of his system.[21] How does such a replication occur?

In reaction against historicism in linguistics, Jameson explains, Saussure attempted to talk about the non-historical aspects of language. On a primary level, he distinguished between diachrony and synchrony, thereby giving himself a focus on the synchronic side of linguistics as opposed to the other side where, he argued, everyone else was working. On a second level and, therefore, within the synchronic system itself, Saussure also distinguished between langue and parole in order to differentiate further synchronic language from speech, and therein had his first internal replication of the original opposition. On yet a third level, Saussure took langue as a system and within it distinguished two ways in which signs are related, the syntagmatic and the associative (or paradigmatic), replicating his original dichotomy for a second time within the system as a whole.[22] The original differentiation between diachrony and synchrony is applied, through various pairs of categories, to three levels of analysis. In other words, the continual application of the dichotomy between synchrony and diachrony systematically generates successive and homologous levels of analysis.

At this point, however, Jameson raises a telling question:

> [I]t becomes problematical to what degree the object of study is the thought pattern of the linguist himself, rather than that of the language, and we here more clearly perceive the moment in which the originality of Saussure's point of departure returns to limit his results: for that initial repudiation of history, which at the very outset resulted in an inability to absorb change into the system as anything but a meaningless and contingent datum, is now reproduced, at the very heart of the system itself, as an inability to deal with syntax as such.[23]

Theoretical discourse on ritual displays a similar logical structure: a distinction between belief and rite, made as readily as the heuristic distinction between thought and action, clears the way to focus on ritual alone. Ritual, in turn, becomes a new starting point at which to differentiate again between conceptual and behavioral components.

However, ritual theory makes a rather distinctive move when replicating the dichotomy between thought and action. Differentiated from belief, ritual becomes a second point at which to distinguish thought and action because it is cast as the very mechanism by which such components are integrated. The elaboration of ritual as a mechanism for fusion simultaneously serves both to differentiate and unite a set of terms. That is, the second structural pattern in ritual theory, in which ritual mediates thought and action, posits a dialectical relation between the differentiated entities instead of replicating an unmediated dichotomy. Ritual emerges as the means for a provisional synthesis of some form of the original opposition.

Saussure generated his linguistic system by positing an initial distinction, the successive and systematic replication of which rendered the distinction an ahistorical, undialectical or pure opposition.[24] Most ritual theory avoids this by incorporating the notion of dialectic or synthesis: ritual is a dialectical means for the provisional convergence of those opposed forces whose interaction is seen to constitute culture in some form.

The three representative models of ritual described above clearly present ritual as just such a medium of integration or synthesis for opposing sociocultural forces. These are not isolated examples. There is a strong impetus within theoretical studies of religion and culture for this type of dialectic, as can be seen in contemporary evaluations of Durkheim's theory of ritual. Some argue that his notion of ritual contains a dialectical mediation of the social and the individual, others argue that its fundamental weakness is precisely that his notion of ritual lacks such a dialectic. For example, Evans-Pritchard pinpoints Durkheim's theory of ritual as the central but 'most obscure' and 'unconvincing' part of his notion of society and religion.[25] Munn, on the other hand, finds it to be of 'signal importance' for ritual studies today.[26] She argues that Durkheim developed a model of 'social (ritual) symbolism as the switch point between the external moral constraints and groupings of the socio-political order, and the internal feelings and imaginative concepts of the individual actor'.[27] Though it is precisely the nature of this switch point that Evans-Pritchard finds obscure, Munn is clearly attempting to find rooted in Durkheim a dialectical relationship between two irreducible entities, the individual's subjective state and the communal order, a dialectic mediated therefore by the collective representations.

Sahlins specifically argues that Durkheim's collective representations fail to mediate at all. Rather, as idealized representations of social values and structures, they merely act upon subjective states to mold them. For Sahlins, Durkheim's collective representations cannot really mediate or rearticulate individual experience within social categories, they simply appropriate and organize it in a 'metalanguage'.[28]

Lévi-Strauss has suggested, in a somewhat similar argument, that Durkheim lacked an 'adequate' notion of a symbol and symbolic action.[29] That is, functioning as mere signs instead of symbols, the collective representations are idealizations of the forms of social morphology that have become independent of these forms, thus acting solely to subordinate and structure individual perception and experience.[30]

Ultimately, it appears that Sahlins and Lévi-Strauss find Durkheim's theory of cult and ritual action less than 'complete' for two reasons: first, it does not generate a level of cultural analysis as such; and second, it does not overcome the fundamental duality that surfaced for Durkheim even in his portrayal of human nature itself. Durkheim states:

> This is the objective foundation of the idea of the soul: Those representations whose flow constitutes our interior life are of two different species which are irreducible one into another. Some concern themselves with the external and material world; others, with an ideal world to which we attribute a moral superiority over the first. So we are really made up of two beings facing in different and almost contrary directions, one of whom exercises a real pre-eminence over the other. Such is the profound meaning of the antithesis which all men have more or less clearly conceived between the body and the soul, the material and the spiritual beings who coexist within us.[31]

We can see in these arguments the tendency to isolate two types of socio-cultural processes or entities and then to seek in ritual theory a model of their necessary reintegration. Indeed, given any initial avowal or assumption of such differentiated processes, a theoretician would have to come up with some phenomenon structured to mediate them if it did not already exist. I am, of course, suggesting two things: that such a theoretical depiction of ritual has been constructed according to a logic rooted in the dynamics of theoretical speculation, and that the unconscious manipulation of the thought–action dichotomy is intrinsic to this construction.

Saussure could not see how his initial distinctions radically limited the descriptive power of his system. Likewise, we do not see how such dichotomies as continuity and change, individual experience and social forms, beliefs and behavior, etc. invoke an assumption about thought and action that runs particularly deep in the intellectual traditions of Western culture. We do not see that we are wielding a particularly powerful analytical tool, nor do we see how our unconscious manipulation of it is driven not only by the need to resolve the dichotomy it establishes, but both to affirm and resolve the more fundamental opposition it poses—the opposition between the theoretician and the object of theoretical discourse. In other words, we do not see how such dichotomies contribute to the relational definition of a knower, a known and a particular type of knowledge.

3. *THE WINDOW OF RITUAL*

To clarify the relationship between dichotomies and dialectics within the structure of ritual theory, we need to give a fuller example of how a system of ritual discourse is generated. The work of Geertz provides an excellent extended illustration for this purpose. Geertz has been a major influence in the history of religions and a navigator for many through the shoals and reefs of methodological issues. This is due in part to the symmetry of his terminology, its appeal to commonsense, and his richly anecdotal ethnographies in which texture and nuance appear to defy enthographic reductionism.

Geertz maintains that the thrust of his theoretical approach is the explantion of 'meaning' in cultural phenomena.[32] With this focus he wishes to go beyond the functional or mechanistic analyses of human activity that he correlates with the reductionism of subordinating either the social to the cultural or vice versa.[33]

Basic to his work is a distinction between 'ethos' and 'world view'. Ethos designates the moral and aesthetic aspects of a culture—a people's 'underlying attitude toward themselves and their world'.[34] Elsewhere Geertz describes ethos in terms of 'dispositions', defined not as activity, but as the likelihood of activity taking place under certain circumstances. Such dispositions are, in turn, further differentiated into two kinds: moods and motivations.[35] World view, on the other hand, indicates for Geertz the 'cognitive, existential aspects' of a culture, a people's sense of the reality real, their most comprehensive idea of a general order of existence.[36] Understood in this way, these two terms clearly lend themselves to a polarization in which ethos is to world view as action is to thought.

At times Geertz explicitly correlates religious ritual with ethos and religious belief with world view, thus invoking the first structural pattern in which ritual is taken for activity in contrast to belief as thought.[37] At other times he presents ethos and world view as synthesized, fused or stored in symbols that are arranged in various systems, patterns or control mechanisms such as ritual, art, religion, language and myth.[38] However, these systems do not only 'store' a synthesis of ethos and world view, they are also seen to effect it in some way, as Geertz argues with regard to ritual: '. . . any religious ritual no matter how apparently automatic or conventional . . . involves this symbolic fusion of ethos and world view'.[39] Here we see the second structural pattern in which ritual involves the integration of thought and action categories.

The dialectical nature of this fusion of ethos and world view is made clear in Geertz's related discussion of symbolic systems such as religion, which involve both 'models for' and 'models of' reality. These systems are 'culture patterns'. They 'give meaning, that is, objective form, to social and psychological reality both by shaping themselves to it and by shaping it to themselves'.[40] With regard to ritual *per se*, Geertz describes this type of dialectic as follows:

> It is in some sort of ceremonial form—even if that form be hardly more than the recitation of a myth, the consultation of an oracle, or the decoration of a grave—that the moods and motivations which sacred symbols induce in men and the general conceptions of the order of existence which they formulate for men meet and reinforce one another. In ritual, the world as lived and the world as imagined, fused under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms, turns out to be the same world.[41]

Here the simplest ritual activities are seen to 'fuse' a people's conception of order and their disposition (moods and motivations) for action. For Geertz, this opposition of conceptions and dispositions, or the world as imagined and the world as lived, constitutes cultural life per se. Moreover, perception and analysis of their opposition and resolution constitute a theoretical explanation of 'meaning' in culture. Indeed, failure to grasp the interaction of these two fundamentally differentiated categories is tantamount to the reductionism that Geertz specifically decries, the reductionism of the social to the cultural or the cultural to the social. Thus, the dichotomous nature of conceptions of order (world view) and dispositions for action (ethos) is fundamental to Geertz's approach, as is their resolution in such symbolic systems as ritual.[42] Resolution is cast as the central dynamic of cultural life.

Although, Geertz has, thus far, simply invoked the two structural patterns discussed earlier, he reveals the further implications of his model of ritual when he goes on to explain that cultural performances such as religious ritual are 'not only the point at which the dispositional and conceptual aspects of religous life converge *for the believer*, but also point at which the interaction between them can be most readily examined *by the detached observer*'.[43]

What does he mean by this? Since ritual enacts, performs or objectifies religious beliefs (action gives expression to thought) and in so doing actually fuses the conceptual and the dispositional aspects of religious symbols (ritual integrates thought and action), Geertz is concluding that ritual offers a special vantage point for the theorist to observe these processes. To see what Geertz actually intends by this statement, we need to question why ritual in particular so facilitates the theorist's project. Let us trace the homologizations that push his argument forward.

Outsiders, states Geertz, will see in ritual only the mere presentation of a particular religious perspective which they may appreciate aesthetically or analyze scientifically.[44] Neither response, he implies, penetrates to the real meaning and dynamics of such a cultural phenomenon. For participants, on the other hand, rites are 'enactments, materializations, realizations' of a particular religious perspective, 'not only models of what they believe, but also models for the believing of it'.[45] Thus the outsider has only conceptual categories with which he or she approaches the ritual activity. Participants, however, experience in rite the integration of their own conceptual framework and dispositional imperatives. In this argument, Geertz sets up a third structural pattern and a third permutation of the thought–action dichotomy. That is, ritual participants act, while those observing them think. Yet in so far as the outside theorist can perceive in ritual the true basis of its meaningfulness for the ritual actors—i.e. its fusion of conceptual and dispositional categories—then the theorist can go beyond mere thoughts about activity to grasp the meaningfulness of the ritual. By seeing this mechanism of meaningfulness for participants, the theorist in turn can grasp its meaningfulness as a cultural phenomenon. That is, it can then become meaningful to the theorist. Thus, a cultural focus on ritual activity renders the rite a veritable window on the most important processes of cultural life.[46]

Slipping in by virtue of its homologization with the other two structural patterns, the third one organizes the argument in such a way that the theoretical explanation of 'meaning' is itself a fusion of thought and action—the theorist's thought (conceptual categories) and the activity of the ritual participants (which is also a fusion of conceptions and dispositions in its own right). Herein lies the implicit structural homology: the fusion of thought and action described in ritual is homologized to a fusion of the theoretical project and its object, ritual activity.[47] Both generate 'meaning'.

4. *DISCRETE EXHIBITIONISM*

Geertz goes on to discuss how an appreciation of the convergence of conceptual and dispositional categories effected by ritual enables one to understand the way in which people regard their religion as 'encapsulated in these discrete performances which they (can) exhibit to visitors and themselves'.[48] He quotes another well-known passage by Singer:

> Whenever Madrasi Brahmins (and non-Brahmins, too, for that matter) wished to exhibit to me some features of Hinduism, they always referred to, or invited me to see, a particular rite or ceremony in the life cycle, in a temple festival, or in the general sphere of religious and cultural performances. Reflecting on this in the course of my interviews and observations I found that the more abstract generalizations about Hinduism (my own as well as those I heard) could generally be checked, directly or indirectly, against these observable performances.[49]

Singer's comments are offered as the discovery of an insightful method. They are also an example of the naturalness of the thought–action dichotomy in ritual disclosure. Let us examine his statement in detail.

First, in regard to Hinduism, the Hindus have rites that they can enact or exhibit, while the researcher has concepts that can be thought or talked about. As a consequence of this distinction, the particularity of any one ritual is contrasted with the more embracing, abstract generalizations of the researcher.

Second, such rites are not only very particular enactments of Hinduism (which, for the researcher, is a type of conceptual totality), they are portrayed as enactments exhibited to outsiders for evaluation or appropriation in terms of the outsiders' more purely theoretical knowledge.

Third, because enactment of the rite is already implicitly construed as effecting an integration for participants between a supposed conceptual totality (Hinduism) and the practical needs of a particular time and place (the dispositions within the ritual context), the researcher easily sees in the exhibition of these rites for theoretical interpretation an equally effective convergence of theory and practice on another level.

Thus, a model of ritual based upon our two structural patterns—in which ritual is both activity and the fusion of thought and activity—ultimately involves a third pattern, one in which the dichotomy underlying a thinking theorist and an acting actor is both affirmed and resolved. It is this homologization that makes ritual appear to provide such a vantage point on culture and the real meaningfulness of cultural phenomena.

To question Geertz's or Singer's appreciation of the way that ritual obliges the detached observer is to discover that ritual does so by virtue of those very features by which it has been theoretically constituted in the first place.

And again we are faced with the question raised by Jameson: to what extent is the object of study the thought pattern of the theorist rather than the supposed object, ritual?

We have seen in Geertz's work not only the two patterns of the thought-action dichotomy described in Section 2, but a third one also. First of all, ritual was said to dramatize, enact, materialize or perform a system of symbols. This formulation invokes the notion that activity is a secondary, physical manifestation or expression of thought. Secondly, by enacting the symbolic system, ritual was said to integrate two irreducible aspects of symbols, the conceptual (world view) and the dispositional (ethos). In this way a thought–action dichotomy is inscribed within the opposing socio-cultural forces Geertz isolates, to be subsequently resolved in the performance of the rite. On a third level, and in a third structural pattern, ritual as performance likewise enables the integration of the theorist's abstract conceptual categories and the particularity of the rite. Here the thought-action dichotomy has differentiated ritual as activity from the thought of the theorist, while casting the resolution of this opposition in a theoretical grasp of the 'meaning' of the ritual. What constitutes 'meaning' for the ritual actors, the integration of their conceptual and dispositional orientations which takes place in ritual, is the same model of 'meaning' for the theorist, i.e. the integration of his or her conceptual categories with the ritual dispositions of the actors.

To restate the structure of this argument more formally is to make ludicrously explicit a type of logic that is effective only when left unexamined. Most simply, ritual is to the symbols it dramatizes as action is to thought; on a second level, ritual integrates thought and action; and on a third level, a focus on ritual performances integrates our thought and their action. The opposition of the theorist and the object becomes homologized with two other oppositions, namely, the opposition that differentiates ritual (beliefs versus activities) and the opposition of two fundamental socio-cultural forces that is resolved by ritual (conceptual versus dispositional forces). This homology is achieved by a hidden appeal to a type of common denominator, the opposition of thought and action. In the end, a model of ritual that integrates opposing socio-cultural forces becomes homologized to a mode of theoretical discourse that reintegrates the dichotomy underlying the identification of a thinking theorist and an acting object.

However, this type of expedient logic carries another inevitable corollary, namely, that theories of ritual which attempt to integrate thought and action in any guise simultaneously function to keep them differentiated. That is, this type of discourse on ritual not only constructs a model that integrates a thinking observer and an acting object, but works at the same time to distinguish them clearly. Thus, the 'resolution' of a dichotomy functions as an affirmation of the polarity of the terms involved. The implications, therefore, of differentiating a subject and object on the basis of thought and action are striking and present ramifications that will be addressed in Section 4. At this point, let us use a final example drawn from Geertz to illustrate further the circular logic that characterizes such homologies.

In his study of a Javanese funeral ceremony, Geertz ventures to analyze 'a ritual which failed to function properly'.[50] The analysis is simple and compelling. He begins by discussing the inability of functionalism to deal with social change and transformational social processes.[51] The reason for this, he suggests, is the tendency of functional theory to identify social conflict as disintegration and to treat sociological and cultural processes unequally, reducing either one to the other.[52] Such reductionism makes it impossible to articulate social change, which arises in 'the failure of cultural patterns to be perfectly congruent with the forms of social organizations'.[53]

Thus, to develop theoretical tools capable of analyzing social change, Geertz wishes to distinguish clearly between culture and the social system. He defines culture 'as an ordered system of meaning and of symbols, in terms of which social interaction takes place'. The social system, on the other hand, is 'the pattern of social interaction itself'.[54] The conceptual–dispositional nature of this distinction is made apparent when he further describes them as a 'framework of beliefs' in contrast to ongoing processes of 'interactive behaviour'. Culture is the set of meaningful terms people use for interpretation and guidance; social system is the actual 'form that action takes'.[55]

With these categories and a great deal of contextual detail, Geertz analyzes the particular 'failure' of funeral services held after the sudden death of a young boy. He considers the funeral rites to have failed for the following reasons: first, they heightened tension and distress in the community rather than producing the usual effects of *iklas*, a detached acceptance of death, and *rukun*, communal harmony; second, the usual Islamic procedures were not followed due to a local officiant's sense of conflict between these practices and the politics of a new group to which the household of the boy belonged; and third, the modifications desperately introduced in order to proceed with a funeral of some sort were *ad hoc*, unauthorized, and initiated by individual enterprise rather than by consensus.[56]

Geertz concludes that the conflict which surfaced in the funeral was the result of growing discontinuity between the community's cultural framework of beliefs and the actual patterns of social interaction. That is, they were urbanites who still thought like villagers, expecting village values to fit increasingly urban forms of organization behind which quite different values were actually operative.[57] Geertz argues that a conflict between the community's cultural categories (their beliefs and values) and their customary social behavior (group affiliation) emerged in the funeral.

This example illustrates the expedient homologizing and collapsing of levels of analysis that can make such an interpretation appear so effective. Geertz's initial discussion contrasts the 'functionalism' of sociological and social-psychological approaches with an approach that can articulate the dynamics of change in positive terms. Within the space of just a few paragraphs, however, these contrasting analytical perspectives have been rendered loosely equivalent to a distinction between sociological and cultural processes that Geertz argues should be considered independently and treated equally. These processes are then described as the forces that are mobilized and brought to confrontation in ritual. Since a ritual that does not work is identified as one in which cultural and sociological categories are experienced as discontinuous, we are led to assume that successful rituals are those in which these terms or forces are 'perfectly congruent'.

Geertz has done two things in this analysis. First, the two methodological perspectives (the sociological and the cultural) have been homologized with a pair of analytical categories (culture and the social system, as defined by Geertz), which were then found to be those very sundered forces underlying the dynamics of the unsuccessful ritual. This is a collapse of three levels and an implicit identification of three sets of oppositions. Ultimately, the discontinuity affirmed in the conclusion is a direct replication of the differentiation established in the beginning.

Second, there are some implications for ritual. Geertz's usual model of ritual is upheld in this analysis by the implication that a successful ritual is one in which the differentiated forces of culture and social system can be effectively integrated. In addition, however, if an unsuccessful ritual effects change, then a successful one maintains stasis or no change. Thus, in Geertz's analysis, ritual as an integrative mechanism is also a synchronic force within the society, rendering it roughly equivalent to what he considers 'culture'. Although it is fairly clear that Geertz wants to conclude that ritual facilitates change, he is logically kept from such a conclusion by the description of this rite as a 'failure' and by the pure oppositions that such an unsuccessful ritual leaves unresolved.

5. *PERFORMANCE*

In recent years the notion of 'cultural performance' has become increasingly popular. Growing in part out of Turner's notion of social drama, the multiplication of categories like 'civil ceremonial' and 'secular rites', Goffman's work on games, or Searle and Austin on speech acts, this approach has signalled a strong dissatisfaction with the categories and posture of ritual studies.[58] Some performance theorists have hoped 'to transcend such conventional dichotomies as oral and written, public and private, doing and thinking, primitive and modern, sacred and secular'.[59] And it seems clear that such dichotomies and their manipulation have contributed to the perception that theoretical analysis is failing to convey something important about how ritual activities are generated and experienced. Grimes rues how 'foreign' ritual has become for us, while Turner quotes D. H. Lawrence's quip, 'analysis presupposes a corpse'.[60] Turner, in particular, has argued that a 'living quality frequently fails to emerge from our pedagogics'.[61]

To many the notion of performance appears to offer a solution. The more cautious position is set out by Lewis, a British anthropologist. According to Lewis, our tendency to be preoccupied with the intellectual aspects of responses to ritual (that is, deciphering the meaning of its coded messages) leads us to overlook more immediate sensory responses. He suggests 'likening' ritual to the performance of a play or a piece of music, but cautions against using such insights into ritual to 'define' it.[62] Most performance theories, however, will either closely identify ritual and performance, or invoke performance as an approach to cultural events among which ritual constitutes some type of subset.

Yet the contributions of performance theory and terminology to the formulation of an approach that does not dichotomize doing and thinking remain somewhat obscure. Indeed, as a whole, this approach appears to suggest a further exaggeration of the structured relations between thinking theorist and acting object which we already examined. The groundwork for a truly alternative structuring of these fundamental relationships does not seem to be laid in performance theory.

Victor Turner's work on performance, for example, remains very much within the framework of his early theory of ritual, where rite, as the transformational dialectic of structure and anti-structure (or organization and *communitas*), serves as a 'vehicle' for unfolding social dramas.[63] Social dramas are embodied in ritual, where they have 'paradigmatic' functions that make clear the deepest values of the culture. In Turner's analysis, such paradigmatic functions also serve to provide the outsider with a 'limited area of transparency in the otherwise opaque surface of regular, uneventful social life'.[64] This is the same 'window of ritual' described by Geertz.

Performance theorists also frequently cite Singer on two basic and interrelated points: first, that people 'think of their culture as encapsulated within discrete performances, which they can exhibit to outsiders as well as to themselves'; and second, that such performances constitute for the outside observer 'the most concrete observable units of the cultural structure', because each performance 'has a definitely limited time span, a beginning and an end, an organized programme of activity, a set of performers, an audience, and a place and occasion of performance'.[65] Such statements, however, are simply the blanket application of a whole system of terms and relations and assumptions, rather than the development of a coherent argument for a method of 'performance analysis'.

Singer does not merely construct an approach to ritual that guarantees direct access to native units of experience and clear observation of sociocultural processes, he also defines culture itself in terms of those activities that appear to provide such clear access and observation. Cultural performances are the ways in which the culture content of a tradition 'is organized and transmitted on particular occasions through specific media . . .'.[66] Thus, these performances are the specific and particular manifestations, i.e. the only 'instances', of culture aside from which culture remains an abstract category.[67]

Moreover, if culture is the giving of performances, then culture is what is given to an 'audience' or to the outside theorist who has joined it. Researchers and theorists come to be repositioned in performance theory: no longer peering in the window, they are now comfortably seated as members of the audience for whom the performance is being presented. And as such, the observer has become a type of participant, integral to the actors' ability to act culturally (that is, perform) and to understand their own culture (which is the result of expressing it in discrete ritual activities).

Performance theory appears to promote yet another mode of participation. In discussing ritual and social drama, for example, Turner calls for the 'performance of ethnography' by both anthropologists and professional actors.[68] MacAloon refers to the 'performance' given by academic participants at a symposium that resulted in the book he subtitled 'Rehearsals Toward a Theory of Cultural Performance'.[69] Grimes finds that the activities of scattered experiments in improvisational theater are 'crucial both to the practice and study of religion, particularly ritual studies'.[70]

Not only does performance theory fail to offer any new options for approaching ritual, as a paradigm for understanding activity of any kind it may well be gravely disadvantaged in two ways: first, by the increased naturalization of the outside observer that is obtained in the very defining of an act as performance. Such an approach takes the relationship between subject and object and inscribes it into the nature of the object itself, making the subject's position seem a natural one in regard to such an object.

Second, the same problem surfaces here that Goody addressed 25 years ago and that occurred in Geertz's analysis of the unsuccessful Javanese funeral, i.e. that slippage by which tools, terms and categories of analysis come either to reside in the object itself or to function as descriptive of the object itself. The notion of performance as a theoretical tool for approaching certain activities comes to be used as descriptive of the fundamental nature of those activities; a model for ritual activity comes to act as the criteria for what is or is not ritual.

6. *CONCLUSION*

This article suggests that most theoretical discourse on ritual is structured by an underlying opposition between thought and action. Though initially employed to afford a heuristic focus on ritual as a type of activity, this fundamental dichotomy helps to generate a series of homologized oppositions that come to include the relationship between the theorist and the actor. Thus, ritual is simultaneously portrayed as mediating or integrating these oppositions.

Constituting ritual in this way involves a particular structuring of the subject's relationship with its object. That is, the thought–action dichotomy not only differentiates ritual-as-activity as an object of theoretical attention, it also differentiates a 'thinking' subject from an 'acting' object—or, when pushed to its logical conclusion, a 'thinking' subject from a 'non-thinking' object. Then, in the same way that ritual is seen to reintegrate thought and action in some form, discourse on ritual is seen to afford special access to cultural understanding by integrating the subject's thought and the object's activities.

As argued above, this discursive structure can be delineated in a series of structural patterns. In the first, ritual as activity is differentiated from conceptual categories. In the second, ritual is the cultural medium by which thoughts and acts (or concepts and dispositions, beliefs and behavior, etc.) are reintegrated. In the third, the activities of the object (the actors) and the concepts of the subject (the theorist) are also integrated by means of a discursive focus on the integrative function of ritual.

These patterns are not 'logical' in the usual sense of the term. Rather, an initial and often unconscious assumption—to think about ritual as a type of activity—invokes a powerful dichotomy between thought and action, which in turn helps to generate a discourse that is loosely structured but effectively systematized by the expedient logic of homologized levels.[71]

It is possible that the whole structure of theoretical discourse on ritual primarily serves to solve the problems posed for scholars by their reliance on a distinction between thought and action. It is a distinction used not only to differentiate project and object, method and data, or theory and facts, it also seems essential to any so-called 'theoretical' project in the first place. Thus, an implicit use of the dichotomy may well determine the real structural problems that remain.

Perhaps, the initial generation of polarized distinctions and their subsequent homologous replication is inevitable in the process of analysis. Indeed, dichotomization and the systems of practical homologies that such dichotomies can generate are thought to be integral to those fundamental processes of differentiation involved in perception, cognition and human activity in general. However, a closed and highly structured discourse may be necessary only in an attempt to generate and secure bodies of knowledge that have a particular function with regard to the knower and the known: they set up a relationship based on differentiating one from the other while inscribing the basis for this differentiation into the nature of the object itself, i.e. reality.[72]

In a more final analysis, the results of such a differentiation between thought and action cannot be presumed to provide an adequate position *vis à vis* human activity as such. Naturally, as scholars have argued before, the differentiation tends to distort not only the nature of the so-called physical activities, but the nature of mental ones as well. Yet the most subtle and far reaching distortion is not merely the obvious bifurcation of a single, complex reality into dichotomous aspects that can exist in theory only. Rather, it is the far more powerful act of subordination disguised in such differentiations, the subordination of act to thought or practice to theory. Indeed, no matter how provisional or heuristic, a distinction between thought and action is not a differentiation between two equally-weighted terms. When used, it is rarely intended to be. Despite the seeming equality of abstract distinctions—male/female, black/white, true/false, one/many—such dichotomies are implicitly employed to afford one term some purchase over the other. To perceive this is to grasp differentiation itself as an activity, and, therefore, to begin to appreciate the activity of theory-making in general. Let us look at this particular form of theoretical activity more closely.

To generate theoretical discourse on culture, or almost any theoretical discourse for that matter, it is necessary to do two things: first, to specify a distinctly 'cultural' level or mode of analysis; and second, to identify an object or phenomenon that exists as a meaningful totality only on such a level of analysis, thus acting as the natural object of the analysis. The object so identified is actually constituted and depicted in terms of the method of analysis specified. Hence, the object and the method are intrinsic to each other, one demonstrating the naturalness and validity of the other. Indeed, as we have seen with ritual, the structure of the constituted object is a veritable model of the method of analysis and vice versa.

Mauss affords a particularly clear and concise example of how this process was used to establish a specifically 'sociological' level of analysis, the object of which was 'total social phenomena' or 'systems in their entirety'. Mauss argues that his method sees these systems as wholes, and that only as wholes is their 'essence' revealed.

> We are dealing with something more than a set of themes, more than institutional elements, more than institutions, more even than systems of institutions divisible into legal, economic, religious and other parts. We are concerned with 'wholes', with systems in their entirety. We have not described them as if they were fixed, in a static or skeletal condition, and still less have we dissected them

> into the rules and myths and values and so on of which they are composed. It is only by considering them as wholes that we have been able to see their essence, their operation and their living aspect, and to catch the fleeting moment when the society and its members take emotional stock of themselves and their situation as regards others. Only by making such concrete observations of social life is it possible to come upon facts such as those which our study is beginning to reveal. Nothing in our opinion is more urgent or promising than research into 'total' social phenomena.[73]

To establish a level of analysis that is distinctly 'cultural', one must likewise identify 'cultural facts' which exist in their meaningful wholeness only on the horizon of this cultural perspective; we have seen that Geertz made 'meaning' in 'cultural phenomena' the object of his analysis. This meaning was revealed by employing a particular method: the initial differentiation of conceptual and dispositional categories, which facilitated a recognition of their fusion (or failure to fuse) in such cultural phenomena as ritual and religion. This method is simultaneously, of course, a model of the object upon which Geertz focuses. It is also the means by which a new and specific relationship is identified between a knower and the object known, a relationship that is mediated by a specifically 'cultural' body of knowledge.

What is the impetus for such cultural knowledge? Although this question goes beyond the scope of this article, possibilities are implicit in the analysis so far.

A more or less 'internal' impetus for generating such discourse on culture may well be the attempt to come to some resolution of the major conflicting forces in the humanities and social sciences today. Variously identified, this conflict is usually seen as a tension between how something functions and what something symbolizes, between intellectualists and symbolists, between utility and meaning, or explanation and understanding.[74] Hymes, for example, has heralded the specific possibility that the study of performance could very well integrate the social sciences and the humanities.[75] Similar sentiments have been expressed by Turner and Grimes among others.

However, a sense of commitment to a mode of analysis in which the symbolic tends to dominate the functional is common to most of these theorists.[76] This suggests that the search for integration is being led by the symbolists, and we can see in their model of ritual something of the integration they are seeking: apparently equal consideration of differentiated social and cultural forces illuminates the effective interaction and fusion of these forces within such phenomena as ritual, making apparent the 'true meaning' of cultural phenomena.

An 'external' impetus for cultural knowledge may derive from the fact that the social sciences and humanities are now operating in a world where 'the natives' have increasingly freed themselves from colonialism and many of the cultural assumptions behind it, where 'local informants' have been educated abroad, and peoples deemed to have no history are becoming quite sophisticated in their manipulation of the media, politics, sentiments and responses of technologically dominant nations.[77] Within this milieu, cultural knowledge may be an attempt to cut a new image, to find a new basis between theorist and cultural participant upon which to continue the traditions of research we inherit. It appears to experiment with a new sense of 'community' between theorists and actors characterized by modest, mutual dependence and shared problems of meaning. Yet domination of the theoretical subject is neither abrogated nor transcended.[78] Instead, it is maintained by the implicit structuring of the thought–action dichotomy in its various forms.[79]

In conclusion, the argument presented above differs from Goody's critique of the terms 'religion' and 'ritual'. It also differs from Needham's critique of 'belief', in which he concludes that the term is inappropriate 'to an empirical philosophy of mind or to an account of human motives and conduct'.[80] Instead of questioning the adequacy of the term 'ritual', this critique questions both the structure of ritual theory as a whole and the practical logic of specific theoretical operations in the analysis of cultural phenomena. It is an attempt to explore those 'wrongly divided' human experiences and the traditional issues of methodological adequacy in which they embroil us.

NOTES

1 W. Robertson Smith, *The Religion of the Semites* (New York: Schocken Books, 1972). Originally published in 1894.

2 F. Staal, 'The Meaninglessness of Ritual', *Numen* 26, no. 1 (1975): 8.

3 H. H. Penner, 'Language, Ritual and Meaning', *Numen* 32, no. 1 (1985): 1.

4 M. Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 28.

5 J. Goody, 'Religion and Ritual: The Definitional Problem', *The British Journal of Sociology* 12 (1961): 142–64.

6 P. Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, translated by Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 29.

7 Goody, p. 143.

8 T. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd Edn, 1970).

9 M. Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970); *The Archeology of Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972).

10 See J.-F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, foreword by Frederic Jameson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), pp. vii–xxi, 6–9, 27–41, *passim*.

11 Such an approach has been called into question in the following studies: R. Needham, *Belief, Language and Experience* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); E. Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978); M. T. Taussig, *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); J. Fabian, *Time and the Other:*

How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

12 My use of the term 'discourse' is based on Bourdieu's discussions of 'discourse on practice' (pp. 16–22, 168–70, 221 note 26) and Foucault's discussion of discourses as characterized both by the formation of their objects and by unity in *The Archeology of Knowledge*, pp. 40–49, 72–76.

13 For a discussion of this gap between theory and ethnography, or research and writing, see Fabian, pp. ix, 21 and ch. 3.

14 See D. Sperber on 'Interpretive Ethnology and Theoretical Anthropology' in his *On Anthropological Knowledge*, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology 54 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 9–34.

15 G. Lewis discusses the general application of the notion of ritual to conduct or behavior rather than thought or feelings in *Day of Shining Red: An Essay on Understanding Ritual*, Cambridge Studies on Social Anthropology 27 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 10–11. In a very different approach, see Lévi-Strauss' differentiation of ritual from myth and, eventually, of living from thinking in *The Naked Man*, Introduction to a Science of Mythology: 4 (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), pp. 669–75, 679–84.

16 E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, translated by J. W. Swain (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 51.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 463ff.

18 S. J. Tambiah, *Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-East Thailand*, Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) and James L. Peacock, *Rites of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).

19 V. Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Chicago: Aldine, 1966).

20 F. Jameson, *The Prison-House of Language* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 17–32.

21 Ibid., pp. 18–21.

22 Ibid., pp. 18–39, *passim*.

23 Ibid., p. 39.

24 Ibid., p. 22.

25 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Theories of Primitive Religion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1965), pp. 61–62.

26 N. Munn, 'Symbolism in a Ritual Context', in J. J. Honigmann (ed.), *Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), p. 583.

27 Ibid. Parentheses in the original.

28 M. Sahlins, *Culture and Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 110–13, especially p. 111.

29 C. Lévi-Strauss, 'French Sociology', in George Gurvitch and Wilbert E. Moore (eds), *Twentieth Century Sociology* (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 518.

30 In this context, Sahlins (p. 111) draws attention to W. Doroszewki's theory of the influence of Durkheim's notion of a 'sign' on Saussure, in Doroszewki's 'Quelques remarques sur les rapports de la sociologie et de la linguistique: Durkheim et F. de Saussure', *Journal de Psychologie* 30 (1933): 82–91.

31 Durkheim, p. 298.

32 C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 89. According to Sperber, Radcliffe-Brown regarded anthropology as a 'natural

science of society', while Evans-Pritchard put it among the humanities. Geertz, on the other hand, is a major representative of a third approach according to which 'the only way to *describe* cultural phenomena is, precisely, to *interpret* them'. Sperber goes on to criticize this approach and to 'develop a fourth view of anthropological knowledge' (pp. 9–10).

33 Geertz, pp. 143–44.

34 Ibid., pp. 89, 126–27.

35 Ibid., pp. 95–97.

36 Ibid., pp. 89, 98, 126–67.

37 Ibid., pp. 127, 131.

38 Ibid., pp. 44–45, 48, 89, 113, 127, 137, etc.

39 Ibid., p. 113 and 127. Also see Geertz's discussion of how symbols 'synthesize' ethos and world view on p. 89.

40 Ibid., pp. 92–93.

41 Ibid., pp. 112–13.

42 For example, Geertz has also discussed ideology, art and common sense as 'cultural systems'.

43 Ibid., p. 113. Emphasis added.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid., p. 114.

46 F. Staal gives an interesting demonstration of the problems that arise when ritual is seen as 'pure activity'. By this characterization, made in the context of a clear and complete opposition between thought and action, Staal wishes to maintain the total resistence of pure activity to any theoretical appropriation whatsoever. Thus, Staal concludes that ritual cannot be understood, that it is 'meaningless'. See 'The Meaninglessness of Ritual', *Numen*, 26, no. 1 (1975): 2–22.

47 A similar example of a particular relationship between the project of the outside observer and the project of the ritual is presented in T. Jennings's 'On Ritual Knowledge', *Journal of Religion* 62:2 (1982), pp. 111–27. Jennings describes ritual as, first of all, a display to an observer (god, theorist, etc.) or observers (the community itself); and secondly, as an epistemological project. Each of these aspects act as a 'point of contact' between the rite and the attempt by outside observers 'to gain a theoretical–critical understanding of it' (pp. 113, 124). We need not castigate our pursuit of the meaning of ritual as 'voyeurism or whoring', Jennings writes, since our cognitive concerns are simply an 'extension' of those of the ritual we are 'invited' to watch (pp. 124–27). An interesting contrast to Jenning's approach might be seen in S. Greenblatt's account of the epistemological project of the amateur ethnographer, Captain J. G. Bourke. Captain Bourke 'witnessed among the Zuni Indians extreme and simultaneous violations of the codes governing food and waste, and hence experienced extreme disgust. This reaction is not simply an occupational hazard; after all, it is the ethnographer's nausea that gives him his particular discursive field. The boundaries of his long study [Bourke's *Scatological Rites of All Nations*, 1891] are defined precisely by the rising of his gorge. . . . It would be absurd to conclude that a similar, if better disguised, revulsion lies at the constitutive moment of *all* ethnography, but one may easily find other and more respectable instances than the work of Captain Bourke, in which aversion serves to transform behavior and material substances into the objects of representation and interpretation.' Greenblatt, 'Filthy Rites', *Daedalus*, vol. III, no. 3 (Summer, 1982), pp. 3–4.

48 C. Geertz, p. 113, quoting M. Singer, *Traditional India: Structure and Change* (Philadelphia: Amerian Folklore Society, 1959), pp. 140–82. Parentheses added by Geertz.

49 C. Geertz, p. 113, quoting Singer, 'The Cultural Pattern of Indian Civilization', *Far Eastern Quarterly* 15 (1955): 23–26.

50 Geertz, p. 146.

51 Ibid., p. 143.

52 Ibid., pp. 143 and 163.

53 Ibid., p. 144.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., pp. 144–45.

56 Ibid., pp. 153–62.

57 Ibid., p. 164.

58 For a discussion of the various roots of performance theory see L. E. Sullivan, 'Sound and Senses: Toward a Hermeneutics of Performance', *History of Religions* 26 (1986): 2–14.

59 J. J. MacAloon, 'Introduction: Cultural Performances, Cultural Theory', in *Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle: Rehearsals Toward a Theory of Cultural Performance* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1984), p. 1.

60 R. L. Grimes, *Beginnings in Ritual Studies* (Washington, DC: University of America Press, 1982), introduction; V. Turner, *From Ritual To Theater: The Human Seriousness of Play* (New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications, 1982), p. 89.

61 Turner, *From Ritual to Theater*, p. 89.

62 Lewis, pp. 8, 22, 33–34, 38.

63 MacAloon, p. 3.

64 Turner, *From Ritual to Theater*, p. 82, and his *Schism and Continuity in African Society* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1957), p. 93, quoted in MacAloon, p. 3.

65 Singer, *Traditional India*, p. xiii.

66 Ibid., p. xii.

67 In her book, *Sherpas Through Their Rituals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), S. B. Ortner echoes Singer's definitions of culture and provides another very intelligent definition of ritual that is still governed by the three homologized structural patterns.

68 Turner, *From Ritual to Theater*, pp. 89–101.

69 MacAloon, p. 3.

70 Grimes, p. 53.

71 See Bourdieu (pp. 96–97, 109–10) for a discussion of the expediency and economy of 'practical logic'.

72 Critiques of this approach to knowing have been assembled in R. Rorty's study of 'representationism' and the claims of knowledge. See his *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). E. Said has drawn out some of the political implications involved in how a body of knowledge can function in the relationship between the knower and the known, yet his study reduces the real scope and nature of the issue by focusing on personalities and political motivations behind the perpetuation of such systems.

73 M. Mauss, *The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies*, translation by I. Cunnison (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), pp. 77–78.

74 See M. Augé, *The Anthropological Circle: Symbol, Function and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Also, J. Skorupski discusses

the 'intellectualist' and 'symbolist' positions in his *Symbol and Theory: A Philosophical Study of Theories of Religion in Social Anthropology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). M. Sahlins raises the issue in terms of 'utility' versus 'meaning' in *Culture and Practical Reason*, introduction.

75 Cited in Sullivan, p. 3.

76 See MacAloon, p. 2.

77 Grimes notes that his informants interpret their symbols and activities with reference to M. Eliade and C. Jung (Grimes, p. 6). In *Reflections of a Woman Anthropologist—No Hiding Place* (London: Academic Press, 1982), M. Cesara uses her own field experiences to argue that the traditional anthropological paradigm of researcher and native not only fails to reflect actual relationships in the field, but thereby distorts and falsifies the anthropological enterprise.

78 See Geertz, *Local Knowledge* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 183, for a discusson of this 'community'. Foucault's critique of anthropologization and the domination of the individual consciousness (*Archeology of Knowledge*, pp. 12–16) addresses this issue.

79 See Sperber (p. 62) on how 'relativism' in cultural anthropology replaces earlier and more overt notions of superiority with a form of 'cognitive apartheid'.

80 Needham, pp. 189–93.

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RITUALS OF REBELLION AMONG CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE YOUTH: THE OUTDOOR DISCO AT TOKYO'S YOYOGI PARK[1]

C. Scott Littleton

Every Sunday afternoon, weather permitting, hundreds of outrageously costumed Japanese teenagers and young adults gather in Tokyo's Yoyogi Park to dance to tape-recorded rock music. The streets that traverse the park are closed to traffic, and a vast throng of spectators, including bemused members of the older generation, descend on the area—immediately adjacent to the former Olympic sports complex—to watch the action. Indeed, since its inception in the early spring of 1980 the 'Yoyogi scene' has become a major tourist attraction, not only for Tokyoites, but also for foreigners, and tour buses now regularly include a stop at Yoyogi in their Sunday-afternoon itineraries. It has also captured the imagination of the Japanese media, especially that portion of which is aimed at a youthful audience.

I had come to Tokyo in March 1980 as a Fulbright scholar to teach at a local university and to continue my field work in a Shinjuku neighborhood which I have come to call 'Daigaku-chô', and almost from the moment I arrived both my neighborhood informants and my students urged me to investigate the Yoyogi scene. It was, they suggested, a phenomenon that deserved to be studied by an anthropologist, especially an American anthropologist who could relate to the 'American-style' performances engaged in by one major subset of dancers. So I began to visit the park on Sunday afternoons and, by the fall of 1980, when the bulk of my investigation was conducted, I had long since been caught up in the spirit of what must be one of the biggest weekly gatherings of its kind anywhere in the world.

RITUALS OF REBELLION

After several months of research and observation, I concluded that the anomalous behavior at Yoyogi was but the latest in a long series of apparently contra-cultural, youth-oriented Japanese 'scenes' that began well before the modern period, and that these phenomena can best be described as examples

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of what Max Gluckman called 'rituals of rebellion'.[2] Such rituals, which Gluckman encountered among the Zulu and other southern African peoples, provide a framework wherein the participants 'openly state their resentment of authority' and generally act in a fashion contrary to the norms and expectations of their social system. They 'proceed within an established and sacred traditional system, in which there is a dispute about particular distributions of power, and not about the structure of the system itself'.[3] Thus, 'rituals of rebellion' are not symptomatic of deep-seated class conflicts or an inherent antipathy to the norms being violated, but rather are socially-sanctioned expressions of nonconformity which actually serve to reinforce these norms and the system that has produced them.

To be sure, Gluckman's model is largely predicated on Frazer's death-and-rebirth cycle, with its attendant fertility implications, and was developed specifically to explain certain features of Southern and Eastern Bantu religious behavior. But as he himself implies, it would seem to apply generally, especially 'within an established and unchallenged social order'.[4]

Such a social order can be found in Japan, both modern and ancient; indeed, despite its affluence and industralization, Japan has managed to preserve a great deal of what can perhaps best be described as its pre-modern 'tribal' heritage.[5] In this paper, I propose that the 'Yoyogi scene' and its predecessors, like the inverted Zulu religious behavior described by Gluckman, ultimately serve to reinforce the norms of the 'unchallenged' society that spawned them. However, before considering this most important matter a detailed description of the 'scene' in question is in order.

THE YOYOGI SCENE

The Yoyogi dancers are organized into small groups, ranging in size from five or six to 25 or 30, each of which supplies its own stereo tapedeck, and stakes out a territory within the confines of the park. These territories are jealously guarded, and the same groups tend to return week after week to the same locations. The local authorities, who otherwise keep a low profile, have imposed a permit system, and polite but efficient policemen regularly check the groups' credentials. Thus, spontaneous, individual dancing is effectively discouraged. Even here, where non-conformity appears to reign supreme, the deeply ingrained Japanese habit of subordinating the individual to the group is very much in evidence. The 'Yoyogi scene' may contrast sharply with the bland image projected by dark-suited 'salarymen', but it is no less organized.

To be sure, other groups, ranging from political parties to the Japanese Hare Krishnas, also make use of Yoyogi Park on Sunday afternoons, as do a great many rollerskaters, skateboarders, high school and college drill teams, etc., each of which occupies its own territory. But the dance groups are clearly the main attraction.[6]

At the time when the bulk of my observations were made (I returned to the 'scene' briefly in the summers of 1983 and 1986), the Yoyogi dance groups were divided into two quite distinct and mutually exclusive *zoku*, or 'tribes': the *Bôsôzoku*, or 'Wild Driving Tribe' (sometimes also referred to as the *Amerugazoku*, from the title of the film 'American Graffiti') and the *Takenokozoku*, or 'Bamboo Shoot Tribe'.

BÔSÔZOKU

The Bôsôzoku, readily identifiable by their 1950s-style clothing and hairstyles—that is, shiny black pants or jeans, pointed shoes, longish greasy hair, and gang-style jackets for the boys, and pastel cardigan sweaters, pleated skirts, saddle shoes, and large hair bows for the girls[7]—look as if they had just stepped out of a somewhat blurred print of 'Westside Story' (see Plate 1). As



Plate 1. A Bôsôzoku dance group. 'Black Shadow' is a typical Bôsô name.

they are the senior of the two 'tribes', both in average age and in the length of time they have been on the scene (to the best of my knowledge, the label Bôsôzoku first surfaced about a decade ago), the 'Wild Drivers' generally occupies the more desirable locations closest to the park entrance and nearby Harajuku Station. This, too, is in accordance with deep-rooted Japanese custom.

As the label implies, the Bôsôzoku derive their self-image from American motorcycle gangs and car clubs as depicted in films and on television. Although primarily from blue-collar families and/or neighborhoods, many of the young men own expensive bikes, especially large Hondas and Kawasakis—a reflection of the widespread affluence of contemporary Japanese society. Indeed, part of the official rationale for allowing the dance groups to use the park seems to have been to reduce the incidence of 'lowriding', drag racing, loitering, and other illegal activities along a nearby boulevard on Sunday afternoons.

In the eyes of the Establishment, the Bôsôs, as we may call them, are thus frequently perceived to be violence-prone juvenile delinquents. This perception, widely shared in 'Daigaku-chô', is reinforced by media accounts of periodic 'wars' between the Bôsôzoku and police and/or taxi drivers in parts of Tokyo, Osaka, and other cities,[8] and has led to a widespread assumption, again reflected in the media, that the growing pattern of violence in junior high schools—assaults on teachers, vandalism, etc.[9]—is somehow linked to the Bôsôzoku phenomenon. Indeed, the label Bôsôzoku now tends to be applied indiscriminately, especially by the media, to all delinquent-appearing groups of young people, including the *banchô*, or leader-centered fighting gangs, whose membership is drawn primarily from the ranks of junior high school students.[10] The Yoyogi dancers are also widely considered to be 'drop-outs', both from the educational system and the world of work, and are frequently compared to the student radicals of the late 1960s and early 1970s who regularly engaged in violent street demonstrations.[11]

My own research does not confirm these perceptions. Few, if any, of the banchô gangs seem to be represented among the Yoyogi dance groups, and, save for traffic and relatively minor 'status' offenses (curfew violations, etc.) the Bôsôs of my acquaintance have no criminal records. Most are either full-time senior high school students or gainfully employed, albeit outside the lifetime employment system. Indeed, many of my informants work part-time as mechanics in the hundreds of small automobile and motorcycle repair shops to be found on the northern fringe of the city, especially in Saitama Prefecture. Moreover, apart from a handful of Bôsô groups that now sport short haircuts and military-style uniforms, and have joined forces with the radical right and its ubiquitous sound trucks, an aspect that has been blown out of proportion by the Japanese media,[12] the great majority are totally apolitical. Nevertheless, their aggressive demeanor and American-inspired dance routines, to say nothing of the perceptions just mentioned, strike the majority of adult Japanese as decidedly alien. This assessment is reinforced by the often bizarre English words and phrases emblazoned on their jackets, and the fact that the groups typically choose names that imitate those of American street gangs, such as 'Black Shadow' or 'Dirty Angel'. As one of my neighborhood informants put it, the Bôsôs have consciously adopted the 'dregs' of American popular culture and, in flaunting this 'negative' life-style at Yoyogi Park, have put themselves beyond the pale, as it were.

Yet these apparent refugees from an American inner-city street gang are in fact wholly 'Japanese' in the way they perform their 'rituals of rebellion'. For example, the dance routines, although American-inspired, are thoroughly rehearsed, and males and females typically dance in two lines facing one another. Occasionally a couple will execute a fifties-style routine, and now and then an individual will perform solo. But none of these actions are truly spontaneous. Moreover, the Bôsôs' clothing is always clean and neat, and their faces invariably seem freshly scrubbed—a far cry from those of their American role-models!

To be sure, the dance routines and other Bôsô behavior are sometimes accompanied by sneering facial expressions and aggressive posturing. But these gestures are purely symbolic, and there is little if any actual violence here, even in situations involving disputes among groups (or 'tribes') over 'territory'. Indeed, the confrontations are themselves highly ritualized.

I witnessed one such confrontation in the company of several other American spectators, one of whom remarked that if a similar situation were to arise in our culture, it would almost certainly end in a riot. However, in the situation in question, after exchanging relatively mild insults, the opponents bowed to one another, and one group simply left the area, as the whole thing had been settled informally long in advance by the leaders of the respective groups.

In short, despite their 'alien' image, the Bôsôs are, at bottom, as thoroughly Japanese in their behavior as the most traditional of their detractors. Indeed, most of my Yoyogi informants seem to harbor the expectation that they will eventually become part of the mainstream, at least in some capacity. What is more, most of my adult informants shared that assumption. Although the Bôsôs' demeanor and deportment are deplored, there is clearly a sense that their contra-cultural behavior is at bottom a form of ritual, and that they will eventually shed their costumes and become 'respectable'.[13] This shared perception reinforces the assumption that we are dealing with rituals of rebellion rather than rebellion per se.

TAKENOKOZOKU

The Takenokozoku, or 'Bamboo Shoots', whose dress style and demeanor are vastly different from those of the zoku just described, are composed exclusively of high school students under the age of 18. The name derives from that of a popular boutique in the exclusive Harajuku district immediately adjoining Yoyogi Park that sells the quasi-traditional costumes that serve to identify its members. These costumes, for the most part consisting of colorful, loose-fitting robes and pantaloons, are highly individualized, unisex in design, and are frequently complemented by elaborate facial makeup (see Plate 2). The resulting image is neither Western nor exclusively Japanese; rather, what emerges is a kind of generalized 'Asian' fantasy, and, like all fantasies, it is highly theatrical in feeling. (Unlike the Bôsôs, the Takenokos do not, as a rule, wear their distinctive clothing on the street, but bring it with them in large shopping bags, changing after they get to the park—more often than not behind a convenient bush!)



Plate 2. A pair of Takenoko dancers. Note the 'un-Japanese' animated facial expression of the girl on the right.

In their demeanor, the 'Bamboo Shoots' generally exude an aura of what can best be described as amiable ecstasy. Their facial expressions are animated, in contrast to the mask-like expressions generally worn by Japanese in public places, or the grimaces affected by the Bôsôzoku, and there is typically much laughter and giggling among all concerned, both during and between performances. However, the performances themselves are highly structured, and some of this levity seems to be an integral part of the overall—and thoroughly rehearsed—routine.

The Takenoko groups usually dance in a circle, males and females intermingled, and their hand movements are graceful rather than jerky. There is a softness here, expressed in the billowing robes and smiling, heavily made-up faces, that contrasts sharply with the macho image projected by the Bôsôs. The whole effect is extremely balletic, and the routines are much more carefully choreographed than those performed by the Bôsôs. The music is for the most part indigenous Japanese rock, typified by the sound of the Yellow Magic Orchestra, who have appeared on stage dressed in Takenoko style.

Ian Buruma suggests that the Takenoko, who generally seem to come from middle-class, 'salaryman' families, are hyper-traditionalists, and that their overall image is consciously derived from ancient Japanese prototypes.[14] Indeed, the dance style is reminiscent of traditional Japanese dances—except, of course, for the animated facial expressions and relaxed attitude of the dancers. Moreover, the heavily ritualized pre-performance behavior, in which the leader delivers a short speech after which all concerned bow and clap their hands several times, recalls the sort of behavior one might expect to see at a *matsuri*, or neighborhood Shintô shrine festival or, indeed, at any formal, quasi-ritualistic Japanese occasion.

It should be emphasized that the internal make-up and behavior of the Takenoko groups are as Japanese in character, if not more so, than those of the Bôsôs: there is always a leader who serves as the spokesperson, younger members defer to older members, and, despite their individualistic image, loyalty and devotion to the group is expected from all concerned. Moreover, the attention to details of costuming and performance, as well as the long hours spent in rehearsal, are, in a very real sense, equivalent to that which is required by any traditional Japanese ceremony or discipline.

But in the eyes of my adult Daigaku-chô informants, the end result is, in its own way, as overtly rebellious, as much at odds with the sort of behavior Japanese expect in public places as the performances of the Bôsôs. The individualized costumes and animated behavior of the Takenoko dancers, as well as the basic style, if not immediate source of their music, all are manifestly 'un-Japanese'. Indeed, one is sometimes reminded of American and other Western 'Flower Children' of the late 1960s. Like them, the Takenokos are consciously rejecting, at least in the context of their dances, the mainstream mode, in this case the formality, stiffness, and lack of individuality that generally characterizes contemporary Japanese society. Thus, these performances are at once highly traditional and contra-cultural, as rebellious in its way as the more manifestly 'alien' behavior of the Bôsô groups. Yet it is also perceived as a ritual of rebellion rather than the real thing. Again, this is reinforced by the expectations of my adult informants, who generally agreed that being a Takenoko is simply a phase that many otherwise 'decent' young people go through before putting on their dark suits and entering the world of lifetime employment and intense conformity to company norms, etc.

THE ZOKU *PHENOMENON IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE*

As I indicated at the outset, the 'Yoyogi scene' is not without precedent in the history of Japanese popular culture. For example, in the early 17th century, at the beginning of the Tokugawa era, groups of young people, dressed in what was then considered outlandish clothing, were wont to gather in tea houses, gardens, and other public places in Edo and engage in various expressive behavior, including dancing, which outraged the sensibilities of the Tokugawa Establishment. Such persons, generally the sons of merchants and lower-ranked Samurai, were referred to as *Kabukishu* (from the verb *kabuku*, 'to behave outrageously') and, as in the case of the Bôsôzoku and the Takenokozoku, their antics were eventually confined to certain specific locations. The 'rituals of rebellion' performed by the Kabukishu were, of course, among the seeds of what later became the Kabuki Theater.[15]

This is not to imply that the behavior of either the Takenokos or the Bôsôs will ever achieve social acceptance as an art form. The great majority of zoku, past and present, are ephemeral—a generation ago it was the *Taiyôzoku*, or 'Sun Tribe', whose members habitually wore Hawaiian shirts and dark sunglasses, that outraged the social critics[16]—and the Takenoko phenomenon already seems to be well on the wane. The Bôsôs are still going strong, but small groups of break dancers have already begun to make their appearance, and other embryonic zoku, including what the Japanese have come to call the *Punku*, or 'Punkers', are waiting in the wings, as it were, to do their own thing at Yoyogi and elsewhere.

To be sure, the 'rituals of rebellion' performed by these youthful Japanese 'tribes' are secular rather than religious. But otherwise, as I noted in describing the behavior of the Takenokozoku, they bear a close resemblance to Shintô *matsuri*, wherein groups of ecstatic, albeit well-organized, young people bobbing and weaving in unison, carry portable shrines around a village or neighborhood.[17] Moreover, the line between 'ritual' and 'ritual of rebellion' is sometimes thin in such traditional religious performances, especially after the participants have consumed copious amounts of beer and sake. The Tokugawa period was characterized by a series of riotous *okage-mairi*, or pilgrimages to the Grand Shrines at Ise, wherein thousands of participants donned special costumes and danced themselves into a frenzy, and generally precipitated what Davis calls a 'moral anomie'.[18] Transvestism and the breakdown of sexual restraints were common, and such behaviors were not by any means limited to okage-mairi. In the last years of the period in question, a number of *matsuri sawagi*, or 'wild festivals', erupted in several parts of the country. A notorious example of such a festival was the so-called *ee-ja-nai-ka*, or 'isn't it good?' movement of 1866–67, which began at Ise and later spread throughout Japan. The youthful devotees of this movement, who frequently practiced an exaggerated form of transvestism, were wont to engage in frenetic *odori-komi*, or 'dance-ins', after which they would run through the streets of Edo and other cities shouting loudly the movement's slogan.[19] Needless to say, the official attitude on the part of the *bakufu*, or Tokugawa regime, toward this sort of movement was for the most part negative, and attempts were made to control the most outrageous excesses.[20] Nevertheless, despite this disapprobation, which was generally shared by the educated classes, the authorities tolerated the pilgrimages and 'wild' festivals, apparently sensing that they provided a safety valve for frustrations that might otherwise lead to real rebellion.[21]

Thus, like the Kabukishu before them, and the Taiyôzoku, Bôsôzoku, and Takenokozoku of modern times, the devotees of ee-ja-nai-ka were not at war with the social system per se, and although that system was on the threshold of profound changes when the movement was at its height the 'isn't it good?' zoku had little if anything to do with bringing these changes to pass. The point here is that such 'negative' matsuri, or 'rituals of rebellion', sacred as well as secular, have long been a feature of Japanese popular and/or religious culture. In contrast to most other highly-developed, post-industrial societies, the Japanese have clung tenaciously to what Gluckman calls a 'repetitive' system.[22] That is, a system in which, as he puts it (*ibid.*), 'particular conflicts are settled not by alterations in the order of offices, but by changes in the persons occupying those offices'.[23]

Even the Meiji Restoration of 1868, from which the modern history of Japan is conventionally dated, was not a true revolution in the Western sense, but rather an extensive reshuffling of persons and roles within essentially the same ruling class.[24] The basic social norms which had prevailed for centuries were not called into question, and great care was taken, as the country began its surge toward modernization, to maintain and reinforce these norms.

It is, I think, fair to say that the overwhelming majority of Japanese have long shared what can best be characterized as a fundamental agreement as to the validity and essential correctness of their 'repetitive' system. And as we have seen, that agreement is implicitly shared by the Bôsôzoku and the Takenokozoku, just as it was by the earlier zoku, despite the fact that their performances are perceived (and, indeed, conceived) as contra-cultural.

As a result, the 'Yoyogi scene' is by no means as divisive as its Western analogs (rock concerts, etc.) have sometimes proven to be.[25] On the contrary, like the religious 'rituals of rebellion' Gluckman described among the Zulu and other South African tribes, the secular matsuri sawagi of the Bôsôs and the Takenokos actually serve to enhance social cohesion. By projecting a rebellious and/or 'un-Japanese' image in an otherwise thoroughly 'Japanese' way, the dance groups are in fact demonstrating the strength and vitality of the remarkable social system that produced them. Moreover, as I have already indicated, this appears to be recognized, at least implicitly, by all concerned, spectators and participants alike.

RITUALS OF REBELLION VERSUS 'REAL' REBELLIONS

Finally, we need to distinguish between the sorts of behavior just assessed and what may be termed 'real' rebellions, that is, movements that have sought to overthrow, or at least profoundly modify, an existing regime. Despite the repetitive character of its social organization (see above), Japan has certainly had its share of 'real' rebellions. One thinks immediately of the Shimabara Rebellion of 1638, that is, the last stand of Christianity against the hostile Tokugawa Shôgunate,[26] the Meiji Restoration itself, the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, in which an army of some 30,000 former Samurai attempted to overthrow the newly installed Meiji regime,[27] and, more recently, the entrenched opposition by disgruntled farmers and aging 1960s radicals to the new Tokyo International Airport at Narita, which has periodically erupted in violent attacks on airport property and personnel and which delayed the facility's opening for 12 years.[28]

However, even these 'real' rebellions, bloody as some of them were, have for the most part been fought out according to a tradition based on what Davis calls 'implicit moral understanding'.[29] As we have seen, even the most far-reaching of all 'real' Japanese rebellions, the Meiji Restoration, conformed to this tradition. Indeed, the great majority of Japanese social upheavals, if we may call them that, have been far more ritualistic and symbolic—and, on the whole, less violent—than such quintessential Western counterparts as the Medieval peasant revolts, the English Civil War, and the American, French, and Russian Revolutions.[30]

In summary, Gluckman's conclusion as to the nature and purpose of rebellion and other socially disreputable behavior among the Zulu would also seem to apply not only to the Yoyogi scene, but to mass movements and rebellions in Japan generally:

> The acceptance of the established order as right and good, and even sacred, seems to allow unbridled excess, very rituals of rebellion, for the order itself keeps this rebellion within bounds. Hence to act the conflicts, whether directly or by inversion or in other symbolic form, emphasizes the social cohesion within which the conflicts exist.[31]

NOTES

1 A preliminary version of this paper was read on 17 November 1984 at the Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association in Denver, CO. The bulk of the field work on which this paper is based was done in 1980–81 while the author served as a Fulbright Visiting Lecturer at Waseda University and the University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan. Further work was done in the summers of 1983 and 1986 and was greatly facilitated by grants-in-aid from the American Philosophical Society and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research. I would like to thank all those concerned with the Japan–United States Educational Commission and the two agencies just mentioned for their welcome assistance. I would also like to thank Theodore C. Bestor, David J. Danelski, Winston Davis, Gunar Freibergs, Luanne B. Hudson, Kazuo Matsumura, Michael M. McAleenan, Martin Murphy, and Udo Strutynski for reading a preliminary draft of the paper and for their many valuable comments and suggestions.

2 Max Gluckman, 'Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa', in Max Gluckman (ed.), 1963 (originally published in 1954), *Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa*, pp. 110–136. New York: The Free Press. An alternative model that might be applied here is Turner's 'anti-structure', as the contra-cultural behavior exhibited by the Yoyogi dancers is certainly 'liminal' in character. See Victor W. Turner, 1969. *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure*, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.

3 Gluckman, p. 112.

4 Ibid., pp. 126–127.

5 See, for example, John Whitney Hall, 1970, *Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times*. New York: Dell Publishing Co. Edwin O. Reischauer 1978, *The Japanese*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Eiichiro Iishida 1968, *Japanese Culture*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Chie Nakane 1970, *Japanese Society*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

6 In recent years, the dancers have shared the stage, as it were, with an increasing number of live bands and variety acts seeking to be discovered by the local media. Indeed, during my most recent visit to Yoyogi (August 1986) I spotted an American rock group, as well as an elderly man singing traditional Japanese folk-songs and several mime groups.

7 These girls are strictly a 'female auxiliary', as it were, and they do not drive motorcycles. However, it has recently come to my attention (via personal communications from Kazuo Matsumura and Shiyuichi Nishino, June 1985) that several all-girl Bôsôzoku groups, replete with gang jackets, biker insignia, tight black pants, and who do drive Kawasakis and other motorcycles favored by their male counterparts, made their appearance at Yoyogi in the summer of 1984, and now regularly participate in the 'scene'. This development, the implications of which need to be investigated in more detail, would appear to reinforce the 'liminal' aspect of the Bôsôzoku phenomenon and can perhaps be understood in the context of the transvestism that has generally accompanied Japanese behavior of this sort (see below). I should add that I have yet to observe an all-girl Bôsôzoku group at Yoyogi.

8 These 'wars' result when a large number of Bôsôs congregate in the vicinity of a station complex or along a major boulevard. The windshields of taxis and police cars attempting to enter such areas have frequently been attacked by motorcycle-riding gang members wielding lengths of iron pipe. Indeed, in the spring of 1980 members of the Osaka Taxi Drivers Association refused to pick up fares in several Bôsô-dominated areas until the police had dispersed the gangs and restored control of the situation.

9 See Thomas P. Rohlen 1983, *Japan's High Schools*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Hiroaki Iwai 1974, 'Delinquent Groups and Organized Crime', in Takie Sugiyama Lebra and William P. Lebra (ed.), *Japanese Culture and Behavior*, pp. 383–395, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Soeda Yoshiya (Autumn 1983) 'Changing Patterns of Juvenile Aggression', *Japan Echo* **10:3** 9–16.

10 Iwai, p. 392.

11 It is perhaps possible to suggest that these demonstrators, who for the most part were students at élite universities, such as the University of Tokyo and Waseda University, were also engaging in 'rituals of rebellion', as the great majority of them shed their radical image shortly after graduation and joined mainstream economic and governmental hierarchies. Moreover, as Doi points out, the rebellion did not involve a true generation gap in the Western sense; see Takeo Doi 1973, *The Anatomy of Dependence*, p. 144. Tokyo: Kodansha International. Nevertheless, the impact of this conflict on the Japanese academic world was very real; as Doi also points out, the careers of many academics were damaged beyond repair, and the scars, physical as well as psychological, are still visible on several campuses; see Doi 1974, '*Higashi-ishiki*: The Psychology of Revolting Youth in Japan', in Takie Sugiyama Lebra and William P. Lebra (ed.), *Japanese Culture and Behavior*, p. 451. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

12 Jan Buruma, (August 1982) 'Japan's Outrageous Conformists', *Asia* **5:2** 55.

13 This, of course, clearly sets them apart from the banchô groups, who see themselves as truly outside—and at war with—the system, and are often a source of recruits for the *Yakuza*, or organized crime 'families'. See Iwai, pp. 392–395; see also Buruma 1984, *Behind the Mask: On Sexual Demons, Sacred Mothers, Transvestites, Gamblers, Drifters, and other Japanese Cultural Heroes*. New York: Pantheon Books.

14 Buruma, 'Japan's Outrageous Conformists', p. 18.

15 Buruma, 'Japan's Outrageous Conformists', p. 54. The Kabukishu style was reputedly derived from the performances of a quasi-legendary *miko*, or female shaman, from Izumo called Ôkuni whose energetic and earthy dancing "took the spectators by storm" in Edo and elsewhere in the first years of the Tokugawa Shôgunate; see Yoshinobu Inoura and Toshio Kawatake 1981, *The Traditional Theater of Japan*, p. 218. New York and Tokyo: Weatherhill. Women were barred from such performances in 1629, and henceforth they became an exclusively male activity, and transvestism became the order of the day. The style was eventually copied by professional actors and playwrights, who turned it into a true art form. However, the tradition of female impersonators, i.e. the *onnagata*, has remained intact. For a comprehensive treatment of the origins and early history of the Kabuki Theater, see Zoë Kinkaid 1925, *Kabuki: The Popular Stage of Japan*, pp. 49f.

16 Buruma, 'Japan's Outrageous Conformists', p. 16.

17 For an analysis of the structure and symbolism of a contemporary matsuri, see A. W. Sadler (April 1969), 'The Form and Meaning of the Festival', *Asian Folklore Studies* **28:1** 1–16; October 1975, 'The Shrine: Notes Toward a Study of Neighborhood Festivals in Modern Tokyo', *Asian Folklore Studies* **34:2** 1–38. See also C. Scott Littleton (July 1986), 'The Organization and Management of a Tokyo Shintô Shrine Festival', *Ethnology*, **25:3** 195–202.

18 Winston Davis (November 1983), 'Pilgrimage and World Renewal: A Study of Religion and Social Values in Tokugawa Japan, Part I', *History of Religions* **23:2** 108. See also Davis (February 1984), 'Pilgrimage and World Renewal: A Study

of Religion and Social Values in Tokugawa Japan, Part II', *History of Religions* **23:3** 197–221.

19 Davis, 'Pilgrimage and World Renewal . . . Part I', p. 115; Buruma, 'Japan's Outrageous Conformists', p. 54.

20 Davis, 'Pilgrimage and World Renewal . . . Part II', p. 198–199.

21 Ibid., p. 200.

22 Gluckman, pp. 127–128.

23 Ibid.

24 Cf. Hall, pp. 266–267.

25 See, for example, Theodore Roszak (1969), *The Making of a Counter Culture*, New York: Doubleday. Margaret Mead (1978), *Culture and Commitment* (2nd edition), New York: Anchor Books.

26 Hall, p. 188.

27 Ibid., p. 284.

28 From 1966 to 1978. See Reischauer, pp. 307–308.

29 Davis, 'Pilgrimage and World Renewal . . . Part I', p. 113.

30 See, for example, Crane Brinton (1957), *Anatomy of a Revolution*. New York: Random House.

31 Gluckman, p. 127.

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FROM ASCETICISM TO THE PACKAGE TOUR—THE PILGRIM'S PROGRESS IN JAPAN

Ian Reader

INTRODUCTION

Pilgrims who follow the old and still popular pilgrimage around the island of Shikoku in Japan dress for the most part in an old and traditional style, wearing a white wrap-round pilgrims shirt and a bamboo hat and carrying a wooden staff. Many also wear other accoutrements such as white leggings and old-style footwear. All these items mark the pilgrim out as apart from the everyday world, suggesting both the elements of separation from the everyday and of the anti-modern nature so often associated with pilgrimage.[1]

This attire is redolent with the symbolism of death. The white shirt, or *hakui*, is also a death shroud for white is the colour of death as well as purity in Japan, the bamboo hat represents a coffin (the words inscribed on the hat are a traditional funeral inscription) and the wooden staff symbolises a gravestone, on which also there is a funeral inscription and the bearer's name. All three combine to show that the pilgrim is not one with the everyday world but is, rather, symbolically dead to it, set apart not just by the symbolism of death but by the fact that this attire implicitly states that the pilgrim is prepared to meet death at any point, is indeed dressed and ready for the grave and is therefore unconcerned with the mundane, open to whatever fates the pilgrimage has in store.

In past times, too, pilgrims did die along the way and even in the precincts of the pilgrimage sites themselves. Miyazaki shows that 36 pilgrims died at the second temple on the Shikoku route in the period 1761–1887.[2] In past ages, when there were no adequate means to cure serious diseases, many went on pilgrimages in the hope of a miracle cure or, failing that, in order to receive the merit believed to come from dying on a pilgrimage. When this occurred, pilgrims would be buried in their shirt/shroud and their hat/coffin, with the staff thrust into the ground as a gravestone: pilgrim's graves still line the old pilgrimage paths in Shikoku. The pilgrim was not just attired for death but was, in a sense, embarking, via the pilgrimage, on a journey to another world. This symbolism was particularly potent with regard to Shikoku: the ideograms

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used to write the name Shikoku refer to the fact that the island consisted of four (*shi*) provinces (*koku*) but a punning alternative ideogram *shi* (death) was at times used to imply that it was the land of the dead. In former times the return of a pilgrim from Shikoku was seen to be something akin to a return from a journey to the world of the dead, a renewal and reawakening of life.[3]

However, most modern pilgrims, whilst wearing clothing that is obviously traditional and a symbol of a readiness to encounter death, travel in a way that is not at all traditional or anti-modern, and in a style and means that is structured to eradicate wherever possible the notion of the unknown. The normal way of pilgrimage these days in Japan is by motorised transport, usually in highly organised bus tours with pilgrims staying at the most modern facilities available, which have been arranged in advance, so that all elements of the unknown have been removed. Imai records meeting, at the start of her own pilgrimage in Shikoku, a party of pilgrims travelling by bus who had every aspect of their pilgrimage arranged beforehand, from the time and place of lunch three days ahead, to the ferry that they would take back to the mainland.[4]

This emphasis on safety, organisation and convenience is manifested in guidebooks and pilgrimage literature which promise the pilgrim that there will be no difficulties or hardships, or even any places where they will lose their way, if they follow the guidebook. One such guidebook states that, so as to heighten the enjoyment and touristic side of the pilgrimage:

> . . . in this book we have also introduced places of interest in the area and local delicacies, as well as local souvenirs that are available.[5]

Organisations that run organised pilgrimage tours not unnaturally emphasise the extent to which such tours provide an easy way to accomplish pilgrimages: the *Junrei no Kai*, a nationwide pilgrimage organisation which runs group tours to all the major pilgrimage routes in Japan, promises those who take its tours that they can pilgrimage in comfort,[6] while a monthly magazine published by the leading tour operator on Shikoku informs pilgrims that, with the opening in 1984 of a road up to the last temple to which pilgrims previously had to walk, the pilgrimage has become 'completely comfortable'.[7]

There appears here to be a disparity between the outward form manifested by the modern pilgrim and the actual manner by which the pilgrim goes about the pilgrimage, a seeming conflict between, on the one hand, the symbolism of death and of the pilgrim as apart from the everyday, and the prevalence of organised, structured and group-oriented pilgrimage which emphasises speed, convenience and enjoyment on the other. Viewed from an historical perspective, however, this apparent conflict between form and manner becomes more understandable. In the following section I will give a brief outline of the form and manner of pilgrimage in Japan as it has evolved historically and as it appears in the present, as a basis from which I will attempt, in the latter part of this article, to make some observations about the nature and development of pilgrimage in contemporary Japan.

THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF PILGRIMAGE IN JAPAN

Analysts of pilgrimage such as Turner have shown the degree to which voluntary pilgrimage is constantly in a process of change, with a general development from the unstructured, unorganised and individual towards the structured and organised, from, in Turner's terms, the existential to the normative.[8] Such a process is reflected in the development of voluntary pilgrimages in Japan, such as that around Shikoku. Historians of the Shikoku pilgrimage have shown that the pilgrimage itself appears to have developed in a piecemeal fashion over a number of centuries, with its origins in the wanderings and ascetic practices of individuals. Chronicles from the late Heian era (i.e. from the latter half of the 11th century onwards) refer to the travels of ascetics around Shikoku and to the development of an ascetic practice that involved going around the island visiting various places with religious connections. More exact references to a pilgrimage appear from the 15th century onwards and, according to the pilgrims' diaries and guidebooks that begin to appear increasingly from the 17th century onwards, by this age there existed something of a structured pilgrimage which involved visiting 88 temples around the island. Whereas the pilgrims of earlier days were generally ascetic wanderers, by this era the majority were farmers and townspeople who, benefiting from the growth of a monetary economy, managed to embark on travels that were a combination of the religious and the touristic.[9]

By the end of the 17th century this pilgrimage consisted of a journey around Shikoku, taking in 88 designated temples on the way. Quite why there were 88 pilgrimage places to be visited is unclear: the scholar-monk Jakuhon, whose *Shikoku Henro Kukokuki* (i.e. A guide to the merits of the Shikoku pilgrimage) of 1690 is one of the most comprehensive early records of the pilgrimage, admits to having no clear idea why there were 88 places to be visited or when this form had developed: nor, he noted, did anyone else he had talked to have any idea.[10] Today there is much speculation about this number and, although it appears to be a popular pastime for writers on the pilgrimage to speculate on the reasons for this number, there is no clear and persuasive evidence or textual source to support any particular theory.[11] One is left to consider that, like so much else in the world of voluntary pilgrimage, it was a product of the way in which the pilgrimage evolved from the unstructured to the structured, shaped by the will and wishes of participants and interested parties.

When Jakuhon wrote his guide, there was a pilgrimage structure, with defined places to visit, but no fixed route or order by which to travel. Jakuhon's guide begins at Zentsuji, temple Number 75 (all the temples have a number by which they have been known at least since the 17th century), but he stated that the pilgrim could just as well start at Ryozenji (known as Number 1) or Idoji (Number 17): it was up to the pilgrim's individual choice.[12] While Zentsuji is the site of the birth of Kobo Daishi, a major figure in the folklore of Japanese Buddhism and of Shikoku in particular, and thus of special reverence for pilgrims, the other two places are important largely because of their proximity to the major ports of entry on the island. Ryozenji, the nearest temple to the ports by which the bulk of pilgrims entered Shikoku from Osaka and the other major population centres, came to be called Number 1 for this reason, with the other temples being numbered in geographical relation to this.

Pilgrims have never followed a set route around the island: the aim of the pilgrim is to visit all the sites on the route but there is not, and never has been, any fixed order or route to follow. Whereas pilgrims who enter from the heavily-populated Osaka region are more likely to start at Ryozenji, they are under no compulsion to do so: it has always been acceptable to go the way one finds most convenient. When the monk Chosen went round Shikoku in the mid-17th century he began at Ryozenji and visited all the temples on the route, not in numerical order but in one that suited himself.[13] One may start from wherever one enters Shikoku and, while it is more common to go round the island in a clockwise fasion, one is at liberty to go anti-clockwise. In 1918, the writer Takamure Itsue, coming to Shikoku by boat from the southern island of Kyushu began her pilgrimage from where she disembarked, at the far side of the island from Ryozenji and went round anti-clockwise, spurred by a popular belief that more merit accrues to the pilgrim who does this.[14]

Neither has it ever been considered necessary to complete this, or other Japanese pilgrimages, in one go. Those who, through lack of funds, time or the necessary permits (in earlier times one needed permission from each province through which one passed) could not manage to do all, would do what they could and attempt to return to Shikoku later to complete the route. This pattern still exists, with organised tours to the longer pilgrimage routes such as Shikoku often covering half the route at a time. Ito Kenichi, whose pilgrimage diaries have recently been published, completed the Shikoku pilgrimage in three visits to the island in an 18-month period in 1970–71,[15] while many pilgrims I have met on different routes throughout Japan follow the pattern of doing the pilgrimage little by little on Sundays and holidays.

The belief structures of the pilgrimage are equally fluid, determined largely by the wishes of the participants. While the early pilgrims were ascetics whose goals were concerned with spiritual liberation, later pilgrims manifested more concern with worldly benefits such as relief from illness. The figure of Kobo

Daishi, regarded as a saintly miracle worker whose grace can eradicate problems and grant wishes, has gradually become the major focus of the pilgrimage and the prime object of veneration by pilgrims, who often chant invocations of praise to him as they travel. Though the worship of Kobo Daishi was a stimulus to many of the ascetics of earlier times, it has grown in particular as the pilgrimage has become more and more popularised and structured. Nowadays every pilgrimage site on Shikoku includes a *Daishido*, or temple dedicated to Kobo Daishi but this has been a relatively recent development. In the 17th century, only 30 of the 88 had *Daishido*, which suggests that the increased focus on this figure, and on the grace and miracles he can bestow, is a complementary part of the ways in which the pilgrimage has grown as a mass and populist activity in recent centuries.[16] Concepts of salvation and miracle play a great part in pilgrimage lore. Shikoku pilgrimage stories are full of miracles and, especially, of the miraculous actions worked by Kobo Daishi. Tanaka cites a book published in 1939 which extols the virtues of pilgrimage suggesting that numerous benefits such as the eradication of evils, the attainment of birth in the Pure Land and protection against bad luck come from it.[17]

Hoshino, following Turner's general line, considers that each pilgrim has determined his or her own ideas, goals, wishes and interpretations of this pilgrimage, because of the lack of any fixed and obligatory structure to the pilgrimage overall.[18] The merits of performing the pilgrimage are certainly not defined categorically by any authority, which does allow pilgrims to conceive the results of the pilgrimage for themselves.

It does appear, though, that there is a continuing movement away from the overtly spiritual goals of early pilgrims, towards more mundane wishes. The concern with escape from disease is still, despite advances of modern medical science, remarkably prevalent: Imai records how, travelling with her young son, almost everyone she meets assumes that he must be ill and that they are in search of a miracle cure.[19]

But pilgrims' beliefs and goals have also developed with the times. According to priests and officiants I have talked to on a number of pilgrimages, including Shikoku and those on the neighbouring islands of Awaji and Shodoshima, modern pilgrims seek, in their expressed prayers and entreaties at pilgrimage temples, more and more this-wordly aims, with a strong preference for safety in all forms. Probably the two most commonly sought requests are *kanai anzen* (safety for the family/in the home) and *kotsu anzen* (road safety). Many parties actually pilgrimage as a group with a defined common aim such as *kanai anzen*, even leaving small banners with the name of the group and the entreaty sought at temples they visit.[20] Such a group aim does not prevent the members of the party from also seeking personal ends, but it does suggest a growing standardisation as organised tours grow in strength and provide the pilgrim with a structure and group identity within which to travel.

The prevalence of group travel is apparently a fairly recent phenomenon: whereas some pilgrims in all eras have travelled in groups in order to eradicate dangers and provide company, it appears that individual pilgrimage was the norm for those who came from outside Shikoku even in the early decades of this century. Hoshino's analysis of the records of a pilgrims lodge in Ehime prefecture in the west of Shikoku for the year 1935 shows that most pilgrims from outside the island travelled individually and that their reasons for the pilgrimage were also highly individual and diverse.[21]

There is, however, very little evidence of individual travel these days, either in Shikoku or on any of the other pilgrimage routes of Japan. Individual and foot pilgrims have gradually disappeared from the pilgrimage world. This is not to say that there are no walkers, but that the numbers are infinitesimal especially when it is considered that, in earlier eras, walking was the standard means of travel, there being no other. When I walked the Shikoku route, admittedly just before the peak season, I met six walkers in six weeks; on Shodoshima, at peak season, one walker in the week it took to walk the 88-stage pilgrimage route, and in Chichibu, a 34-temple pilgrimage within easy reach of Tokyo, five walkers, all on one-day hikes of part of the route, in five days. These, it should be stressed, are pilgrimages which have a fairly strong historical tradition of walking. The oral evidence I gathered from people who live on Shodoshima and Shikoku, and from priests at some of the temples, confirmed that walkers are rare these days, although prevalent until approximately 30 years ago.[22]

Such major changes have come about since the war, especially in the last two decades as increased communications, more and better roads and transport and higher standards of living have been converted into the growth of package-tour pilgrimages with an increasing emphasis on the ludic and the structured. The Iyotetsu Kanko Bus Company, based in Matsuyama, one of the main towns of Shikoku, claims to have inaugurated the concept of organised bus tours of the Shikoku pilgrimage in 1953, from which time the organised tour has come to be the most popular way of pilgrimage. The company notes, in the magazine it publishes on the Shikoku pilgrimage, that car pilgrimages have become quite popular in the last few years, but that organised bus tours still attract the most custom.[23]

It has become customary, in the light of the large numbers of people going on pilgrimages in the modern day, to talk about a pilgrimage revival or, to use a popular loanword of the times, a 'boom'.[24] The better known pilgrimages, such as Shikoku and Saikoku, a 33-stage pilgrimage dedicated to the Buddhist figure of compassion, Kannon, in the Osaka/Kyoto area, receive huge numbers of visitors each year, while many smaller routes that are often partially modelled on these main routes also appear to be flourishing.

However, it should be pointed out that the popularity of pilgrimage is nothing new in Japan: Miyazaki, basing his estimates on the records of pilgrims' lodges in 1764, concludes that as many as 36–48,000 pilgrims were travelling around Shikoku during a six-month period in the mid-18th century, a figure which bears close comparison with the estimates of about 100,000 pilgrims a year in Shikoku these days.[25] The whole Edo era (17th to 19th centuries) was a time of immense activity when many of the smaller pilgrimage routes modelled along the lines of Saikoku (with 33 stages) or Shikoku (88 stages) proliferated throughout Japan, opening up the world of pilgrimage to people to whom it had been previously inaccessible.[26]

It could be argued that the concept of a 'boom' in pilgrimage in Japan is not so much the result of any vast increase in numbers as it is the result of increased attention being paid to the subject by the Japanese media and interested parties such as tourist and transport organisations. To some extent, at least, it is the advent of mass communications that has publicised pilgrimage in Japan and helped to create the image of a 'boom'. Newspaper companies in particular have actively promoted pilgrimages by sending reporters out to write articles and books about the better known routes or to give publicity to lesser known routes.[27] Newspapers, as keen in Japan as elsewhere to wage campaigns that promote sales, have at times seized on aspects of pilgrimage for such ends: in April 1985 the Asahi newspaper ran a campaign to promote better health by encouraging people to walk more and, to highlight this, it sent two journalists off to walk some of the Shikoku pilgrimage.[28] The media have even created their own pilgrimage routes: in 1932 a group of newspaper companies in the Osaka-Kobe area put together a 33 temple route from temples in the region, calling it the Shin Saikoku (i.e. New Saikoku) route.[29]

This is merely one instance of a continuing activity: pilgrimage creation, whether by media, travel firms, groups of temples, transport companies or all of these, is a recurrent theme in Japan. A recent route has been formed on the island of Awaji in the Inland Sea which focuses on the syncretic Seven Gods of Good Fortune (*Shichi Fukujin*): this route has been heavily promoted both by the island's tourist offices, by travel companies that run tours of the island, for it provides a focus of tourist interest and places for tourists to visit on an island short on tourist attractions but keen to promote tourism, and by the priests of some of the temples concerned, which stand to benefit from the income generated by pilgrims. Railway companies, too, have been active in promoting pilgrimages: the Meitetsu company in Nagoya has put together a route focused on the *Shichi Fukujin* in the area west of Nagoya which can be travelled entirely by the trains of the company which actively publicises it, especially around the New Year, a time when Japanese people traditionally visit shrines and temples. Other railway companies have developed their 'own' pilgrimages: the Hankyu railway of Osaka, for example, has its *Shichi Fukujin* route which can be done exclusively on Hankyu trains.

Such activities are obviously intended to publicise the organisation involved and to increase its business but they also express the conviction that such major companies, including the media, see themselves as guardians of the national culture. Newspaper companies in Japan tend to take a great interest in the maintenance and promotion of national culture, an outlook apparently shared by the railway companies. A spokesman for the Hankyu Railway told me that, by developing a pilgrimage, the company felt it was encouraging both education and religious belief: of course, this would benefit the company but profit was an incidental result rather than a motive.[30]

Intensive tourist publicity has accompanied this media interest in pilgrimage. Researchers have noted that key components in the popularity of pilgrimage in the modern era are its touristic element, increasingly strong as better communications and greater economic wealth have enabled people to travel more, and its essentially anti-modern nature. Japan's long and largely rural tradition and culture has, in many respects, been overwhelmed by a modern, Westernised and urban one and, while the comforts brought by this change are widely welcomed, an undercurrent of unease persists, especially in the older generation, due to the seeming erosion of overtly Japanese values. Now, as most people wear Western clothes and work in modern businesses and industries, what is identifiable as the 'real' (i.e. pre-Western) Japan appears to be fading. As a reaction to this, there has been a growth of nostalgic interest in aspects of Japanese culture that appear to be inherently traditional and 'Japanese', as opposed to modern and Western: pilgrimage, with its roots in Japanese religious and social history and with its traditional form symbolised by the pilgrim's attire, has become a natural focus of such sentiments.[31]

Particularly because of the ways in which pilgrimage has speeded up (one can reach Shikoku in a matter of hours from anywhere in Japan now, whereas in the days of non-motorised travel it could take weeks merely to reach the island, let alone to travel around it), it is now possible to leave a city-based, modern life-style, don the pilgrims garb, do a pilgrimage and, in so doing, feel both a return to spiritual roots and an accompanying sense of renewal, but still be able to return to the aforementioned city life in a matter of days. This notion of renewal, which has always been an intrinsic part of the pilgrimage process, is emphasised by the leaflet handed out to pilgrims at the temple Ryozenji on Shikoku, which states that, in dressing in the clothes of death one is journeying to the world of the dead, to return, reborn to this world.[32] Of course this journey to the world of death, symbolised by the pilgrim's attire, is no longer hazardous and fraught with discomfort: rather, it is safely cushioned and planned. However, the implicit themes of leaving the everyday and turning to the past before returning, renewed, to the modern remain as strongly as ever. Thus, this nostalgic element of return dovetails neatly with the ways that society has moved away from the old; if it had not, the conditions by which the pilgrim could escape the present would be lacking.

Modern tourist publicity makes much of these themes, emphasising the traditions of pilgrimage and its form (it seems almost obligatory for tourist posters of Shikoku to feature a white-clad pilgrim), which has become in itself a symbol of a return to the past. The Shikoku pilgrimage in particular is frequently described as the 'spiritual homeland' (*kokoro no furusato*) of the Japanese people, a term full of nostalgic implications of returning to one's roots: this term is a popular catchphrase in tourist publicity that summons up images of the old, traditional and peaceful as opposed to the new and frenetic. This image, when used, as is often the case, in connection to pilgrimages, suggests that, by undertaking a pilgrimage, Japanese people can make closer contact with their roots and with the inner core of their own culture, and that this contact in itself will fortify them and enable them to return, revived, to their modern lives.[33]

In light of this, the paradoxical nature of the image drawn at the beginning of this article becomes increasingly clear. The pre-modern style of the pilgrim's dress has added meaning and implication when juxtaposed with the situation in which the pilgrim travels: travelling by the most modern means makes it more vividly symbolic to don the ancient garb, for this provides a dramatic manifestation of the 'apartness' of the pilgrim from society, not so much in the manner in which the pilgrim is travelling but in the implicit attitudes inherent, for the time of the pilgrimage, in the clothing. Even for walkers this symbolism is striking: Imai Mimisako, engaged by the Mainichi newspaper company to write a series of articles about the Shikoku pilgrimage, which later evolved into a book, makes it clear, prior to setting out, that her travel (with her husband and son) is purely journalistic and touristic but, as she puts on the white pilgrims shirt, she reports a change of feeling and attitude which lasts throughout the book: When she finishes, she returns to her city home, full of feelings of renewal, resolving to improve her life. She and her husband continually emphasise their feelings of separation from everyday (i.e. Western-style and modern) life and how they feel that their attire sets them apart from and outside modern society, even when they enter (which they appear to do with great regularity) such aspects of the modern world as coffee shops and amusement arcades.[34]

For them, obviously, the separation appears to be overtly bound up with the form they have taken, their white pilgrims shirts and hats, rather than with any actual compulsion or obligation to retreat from worldly activities and places during the pilgrimage. The implication is that what appeals to the modern pilgrim, and what the pilgrim identifies with on the pilgrimage, is a sense of apartness from modernity expressed through the external aspect of the attire, rather than from any process of being, for any extended period of time, cut adrift from the normal patterns and comforts of society. For a pilgrim travelling by the most modern means, separation is primarily symbolic, through the form and mode of attire, rather than actual.

THE IMPLICATIONS AND EFFECTS OF MODERN PILGRIMAGE

All this has reverberations on routes and pilgrimage structures, with convenience and speed becoming more and more paramount. Walkers are, admittedly, few and far between these days but recent developments have served to discourage the foot pilgrim. The old pilgrimage footpaths have been disappearing fast, often turned into roads with no provision for the walker. The 80-km stretch of the pilgrimage route between the temples Yakuoji (Number 23) and Higashidera (24) on Shikoku, for example, followed the seashore all the way but it has in recent years been turned into a highway which makes no provision for the walker, who has to walk along the side of the road. This in turn discourages people from walking, because the route is neither quiet nor particularly safe. A number of pilgrims that I met, including a Buddhist priest who was walking the rest of the route, stated that they took buses at this stage as it was not conducive to walking. The pilgrim in Shikoku is nowadays liable to walk along roads rather than footpaths for most of the way, which serves to lessen the stimulus to walk.[35]

As the pilgrimage becomes more oriented towards motorised traffic, the older structure that supported the walker has eroded with the disappearance of many of the old pilgrims' lodges that catered for walkers. This is due both to the lack of walkers and to the fact that the simple facilities that they offer are unacceptable to modern pilgrims for whom increased convenience and comfort have led to higher demands and expectations, and who, travelling by bus, are able to go further afield in the search for accommodation.[36] Increased mobility has meant a wider choice of places to stay, which in turn has heightened the ludic aspects of pilgrimage as it undermines facets such as acceptance and endurance that once played a part in the whole framework of the pilgrim's life. What appears to be happening on Shikoku is that there are numerous places to stay convenient for bus parties at distances apart suitable for a day's bus travel, but fewer and fewer places in between accessible to walkers, which further discourages people from walking, especially as it appears that many of the places that cater for group travel, including even temples that accommodate pilgrims, are liable to refuse those who travel on foot.[37]

It is not altogether surprising that one is beginning to notice cracks appearing in the pilgrimage community, with the growth of latent tensions between walkers and those on buses, most clearly expressed in somewhat vituperative passages from the diaries of those who have gone on foot and who have resented the ways in which the route has been transformed for the sake of those who go by bus.[38] The growth of a structure that caters for groups is, by ceasing to provide for individuals, leading to differentiations between groups and individuals. This in turn works against any potential unity within the community of pilgrims.

According to various temple priests I interviewed on Shikoku, there are also tensions between different groups of pilgrims, as each has its own goals, schedules and group identities that cut through any ideas of unity within the wider community of pilgrims. On Shikoku, as on many pilgrimages in Japan, pilgrims receive a stamp or seal from each temple they visit in a book or on a special scroll they carry. It takes time for temples to inscribe each scroll or book and, when a number of bus parties converge on a temple at one time, each with several dozen scrolls to be inscribed, some pilgrims are caused to wait. This leads to frustrations, arguments and disputes, especially when those who are forced to wait find their carefully planned schedules disrupted, and further eradicates any feelings of community amongst pilgrims. As the tendency for groups to travel as a unit with group wishes and expectations grows, it is likely that increased fragmentation and inter-group oppositions will occur.

The speeding up of the pilgrimage process, the increasing ease with which pilgrims can get between sites and the removal of the barriers of hardship and effort formerly necessary for performing a pilgrimage have all helped to focus the pilgrim's energies on the sites themselves, rather than on the journey as such. Whereas the whole pilgrimage, especially when linked to the symbolism of death and of a journey to the other world, with its implications of renewal and rebirth, formed a unit in which the route itself and the feelings of separation gained from following it were as much a part of the pilgrimage as the temple sites, it appears that the focus is now falling largely on the sites, with the spaces between to be completed as fast as possible.

Observers have, for instance, noted the ways in which pilgrims in tour parties appear to swing between poles of behaviour, from the highly ludic and often irreverent outside or between sites, to the reverent and pious inside them.[39] This suggests that pilgrims are making some differentiation between the sites themselves and the way that links them, that they are, by their actions, expressing the opinion that the sacred space of the pilgrimage is limited to the pilgrimage places themselves rather than to the totality of the route; outside such sites the pieties exhibited inside are to be dispensed with.

This concern with places rather than the totality is further expressed by the *hoin* or temple seal stamped into the book or scroll carried by the pilgrim. Once seen as recognition for performing an act of piety at a temple, this has come to represent, in the mind of the modern pilgrim, a symbol of having performed the pilgrimage and of the merit that goes with this. A scroll or book with the *hoin* of all 88 temples is believed to bring the bearer great benefit (a belief without scriptural or ecclesiastical justification but adhered to by virtually all pilgrims I have met) to the extent that it is not uncommon to meet pilgrims for whom the most important part of the pilgrimage is the completed book or scroll. Temple authorities tend to passively encourage this viewpoint (which does benefit them, as the temple receives a fee for bestowing the *hoin*) by stating that interpretations of the pilgrimage and its aspects, such as the *hoin*, are the prerogative of the pilgrims, not the religious authorities.[40]

One young man informed me that he was taking a week to drive around the Shikoku route and advised me to get a car: it would enable me to obtain all the *hoin* in one-sixth of the time it took to walk.[41] On the pilgrimage around Shodoshima there are several small sites inaccessible except by foot. Usually these are administered by a nearby temple which bestows the *hoin* on their behalf. It transpires that large numbers of the buses that ply the Shodoshima route do not visit these sites at all: when I asked at a number of such sites why there seemed to be so few pilgrims visiting these sites when there were so many elsewhere on the island the site officiants observed that the seal was obtained elsewhere and so many people did not feel it necessary to go to the site itself. Indeed, at another site on the way, a couple touring by car informed me that they would not be going to the next site on the route as it was difficult to reach and they had already obtained the seal for it.[42]

It is even possible to buy completed scrolls, with the seals of all the temples on a pilgrimage route, without having gone on the pilgrimage. Advertisements for such scrolls occasionally appear in newspapers, stating that to perform a pilgrimage such as Shikoku, even by bus, is difficult and time-consuming; as an alternative and safer way, the advertisement offers completed scrolls that can be obtained for a sizeable fee.[43] This implies that the real importance of pilgrimage is not in the action of being on the route but in the external symbols of its completion. Certainly, for modern pilgrims, collecting the *hoin* appears to be an intrinsic part of the process, and any means that hastens this process or allows it to be collected with ease appears to be highly popular.

CONCLUSION

In this article I have outlined some aspects of pilgrimage in Japan in the present day, focusing on the ways in which pilgrimage has moved away from the unstructured and individual and towards the structured, group-oriented and organised. A certain amount of this movement has been promoted by interest groups such as the media and tourist organisations, and this has stimulated further standardisation along with an increasingly touristic element, which in turn is causing tensions and fragmentation within the pilgrimage community as a whole.

Modern Japanese pilgrimages offer a means of escape from the pressures of society along with a route by which to return to them renewed, a means of enjoying the benefits of increased wealth while reinforcing nostalgic and intrinsically 'Japanese' feelings which are externally suppressed in the everyday lives of modern Japanese. Pilgrimage provides a convenient temporary release valve and escape route from the pressures of modern living, as well as a means of renewal so as to be able to cope with such living. Organisational developments have meant that the dangerous aspects of pilgrimage have been superseded by concerns for safety, comfort, speed and enjoyment, which themselves have been increasingly emphasised as major concerns of the pilgrimage. At the same time, the pilgrim as an individual and an outsider has been transformed into a member of a group, a participant in an organised, mainstream activity.

The focus has accordingly been moving away from the totality of the pilgrimage route to specific aspects of it. The route is becoming less an intrinsic part of the pilgrim's journey and more the means by which to reach, as swiftly as possible, the next site where the pilgrim engages in the actions and pieties of the pilgrimage while obtaining the seals that affirm the completion of the action of pilgrimage and assure the pilgrim that the goal has been attained. As a result, pilgrimage in Japan is becoming more and more focused not on the essence of the journey but on its completion: the individual and liminal pilgrim of former times is becoming a bus passenger in a hurry with a schedule to keep.

NOTES

1 See, for example, Victor Turner, 'Pilgrimages as Social Dramas', in Turner *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, U.S.A., 1985, pp. 166–230; and Turner *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture* Blackwell, Oxford, 1978, especially pp. 2–20.

2 Miyazaki Ninshō, *Shikoku Henro—Rekishi to Kokoro*, Toki Shobō, 1985, p. 205.

3 Miyazaki, op. cit., pp. 46–47.

4 Imai Mimisako, *Oyako Henro Tabi Nikki*, Tōhō Shuppan, 1981, pp. 26–27 gives the schedule of this particular group. The parties I have met on various routes in Japan invariably had similarly planned schedules.

5 Yamashita Hirotaka, *Junrei Benrichō*, Kyorakusha, Tokyo, 1984, vol. 1, p. 8.

6 This is a common theme of this organisation's advertisements about its pilgrimage tours: see, for example, *Daihōrin*, vol. 57, No. 7, Daihōrinkaku, Tokyo, 1986, inside back cover.

7 Iyotetsu Kankō Kaihatsu (ed.), *Henro* (monthly magazine), Iyotetsu Kankō, Matsuyama, No. 1, April 1984, p. 2.

8 See, for example, Turner, 1985, pp. 169–171.

9 Miyazaki, op. cit., and Shinno Toshikazu *Tabi no Naka no Shūkyō* NHK Books, Tokyo, 1980, provide reasonable accounts of the history of the Shikoku pilgrimage: I have based my summary largely on these two books.

10 Jakuhon 'Shikoku Henro Kudokuki', in Iyoshi Dankai (ed.), *Shikoku Henroshishū*, Iyoshi Dankai, Matsuyama, 1981, p. 120. Although Jakuhon's guide was printed in 1690 an earlier text dating from 1689 is in existence (ibid. p. 323).

11 On the various theories for this number see Miyazaki, op. cit., pp. 38–42 and Tanaka Hiroshi *Junreichi no Sekai* Furuima Shoin, Tokyo, 1983, pp. 67–70. Most

depend on additions and multiplications of numbers with religious significance but, as these writers agree, there is no substantial evidence to support any particular theory.

12 Jakuhon, op. cit., p. 152.

13 Miyazaki Ninshō (ed.), *Chōsen Shikoku Henro Nikki*, Daitō Shuppansha, Tokyo, 1977, pp. 1–85. Chōsen took what is probably the shortest route, although this was not because his prime concern was speed: it took him 91 days to walk, while the average time is 50–60 days.

14 Takamure's pilgrimage is described in detail in Hoshino Eiki, *Junrei*, Kōdansha, Tokyo, 1981, pp. 10–38.

15 Itō's account of his three-part pilgrimage is given in Itō Kenichi, *Shikoku Henroki*, Furukawa Shobō, Tokyo, 1985.

16 Tanaka, op. cit., p. 110.

17 Ibid., pp. 46–47.

18 Hoshino Eiki 'Shikoku Henro ni Okeru Seichisei no Tokushitsu', in Sasaki Hiromiki, Miyada Noboru and Yamaori Tetsuo (eds), *Gendai Shūkyō 3-Seichi*, Shunjūsha, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 100–102.

19 Imai, op. cit., pp. 13–20.

20 This section is based on observances at pilgrimage sites on numerous routes and on interviews with priests on Shikoku, Shodoshima, and Awaji in the period between February 1984, when I first visited Shikoku, and April 1986.

21 Hoshino (1980), p. 99.

22 The observations in this section are based on my experiences while walking the Chichibu pilgrimage (September 1981), Shikoku (February–March 1984) and Shodoshima (March 1986).

23 *Henro*, No. 20, January 1986, p. 2; and No. 1, April 1984, p. 1.

24 This word, widely used in Japan to denote popularity, appears frequently in pilgrimage-related literature: see, for example, Hoshino (1981), pp. 181–182.

25 Miyazaki, op. cit., p. 185. Miyazaki shows that 200–300 pilgrims passed through one lodging place every night in the period between February and July 1764. While no clear figure exists for the present time, the figure of 100 000 appears to be a general consensus: see, for example, *Henro*, No. 27, June 1986, p. 3.

26 On developments in the Edo period see Hoshino (1981), pp. 40–43. The topic of pilgrimages modelled on the major pilgrimages has been dealt with at length by Tanaka, op. cit., but has yet to be widely discussed in European languages.

27 For example, Imai was commissioned by the Mainichi Newspaper Company to write a series of articles on the Shikoku pilgrimage, which developed into a book (Imai, op. cit., pp. i–ii).

28 This series of articles was printed in the national newspaper *Asahi Shinbun* on 4–15 April 1985.

29 Nakao Takashi, *Koji Junrei Jiten*, Tokyodō Shuppan, Tokyo, 1973, p. 173.

30 This interview was conducted at the Hankyū Railway Information Office, Umeda, Osaka on 16 January 1986.

31 On the reasons generally cited for pilgrimage's contemporary popularity see Hoshino (1981), pp. 181–189.

32 The text of this leaflet is given in Imai, op. cit., pp. 17–18.

33 The phrase *kokoro no furusato* can be found repeatedly in pilgrimage literature: it appears, for instance, in the first issue of the magazine *Henro* to describe the Shikoku pilgrimage (*Henro*, No. 1, April 1984, p. 1).

34 Imai, op. cit., records these changes first on pp. 12–13 and they form a theme throughout the book, even though she appears to spend as much time visiting coffee shops and riding in taxis as she does walking.

35 Imai, op. cit., p. 37, complains bitterly about the lack of provision for walkers. The priest and other pilgrims mentioned were encountered in February 1984 when I walked along this section.

36 My remarks are based on interviews with owners of three pilgrims lodges, Akamatsu and Ōsansō in Shikoku (28 February and 3 March 1984), and Aburaya on Shodoshima, 20 March 1986.

37 The experiences of a foot pilgrim, Hirayama Būemon, reported in *Henro*, No. 27, June 1986, p. 3, show how he was frequently refused accommodation. My experience was the same: even temples that catered for pilgrims more often than not were unwilling to accommodate individual and foot pilgrims, preferring the greater business that comes from large parties.

38 Imai constantly expresses such resentments: on p. 37, for instance, she refers to bus pilgrims as the *henro gundan* or 'pilgrim army'. The journal of a priest who has recently walked the Shikoku route, Takada Shinkai, *Sutete Aruke*, Yamate Shobō, Tokyo 1985, also makes differentiations between walkers and others, and often passes critical comments on those in buses: see, for example, pp. 176–201.

39 Imai, for example, comments on the extremely jocular and tourisitic atmosphere of pilgrimage groups yet shows the extent to which, within temple precincts, such pilgrims exhibit very pious feelings: see, for example, pp. 117–128. My own observations tend to concur with this view: most pilgrimage parties I have encountered have drunk alcohol copiously in the evenings and have travelled as if on a holiday, while becoming reverent whenever they entered temples on the route.

40 Okamoto Gishō, the priest at Senkōji, the first temple on the Awaji 88 stage pilgrimage, told me in an interview on 3 March 1986, that, whatever his personal feelings might be, it was not his place to state them openly: it was up to pilgrims to determine what they wished.

41 While his comment, made to me on 13 March 1984 at the 83rd temple, Ichinomiyaji, on Shikoku, might sound rather cynical, it does express an attitude that I found prevalent among pilgrims on this and other routes. Miyazaki, op. cit., pp. 213–219, considers that the focus is on speed and completion, rather than on the route itself these days.

42 These remarks are based on interviews and encounters on Shodoshima, 14–21 March 1986.

43 Such an advertisement appeared in the *Asahi Shinbun* 24 March 1984.

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THE SEXUAL LIFE OF THE SAINTS
TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN HEAVEN

Bernhard Lang

> As people conceive their heaven, so they conceive their God; the content of their idea of heaven is the content of their idea of God, only that what in God is a mere sketch, a concept, is in heaven depicted and developed in the colours and forms of the senses. Heaven is therefore the key to the deepest mysteries of religion.
>
> Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*.[1]

According to Malinowski, when a Trobriander muses about life after death, 'all other aspects soon fade into the background and sex comes to the fore'.[2] The Trobriand 'erotic paradise', as Malinowski termed it, is filled with luscious and hard-working women, bacchanals of dancing and feasting, and spirit orgies. Although scenes of marriage and family sometimes appear in songs, promiscuity seems the accepted norm in the heaven Trobrianders call Tuma.

Caught up in the excitement and delight of descriptions of Tuma, Malinowski ignored the more down-to-earth task of trying to make sense of this erotic paradise. He only tentatively related the social life of the living Trobrianders to their expectations and ideas about an afterlife. Why Malinowski failed to reveal the rationale of the Trobriand paradise, or even to attempt an interpretation of its meaning, remains a mystery. Perhaps the richness of the ethnographical data demanded such a level of attention that it overshadowed the development of interpretive theories. Calling the Trobriand heaven 'a matter of remote speculation', Malinowski insisted that it did not affect the way people actually felt about death. 'On this point they are exactly like ourselves', he reflected. 'Many a good Christian will grow enthusiastic about the joys and consolations of heaven without showing, however, any alacrity to repair thither'.

Our study separates into two distinct parts that deal with two different concepts of the Christian heaven. First we will consider how the original Christian concept of an afterlife involves the assumption of an asexual existence. This assumption reflects the early church's alienation from 'the

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world', and can be explained in terms of Max Weber's theory of charisma and Mary Douglas's understanding of the body politic. The second part will show how a new interpretation of the Christian heaven appears in the 18th century which, in the spirit of the Trobrianders, sees the continuation of marriage (and useful work) in the hereafter. This concept of an erotic paradise marks the end of viable charismatic Christianity and continues to shape popular thought regarding life in the spirit world.

NO SEX IN HEAVEN: THE EARLY CHRISTIAN VIEW OF LIFE AFTER DEATH

In Christianity the myth of the eternal fate of men and women is part of an encompassing myth of human history. In the beginning, so the myth goes, men and women were immortal, and death was introduced as a consequence of human sin. By sending his son, the Christ, God destroyed not death itself, but the power of death, thus opening up the possibility of eternal life. Paradise could be restored. Paul uses the concepts of 'indestructability' and 'immortality' to explain this eternal life. People attain immortality only when they belong to the community of Christian believers who are in the flesh but not of the flesh. Just as the present world, reigned by Sin and Death, will pass away, so the human body, as part of that world, must die. 'Flesh and blood can never possess the kingdom of God, and the perishable cannot possess immortality'.[3]

For the Christian believer there are two ways to achieve eternal life, depending on whether one is alive or dead at the final and universal judgment. Those living at judgment time will experience the transformation of their bodies 'in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet call'.[4] The dead will rise bodily, and then be transformed, or perhaps rise with their new, transformed bodies. As with Jesus himself, 'once raised from the dead [the human individual] is never to die again: [the human individual] is no longer under the dominion of death'.[5]

Paul emphasizes the difference between the old, mortal body, and the new, immortal one. For the latter, he coins the expression, 'spiritual body', but unfortunately does not describe its qualities.[6] One New Testament passage does, however, convey an intimation about the 'spiritual' body. Confronted with a somewhat blasphemous joke about a woman who might have sex with seven brothers in the other world, Jesus asserts that there will be no sex at all in heaven. The subtle joke suggests that a woman legally married to seven brothers in succession in this life will have intercourse with all of them in the next. The excessive fulfilment of the Levirate law is implicitly, yet effectively, compared to the sins that are to be expected beyond the grave. Thus the idea of an afterlife is ridiculed. This is the serious answer of Jesus:

> The men and women of this world marry, but those who have been judged worthy of a place in the other world and of the resurrection from the dead, do not marry, for they are not subject to death any longer. They are like angels; they are sons of God, because they share in the resurrection.[7]

Thus men and women will be transformed into angel-like spiritual beings over whom death has no power. In eternal life sexuality will no longer be necessary for the reproduction of life.

In the New Testament eternity and immortality are waiting for those who have qualified as good Christians. Transformed into spiritual beings, they may now enter heaven. Their mortal, material, and sexual bodies must be left behind. Sexuality belongs to the frame of this world which is to pass away.

How can such a view be accounted for? It is clear that early Christianity inherited the doctrine of a future life, or life after death, from certain Jewish circles in which such ideas flourished. This alone, though, falls short of explaining why eschatology—the belief in the hereafter and the end of history—was adopted by early Christianity and why it eventually acquired such a prominent place in Western thought. For a more thorough explanation we propose a theory based on Max Weber's sociology of charisma and Douglas's anthropology of body symbolism.

Early Christianity, viewed from a sociological perspective, was a charismatic movement characterized by non-involvement in economic life and a lack of interest in such worldly matters as having children. The religious charismatic, preoccupied with creating a following that worships God 'in spirit and in truth', has to be free from worldly attachments and occupational and family duties. Since his mission itself is otherworldly, the charismatic inevitably turns away from this life. Spirituality is the centre of life, and everything that is unrelated to religion is either corrupt, inauthentic, or simply irrelevant. Although the full consequences of such an attitude were only realized by leaders, the ideal as such was recommended to everyone.

At this point Weber's notion of the charismatic can be supplemented by Douglas's interpretation of the dichotomy of body and spirit. Giving religion priority over social concerns, the charismatic mind tends to emphasize the distinction between body and spirit, matter and mind. It is through the body that we are related to 'the world', that is, to the family, procreation, economic life, and politics. The spirit, on the other hand, relates us to religion, the community of believers, and ultimately to God who himself is spirit. Emphasis, or over-emphasis, on the spirit necessarily alienates one from the present order of things. Conversely, whoever is disinterested in ordinary social life is likely to lack concern for 'the body'. Those who depreciate society in its established form, devalue 'the flesh' and revere 'the spirit'.

That Jesus was a religious charismatic is beyond dispute. His message was purely religious; it issued directly from a very definite idea of God, and of the divine will in relation to humankind. To Jesus the whole meaning of life was religious; his life and his teaching were wholly determined by his thought of God. Here was a man living entirely in the presence of God, which is conceived as 'a searching and penetrating gaze and as a "fascination" which draws the human being to Himself'.[8] In the measure as the human individual is drawn to God, it is at the same time drawn out of the world as we normally experience it. Early charismatic Christianity demonstrates this by parting from the Jewish ideal of having many children. Jesus and St Paul remained unmarried and childless; both of them utterly alien to an ideal of Christian family and domesticity. The celibate Paul wished that others would live like him, and the book of Revelation celebrates the 144,000 who have not 'defiled themselves' with women.[9] Jesus, himself known for the disregard of his relatives,[10] called his disciples and followers out of their families, and united them in a charismatic community in which marriage formed no structural element. Far from being a stabilizing factor in society, charisma tends to disrupt marriages and families. Jesus claims to 'have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother'.[11] Paul allows half-Christian marriages to be divorced for the sake of peace. The early Christian community is based on the denial of family and kin ties. Eucharistic rites established new social bonds which took precedence over kinship ties. Christians share meals, not beds. Jesus' followers must have included many people who gave up 'home, or wife, brothers, parents, or children, for the sake of the kingdom of God'.[12] Travelling missionaries were carefully instructed not to visit their relatives living *en route*.[13] Travelling encourages withdrawal and belongs to the art of remaining an outsider.

Almost by definition, outsiders are individuals in a qualified sense. In pre-modern societies, as Dumont has convincingly argued, 'individualism' as a value was only known to, and practiced by, the world-renouncers such as the Buddhist monk, the Christian ascetic, the cynic philosopher.[14] Although not truly autonomous in the modern sense, they enjoyed the privilege of moral choice and innovation. They were free.

In a like manner, Mary Douglas argues that 'to insist on the superiority of spiritual over material elements is to insist on the liberties of the individual'.[15] In religion, this attitude means 'preaching the possibility of the private individual attaining salvation by modes of direct communion with godhead which bypass institutional forms'. All this is true of the early Christian movement. Individual 'conversion' and 'faith' were seen as free responses to apostolic preaching, eventually dramatized and celebrated by individual baptism which symbolized 'death' and 'resurrection'—the death of someone's natural identity and the resurrection into an incomplete yet real spiritual existence. Even though 'houses' or families are reported to have become Christian,[16] preachers mainly tried to convert individuals which must have been easier to accomplish. Moreover, Christianity bypassed such established institutions as Synagogue and Temple. Modern individualism, often traced back to the Protestant reformation, is clearly prefigured in the New Testament. The early Christian believer is an individual.

Only after the eclipse of religious effervescence, and the inevitable return to everyday routine as well as the establishment of new routinized rituals, did Christianity begin to adopt the more common ideal of domestic peace under a patriarchal householder. Eventually, marriage was solemnized in elaborate rituals and regarded a 'sacrament'. For the present analysis, this development is no longer relevant, for it was precisely the initial charismatic disruption of the normal, and the individualistic withdrawal from the world that structured the original Christian vision of the hereafter. In order to see how Christian theology elaborated the New Testament idea of heaven, we can turn to two themes, that of the anticipation of heaven in ascetic life, and the insistence on asexual existence in the actual hereafter.

When Jesus asserted that 'there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven', he promoted celibate life among his followers. At the ideological level, this saying of Jesus reflects 'the wish to conform to the deity not only spiritually, but also physically'.[17] The spiritual character of God and the asexual nature of life in the hereafter are closely connected to the early Christian disdain for established society.

Despite the routinization of charisma in the emergence of ecclesiastical institutions there were always Christians who expressed contempt for the world and, along with it, contempt for the body. In the apocryphal *Obsequies of the Blessed Virgin*, the apostles John, Andrew, and Peter vehemently proclaim total renunciation of food, sex, family and possessions, i.e. everything that binds them into the web of normal human society.[18] Accordingly, Christian ascetics and monks neglect both bodily health and sexual life in order to participate in an eternal mode of being. Celibate monks conceive of their life as the life of angels (*angelikos bios*), a theme that runs through much of patristic and early monastic literature.[19] Gregory of Nyssa (335–94) explains the underlying ideology as follows:

> Our Lord has announced that the life after our resurrection shall be that of the angels. Now the peculiarity of the angelic nature is that they are strangers to marriage. The blessing of this promise has been already received by the ascetic who has not only mingled his own glory with the halo of the saints, but also by the stainlessness of his life has imitated the purity of these incorporeal beings.

Elsewhere in the same *Treatise on Virginity* he insists that 'in every soul which passes through this life in the flesh under the protection of virginity, the strength of Death is in a manner broken and annulled'.[20]

For the female ascetic, menstruation acts as a permanent reminder of the reproductive process, and hence of transient society and death. Only beyond menopause, then, can virginity be complete. Menstruation, however, can be eliminated by fasting. Some women produce a specially valued result of anorexia nervosa: the premature cessation of the menstrual cycle.[21] Menstrual blood symbolizes the female body and relates it to 'this world', while amenorrhea, the absence of menstruation, anticipates heaven. For the male ascetic, too, celibate life was not enough. Ideally, he should be able to control his body so completely as to avoid having erections and ejaculations.[22]

In his *Essence of Christianity*, the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach tried to explain the logic that connects asceticism and the belief in individual immortality. In natural history, he argues, the species is sexual and reproduces itself indefinitely. Here the species is immortal, not the individual. In Christian doctrine, on the other hand, the individual person is made immortal. Since sexuality and reproduction cannot contribute to immortality, the difference of sex is considered only an external adjunct to an essentially sexless soul. 'The unwedded and ascetic life', he explains, 'is the direct way to the heavenly, immortal life, for heaven is nothing else than life liberated from the conditions of the species, supernatural, sexless, absolutely subjective life'.[23]

What, then, happens after death? As long as we live in the flesh, we are constrained by our bodies and have to compromise with 'the world' and established society. After death, we are released from physical and social constraints and thus able to meet all the requirements of charismatic asexuality. Christian doctrine asserts that after death, our original nature is restored, the nature humankind had in paradise before the fall. According to one version, there was no sexuality in Paradise and we were designed to procreate in some non-carnal way. 'God did not create for them parts of shame', asserts a medieval mystic,

> since their bodies should be pure and they should wear the garment of angels [i.e. be asexual]. They should get their children by holy love—which penetrates without breaking, like the sunbeam playfully penetrates water. But after they ate the forbidden fruit, their bodies were distorted in a way we can see in ourselves.[24]

This primordial distortion reverses in the hereafter so that the original beauty of men and women is restored. Another particularly graphic text assures its 6th-century readers that a dead person's departing soul looks like a human body stripped of its sexual features.[25]

Mainstream Christian theology, however, did not adopt such radical views. According to Augustine, Adam and Eve had a sexual life in Paradise.[26] This original sexuality was lacking in lust (*libido*). If the first couple had not disobeyed the divine commandment, they would have had as many offspring as God had appointed without involving male lust and female pain. God planned not to let his creatures die, but to transform their material bodies into asexual, spiritual ones beyond corruption. Since God has never abandoned his original plan, he will realize it in the glorified body which will be, for aesthetic reasons only, male or female. Men and women will be able to touch, though certainly not in a sexual way.[27]

One should not misconstrue the meaning of the community of the blessed. To invent a picture of happily reunited families in the other world, and a heaven furnished with houses, towns, and flourishing community life or, alternatively, a Paradise Restored with a quiet pastoral atmosphere and shady groves for lovers is a gross departure from the traditional notion of heaven. Before the 18th century such an 'islamicized' heaven was unknown in Christian orthodoxy.[28] The blessed, on the traditional view, will fill those positions in a pre-existing heavenly hierarchy that became empty when God expelled the evil angels.[29] There are higher and lower ranks, and each individual will be alloted his or her position according to merit. Mediocre Christians are in the lower ranks, while saints and martyrs occupy privileged positions near the Blessed Virgin and the Trinity. Consequently, members of the same family will not necessarily find themselves on the same hierarchical level. In other words, the family has lost its function, and the institution is simply abolished. Families are dissolved, and each individual is treated separately. Whatever communication may exist in heaven, writes the Jansenist theologian Pierre Nicole (1625–95), 'the human being is created to live in an eternal solitude with God alone' (*L'homme est créé pour vivre dans une solitude éternelle avec Dieu seul.*[30])

There is no important communication within the various heavenly hierarchies. The blessed know everything; so what should they communicate? Since their source of perfect happiness is God, having friends cannot essentially contribute to their bliss, asserts Aquinas.[31] The blessed do not unite in order to promote communication among themselves, nor do they unite in work. The provision of food and shelter not only presupposes the exercise of the human body, but also division of labour, economic exchange, the existence of households and, ultimately, sexual reciprocity and reproduction. Therefore, work must be alien to heaven. Heaven means rest. 'Anyone who enters God's rest, rests from his own work.'[32] The saints unite not in work, but in leisure-time activities—in the praise and worship of God. God, and not their fellow-saints, is the exclusive focus of their attention. In the words of Pierre Nicole: 'The community of the blessed will in no way restrict their individual solitude, because no one will ever detract them from their total devotion to God'. The traditional description of what may be called every-day-life in heaven can be taken from the biblical book of Revelation which says that 'His servants shall worship Him; they shall see His face'. The blessed, 'each holding a harp', perform their never-ending worship. 'To Him who sits upon the throne and to the Lamb be blessing and honor and glory for ever and ever!'[33]

This concept of heaven is well illustrated in medieval art. Figures 1 and 2 are details of a last judgment panel which shows the resurrected saints as they are welcomed by angels and march into glory land, while the damned are tortured by devils. The 15th-century artist depicts the angels and saints as children in order to emphasize their non-sexual status. Folding their hands in prayer all the blessed are oriented towards the deity, even the one who is embraced by an angel (Figure 1). The damned, on the other hand, are adults who clearly retain their sexual features. The perfect body of one woman is evident despite her face which is distorted by fear or pain (Figure 2). In Figure 3 we see heavenly choirs surrounding the Holy Trinity and the Virgin Mary. The worshippers are absorbed in ecstatic praise or silent contemplation. They face the divine centre and live from it. The centre, on the other hand, could live without the periphery. This is the theocentric concept of heaven.

In conclusion, the whole range of traditional Christian ideas about life after death can be understood from its axiom, that there is no sex in heaven. This idea reflects the early Christian charismatic neglect of worldly matters as well as the rejection of established society to which one relates through a sexually active and child-bearing body.

PARTED TO MEET AGAIN: A MODERN VERSION OF CHRISTIAN HEAVEN

The dogma of sexless heaven was so firmly established that it was able to survive the social formation from which it was born. It was accepted by a Christianity which had adapted better to everyday life than its charismatic precursor. Such an astonishing persistence may tentatively be explained by the inertia characteristic of dogmatic systems, and by a conclusive logic that contrasts mortal life to immortality which requires no reproduction.

This traditional model of heaven, however, lost much of its prestige and unquestionable immutability in the 18th and 19th centuries. Some people seemed less sure about heaven than their ancestors. One branch of the European Enlightenment questioned Christian claims concerning the hereafter altogether. Others found the general ideas of immortality, punishment, and reward more acceptable than the imagery used to clothe these doctrines. The influence of such philosophical reductionism, however, should not be exaggerated. The philosophical Enlightenment was an intellectual, rather than a popular movement, and engaged no more than a few intellectuals of the elite. The majority of the Western world remained broadly Christian.



Figure 1. *Resurrected Saints Marching up to Heaven.* Detail of Stefan Lochner, Last Judgment, ca. 1440.

Challenged to review its repertoire of doctrine, 18th and 19th-century Christians developed a new idea of heaven that was much more 'earthy',



Figure 2. *A Woman Tortured in Hell*. Detail of Stefan Lochner, Last Judgment.

indeed more continuous with this world than traditional dogma would allow. The chief prophet of the new idea was Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772), the famous Swedish scientist and mystic. Although the subject is



Figure 3. *The Trinity*. Illumination by Jean Fouquet, 15th century.

ever-present in this author's many-volumed and often repetitive work, two of his books develop his vision of the hereafter in a more or less systematic fashion: *Heaven and its Wonders and Hell* (1758) and *The Delights of Wisdom Concerning Conjugial Love* (1768).

In the present life, Swedenborg argues, we find ourselves in a material world of which we form a part. We have bodies. At the same time we belong to a higher realm, that of the spirit and of heaven. For the worthy, this life is nothing but a preparation for eternal life in heaven after death. For the unworthy, this life's pilgrimage will end not in the higher, but in the lower regions of the universe, i.e. in hell. Death, the natural transition of a soul shedding a tired or ailing body, is like a short sleep that interrupts conscience. We awaken into a realm of pure spirit and beauty, welcomed by beings who have passed before us. For some time we rest and enjoy reunion with old friends. Little by little as we adjust to the alteration we associate with spirits whom we recognize as being of our kind and character. This process of our true character asserting itself leads us either upwards into one of the several heavenly worlds, or downwards to the chaotic realm of hell. No divine sentence determines our eternal fate. The gravity of our own being decides where we spend eternity.

In heaven we live in one of the numerous societies whose towns, houses and parks replicate the topography and architecture of earth. The citizens of these societies are called angels—each angel having been human in the former life. (Swedenborg rejects the idea that angels are distinct from humankind and form a separate class of creatures. He simplifies traditional Christian cosmology.) Transformed into spiritual beings, the dead not only retain all their senses and faculties, but can also use them with greater ease than before. They are able to touch, smell, hear, speak, move, eat, drink, remember, and feel pleasure.

Life in heaven is neither idle nor a monotonous round of religious exercises. It is a scene of busy activity. Some devote their time to studying in libraries, others initiate those who have newly arrived from the world, or instruct those who were pagans, a third group travels to earth as guardian angels, a fourth group nurtures the arts, music, and literature, a fifth takes care of children who have crossed over too early in their lives, a sixth worships the Lord, and so on. And, more importantly, *angelic existence is not sexless*. There is the male and the female soul, and the complete human being is a conjunction of the two. Hence when married partners truly unite in this world, they continue the same fellowship in the next. If married life has not been entered, or an unsuitable connection formed, congenial consorts will be found in the hereafter. Without marriage in heaven, all those who have died in infancy or childhood, along with all who have lived unmated on earth (including Swedenborg himself) would be doomed to forgo the highest form of human happiness, and pass their eternal lives in lonely imperfection. Heavenly marriage is for companionship, tender affection, love, and of course sexual pleasure. Swedenborg exalts the renewed pleasures of the senses. The angels, we are told, 'declare that they are in continual potency, that after the acts there is never any weariness, still less any sadness, but eagerness of life and cheerfulness of mind'. The married pair can therefore 'pass the night in each other's bosoms as if they were created into one'.[34] There are no offspring in heaven. Women who are particularly fond of children may 'adopt' and educate them. Swedenborg envisions the touching scene of a father recognizing his children who had passed away before him. They join him at once, and they cling together 'like a bundle of sticks'.[35] Yet, such scenes are anecdotal and do not form an integral part of Swedenborg's thought. For him, the essential, and hence eternal unit is the adult married couple, not the family.

Swedenborg's fantasies about his own heavenly marriage, though not confided to his published work, are known.[36] He expected to be united with a certain Elizabeth Countess Gyllenborg-Stierncrona, whose husband the jealous visionary transferred to hell. Her interest in writing and publishing—she is the author of two devotional volumes on the Blessed Virgin—may have made them congenial.

In order to reconcile his radical views with the New Testament, Swedenborg resorts to allegory, hidden meanings, and the introduction of new theological definitions. He has no difficulty in deflating Jesus' assertion of heavenly celibacy. 'Marriages in the heavens are not like marriages on earth', he explains; 'there are spiritual weddings in the heavens, not called weddings but bondings of minds'.[37] By such witty and yet contrived definitions he evades the actual exegetical problem. For Swedenborg it is quite clear that the woman who had been successively married to seven husbands will belong only to that partner to whom she was 'truly' married. True love is essentially unique and happens only once in a lifetime. Modern romantic love (with which Jesus was unacquainted) must last forever.

It is evident that major features of the traditional heaven are here modified or simply omitted. In Swedenborg's theological system, the framing mythology—the fall, salvation through Christ, the resurrection of the body followed by a last judgment—has lost its original importance. The angels, mythical beings of the old system, are redefined in human terms. The eternal worship of God is drastically reduced in importance in that it is no longer the exclusive occupation of those in heaven. The protestant work ethic is on the verge of being introduced into eternal life. Above all, the marriage relationship not only continues in the hereafter, but becomes an important, if not the essential, source of eternal bliss. Swedenborg's heaven is human-centered rather than God-centered.

Measured by the standards of his time, Swedenborg's heaven appears much more rational than its traditional Christian prototype. One has to keep in mind that Swedenborg was one of the foremost scientists of his age, someone who had the potential of becoming a second Newton. Although his interest in science was minimal after he had begun to receive revelations, his approach remained rational. He accepted the traditional conception of the human being as essentially an immortal soul, and shared the Enlightenment hostility to the 'unreasonable' Christian mythology of resurrection and final judgment.[38] Did Swedenborg, then, invent a rational heaven for a rational age?

In order to understand the logic of Swedenborg's hereafter, we have to turn not to philosophical rationalism, but to another social and intellectual force: the surge of sentiment. What social historians call the 'affective revolution' of the 18th century substantially influenced the new image of the hereafter, making heaven a place where people can relate to each other.[39] The idea of choosing one's own partner while rejecting arranged marriage, the rejection of traditional Christian suspicion and hostility towards sensuality, and the glorification of sexuality for its own sake promoted the emphasis on romantic love, sexual privacy, and domesticity. This surge of sentiment involves a new definition of human happiness, and hence of the human being.

Marriage and family were no longer perceived to bind the individual into the web of society so fully that the individuality might be endangered. Instead, married life was seen to create private individual space largely inaccessible even to other kin. Legal and police control, so important in the absolutist state of the 18th century, ended in front of the home which was allowed to develop into the proverbial castle. Now celibate life, whose extreme forms excluded even friendship,[40] can only be viewed in terms of deprivation and estrangement. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78), who mused about meeting friends in heaven,[41] explains the new feeling in a particularly striking way:

> The first of my needs, the greatest, the most powerful and the most inextinguishable, lay completely in my heart; it was the need of an intimate society, a society that was as intimate as possible. It was especially on this account that I needed a woman rather than a man, a woman-friend rather than a man-friend. This strange need was such that the closest bodily union could not be enough: I should have had to possess two souls in one body; otherwise I always experienced a sense of emptiness.[42]

A new philosophy of sexual life has emerged; a philosophy which shaped the earth and the heavens. 'All desire wants eternity', says Nietzsche's Zarathustra, 'wants deep, deep eternity'. Given the value love relationships acquired in the 18th century, a new theological interpretation was necessary. Traditional Christianity had left affective life in a spiritual vacuum. The charismatic fear of sexuality and its narrow equation with reproduction had to be replaced by a wider perspective. Swedenborg succeeded in filling the vacuum and providing the new perspective in a way that seemed intellectually acceptable as well as emotionally pertinent.

Swedenborg's heaven, though in its extreme form peculiar to the Swedenborgian Church, is far from being isolated. Some of its elements can be traced back to the church fathers. In 217 A.D., Tertullian argued that a widow should refrain from a second marriage. One of the arguments used by the sternly ascetic theologian was that in the hereafter, wives will belong to their first husbands, though certainly not in a carnal way.[43] Such a view of 'meeting again' can be found in almost every century of Christian history, especially in letters of consolation, poetry of courtly love, and funeral sermons.[44] The boldest speculations we meet are those of John Milton (1608–74). In a passage of *Paradise Lost*, Milton introduces sexual love into heaven. Although he speaks only of love among the angels and is silent about men and women, one can see that the author's well-known revaluation of married love began to make inroads into the other world.[45]

In the second half of the 18th century there is a rapid change in both theological climate and popular belief. What had been a latent tradition in post-charismatic and socially established Christianity finally developed into a new doctrine. Christoph Martin Wieland, in his *Letters by Deceased to Their Surviving Friends* imagined a far-away world inhabited by men and women who have died. They are immortal, young, beautiful, naked, and they enjoy music and carnal love in a heavenly paradise.[46] In 1758 Swedenborg, who may have been aware of Milton's views on angelic love, published his *Heaven and Hell*. In 1768–72 Lavater's *Prospects of Eternal Life* followed, and Jung-Stilling's *Scenes from the Spirit World* in 1793. All of these writers were Protestants, but there is also a Catholic book of 1772 entitled *On the Hope and Consolation of Meeting Our beloved Ones in the Other Life*, written by the Italian Dominican scholar Ansaldi. Far from being purely academic, the subject stirred the romantic and popular imagination, and found its way into sermons, hymns, literature, sentimental, poetry, and farewell letters written on the deathbed.[47] Heaven was suddenly peopled with friends and relatives. For the more daring authors love and marriage were not only 'till death us do part', but for 'time *and* eternity'.

Blake's etching 'The Meeting of a Family in Heaven' provides graphic clearness to what was expected beyond the grave (Figure 4). The explanatory text merits to be quoted: 'The sweet felicity, the endearing tenderness, the ineffable affection, that are here depicted, are sufficiently obvious. The husband clasps the wife; the children embrace; the boy recognizes and eagerly springs to his father'.[48] They meet, never again to part! The etching shares the basic structure of Fouquet's medieval 'Trinity': there is a centre and a periphery (Figure 1). Now that a man and a woman have moved into



Figure 4. *The Meeting of a Family in Heaven*. William Blake, 1808.

the centre, the divine must be relocated. The angels, whose wings form a gothic arch, suggest a peripheral divine presence. Heaven has become anthropocentric.

19th-century Catholic, and even more so, Protestant devotional and popular literature made domestic heaven a favourite subject. The American Protestant writer, Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, published several novels with a heavenly theme, *The Gates Ajar* of 1869 being the most influential. *In Heaven We Know Our Own*, the popular Catholic version, was written by the French Jesuit François-René Blot in 1862. Styled as a collection of letters to a mourning widow, it enjoyed wide circulation in French, English, and

German editions. In Germany its daring conclusions about marriage continuing beyond the grave were supported by a massive volume called *The Other Life*, written by Wilhelm Schneider, a professor of theology. Its unusual views never interfered with the author's appointment as the Catholic bishop of Paderborn.

In Victorian Britain, the title of high priest of eternal married love must be awarded to Charles Kingsley (1819–75), the famous Christian socialist, author of popular novels, and chaplain to Queen Victoria. The main function of marriage, he insisted, is partnership, not procreation, and it is through married love that we come close to God. Married life is sacramental; a means of grace. Celibacy, of course, is rejected.

In a more private context, Kingsley spoke of his marriage bed as an 'altar'—perhaps echoing a somewhat literal reading of one formula used in the wedding service, which says, 'with my body I thee worship'. This view is brought into sharp focus by only recently published drawings of an even more private nature. One of these drawings shows a naked man and a woman floating across the sea intertwined on a wooden cross.[49] Despite the risk of overstating we would suggest that for Kingsley, sexual union has 'saving' qualities and tends to supplant Christ's death on the cross. Kingsley believed in the eternity of marriage and expressed his feeling that, even on the level of sexuality, 'there is more in store for us'.[50] Another drawing shows a couple in heaven, probably Charles himself and his wife Fanny, who have wings and fly in carnal union (Figure 5). Kingsley's biographer explains that heaven 'would consist of one perpetual copulation in a literal, physical sense'.[51] While Blake's etching shows a 'natural' scene in a heavenly setting, Kingsley gives his 'supernatural' scene a natural surrounding, indicated by earthly landscape. The wings of Blake's angels, now transferred to the lovers, no longer suggest the presence of deity. The lovers themselves are deified.

Marriage is not 'till death us do part', but 'for time and eternity'![52] By the end of the 19th century, this view was shared by numerous Protestant and Catholic writers, and had an established place in Swedenborgian, Mormon, and Spiritualist teaching. The world had changed—and so had heaven. In the 20th century, writings depicting heaven have decreased in number. Critical theology made is appearance and concentrates on the present life, at the expense of the next. Books on life after death now often resort to generalities and vague language.

The theme, however, of meeting one's beloved in the hereafter is far from disappearing. The official Catholic ritual of exsequies, published in 1969, has married partners 'eternally conjoined'. The Catholic popular pamphlet *We Will Meet Again in Heaven* repeats the teachings of its model, Blot's *In Heaven We Know Our Own*.[53] While the present pope somewhat mysteriously


HE IS NOT DEAD BUT SLEEPETH

Figure 5. *Heavenly Lovemaking*. Charles Kingsley, ca. 1849.

spoke of the 'nuptial meaning of the body' in the other life, poets and popular authors are less ambiguous.[54] W. B. Yeats celebrates the heavenly love of Baile and Ailinn as 'the intercourse of angels', and the American theologian Kreeft argues that 'there is certainly sex in heaven simply because there are human beings in heaven'.[55] Kreeft invents a promiscuous sexual life of male and female saints which reminds us of the Trobriand paradise. Mrs Leander, spiritualist writing medium and self-styled specialist in next-world research, seems to take particular interest in the heavenly sexual life of former popes and dignitaries of the Catholic Church. According to her *Talking to the Other World*, a former cardinal of Cologne has overcome his former shyness and is now able to appreciate sexual life. Anabell, a very powerful female spirit who supervises the other world, is reported to have put Popes Pius XII and John XXIII under wedlock. Quite happy in their new state, these men would now reject celibacy even for the church they headed.[56]

Most widespread as well as most visible is the new idea of heaven in cemeteries. Ever since the 18th century, the motif of 'meeting again' holds its place on tombstones where the name of the deceased may be followed by a simple 'parted to meet again' or by little poems asserting that 'we weep with joy that God has given the hope that we shall meet in heaven'.[57] An epitaph found in the cemetery of Drumcliffe in Ireland goes so far as to substitute the traditional vision of God by the vision of the human partner's face:

> Dear Robert—If heaven be as some aver
> recapturing the joys that were,
> those lost dear raptures that we knew,
> then I shall sit again with you
> within a quiet, sunfilled place
> and watch the glory of your face,
> and talk through all eternity
> of this and that of you and me.
> From your ever loving wife Pat. August 1978.

The best comment on this epitaph can be found in a 19th-century letter in which the writer mused about the next life and the relatives he will meet there. 'As you know to me heaven is where Father and Mother and Aunt Esther are, rather than or I should say, more than God is. For God is here, they are not.'[58] Heaven has become anthropocentric. It is not exaggerated to say that, at least on a popular level, the New Testament model of the hereafter has been replaced by the Swedenborgian one. Despite its obvious lack of formal support from the Bible, it has succeeded in establishing itself. Popular expectations of heaven are stronger than petrified doctrine, especially if the latter lacks the backing of a living charismatic community in which it originated.

To conclude: there are two Christian views of heaven. One theocentric with sexless men and women absorbed into divine glory, and the other an anthropocentric one with sexual human persons whose heavenly bliss is enhanced by, if not consisting in, the enjoyment of a partner of the opposite sex. While the first notion presupposes charismatic non-involvement with the world, the second one is related to socially-established Christianity and the 'affective revolution' which cannot conceive of happiness outside a sexual or marital relationship. In order to find out how people—or entire cultures—feel about the sexes, we should not neglect what they say about the hereafter. Heaven is not for angels and sparrows only (as Freud maintained), but for anthropologists who study the logic of human relationships.

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Fouquet illumination is reproduced with the permission of the Musée Condé in Chantilly, France, from a print provided by Giraudon, Paris. For the kind permission to reproduce the Kingsley drawing I thank Mrs Angela M. K. Covey-Crump of Ely, Cambridgeshire.

NOTES

1 Feuerbach, 1957:157.
2 Malinowski, 1931:361.
3 1 Cor 15:50.
4 1 Cor 15:52.
5 Rom 6:9.
6 1 Cor 15:44 ff.
7 Lk 20:35, 36.
8 Troeltsch, 1931:52.
9 1 Cor 7:7; Rev 14:4.
10 Lk 2:41–51; 8:19–21.
11 Mt 10:35.
12 Lk 18:29.
13 Lk 10:4; cf. Lang, 1982.
14 Dumont, 1982.
15 Douglas, 1969:69,77.
16 Acts 16.
17 Dietrich, 1939:328 on Mt 19:12.
18 Wright, 1865:44,45. The text dates from the 3rd or 4th century.
19 van Eijk, 1972.
20 Gregory of Nyssa in Schaff/Wace, 1979, 359,360.
21 Warner, 1976: 74,75; Bell, 1985.
22 Rousselle, 1983:201–02.
23 Feuerbach, 1957:170.
24 Mechthild, 1955:141–42.
25 Charlesworth, 1982:82–83.
26 Augustine, 1894:272.
27 See, for example Marrou, 1976: 447–48; Weber, 1973:257–63.
28 The reader may here allow for a certain simplification. The most conspicuous exception is the heaven of some Renaissance authors and artists. These will be dealt with in a forthcoming book: *Paradise Found: A Cultural History of Heaven.*
29 Augustine, City of God, 22:1,2.
30 Nicole, 1733:348.
31 Aquinas, Summa theologica, I II 4:8.
32 Hebr 4:10.
33 Rev 22:3 ff.; 5:8,13.
34 Swedenborg, Apocalypse Explained, No. 992.
35 Swedenborg, Conjugial Love, No. 410.
36 Toksvig, 1948:78, 317.
37 Swedenborg, Heaven and Hell, No. 382*b*.
38 Cf. Chaunu, 1978: 244–49, 256.
39 Shorter, 1976; Stone, 1977.
40 See the 4th-century monastic Rule of Pachomius: Rousselle, 1983:199–200.
41 Rousseau, 1964:729.
42 Rousseau, 1959:414.

43 Tertullian, On Monogamy, 10 = Roberts/Donaldson, 1979:67.

44 See, for example, Hoffmann, 1906; Tusiani, 1974:24; Mohr, 1979:187–92.

45 Milton, Paradise Lost, 8:614 ff. Aers/Hodge, 1979:21 comment on the non-genital nature of angelic sexuality.

46 Wieland, 1753:100, 101.

47 The sources are numerous; for examples see: Greenwood, 1847:232–51, 315; Harbaugh, 1858:197–230; Thompson, 1883:789, 823, 825; Hoffmann, 1906:70–75; St. Armand, 1977; McManners, 1981:175.

48 Blair, 1808:35.

49 Chitty, 1975:91, 126.

50 Kingsley, 1888, vol. 2:77; cf. 1:121 ff.

51 Chitty, 1975:17.

52 The latter formula is used in the Mormon wedding ceremony.

53 Welser, 1962. According to the publisher, between 1962 and 1976 45,000 copies were printed in five editions.

54 John Paul II, 1982.

55 Yeats, 1966:555; Kreeft, 1982:73.

56 Leander, 1983:129–34.

57 Inscriptions on tombstones of the London Highgate Cemetery, dated 1926 and 1871.

58 Quoted in Caskey, 1978:290–91.

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THE LIMITS OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE WORK OF DAVID MARTIN

TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF DAVID MARTIN'S SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION, CENTRED ON HIS ESSAY: 'CAN THE CHURCH SURVIVE?'

Jonathan D. Harrop

INTRODUCTION

Within sociological literature, David Martin's 'Can the Church Survive?'[1] is an ingenious and probably unique essay. Its uniqueness lies in the subject matter which links the concept of secularization with the phenomenon of ecstatic experience. Its ingenuity lies in the surprisingly optimistic prognosis for the Church in a world where most sociologists seem to accept secularization as a fact of life and not something seriously to be doubted. It is the contention here that Martin's argument fails as the result of a logical flaw. This flaw, however, is obscured, not merely by the presentation of the essay but also by the established theoretical framework of mainstream sociology. Shiner, for instance, points to six types of concept used to study secularization on an empirical basis.[2] Whereas there is no need for elaboration here, each of these concepts tacitly operates in conjunction with a working concept of religion. In each case, the sociologist works within a framework which is based on the two polar opposites of religion and secularity. The understandable assumption is, therefore, that whatever framework is being used, once secularity has been refuted religion has necessarily been secured. 'Can the Church Survive?' *is* a convincing refutation of secularity but the failure of the argument hinges on the unusual point that, in this particular case, religion and secularity are not in fact opposites at all. Indeed, on closer examination, there only seems to be a slight conflict of interests.

This, however, is not intended merely to be a logic chopping critique of a single essay. 'Can the Church Survive?' provides us, in many senses, with a cameo of Martin's sociology of religion. A close examination of the essay, as a starting point, raises a series of questions which reveal shortcomings, not

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only in the essay itself, but shortcomings which can be traced throughout much of Martin's sociology of religion. A thorough critique of a writer as prolific as Martin would be beyond the scope of a paper of this size. It is therefore intended to show how the failure of 'Can the Church Survive?' indicates certain loose threads in the knitted fabric of Martin's work which, if pulled, will unravel much of it. By focussing primarily on two substantive areas—first, questions of definition and explanation, and secondly, the polemic against secularization—it is hoped to indicate how Martin's work is both incomplete and ultimately unworkable. Finally, it is suggestive of the reasons for these problems and the possible implications for any religiously committed sociologist.

ECSTATIC EXPERIENCE

The argument in 'Can the Church Survive?' places crucial reliance on the phenomenon of ecstatic experience, and so before beginning an examination of the essay, it is necessary to explain briefly what is meant here by the term 'ecstasy'. Although Martin's terms vary ('experience', 'mysticism', 'transcendence', 'unfocussed rejoycings' . . .) these 'experiences which carry with them a kind of commanding verity'[3] are all seen as instances of ecstasy manifested in different ways. It seems reasonable to assume, in the light of what Martin and other writers have to say on the subject,[4] that all are instances of ecstasy manifested in different ways and not different types of experience. (He has, for instance, read Laski on the subject;[5] she claims that ecstasy is one thing and not a collection of many and Martin has no quibble with her on this.) What Martin is talking about are not the deliberately engendered experiences resulting from, say, the use of drugs or drum-and-dance rituals, but rather the unexpected, 'out of the blue' experiences. Because the purpose of this paper is sociological argument and not a study of ecstasy *per se*, and because no dispute is offered in respect of Martin's conception, the main points will merely be described where they are pertinent to the present discussion.

Ecstasy exists in the realms of the psychological: despite possible subjective interpretations, it is a state of mind rather than being a state of the soul or anything of that nature. It is liable to be experienced in a great variety of ways; Hardy produces a detailed statistical breakdown including type, frequency, length of duration and so forth. Laski classifies both the varieties of ecstasy and the types of people experiencing it. The light-hearted, happy, at-peace-with-the-world feeling that may continue for an extended period (exemplified by Martin in his lengthy quote from an L.S.E. student's essay[6]) is essentially the same as the very short experiences of almost paralysing intensity discussed by Laski. Appearances notwithstanding, it is not something that the individual is suddenly 'filled' with: rather, it resembles a cathartic release after a build-up of internalized factors.[7] It exists in its own right: it is not merely a heightened variant of something else such as aesthetic pleasure or religious conviction, though it may frequently occur in conjunction with these or other psychological states.

Ecstasy usually has what Hardy calls a 'trigger'—an event or experience which initiates it. It almost always has what Martin terms a 'point of attachment'—some reference point through which the individual makes his experience intelligible. The trigger and point of attachment may frequently be the same thing and in some sense the experience usually brings the ecstatic individual closer to the point of attachment—deeper love, greater affinity, tighter social bonds or whatever. We cannot be sure in what ways social factors affect the propensity to experience ecstasy but we can fairly guess that even in the humdrum, material world of the late 20th century it is showing no signs of decline and seems unlikely to diminish in the future.

Though it may seem trite, the old phrase: 'Darling, they're playing our tune' furnishes us with a simple model which illustrates the three main points which are pertinent to the present discussion. (a) The tune is the trigger which initiates the experience. (b) The experience becomes intelligible through another person—'Darling' becomes the point of attachment. (c) The speaker, as a result of the experience, is brought closer to the person who is the point of attachment.

THE FLAW IN MARTIN'S ARGUMENT AND THE QUESTIONS IT RAISES

Within any normal sociologial framework, the terms 'religious' and 'secular' exist as polar opposites. 'Can the Church Survive?' is a refutation of secularity and as such Martin claims that the future of religion, concretized in the Church, is secure. In the preface to the essay, Martin tells us that the original format of the argument dealt not so much with the Church's survival, but 'was concerned with the question "Can we have a completely secular society?"'. It also considered questions of ecstatic religous experience and their relation to the 'particularized tradition of the Christian religion'. In 'Can the Church Survive?' secularity and ecstatic experience (or rather its absence) are welded into a single notion 'A completely secular society would presumably be one where this type of awareness [ecstasy] was absent, and there are no signs that secularity defined in such a way is more dominant now than in the past, or is likely increasingly to dominate the future.'[8] Operating with such a definition (though he does not do so explicitly, and his reluctance to offer definitions will be dealt with below) it appears that Martin has shown a future secular society to be an impossibility.

This concept of secularity is operationalized in the essay, the basic argument of which is this: whilst ecstasy continues it will continue to need a point of attachment. Religion has always fulfilled this role and continues to do so today. There is every indication that ecstasy will continue unabated into the future. Religion, despite what Bellah says,[9] will always need its institutions, namely 'the Church'. Therefore, whilst people continue to experience ecstasy, the Church's future is assured. Martin then moves on to claim that there are 'various springs within our civilization from which religious awareness might be renewed'.[10] There are, therefore, barriers to secularity (which will secure the Church's survival) as well as there being some areas of life which '*might*' fuel a religio-ecclesiastical revival.

Since a rudimentary understanding of the nature of ecstasy is essential to an understanding of the argument as a whole, Martin provides us with a wide variety of examples and, on occasion, first-hand accounts—17th-century literature, the aforementioned student's essay, the experiences of the Welsh border country, concerts in Leningrad and so forth. At this point things start to become problematical. Ecstasy abounds in the world and 'Can the Church Survive?' abounds with examples of it. Certainly the nature of some of these examples is profoundly religious; most of them, though, have much more profane[11] points of attachment. Ecstatic experience undoubtedly does validate religion but there is no necessary reason for the involvement of a religious point of attachment. As Martin says: 'Marghanita Laski would remind us that atheists too are afflicted by ecstasy'.[12] In fact, he goes as far as to concede that 'there is indeed a widespread fear both of any explicit link with the name of God and an even greater fear of any mediation through ecclesiastical institutions'.[13] Martin's problem here is that in a hypothetical secular society people will not experience ecstasy in any form and to prove that ecstasy is not in decline (that secularization is not occurring) he has to furnish us with evidence which includes examples. The trouble with these examples is that the later they are located historically, the more likely they are to have profane points of attachment[14] as Church-centred religious consciousness diminishes within society as a whole.

It is Martin's claim (one which is not disputed here) that there are 'various barriers to the achievement of complete secularity: the confrontation of pragmatic politics by visionary politics, the refusal to accept the disenchantment of nature . . .'.[15] Ecstasy, therefore, has what may be termed a 'point of irreducibility' and, as 'defined' by Martin, secularity can never be achieved. The answer to his original question, 'Can we have a completely secular society?' is, therefore, 'No'. The difficulty which arises now is that he is no longer asking that question: he is asking 'Can the Church survive?' and thus far he has produced little evidence in either direction.

As outlined above, a normal theoretical framework would contain an axis which had religion and secularity at its extremes. It is by no means obvious, especially to a sociologist who is used to taking such a framework 'as read', that Martin is in fact using two axes. (The essay has probably remained enigmatic precisely because of this point.) One of these axes has ecstasy and secularity at its extremes; the other has religion, actualized in the Church, at one extreme and what may be termed 'the absence of religion' (we cannot call it 'secularity') at the other. If Martin's argument is to 'work', he must forge a link between these two axes. This may be shown diagrammatically as:



It is precisely at this link point that the argument falters. Martin has produced a mass of convincing evidence to show that there is a point of irreducibility beyond which ecstasy will not decline. The problem with this evidence is its overwhelming profanity. There is no necessary reason why ecstasy should have a religious point of attachment unless religious preconceptions already exist. Since Church-centred religious awareness is declining (even Martin concedes this) it seems reasonable to suppose that religious ecstasy will similarly decline. The evidence which Martin marshals against secularity has also become a mute indicator of a retreating Church.

Briefly, some mention should be made of the sources within society of the possible rejuvenation of religious awareness which Martin suggests. 'Having invented the therapeutic community, psychoanalysis will soon be inventing the Church'[16] or, by implication, the Church is a logical progression beyond the limitations of 'a psychoanalytically assisted tolerance of oneself'.[17] Whether Martin is correct does not matter much here. The point with this, along with the few other sources he speculates on, is that they lie *outside* the Church, yet he is wholly dismissive of Bellah and sociologists of that persuasion who wish to see religion existing outside ecclesiastical establishments. Whatever Martin conceives religion to be, it is unambiguously centred in Canterbury and Rome and any week-day experiences we may have are properly made intelligible on Sunday. Either religion is confined within the Church or it is not: either may be the case, but not both, as Martin seems to wish.

Popper makes the very reasonable assertion that the sociologist has a duty to articulate himself in a comprehensible manner so that his work can be clearly understood and evaluated by other sociologists.[18] Now we may wish to stop short of accusing Martin of deliberate obscuritanism, but the logic of the argument in 'Can the Church Survive?' is *extremely* difficult to discern. This is compounded by the understandable assumption that is going to be made by most sociologists, that religion and secularity are opposites. Further confusion is generated by the unsystematic introduction of the seemingly self-contradictory notion that religion lies wholly within the Church but is somehow going to be rejuvenated by outside sources.

It has been claimed above that 'Can the Church Survive?' functions as an example of Martin's sociology of religion 'in microcosm'. It is an ingenious and novel argument which lies firmly within Martin's tradition of attacks on secularity and secularization. The faulty nature of the argument, however, seems to have remained uncriticized (or unrealized?) during the 13 or so years since its publication, and any success that it may have had relies heavily on the obscured, tacit definitions of the key concepts which it employs. One cannot, of course, demand formal definitions every time a sociologist puts pen to paper but the absence, or at best 'slipperiness', of key definitions is a persistent feature of Martin's work. Three categories of question are therefore posed by the critique of the essay. (a) Does Martin offer any definitions or explanations of religion and/or secularity and if so, what is their nature? (b) What is the nature of his polemic against secularity and, because 'Can the Church Survive?' indicates certain internal inconsistencies, how consistent are the arguments and conclusions within this polemic? (c) Because on examination, much of what Martin has to say can be shown to be inconsistent, is there any consistent rationale which underpins his work?

Yeo claims[19] that 'Religion refuses to be tidied up' and that additionally 'David Martin also refuses to be tidied up'. In his work we find 'overlap, digression, arbitrary placing of bits of argument, writing as thinking rather than as report on a settled process of thought, bits tacked on with the stitches either showing or absent . . .'. The claim here is that even in the face of this untidiness there is, motivating Martin's work, a type of consistency and that the sociological inconsistencies we find are not capricious, but are systematic in their nature. This motivation, however, is not sociological: rather, it is the result of Martin's own Christian conviction. The rationale which shapes (or mis-shapes) his sociology is his own religious ideology. This point is intimately bound up with the first two questions posed above, and therefore initially it will be necessary to deal with it in piecemeal fashion whilst considering these questions before a shorter, final conclusion is offered.

DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS

As a starting point, let us first consider 'the Church' and ask what it is that Martin believes is capable of survival. It is not the church of normal sociological nomenclature (i.e. church, sect, denomination, cult, etc.); rather, it is the sense of the word demonstrated by Luke:

> Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock over which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the Church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood. (Acts 1:28)

It is the Churchman's sense of the word, i.e. that part of the worshipping community which somehow falls within the realms of God's grace and would presumably include the sociologist's churches, probably most denominations and possibly some of the more orthodox sects and cults. Martin is a practising Christian and he is talking about the *Christian* Church, not the sociological entity. The criteria for what constitutes the Church are not sociological and it would probably defy sociological definition anyway. Thus, it *must* remain undefined. Here we see the nature of the problem with which this section deals. Martin's Christian world view is greater than the areas to which he is limited as a sociologist and, in remaining true to his religious beliefs, he is forced to avoid any sociological definition of the Church.

Since Martin remains evasive on the matter of definitions of religion and secularity in 'Can the Church Survive?', one is permitted to query whether anything more definite is to be found elsewhere in his work:

> When I think of religion I usually have in mind certain more or less consistent orientations towards the world, limited in number, with various correlates regarding the nature of man, the meaning of life and history, an assessment of the value of the material world, together with related attitudes towards various institutions such as the state, law, coercion, the family etc. These orientations usually involve a transcendent vision of man, society and nature . . .[20]

It would contribute nothing of substance merely to list other similar references in Martin's work, but this is possibly the closest he ever comes to a formal definition of religion. It has a definite start—'certain more or less consistent orientations towards the world . . .'—but it does not have an end as such. Within two paragraphs it peters out and drifts into a similarly vague, partial definition of secularization which it claims is: 'immensely complicated, and the trouble with the concept of secularization is that it attempts to simplify that complexity in the interests of ideology or of an over-neat intellectual economy'. In this sort of situation, Martin is offering two arguments. First he claims that secularization and, by implication, religion, are too complex to be tied to neat definitions and if they are, they become 'over-neat' (they refuse to be tidied up). He implies, however, that he has produced some sort of proto-definition, that at least *he* knows what he is talking about and that anything which flows from it is bound to be consistent. Second, he attempts to shrug off the concept of secularization and to blame his adversaries for what he sees as their intellectual failings. (This second point shades into the anti-secular polemic and will therefore be dealt with at a later stage.)

Put simply, Martin never adequately defines religion or sides with any extant definition: he only implies that he knows what he is talking about. Thus his work becomes too slippery to be accused easily of using inconsistent or self-contradictory notions. In the sense that definitions can often inhibit a fully rounded understanding as often as enlightening ignorance, Martin may have a partial defence, but since 'Religion . . . has a fairly specific content'[21] we might reasonably demand a little more specificity from someone who has written so much on the subject.

If it is that Martin is unable to simplify the complexity of religion into an adequate definition, it should nonetheless be possible for him to produce a more generalized account or description. In the chapter 'Explanations' in *A Sociology of English Religion*[22] Martin claims that there are four basic 'proclamations' used to account for religion. They centre round Nietzsche and Freud, Feuerbach and Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. The first two are fundamentally critical of religion whilst the second two, even though they may not be specifically anti-religious, are not Christian in their scope and are pessimistic in their outlook. Throughout his work Martin does recognize that these four proclamations play some role in the *shaping* of religion but they do not seem to affect the ontological content.[23] He creates the impression that, because he is dissatisfied with all four proclamations, he is going to offer his own fifth proclamation—literally, his '*quintessence*' of religion. Having discussed their inadequacies, however, and having mentioned the unfulfilled promises of science and rationalism to provide the framework for a meaningful world view, he merely closes with the comment that 'a society ceases to provide such a framework at its peril'.[24] The possibility of a broader explanation of religion fails to materialize and no quintessence is offered. As with the case of specific definitions, this is merely an example of Martin's evasiveness; suffice it to say that he remains equally evasive elsewhere.

Secularization (at least when it is the antithesis of religion) can only be understood in the light of a working concept of religion and Martin similarly avoids any clear statement of his stance in this respect. In his sympathetic review of Martin's work,[25] Yeo claims that 'He has worked away at giving [secularization] a range of social, historical—and therefore different—meanings'. (It is worth noting—and Yeo recognizes this to some extent—that these meanings are equally as unspecific, implicit and partial as anything he has to say about religion). In principle there is nothing wrong with this and, if secularization is as 'immensely complicated' as Martin claims, sticking to one concept would be artificially restrictive, but only if the results are consistent and compatible. It is intended to show in the following section that this is anything but the case in Martin's work. Martin's ambivalence (sociological ambivalence, that is) in relation to religion and secularity are clearly illustrated in 'Can the Church Survive?':

> It is also quite clear that if religion is seen as man's need to come to terms with the conditions of human life and with the reality of change, then a secular society is indeed barely possible. You *can* define religion in that way and by the same definition eliminate the possibility of secularization. Definitions are—like comment—free, but this definition is not one I would want to use very frequently.[26]

Again, it is to be emphasized that this is only fair practice when it yields consistent results. In the sentence prior to this quotation Martin says that 'Robert Bellah is too clever a sociologist not to hedge his bets . . .'. Despite his dislike of Bellah, they do seem to have at least one feature in common!

It is legitimate for the sociologist to call upon outside disciplines from time to time. Differences between Yorkshire mining communities and Welsh hill farming communities, for instance, may well be amplified by some reference to geography or geology. Similarly, hybrid disciplines like social psychology can legitimately exist in their own right. The exception to this seems to be that the sociologist is only allowed the briefest liaison with theology. People's *beliefs* can be discussed (religious beliefs are the lynch pin of Weber's *Protestant Ethic* thesis) but not what they *believe in*. Belief in a God who is active in the cosmos may cause people to act in certain ways and this comes within the ambit of sociology. To point directly to the intervention of God, in whatever form, in the social or material world is outside the bounds of sociological legitimacy. What is suggested here is that Martin's quintessence of religion involves his own notion of God (whatever that may be) and man's relationship with that God. No practising Christian can possibly believe that his religion is merely a social product (*à la* Durkheim for instance) and thus, for Martin, any definition of religion would perforce involve God and not merely a *belief* in God. Therefore, whenever his work approaches a possible definition of religion (or secularity, or even 'the Church') it must stop short of, or bypass, a quintessence lest it breaches Berger's principle of methodological atheism. The incomplete nature of Martin's sociology of religion lies in the fact that, in some sense, a 'God shaped' piece is missing from the jigsaw.

Martin, particularly in his later works, skirts very close to the bounds of legitimacy:

> God is not the ensemble of all that is, that is the Totality, the All. Nor is he an unexplained remainder. . . To put the matter epigrammatically: God is not *the*

> whole, nor is he *a* hole. A hole-in-the-multi-factor-analysis God will not do and cannot be.[27]

He can confidently talk about what God *is not*, but it is intended to demonstrate below that Martin manages to talk about God directly and, in a sense, still remains within methodologically atheistic principles.

At the beginning of 'Can the Church Survive?' Martin makes use of the sociology of music for purposes of analogy. The sociology of music exists at the interface of music and society. Music, however, exists in its own right and 'A sociological analysis only skirts the fringe of the musical experience itself'.[28] For Martin, much the same state of affairs seems to exist with religion. The sociologist may see in religion many of the things that the active worshipper sees: solidarization or 'fellowship', alienation and re-integration or 'sin' and 'atonement', a functional value system or 'Divine Law'. . . The difference lies in the fact that the sociologist does not see beyond the social aspects, whereas the worshipper sees the social aspects as 'side benefits' (or drawbacks) centred round something spiritual or supernatural. The sociology of music is not the study of music itself: the sociology of religion is not the study of religion because religion, for Martin, involves God. The four 'proclamations' are involved in some part, but in merely discussing religion in these terms his work is bound to remain forever partial.

This sort of area falls uncomfortably beween two stools. The sociologist cannot utilize God in his work. The theologian can utilize society, but frequently theologians are not qualified to make anything more than educated lay observations. Until socio-theology becomes an acceptable hybrid discipline it seems doomed to remain an area where both men and angels fear to tread, and where David Martin will continue to experience problems.

THE POLEMIC AGAINST SECULARIZATION

Martin's difficulties in the area of definition and explanation remain intractable. 'Can the Church Survive?' and its success or failure rest heavily on the obscured, implicit definitions it uses. The essay, however, requires us to look in at least one other direction, since it fits within the context of Martin's extraordinarily tenacious attacks on secularization. Were he allowed to introduce the quintessential God he could, in principle, complete an adequate definition of religion and, by implication, secularity and 'the Church'. It is argued here that his critique of secularization presents us with problems of a quite different nature. The underlying rationale is the same but the problems are such that (at the risk of blasphemy, as it were) even God could not solve them. It is claimed that a fundamental dichotomy exists in Martin's work in this area, that it is the result of his own religious ideology and that it produces a confused and self-contradictory sociology of religion.

'Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularization' (1965)[29] was Martin's first publication on the subject, in which he argues that secularization is 'a tool of counter-religious ideologies'.[30] This is true of all counter-religious ideologies, though space only permits him to discuss rationalism, Marxism and existentialism. Since these ideologies can be shown to be fundamentally confused about what they regard as '*really* "religious"' (*sic*), the logic of secularization which they impose on the world is misconceived and hence necessarily productive of unsound analyses. (It is, of course, worth noting that Martin avoids the question of what *really* constitutes *really* religious.) The essay begins with the confident announcement that 'This is a work of "demolition"' and ends with the statement that 'Secularization should be erased from the sociological dictionary'.

A year later, in 1966, the argument had progressed a little further and changed somewhat in its approach. 'Some Utopian Aspects of the Concept of Secularization'[31] argues that most (though in this instance, not all) secular ideologies have their ontological roots in religion. There is therefore no fundamental ideological conflict involved and, by implication, it is time that these ideologies returned to the fold of their religious origin. The stance is a reversal of the Durkheimian position which holds that sacred ideologies have their roots in profane society.

Both these arguments are adamantly 'anti-secularization' and either of them may be correct. The point here is that unless some extremely awkward conclusions are to be drawn (awkward for Martin, that is) they cannot both be correct. If these secular ideologies are fundamentally confused *and* they are fundamentally religious, then this points to the conclusion that religion itself must be fundamentally confused. Perhaps the situation is not quite as black-and-white as that—and doubtless Martin would claim that it is not—but it does begin to point, in two of his earliest works, to the adoption of contradictory stances in relation to secularization.

'Can the Church Survive?', written some seven or eight years later, is again anti-secularization in its stance but has shifted somewhat in its vehemence in that it does concede some ground to the process of secularization, conceived in the normal sense. Martin mentions the possibility of the historically-rooted symbolism of religion drifting out of reach into a 'tiny ecclesiastical backwater'.[32] He admits that 'the unified emotional environment through which [men] might make up a coherent approach to the world mediated through an ecclesiastical institution is no longer there'.[33] Indeed, scattered throughout his work are references to the 'base line' of the 12th century where he considers that society was at its most religious. We have what may appear to be a tempering of his initial anti-secular enthusiasm by the later acceptance of 'reality'.[34] This, however, is not the case. The wish to erase secularization from the dictionary and the later apparent acceptance of the concept, implicit in the title of his book, *A General Theory of Secularization*[35] for instance, indicates a dichotomous approach to the problem. (At least part of the reason why 'Can the Church Survive?' is so problematical is that it spans this dichotomy.) That which Martin wholly condemns in many of his works is not the same as that which he concedes ground to in others. The former is a *concept* whilst the latter is a *process*: the former exists in the abstract and theoretical whilst the latter exists in the concrete and real. In the realms of the theoretical, Martin gives little, if any, quarter to secularization. The concrete world of hard fact is an area which must be treated differently.

'Can the Church Survive?', aside from its faulty logic, is not entirely internally coherent in that it concedes to secularization (the Church has shrunk and will never again reach the heights of its medieval zenith) but also claims that secularization (in its non-ecstatic sense) has not occurred and is not inexorable. Martin's more abstract arguments do tend to be more internally coherent than this because recalcitrant reality is kept more at a distance. Furthermore, possible contradictions between them, as indicated above, tend to be either peripheral or very generalized and somewhat amenable to *post hoc* rationalization. 'Secularization Amongst the Sociologists'[36] is reminiscent of the two essays above in that it discusses the changing *concepts* of secularization and implies that the inconsistency of such concepts casts severe doubts on their veracity or usefulness. 'The Over-Secularized Concept of Man'[37] argues within the notoriously difficult area of the metaphysics of human nature and claims that man's nature is much more spiritual than many would have us believe. Within the realms of abstract theory, it is possible to argue almost any case and the refutation of one area of theory by another (as in the case of logical positivism, for instance) is a huge and rarely completed task. At the theoretical level, Martin argues consistently against secularization and the minimization of references to empirical reality, with its diminished levels of religious beliefs and practices, assist these self-sustained arguments. This empirical reality, however, must be partly conceded and argued against differently.

When dealing with the concrete, Martin's arguments fall into three broad categories. The first avoids or minimizes contact with uncomfortable areas, though this evasiveness, like his evasiveness in the area of definition, is not always clearly apparent. The second, where factual reality cannot be avoided, is to interpret that reality in such a way that religion is less diminished than most other sociologists would have it. The third, wherever aberrant opportunities occur, argues for the growth or extension of religion. When considered in isolation many of these arguments may seem to make valid points. When compared one with another, however, they present contradictions whose ramifications spread throughout much more of Martin's sociology than it is possible to consider here.

The *General Theory of Secularization* purports to discuss secularization within western Christendom and to produce a cogent system of ideas to explain the decline of religion. His approach is reminiscent of his early essay: 'The Denomination'[38] which takes as its starting point H. R. Niebuhr's *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*[39] in that the emphasis, despite the title, is very much on those social factors which cause *change within*, rather than the *decline of*, religion. Additionally, works like 'Religion in Bulgaria', which Martin claims is the most secular of the eastern European countries, and 'The Secularization Pattern in England'[40] show the most remarkable empirical avoidance of what their titles seem to suggest.

The minimization of secularization is a recurrent theme which appears frequently in Martin's work. A particularly good example is the chapter: 'Practices' (a predominantly statistical analysis of Church-going) in *A Sociology of English Religion*. Martin quite rightly bemoans the inadequacy of statistical information available, but what information there is, is freely available to all. Nevertheless, whilst most sociologists of religion insist that the world is becoming 'more and more relentlessly secular' (as he tells us in the opening sentence of 'Can the Church Survive?') he concludes this chapter of seemingly low indicators of religious practices by wishing to draw nearly 50% of the population into the category of Church attenders. Furthermore, he admits only to 'some mild erosion of the conventional rites of passage'.[41] One seriously wonders what the term 'mild' means. How many children today go unbaptized? How many reach maturity without Confirmation of that Baptism? How many of them marry in secular Registry Offices? *A Sociology of English Religion* was published nearly 20 years ago. If statistical patterns have not changed significantly since then, Martin's claim of 'mild erosion' seems remarkable. If they have changed, it may be the case that secularization has overtaken Martin whilst he has been arguing against it.

Martin's arguments for the growth or extension of religion are widely scattered and unpredictably placed ('bits tacked on'). However, since he is also frequently prepared to concede to some degree of secularization, many of the points he makes run counter to what he claims elsewhere. 'Can the Church Survive?' contains the argument that the 'springs' which might renew religious consciousness actually lie *outside* the Church whilst in the same essay Martin rejects Bellah's notion of religion existing anywhere but *within* the Church. Secular society somehow feeding religion into the Church may seem strange but it is even more so when contrasted with the essay: 'Secularization: The Range of Meaning'. Here Martin argues that in some diffuse sense, as 'secularization' occurs, religion permeates out from the Church and desecularizes secular society. The concept of 'vocation', for instance, is a religious one but as the number of clergy decreases the concept becomes broadened to other professions which take on a certain religiousness as a result, i.e. it is 'an *extension* of religious concepts'.[42] Again, this position contrasts oddly with his stance in the *General Theory*. Here, religious institutions are contracting in size but as they do so the amount of 'real religion' remains fairly constant within narrower parameters: 'With such increasing differentiation, the sectors which are removed become "secularized" while the Church and its clergy become more religious'.[43] (This last point is far from being new, neither is it sociological in its origin. It seems to be a sociological adaption of Remnant Theology whose mainspring was the Babylonian Exile of the 5th century B.C.) Series of contradictions like this seem to bounce around Martin's work as unpredictably as a pin-ball—or as unpredictably as his placing of them.

Either secularization is occurring or it is not. Either religion is viable outside the Church or it is not. Either the secular world is becoming more, or less, secular but not both. Even in less central matters the contradictions persist. In 'Can the Church Survive?', for instance, Martin holds up Birmingham as some sort of urban anti-Christ ('Practices', above, shows Birmingham to be an area of low levels of religious activity). Cities stifle ecstatic awareness and a 'geography of mysticism',[44] were it ever produced, would doubtless show this to be the case, except when it is convenient to show the opposite. It was the very nature of the city itself which triggered the L.S.E. student's experience.

Yeo is correct: 'David Martin's work . . . is scrupulous, delicately aware of what from a theological point of view *must* be'.[45] If theology or Christian conviction demands the continuance or resurgence of the Church then that higher authority is enough and the facts of social reality cannot be allowed to get in the way. In the *abstract* Martin argues consistently against secularization. In the *concrete* he appears like the 'prophet crying in the wilderness', arguing against the seemingly inexorable trend of history whenever the opportunity arises. The prophet in question, Deutero-Isaiah, produced a triumphant prognosis for the Hebrew nation at a time when it appeared that the ethnic identity of the Hebrews was on the verge of extinction, i.e. the period of the Babylonian Exile and the rapid emergence of Remnant Theology. Martin and Deutero-Isaiah have this in common—faith in God even when the situation looks grim to others. In 'Can the Church Survive?' Martin places great stress on the historical content of Christianity. If God really is involved, it cannot be his intention merely to allow his Church to fizzle out and die. (Something of what this involvement consists of will be dealt with in the concluding section.) It has been indicated that a great deal of unarticulated religious commitment underscores Martin's sociology. The inclusion of God would, in principle, allow a complete definition of religion. In the polemic against secularization, the contradictions would still persist, but at least the motivation behind this polemic would become clear.

The abstract/concrete dichotomy in Martin's work can perhaps be made clearer by a brief analogy with Marxism. In 1848, the 'Year of Revolutions', Marx's predictions should have been borne out. Two years later events had not followed their historically inevitable course and Marx told us that we would have to wait a further 'ten, twenty, fifty years'. In an attempt to make the eschaton still credible, so long after the latest predicted date, the abstract has had to be re-worked, the concrete has had to be re-interpreted and recalcitrant facts forced to fit theories. Only the Marxist's *faith* is sufficient to cope with the bad 'fit' between abstract theory on the one hand and concrete reality on the other.

Similarly, Martin has an abstract theory backed by faith—a faith which has a historical aspect to it. Whatever that historical aspect may be, it cannot be a goal of extinction for the Church (or its reduction to an 'ecclesiastical backwater') and therefore secularization *cannot* win. The problem is that there is little hard sociological evidence for this. At this point the Marxist has the advantage because he can call upon the greatest god in his pantheon—Dialectical Materialism—to be his final arbiter. As a sociologist Martin cannot call upon any gods for help because this would mean divine intervention, which is quite unacceptable to sociology.

This does not, however, mean that all academics see this aspect of Martin's work in a bad light. Yeo[46] claims to 'warm particularly to Martin's rich sense of contradiction, "the creative role that may be played by strain" and how "Christianity in particular embodies a logic which builds up a rich destructive trouble for itself"'. He believes that Martin 'thinks dialectically' (though not, in the usual sense, materially), 'thinks double entendre is at the heart of Christianity', 'loves paradox and thinks we have to live with it'. Yeo is probably correct, but it is not good enough. Even if we *like* his style, outright contradictions cannot simply be reclassified as 'paradoxes', implying that they are merely *apparent* contradictions. One cannot simply claim 'Dialectics' (reclassifying contradictions as 'dialectical antitheses') like the foreign emmissary claims 'Diplomatic Immunity' to avoid the consequences of his own misdemeanours. Christianity may contain paradoxes, but Martin contradicts *himself* and those contradictions will not go away.

METHODOLOGICAL ATHEISM—THE LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW

A sociologist has no remit to talk about God. If he were to talk about God he would immediately convert himself into a theologian or a philosopher of history or a prophet.

Thus Martin opens the first chapter, 'Transcendence and Unit', in *The Breaking of the Image*. He then goes on to 'talk about God' throughout the chapter and concludes that he has not done so: 'In all this nothing has been said about God'. He is excused this apparent anomaly in the sense that *as a sociologist* he has not mentioned God. The sociologist does not have to be an apostate or atheist when he discusses events in the world but what he cannot do is to turn to God as an explanatory factor. In 'Transcendence and Unity' Martin talks about God in such a way that no factors can be directly attributable to him. Quite rightly he says that God cannot be identified as 'the murky residuum of multi-variate analysis'.[47] Thus if Martin does not try to use God to explain social events he remains beyond reproach.

Men claim to have seen the hand of God at work in the world in a great variety of ways. Archaeology shows that the walls of Jericho did indeed fall down—several times—at the result of earthquakes. To attribute the Biblical narrative to divine intervention is a crudity, unacceptable to all but a religious minority. This sort of perspective involves a view of God working outside the laws of nature—those laws being immutable as far as man is concerned—but merely prescriptive rules which can be ignored at will by God.

The opposite view is that there is no divine involvement in the world at all, and that is an end to the matter. This sort of view is not necessarily atheistic since one could hold to a sacred/profane dualism that did not incorporate any direct interaction between the two spheres. (Some of the more extreme forms of Gnosticism may fit this model.) Here, there would be no difference, in principle, of the interpretation of events by an atheist or by someone holding to such a credo.

Between these extremes all manner of explanations are offered. Reinhold Niebuhr, for instance, seems to see a God who does not so much 'act' in the world but who inspires men to action. This is admittedly an oversimplification to make a point, but since God does not force his attentions on anyone there is, in the final analysis, no incongruity between Niebuhr's theological writings and his sociological writings. Martin's view seems to come close to this but it is not exactly congruent since, as we have seen, there are certain areas which he is forced to avoid.

It is possible to interpret events in the world in such a way that God is involved but that he acts within the laws of nature and thus remains 'invisible' in the sense that he cannot be pointed to directly as a separate factor in the equation. McPherson discusses two views of the concept of 'miracle'.[48] The 'strong' view involves the interpretation of events that is supposed to have happened at Jericho, where God works outside the laws of nature and explanations in miraculous and natural terms become mutually exclusive. More pertinent here is the 'weak' view where miraculous and natural explanations seem able to co-exist. Though he gives no examples, this view would presumably include, for example, the Christian Science view of miracles where God works *within* the laws of nature. *What* happens can be explained in scientific terms; *why* it happens can only be explained with reference to God. This sort of view (not limited to Christian Science, of course) involves divine activity in the world that is not *separately* identifiable.

Miracles, despite their possible universal meanings or implications, are fairly discrete events. It is possible, though, to transpose this latter view of the workings of God to society as a whole and to an interpretation of history. Such a view would hold that, without 'breaking the rules' or making himself intrusively obvious, God is somehow shaping society or guiding the course of human destiny—'Christian Historicism' for want of a better term. This very broad stance is of course open to a wide variety of interpretations, but it is claimed here that somewhere within it we can locate David Martin.

> There is no room for a trickster-God or a being who suddenly suspends the rules for a brief period of pure inexplicable activity. A social mutation may occur but it does so within the ambit of understandable processes in which we discern no intruding arbitrary element.[49]

This sort of position would fit either the Neibuhr type of model or Christian Historicism. However, a strict interpretation of the former would not concur with what Martin has to say elsewhere. Pushed to its limits, the Neibuhr scheme would allow society to completely turn its back on God and become wholly secular, since God does not 'act', even in McPherson's 'weak' terms. Though this may leave some scope for the highly individualized view of religion, articulated by such scholars as Luckman[50], this is not the course envisaged by Martin. Religion has a historical content and therefore it must have a historical purpose. It is simply that it is not the sociologist's job to discuss this purpose:

> A prophet looks at the seeming flux of events and discerns the finger of God. He brings out the invisible writing and identifies it as *the* true word. It is no business of the sociologist to distinguish the true and lively word from any other statement.[51]

For Martin, in the real world (as opposed to that which the sociologist is limited to) God has a guiding influence on events. It is just that this influence cannot be identified in McPherson's 'strong' terms. Since God does not indulge in meaningless activity, his ultimate purpose (whatever it may be) cannot be the extinction of the Church or its reduction to an ineffectual level. Therefore he must surely work to sustain his Church in the future. It would be wrong to put words into Martin's mouth, but if this is not exactly correct, it must be somewhere close to the truth.

As far as the strict letter of the law is concerned, Martin probably remains a methodological atheist. He does 'talk about God', but not as a sociologist. Whether he remains within the spirit of the law probably depends on one's own view of what that spirit amounts to. That a certain degree of religious commitment orients Martin's work cannot be denied. There are two David Martins—the Sociologist and the Christian. For the latter, nothing lies outside his world view. The former cannot discuss this world view in its entirety, but only the social structures and processes involved. It is not, however, *merely* in these structures and processes that the survival of the Church lies. 'Can the Church Survive?' is a statement of faith made by the Christian but it is left to the Sociologist to argue the case on an inadequate basis. Thus, as with Marxism, an inner contradiction persists, generated by the bad 'fit' between faith and social fact.

Secularization is not a problem for most sociologists. It *contains* problems concerned with the explanation of social processes but it is not a problem to be argued *against* as if it were some form of social evil. It is only a problem to be argued against for those who, like Martin, hold to certain types of religious beliefs. The sociologist sees religion in social terms (whatever that means). The Christian sees the social aspects as centring round a spiritual or supernatural core—a 'quintessence'. This quintessence is, as Martin says, 'either true or numbered amongst the saddest delusions ever to seize upon the human mind'.[52] If it is a delusion, then it is a *social* delusion. If it is true, it involves man's relationship with God and secularization *is* a problem to be argued against. If the latter is correct, it is a *religious* problem and not a social one and, it is therefore not the sociologist's job to conduct the argument.

Perhaps a closing comment can be made. Martin-the-Christian makes the statement of faith and leaves Martin-the-Sociologist with the insoluble problems. Martin-the-Christian is the spiritual descendent of Deutero-Isaiah whilst Martin-the-Sociologist is left to produce an unworkable sociology of religion. The grain of comfort in all this may be that, against the weight of the evidence, Deutero-Isaiah proved to be correct.

NOTES

1 Martin, D. 'Can the Church Survive?', *Tracts Against the Times*, Lutterworth Press, Guildford, 1973.

2 Shiner, L. 'The Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research', *Sociological Perspectives*, Thompson, K. and Tunstall, J. (eds), Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1979.

3 'Can the Church Survive?', p. 172.

4 See, for example: Hardy, A. H. *The spiritual Nature of Man*: A Study of Contemporary Religious Experience, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979. Laski, M.

Ecstasy: A Study of Some Secular and Religious Experiences, Cresset, 1961, and *Everyday Ecstasy*, Thames and Hudson, London; 1980. Miles, T. R. *Religious Experience*, Macmillan, London, 1972.

5 It should be noted that Martin refers only to Laski's first book (above). Her second was published after 'Can the Church Survive?'.

6 'Can the Church Survive?', p. 174.

7 The events of Pentecost could be explained in this way. However, because ecstasy does seem to strengthen or promote genuine relationships, this sort of explanation would in no way devalue any genuine spiritual content.

8 'Can the Church Survive?', p. 172.

9 Ibid., p. 182.

10 Ibid., p. 180.

11 The Durkheimian term 'profane' is used to avoid confusion with 'secular' in this context. Where necessary, Durkheimian terminology will continue to be used.

12 'Can the Church Survive?', p. 173.

13 Ibid., p. 180.

14 Ibid., pp. 175–6. The story of the student reading Traherne's 'Four Centuries of Meditation' illustrates this point. '[The] student was well aware of the disenchantment of nature': In the 20th century he knew there were no such things as demons or fairies. Traherne, in the passage quoted, is attempting to convey his sense of ecstasy to the reader and in the instance cited by Martin seems to have succeeded. The student experienced this in a fairly profane way, if Martin's assessment is correct, yet the passage itself abounds with sacred imagery: 'Adam in Paradise . . . glorious . . . from everlasting to everlasting . . . Immortal Cherubims!'

In the 17th century, the passage is seen and understood in explicitly sacred terms. In the 20th century, the same passage is seen by someone who does not believe in fairies and presumably does not believe in immortal cherubims either, yet he can still relate to the ecstasy it conveys.

Ecstasy still persists but it is more and more often interpreted in a profane form.

15 Ibid., p. 180.

16 Loc. cit.

17 Ibid., p. 179.

18 Popper, K. 'Reason or Revolution?' in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, Adorno, T. W. (ed.), Heinemann, London, 1977.

19 Yeo, S. 'The Varieties of Religious Organization', *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 25th July 1980.

20 Martin, D. *The Religious and the Secular*, Routledge, London, 1969, p. 5.

21 'Can the Church Survive?', p. 177.

22 Martin, D. *A Sociology of English Religion*, S.C.M. Press, London, 1967.

23 See, for instance, Martin, D. 'The Denomination', *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 14, 1962, as well as the comments in the succeeding two paragraphs.

24 *A Sociology of English Religion*, p. 116.

25 Yeo, *op. cit.*

26 'Can the Church Survive?', p. 183. This, incidentally, contains a measure of the Feuerbach/Marx proclamation.

27 Martin, D. *The Breaking of the Image*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1980, p. 2.

28 'Can the Church Survive?', p. 172.

29 Martin, D. 'Towards Eliminating the Concept of Secularization', *Penguin Survey of the Social Sciences—1965*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1965.
30 Ibid., p. 169.
31 Contained in *The Religious and the Secular.*
32 'Can the Church Survive?', p. 178.
33 Ibid., p. 180.
34 Ibid., p. 185.
35 Martin, D. *A General Theory of Secularization*, Blackwell, 1978.
36 Contained in *The Religious and the Secular.*
37 Ibid.
38 Martin's arguments shift their ground somewhat at different times. The similarity of these two works is therefore marked by their 16 years difference in publication.
39 Niebuhr, H. R. (1929) *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*, (New York: New American Library, 1980.)
40 Both contained in *The Religious and the Secular.*
41 *A Sociology of English Religion*, p. 51.
42 *The Religious and the Secular*, p. 50.
43 *A General Theory of Secularization*, p. 279.
44 'Can the Church Survive', p. 176.
45 Yeo, S. *op. cit.*
46 Loc. cit.
47 *The Breaking of the Image*, p. 2.
48 McPherson, T. *Philosophy and Religious Belief* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980, pp. 83–89.)
49 *The Breaking of the Image*, p. 3.
50 'Can the Church Survive?', p. 181.
51 *The Breaking of the Image*, p. 1.
52 'Can the Church Survive?', pp. 177–8.

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BURIAL '*AD SANCTOS*' AND THE PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF THE BUDDHA IN EARLY INDIAN BUDDHISM

A STUDY IN THE ARCHEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS

Gregory Schopen

This paper is an attempt to look at Indian Buddhism 'on the ground' and is an exercise in what might be called 'the archeology of religions'. It focuses on one distinct aspect of Buddhist sacred sites in India: the fact that stūpas housing the physical remains of the Buddha or marking a spot where the Buddha was thought formerly to have been present are frequently surrounded by large numbers of smaller secondary stūpas. It attempts to show that these secondary stūpas have mortuary associations and suggests the resulting pattern parallels what is known in the Medieval West as 'burial *ad sanctos*'. It then attempts—through known archeological parallels, inscriptions, and literary sources—to give meaning to this pattern and suggests that, in spite of doctrinal statements to the contrary, the historical Buddha remained a living presence in the midst of Indian Buddhist communities.

INTRODUCTION

It is hardly revolutionary to suggest that, had the academic study of religions started quite literally on the ground, it would have been confronted with very different problems. It would have had to ask very different questions and it would have produced very different solutions. It would, in short, have become not the 'History of Religions'—which was and is essentially text bound— but the 'Archeology of Religions'. It would have used texts, of course, but only those that could be shown to have been actually known or read at a given place at a given time, or to have governed or shaped the kind of religious behaviour that had left traces on the ground. In fact texts would have been judged significant only if they could be shown to be related to what religious people actually did. This archeology of religions would have been primarily occupied with three kinds of things then: religious constructions and architectures, inscriptions, and art historical remains. In a more general sense, though, it would have been preoccupied *not* with what small, literate, almost exclusively

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male and certainly atypical professionalized sub-groups wrote, but rather, with what religious people of all segments of a given community actually did and how they lived.

All of this—since it did not happen—is, of course, totally academic. But—and this is the beauty of it—since the 'History of Religions' is also totally academic, it still might. In fact what I will present here is meant as a small push in that direction. I want to look, in what follows, at Indian Buddhism on the ground. It is, however, very clear to me that since this is something of a first attempt[1] the results that it will produce will necessarily be somewhat tentative. My data can and should be supplemented. My methods may have to be refined. My conclusions and interpretations may have to be modified and perhaps, in part, rejected. But it should be an interesting discussion, and once the discussion is engaged I very much suspect it will become an unavoidable part of Buddhist studies and, I hope, of the academic study of religions in general.

STARTING ON THE GROUND

If, then, our study of Indian Buddhism is to start on the ground the first and most noticeable things we encounter are Buddhist sacred sites. Like so many sacred sites elsewhere, these sites immediately appear to be connected, at least in part, with the way in which the early Buddhist tradition disposed of and behaved towards its 'very special dead'.[2]

From two inscriptions of Aśoka we know that already in the 3rd century C.E. the Buddhism that he knew had developed two geographically fixed sacred sites. In fact both of these sites are probably pre-Aśokan. One of them most certainly is. Although these two sites appear to us to be different in kind, Aśoka himself behaves in regard to both in exactly the same way. In both inscriptions when he initially describes what he did he uses exactly the same wording: 'King Priyadarśī . . . came in person (and) worshipped (here)' (*devānapiyena . . . attana āgācca mahīyite*, Rummindei; and *devānaṃpiyena . . . attana āgācca mahīyite*, Nigliva).[3] The places in question are Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha Śākyamuni, and the Stūpa or monumental reliquary of the past Buddha Konākamana.[4] In regard to the latter it should be noted that some years before 'coming in person' Aśoka had the reliquary doubled in size (*thube dutiyaṃ vaḍḍhite*). In regard to the former he also effected some construction at the site and he describes it in an important way. He says: 'King Priyadarśī . . . came in person (and) worshipped, saying "here the Buddha was born, Śākyamuni", he had a stone wall made and erected a stone pillar. Saying "here the Blessed One was born", the village of Lummini was freed from tax and put at 1/8th' (*devānapiyena . . . attana āgācca mahīyate hida buddhe jāte sakyamunī ti silāvigaḍabhī ca kālāpita sślātthabhe ca ussapāpite hida bhagavaṃ jāte ti luṃminigāme ubbalike kaṭe aṭṭhabhāgiye ca*). The statement 'here the Blessed One was born', however, is almost certainly not Aśoka's, but an old ritual formula that was to be spoken by any individual upon arriving at the sacred site. It is almost certainly an actual quotation or direct paraphrase as is indicated, at least in part, by the particle *ti* (Skt. *iti*), although this has not always been understood.[5] This quotation, or direct paraphrase, makes it highly likely that Aśoka knew some version of a short text now preserved in somewhat different forms in the various versions of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*. The earliest actually datable Indian version—which is also closest to the wording found in Aśoka—has the Buddha say:[6] 'After I have passed away, monks, those making the pilgrimage to the shrines, honoring the shrines, will come [to these places], they will speak in this way: "Here the Blessed One was born", "here the Blessed One attained the highest most excellent awakening",' etc. (*āgamiṣyanti bhikṣavo mamātyayāc caityaparicārakās caityavandakās* (*Tib. mchod rten bskor ba daṇ mchod rten la phyag 'tshal ba*; cf. Pā, though not here, *cetiyacārika*) *ta evaṃ vakṣyanti / iha bhagavāñ jātaḥ /*, etc., 41.7–8). The similarity in context and wording between the *Mahāparinirvāṇa* text and the Aśokan inscription is too close to be coincidental.

If Aśoka knew a version of the text that was similar to the one that has come down to us—and the fact that he quotes or paraphrases what he does indicates that some version of it was very old—then we are able to recover a number of other points. First of all there is the question as to whether or not Aśoka's action was unique and purely individual in its motivation; the old text would suggest otherwise. It would suggest that he was only doing what was prescribed for 'a devout son of good family'. The extant Sanskrit version of the old text says: 'Monks, there are these four places which are to be/must be visited by a devout son or daughter of good family during their life' [*catvāra ime bhikṣavaḥ pṛthivīpradeśāḥ śrāddhasya kulaputrasya kuladuhitur vā yāvajjīvam anusmaraṇīya* (but read with the ms. *abhigamanīyā*[7]) *bhavanti*, 41.5]. The Pāli text is, interestingly, even stronger. It says: 'Ānanda, there are these four places that a devout son of good family must do *darśan* of, and powerfully experience' (*cattār' imāni ānanda saddhassa kulaputtassa dassanīyāni samvejanīyāni ṭhānāni*). In both cases there are future passive participles which blend into and frequently replace the imperative in both languages. Both versions make it clear that there must be direct contact with these places and the verbs in the Pāli version are particularly striking.[8] It is worth noting that, despite the fact that it has dropped out of the English translations in particular, the final sections of the Pāli version of the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* are clearly marked with the notion and importance of *darśan*, and *darśan* is about direct, intimate contact with a living presence.[9] In fact the idea that Bodh-gayā was a place at which one did *darśan* must have persisted for a very long time. We find reference to it again in an inscription written in *Devanāgarī* that may be as late as the 15th century.[10]

It is also worth noting, in light of a common misconception, to whom these injunctions were directed. A *kulaputra*, 'a son of good family', was no more the actual son of a family of a certain socio-economic class, than an *ārya* was a member of a specific racial group. 'Son of good family' was simply an honorific title, a title applied as much to monks as laymen. Note that, in the Sanskrit version, the injunction is delivered to monks, in the Pāli version to a specific monk. Note that a few lines later in the same passage the Sanskrit version replaces 'devout son of good family' with two other titles: 'one who makes the pilgrimage to the Shrines', and an 'Honorer of Shrines'—and we know from early inscriptions from Amarāvati that the second of these, at least, was a monastic title.[11] The Pāli version makes an even more specific substitution. For its 'devout son of good family' it substitutes later in the same passage 'devout monks, nuns and lay men and women' (*saddhā bhikkhubhikkhuniyo upāsaka-upāsikayo*)[12] In fact all of the early epigraphical material confirms a predominately monastic preoccupation with Bodh-gayā. The greater part of the surviving 1st century B.C.E. railing appears to have been the gift of a single nun; all the Kushan and Gupta inscriptions in which the status of the donor is clear record the donations of monks—monks from as far away as Sri Lanka.[13]

Again if we can assume that Aśoka knew a version of the old text which was similar to the oldest actually datable version that we have, then we can say at least two other important things about the early Buddhist conception of sacred sites. That version, after having the Buddha say 'after I have passed away, monks, those making the pilgrimage to the shrines . . . will come, they will speak in this way, etc.', has him then say: 'Those who during that time die here with a believing mind *in my presence*, all those who have karma still to work out, go to heaven' (*atrāntarā ye kecit prasannacittā mamāntike kālaṃ kariṣyanti te sarve svargopagā ye kecit sopadhiśeṣāḥ*, 41.9 & 14.

First of all it seems fairly clear that the monk redactor of the text thought that the Buddha was, after his *parinirvāṇa*, in some sense actually present at the places where he is known to have formerly been. The text is hard to read in any other way. Secondly, it is equally clear that the monk redactor of the text accepted as fact that a devout death that occurred within the range of this presence assured for the individuals involved—and these were both monks and laymen—rebirth in heaven. The Pāli version of the text, while it differs somewhat in articulation, confirms the essentials: 'Indeed, Ānanda, whosoever, being engaged in visiting the shrines with a devout mind dies, they all after the break up of their body, after death, will be reborn in heaven' (*ye hi keci ānanda cetiyacārikam āhiṇḍantā pasannacittā kālaṃ karissanti sabbe te kāyassa bhedā param maraṇā sugatiṃ saggaṃ lokaṃ uppajjissantīti*). One cannot help but suspect that both these ideas are somehow connected with a curious but consistent pattern clearly observable in the archeological record of Buddhist sacred sites.[14]

AN ARCHEOLOGICAL PATTERN

Everywhere in the Indian Buddhist archeological record the exact spot at which the former presence of the Buddha was marked had a clear and pronounced tendency to draw to it other deposits. Bodh-gayā, although a much disturbed site, is a fine example. Crowded in a jumbled mass around the central point of the site, the exact point of former contact, are hundreds and thousands of small stūpas, of various sizes, and what we see today is only the lowest strata. Above this strata, according to Cunningham, were at least 'four tiers of similar monuments . . . carved stones of an early date were frequently found in the bases of the later monuments, and as the soil got silted up, the general level of the courtyard was gradually raised, and the later stūpas were built over the tops of the earlier ones in successive tiers of different ages . . . so great was the number of these successive monuments, and so rapid was the accumulation of stones and earth that the general level of the courtyard was raised about 20 feet above the floor of the Great Temple'.[15]

However, it is not just at spots at which the former presence of the Buddha was marked that we find this pattern; exactly the same thing occurred around stūpas containing relics. Here the presence of the relic has had exactly the same effect that the presence of the point of former contact with the Buddha's physical body had. It has drawn to it a jumble of minor stūpas which crowd around it in an ever increasing state of disarray. The Dharmarājikā Stūpa in Taxila is a good, early example. Although, as Marshall himself admits, there is no surviving evidence to actually prove that the main stūpa is Mauryan, it is unlikely that it is much later; a 2nd century B.C.E. date is not unlikely.[16] Within a century this main stūpa was surrounded by a tight circle of smaller stūpas crowding around it, some of which—by coin finds—can be dated more specifically to the 1st century B.C.E. A similar situation is found at Jauliāñ, a later but particularly well-preserved site that had not been overwhelmed by successive layers of building. Here there is a central stūpa on a well planned oblong plinth, but crowded around it are at least 21 smaller stūpas of varying size which, by their irregular placement, were clearly not a part of the original plan, and were clearly added at different times wherever space allowed. When space ran out, these stūpas spilled down to a lower level where five more are found.[17] Likewise at Mīrpūr-Khas in Sind—a site both badly preserved and badly reported—around the main stūpa at the upper level was 'a regular forest of smaller stūpas' which, much like at Bodh-gayā, had been built directly on top of still earlier levels of still earlier minor stūpas. Cousens thinks that the main stūpa at least cannot be later than 400 C.E. and may be earlier.[18]

This clustering apparently occurred even at sites where it is no longer visible. The main stupa at Sāñcī, for example, today rises somewhat awesomely straight out of the flat, clear ground that surrounds it. This, however, was not always the case. Marshall says 'Time was when the Great Stūpa was surrounded, like all the more famous shrines of Buddhism, by a multitude of stūpas of varying sizes crowded together on the face of the plateau. The majority of these appear to have been swept away during the operations of 1881–83, when the ground around the Great Stūpa was cleared for a distance of some 60 feet from the outer rail'.[19] Only a very few of these smaller stūpas survived the destruction.

THE MORTUARY ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PATTERN

These smaller stūpas have, by habit, been taken to be 'votive stūpas' and a number of imaginative scenarios created to explain their presence. But in a significant number of cases this simply cannot be so. These cannot be 'votive' in any meaningful sense of the term because these smaller stūpas contain things, and the things they contain are of particular interest. All of the earliest smaller stūpas crowding around the Dharmarājikā described by Marshall contained 'relic' deposits, i.e. anonymous bones and ashes.[20] That these bones and ashes did not belong to Śākyamuni may be inferred from the fact, attested almost everywhere, that when his relics were deposited they were accompanied with an inscriptional label of some sort indicating that they were his.[21] Moreover, his relic was already present in the main stūpa. Likewise at Jauliāñ, where only the bases of most of the smaller stūpas survive, still at least three of these contained anonymous burial deposits or chambers which once contained such deposits.[22] At Mīrpūr-Khas 'all the smaller stūpas of the upper level, which had been opened, had funerary associations, as they contained urns with pieces of bone. Below the floor of these stūpas were found some earlier minor stūpas, which included two of clay, one with bones'.[23] Even at Sāñcī, at least one of the very few surviving 'votive' stūpas contained such an anonymous burial deposit.[24] The situation at Bodh-gayā is a little more complex, but equally interesting.

Cunningham says in regard to the 'votive' stūpas found in such large numbers at Bodh-gayā that 'the pinnacles of the tall mediaeval stūpas were always more or less broken, and even the solid hemispheres of the earlier structural stūpas were mostly displaced'.[25] That is to say that almost all of these stūpas had no 'pinnacle' or elaborate finial. Cunningham attributes this 'loss' to the construction of new structures on top of the old, but there is now evidence to suggest that his explanation may not be correct.

Excavations of the site at Ratnagiri in Orissa have revealed very similar 'votive stūpas' in numbers equaling, if not surpassing, those found at Bodh-gayā.[26] Here it is even more clear than at Bodh-gayā that a considerable number of these stūpas were portable, i.e. they were brought from somewhere else and deposited near the main stūpa. But here—to judge by the photographs—most of these stūpas appear never to have had 'pinnacles'. Most appear to have a socket on top into which plugs of various shapes were inserted.[27]

Indeed, a very considerable number of these so-called 'votive' stūpas from both sites seem to correspond in form, at least, to what I-tsing in his *Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago* called a *kula*. However, these *kulas* had a very specific use. I-tsing says: 'They [Buddhist Monks in India] sometimes build a thing like a stūpa for the dead, to contain his *śarīra* (or relics). It is called a '*kula*', which is like a small stūpa, but without the cupola on it'.[28] That at least some of the monolithic 'votive stūpas' at Ratnagiri corresponded, not only in form but also in function, to I-tsing's *kula* is beyond doubt. Mitra, in referring to the smaller monolithic stūpas at Ratnagiri, says: 'They are mostly votive in nature, with or without some inscribed texts in their cores, but in a few cases their funerary character was obvious, for they contained charred bone relics either within sockets plugged by stone lids or in urns'.[29] It may not be only these cases that are funerary. If, as appears likely, the sockets on the top of these stūpas, which previously have been taken to be meant for the insertion of some kind of finial, were actually intended for and held ash or bone, then the funerary character of a very large number of these stūpas is established.[30] But there is still something more of interest in what Mitra says.

THE MORTUARY ASSOCIATIONS OF INSCRIBED DHĀRAṆĪS

Mitra refers here, and elsewhere, to the presence of 'inscribed texts' in the cores of some of these stūpas, and the same thing has been noticed at Bodhgayā, Nālandā, Paharpur, etc. A significant number of these 'texts' are *dhāraṇīs*, at least in later stūpas. Although largely ignored, it has recently been shown that these are not *ad hoc* compositions, but specific *dhāraṇīs* taken from a specific group of texts. And these texts in fact tell us quite explicitly why these *dhāraṇīs* were placed in stūpas.[31] Although this group of texts is only now beginning to be studied, even a preliminary survey makes it clear that all of them are preoccupied with the problem of death and with procuring a means to avoid rebirth in the hells or other unfortunate destinies, or to release those already born there. The latter, in fact, is one of the primary reasons for placing *dhāraṇīs* in stūpas. I cite here a typical example from the Tibetan translation of the *Raśmivimalaviśuddhaprabhādhāraṇī*: 'Moreover, if someone were to write this *dhāraṇī* in the name of another (who is deceased) and were to deposit it in a stūpa and earnestly worship it, then the deceased, being freed (by that) from his unfortunate destiny, would be reborn in heaven. Indeed, being reborn in the region of the Tuṣita gods, through the empowering of the Buddha he would (never again) fall into an unfortunate destiny' (*yaṅ gaṅ la la źig gis gsaṅ sṅags yi ger bris pa gźan gyi miṅ nas smos te / mchod rten gyi naṅ du bcug la nan tan du mchod pa byas na śi ba gaṅ yin pa de naṅ soṅ gi gnas nas thar te mtho ris su skye bar 'gyur ro / yaṅ na dga 'ldan gyi lha'i ris su skye bar 'gyur te / saṅs rgyas kyi byin gyis brlabs kyis ṅan soṅ du ltuṅ bar mi 'gyur ro*).[32] But these *dhāraṇīs* are also

connected with Buddhist mortuary practices in a variety of other ways as well. Again a typical example can be seen in the *Sarvakarmāvaraṇaviśodhani-dhāraṇī*: 'If one, reciting (this *dhāraṇī*) over earth or sesame or white mustard or water, were to scatter it over the corpse, or if, having washed (the body), one afterwards were to either cremate it or deposit and preserve it in a stūpa, writing this *dhāraṇī* and attaching it to the top (or head), then the deceased—although already reborn in an unfortunate destiny—being freed, would without a doubt after seven days be reborn in a blessed heaven, or else he would be reborn through the power of his own vow' (*sa 'am til lam yuṅs kar ram chu gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba la bzlas brjod byas te śi ba'i lus la gtor ram / khrus byas nas de'i 'og tu bsreg pa 'am / yaṅ na mchod rten gyi naṅ du bcug ste bźag la / rig sṅags kyaṅ bris te mgo bo la btags na de naṅ soṅ du skyes pa yaṅ źag bdun gyis gnod mi za bar thar te bde 'gro mtho ris kyi 'jig rten du skye bar 'gyur ba am / yaṅ na raṅ gi smon lam gyi dbaṅ gis skye bar 'gyur ro/*).[33] Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that similar, although more complicated, funerary rituals involving the same kinds of uses of written *dhāraṇīs* are to be found in the *Sarvadurgatipariśodhanatantra* recently published by Skorupski—a text which, though a fully developed tantra, is clearly related both narratively and 'doctrinally' to our group.[34]

That the *dhāraṇīs* found at Ratnagiri and elsewhere had funerary associations is suggested not only by the texts that they were taken from, but also by the fact that they are almost always found in exactly the same archeological contexts as are the anonymous deposits of bone and ash. This again is particularly clear at Ratnagiri. In addition to the small *kula*-like monolithic stūpas there are also a considerable number of small structural stūpas crowded around the main stūpa at Ratnagiri and an even larger number of them still contained undisturbed their original deposits of anonymous bones. Mitra specifically mentions that in stūpas 3, 4, 23, 24, 25, and 115—all structural—bone deposits were found; however, she then adds that 'there is every reason to believe that there were many more *śārīrika* stūpas (i.e. those containing bone or ash). For, stray bones with or without reliquaries were found in the stūpa area. Apparently, they must have got dislodged from structural stūpas, many of which are reduced to the lowest part of the base or platform'.[35] All eight of the *dhāraṇīs* found at Ratnagiri—exactly like the anonymous bone deposits—were found in the cores of structural stūpas.[36]

THE ARCHEOLOGICAL PATTERN RECAPITULATED

The archeological record of Buddhist sacred sites exhibits, then, from the very beginning of our actual evidence, at least one curious but consistent pattern. This pattern, significantly, is most distinctly and directly visible at what are our very earliest undisturbed sites. The Dharmarājikā at Taxila, which dates to the second century B.C.E., is a fine example. But there are also clear indications that the same pattern held at other very early sites like Sāñcī and

Bhārhut until these sites, by different agents, were irrevocably altered or virtually destroyed. It continues to hold through the 4th and 5th centuries C.E.—for example, at Jauliāñ and Mīrpūr-Khas—and is found still in its full disorderly effervescence in the 10th and 12th century at Ratnagiri. What we find is a large central structure which marks one of two things: either the presence of a spot that was formerly in direct contact with the physical body of the Buddha, or—more commonly—the presence of an actual physical piece of that body. Around this structure are closely packed in increasing disorder a large number—increasingly so—of other smaller structures which frequently contain anonymous bones or bone ash or other items connected with mortuary deposits. That these smaller structures were added at different times is apparent from the fact that they are not part of any discernable original or ordered plan. In fact they frequently appear to violate any pre-existing orderly plan of the sites. The only concern which appears to have governed their placement was an apparent desire to have them as close as possible to the main structure. All of this would suggest, in turn, that these mortuary deposits were purposely brought here, again at different times, from somewhere else. In fact a considerable number of the smallest of these structures were obviously portable.[37] This, in outline, is what we see. What we want to know, of course, is what it means.

SOME ARCHEOLOGICAL PARALLELS

It is worth noting, however briefly, some remarkably similar archeological configurations found elsewhere. In at least some of these other instances we know a considerable amount about the ideational systems that produced these parallel configurations and they are therefore at least suggestive of what the configuration in Buddhist India might have meant.

Philippe Ariès condensed into a few sentences a large body of archeological literature that is of interest to us. He says:

> 'Over the saints tomb a basilica would be built . . . Christians sought to be buried close to this structure. Diggings in the Roman cities of Africa or Spain reveal an extraordinary spectacle concealed by subsequent urban growth: piles of stone sarcophagi in disorder, one on top of the other, several layers high, especially around the walls of the apse, close to the shrine of the Saint'.[38]

This, again according to Ariès, 'is what one finds in Tipasa, Hippo, and Carthage. The spectacle is just as striking in Ampurias, in Catalonia . . . [and] . . . the same situation is found in our Gallo-Roman cities, but it is no longer visible to the naked eye and has to be reconstructed beneath the successive deposit of history'.[39]

Notice that, apart from the technical vocabulary (basilica, sarcophagi, etc.), Ariès description of the archeological record in the Roman cities of Africa, Spain and France could almost serve equally well as a description of what was seen at Bodh-gayā, Taxila, etc. Another site of interest to us differs from these two groups in only one significant way: the successive waves of mortuary deposits, rather than being heaped one on top of the other, have spread out in horizontal layers to cover an immense area, to produce in effect what has been called 'the greatest cemetery of Japan'. This is the 'cemetery' on Mt Kōyasan. Here a dense jumble of graves and markers covering many acres crowds around the tomb of Kōbō Daishi, the 8th/9th century Monk who, among a multitude of other things, founded Shingon Buddhism. Casal notes that 'the number of graves . . . is indeed very large . . . But not all the graves contain a body or its ashes; it suffices to bury a bone, or even some hair or a tooth. The important thing is that one's symbol be interred near the great teacher . . .'.[40]

It is interesting to note that the ideas that produced the configuration of crowding or clustering of mortuary deposits around a central structure in both the Roman cities of Africa and Spain and on Mt Kōyasan appear to be reducible—in both cases—to two basic sets. The first set is perhaps the easier to describe because there is an established vocabulary that can be applied to it. The ideas grouped here are essentially eschatological: in the Christian case they concern the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, in the case of Kōyasan they concern the coming of Maitreya, the 'Future' Buddha. The Christian case can be illustrated by some remarks of Patrick Geary: 'Early Christians took literally Christ's promise of the resurrection and thus expected that on the last day the martyrs' physical bodies would be taken up again by their owners . . . Christians believed that physical proximity to these bodies was beneficial, and that those buried near a Saint's tomb would be raised up with the saint on the day of judgement'.[41] Similar ideas were also certainly associated with the tomb of Kōbō Daishi, although one might dispute the exact wording of those scholars who have described them. Lloyd, for example, says: 'The Shingon are firm believers in Maitreya . . . It is their conviction that the body of Kōbō Daishi, which never decays, is awaiting the advent of Maitreya in his tomb at Kōya San, and Shingonists often send the bones of their dead, after cremation, to Kōya San, so as to be near to Kōbō at the resurrection, which will take place when Maitreya makes his appearance'.[42]

The eschatological set, though clearly present in both cases, is only one of two sets and probably not the most important. The second set—again present in both cases—is based on the notion that the tomb or shrine contains an actual living presence. It was thought, to quote Hakeda, that 'Kukai had not died but had merely entered into eternal Samādhi and was still quite alive on Mt Kōya as a savior to all suffering people'.[43] Here there is no preoccupation with some distantly future eschatological event. Burial in close physical proximity to the living presence in fact effects an immediate result, it assures that the individual whose bones or ashes are placed there will gain rebirth in paradise, in the Pure Land of Amitābha, in Sukhāvatī.[44] Christian notions that fall into this second set are much more richly documented. 'It was commonly believed', says Stephen Wilson, ' . . . that, far from inhabiting any distant heaven, the Saint remained present in his shrine. Delehaye wrote that, for those who followed his cult, St Menas 'resided, invisible, in his basilica' in the Mariut, near Alexandria'.[45] Here too eschatological notions are largely absent and a different set of functions comes into play. Ariès first quotes St Paulinus who had had the body of his son buried beside the Saints at Alcala. Paulinus writes: 'We have sent him [his dead son] to the town of Complutum so that he may lie with the martyrs in the union of the grave, and so that from the blood of the Saints he may draw that virtue that refines our souls like fire'. Ariès himself then adds the following observation: 'We see here that the Saints not only grant protection from the creatures of Tartarus, they also communicate to the deceased who is associated with them a little of their virtue, and postmortem, redeem his sins'.[46]

THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF RELICS AS 'LIVING ENTITIES'

We know then that the above ideas produced the essentially similar archeological configurations that are to be seen at Carthage and Kōyasan, and we might well expect that similar thinking produced the same configuration at Bodh-gayā and Taxila. However, in India the first set seems not to have been operational. There is no evidence of any kind of a connection between the presence of the relic—whether it be a contact relic, like a spot of earth, or an actual bone—and any eschatological event.[47] In fact, if there is any eschatological thinking in India, it takes a decidedly different form. This would seem to suggest that if the configuration found at Bodh-gayā and Taxila was produced by ideas similar to those that produced Carthage and Kōyasan, then the ideas involved would probably belong not to the first set, but to the second. But if this were the case we might expect to find at least some indications that the relic in Early Buddhist India was thought of as an actual living presence, and we have some evidence for this.

The first piece of evidence that might be brought forward is the old text we started with which is now preserved in the various versions of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. Notice that the redactor of the Sanskrit version seems clearly to have thought that the Buddha, though dead, was somehow actually present at the places where he was formerly known to have been. Notice too that he explicitly indicates that a death in physical proximity to that actual presence produces specific and positive results, that it, like burial near a Saint or close to Kōbō Daishi, resulted in 'heaven'. In other words, death at Bodh-gayā and burial *ad sanctos* at Carthage and Kōyasan have exactly the same result, although the 'heaven' in each case is somewhat differently appointed. In fact the key concept in this old text—only very slightly extended—is probably able to account by itself for what is seen in the archeological record of several Buddhist sacred sites in India. The extension would only be from *death* to *deposition of the already dead* in close physical proximity to that actual presence.[48]

However, strictly speaking, the old text is referring only to geographically fixed points of former contact with the physical body of the Buddha, Bodhgayā, Sārnāth, etc. The text says he is present at these places and yet the archeological pattern appears to indicate burial *ad sanctos* not just at these sites, but also at sites where there is only a bodily relic. This archeological evidence, if we are correct in our interpretation of it, would suggest that at these sites too the Buddha was thought to be actually present and alive. There is again some evidence that would indicate this to be the case.

One of the earliest Indian inscriptions after Aśoka is written on the broken lid of a relic casket that came from Shinkot. It records, very laconically, the deposition of a relic of the Buddha Śākyamuni in the reign of the Indo-Greek King Menander, who ruled in the 2nd century B.C.E. All are agreed—Majumdar, Konow, Sircar, Narain, and Lamotte[49]—that it said on the rim: '… [on] the 14th day of the month Kārttika, the relic of the Blessed One Śākyamuni which is endowed with life was established' (*kārttikasya* [*māsasya*] *divase* 14 *prāṇasametaṃ* [*śarīraṃ*] [*bhagavataḥ śākyamuneḥ*] *pratiṣṭhāpitam* /).[50] Something similar to this also occurs on the inner face of the lid: '[This is] a relic of the Blessed One Śākyamuni which is endowed with life' (*prāṇasametaṃ śarīraṃ bhagavataḥ śākyamuneḥ*). What this seems to mean is, of course, what Konow and Lamotte have already said: 'The relics were looked upon as living entities'; 'la relique corporelle . . . c'est un être vivant 'doué de souffle'. However, neither of these authors noted—perhaps because it did not seem germane to their particular point—that this is the earliest actually dateable reference to the relics of the historical Buddha, and that, in fact, the conception of the relic as 'un être vivant' is the earliest actually attestable conception that we have.

Other early sources indicate that the physical relics of Śākyamuni were endowed with more than just 'life' or 'breath'. They were 'informed', 'parfumée', 'saturated', 'pervaded', 'imbued' with just those characteristics which defined the living Buddha. Statements to this effect are found in a wide variety of sources. The inscription of Senavarma is a good example. This inscription, which dates to the early 1st century C.E., is 'la plus longue des inscriptions Kharoṣṭhī jusqu' ici connues', and has proven to be difficult.[51] The portion which concerns us, however, is clear. Senavarma says in part: *ima dhadu śila(pari)bhavita samasiprañavimutiñaṇadra(śa)paribhavita* . . . *pratiṭhavemi*, 'I establish these relics which are infused with morality, infused with concentration, wisdom, emancipation and knowledge and vision'. The list of faculties and qualities given here looks very much as though it may have been intended for, or is perhaps a haplography of, what the Pāli tradition calls the five *sampadās* or 'attainments' and, of course, normally only a living person can be 'infused' with such 'attainments'. Yet another Kharoṣṭhī inscription, which can be dated more exactly to 25/26 C.E., has a similar characterization of the relics of Śākyamuni. Here the relics are said to be *śilaparibhavida sama(s)iparibhaveṃtu prañaparibhavida* or 'infused with morality, infused with concentration, infused with wisdom'.[52] That is to say the relics themselves were thought to retain—to be infused with, impregnated with—the qualities that animated and defined the living Buddha.

Something of the same vocabulary found in these two inscriptions is also found in Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita*. In fact both inscriptions and Aśvaghoṣa may have been closely contemporaneous. Johnston dates the latter to 'between 50 B.C. and 100 A.D. with a preference for the first half of the first century A.D.'[53] It is not, however, just his date that makes Aśvaghoṣa important for us. Both our inscriptions record the gifts of laymen, although they, or the redactors of their inscriptions, had some apparent familiarity with accepted Buddhist doctrines.[54] Aśvaghoṣa, on the other hand, was most decidedly a monk, an extremely literate and very widely learned monk and his conception of relics is important because of that; they are the conceptions of a monk extremely well versed in Buddhist doctrine.[55] In the passage that concerns us Aśvaghoṣa says, for example, that the relics of Śākyamuni, like 'the sphere (*dhātu*) of the chief of the gods (*Brahmā*) in heaven at the end of the aeon', cannot be destroyed by the final cosmic conflagration; that these relics 'cannot be carried even by Viṣṇu's Garuda'. That 'though cool, they burn our minds' (*bsil ba yin kyaṅ bdag cag rnams kyi yid rnams sregs*). But Aśvaghoṣa also uses less overwrought expressions, like those found in our inscriptions. The relics, he says, are 'full of virtue' (*dge legs gaṅ ba*), and 'informed (*paribhāvita*?) with universal benevolence (*maitrī*)' (*byams pas yoṅs su rnam par bsgoms pa*).[56]

There are also other witnesses, at least one of which is 'hostile'. The *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* is one of the earliest Mahāyāna texts translated into Chinese and some version of it was very probably contemporaneous with both our inscriptions and Aśvaghoṣa.[57] Like the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottama*, the *Buddhabalādhāna*, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* and a number of later texts, it is in part preoccupied with sometimes sustained arguments intended to devalue—if not altogether deny the value—of relics.[58] In fact it devotes large parts of at least three chapters to such arguments. As a part of these arguments, the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* on two occasions concedes that there are good reasons for worshipping relics and in so doing uses much the same vocabulary as is found in our two inscriptions and in Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita*. It is stated quite explicitly that 'the relics of the Tathāgata are worshipped because they are saturated with the Perfection of Wisdom' (*api tu khalu punar bhagavaṃs tāni tathāgataśarīrāṇi prajñāpāramitāparibhāvitatvāt pūjāṃ labhante*).[59]

The final instance that we might cite here where relics are said to be 'saturated' or 'infused' or 'prevaded' with specific qualities comes from the Fourth book of the *Milindapañha*, a 'book' which Demiéville has shown was almost certainly added to the Milinda in Ceylon at a date not much earlier than the 5th century C.E.[60] It is, therefore, noteworthy that despite the fact that it is separated from the Senavarma inscription by 500 years, the *Milindapañha*—as Fussman has already pointed out—contains an almost exact verbal parallel to that inscription. Here too the relic is described as 'infused with morality, concentration, wisdom, emancipation, and the knowledge and vision of emancipation' (*sīlasamādhipaññavimuttiñāṇadassanaparibhāvitaṃ dhāturatanañ*).

Each of these passages comes from a distinctly different kind of source, and yet they all use exactly the same participle, *paribhāvita*, in characterizing the relics of the Buddha. The same participle is, of course, used elsewhere, and its characteristic usages are worth noting. One of the most common usages of the term in Canonical Pāli, oddly enough, has to do with chicken's eggs. In a frequently found simile, eggs are described as 'sat on' (*adhisayita*), 'heated' (*parisedita*) and 'pervaded or infused' (*paribhāvita*) by a hen. It is this that makes the eggs 'live'. In fact the point of the simile is that if this is not done properly the chicks do not live.[61] Apart from this, the term is more usually applied to living persons. A particularly interesting usage occurs twice in the *Sarvatathāgatādhiṣṭhānasattvāvalokanabuddhakṣetrasandarśanavyūha-sūtra* from Gilgit. Here the negative *aparibhāvitakāya*, 'having an unpervaded or uninvigorated body' is twice paired with *alpāyuṣka*, 'having little life'.[62] At *Mahāvastu* [Senart (ed.), Vol. i, p. 153.12] bodhisattvas, like relics in Aśvaghoṣa are said to be 'completely saturated with virtue' (*kuśalaparibhāvita*); likewise at *Milindapañha* 361.23 those who fulfill the ascetic practices, like relics in our two inscriptions, are said to be 'saturated with the lovely and excellent unparalleled sweet perfume of morality' (*sīlavarapavara-asamasuci-gandha-paribhāvito hoti*). Again like relics in Aśvaghoṣa, bodhisattvas are said at *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* [Kern-Nanjio (ed.), p. 3.1] to 'have their body and mind saturated with benevolence' (*maitrīparibhāvitakāyacitta*). From these and other passages it seems evident that *paribhāvita* implies 'filled or infused with life', 'invigorated', 'strengthened or made strong', 'impregnated', 'animated', and that, according to our passages, is what relics are.

THE STŪPA AS A 'LEGAL PERSON'

A set of three imprecatory inscriptions on the gateways of Stūpa no. 1 at Sāñci also deserves our attention. The substance of these three inscriptions—which are very much alike and which are as early as at least the 1st century B.C.E.—is fully expressed in the following passage from the inscription on the West Gateway: 'He who dismantles, or causes to be dismantled, the stone work from this Kākaṇāva [i.e. the old name for the stūpa at Sāñcī], or causes it to be transferred to another "house of the teacher", he shall go to the [same terrible] state as those who commit the five sins that have immediate retribution' (*pac ānatariya-kārakāna gati[ṃ] gacheya yo ito kākaṇāvato selakame upā[ḍeya] upāḍ-[ā]peya vā anaṃ vā ācariyakulaṃ saṃkāmeyā*).[63] There are two things that should be noted here. First, the stūpa or reliquary at Sāñcī appears to be implicitly classified as an *ācariya-kula*, a 'house of the Teacher [i.e. the Buddha]'. Bühler long ago suggested that this is a comparable expression, a parallel expression, to the common Indian term for a temple, *devakula*, 'a house of the Deva'. But if this is the case, we know that *devakula* was taken quite literally, i.e. it was the place where the deva lived, where he was actually and powerfully present, and it is rather unlikely that an *ācariya-kula* would have been conceived of any differently.[64]

The second point to be noted here is that these inscriptions indicate that a set of important ideas known only from later literary sources was already operational at Sāñcī in the 1st century B.C.E. In a very useful study of the material found in the various monastic codes (*Vinayas*) dealing with 'la construction et le culte des stūpas' André Bareau noted that 'comme toute personne, le stūpa a le droit de possession . . . et ce droit doit être protégé'. He goes on to say, for example, 'les Sarvāstivādin parlent aussi des biens inépuisables du stūpa, qui sont inaliénables. Les biens qui sont donnés en offrande au stūpa ne peuvent être utilisés à d'autres fins. On ne doit pas les mélanger avec les biens de la communauté des quatre directions, ni avec les biens consistant en nourriture, ni avec les biens à partager'.[65] From these same texts it is clear that the property belonging to the stūpa or reliquary included real property, land in the form of gardens with productive fruit and flowering trees, and ponds.

What Bareau did not note was that 'le droit de possession' of the Stūpa was referred to and elaborated in sources other than the *Vinayas*. These other sources are important for two reasons: first, they are still later than the *Vinayas* and therefore indicate the long continuity of these ideas; and secondly, at least some of these sources must be considered, again, as hostile witnesses since they are Mahāyāna Sūtras, the majority of which perhaps are at best ambivalent in regard to the value of relics and stūpas, if they are not explicitly engaged in actually devaluing them.[66] The number of these references in Mahāyāna literature is also impressive. Edgerton, under the term *staupika*, cites two passages from the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, two from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and one each from the *Rāṣṭrapāla and Gaṇḍavyūha*.[67] However, there are at least four more in the *Śikṣā* and two also now available in the *Upālipariprcchā*.[68]

The strength of the ideas concerning the stūpa's rights of ownership is clear from a long passage from the *Ratnarāśi-sūtra* quote in the *Śikṣā* (56.9). The substance of this passage is this: although funds of the 'local order'—if there is a surplus and unanimous agreement—can be used to make up a deficit in the 'ecumenical' order (normally such funds must be kept strictly separate), funds belonging to the stūpa, even if there is an excess, must never be handed over to either the 'local' or 'ecumenical' order (*yadi punaḥ kāśyapa kiyad bahur api staupiko lābho bhavet / sa vaiyāvṛtyakareṇa na saṃghe na cāturdiśasaṃghe upanāmayitavyaḥ*). The text in fact goes so far as to say that 'a robe (or piece of cloth) given to the stūpa *must* be allowed to go to ruin on the stūpa through the wind and sun and rain', that such a robe cannot be exchanged for a sum of money, and that nothing that belongs to a stūpa can have a commercial price set on it (*yac ca stūpe cīvaraṃ niryātitaṃ bhavati tat tatraiva tathāgatacaitye vātātapavṛṣṭibhiḥ parikṣayaṃ gacchatu / na punaḥ staupikaṃ cīvaraṃ hiraṇyamūlyena parivartayitavyaṃ / na hi staupikasya kaścid argho . . .*).[69] The reason given for this is of some interest: 'Whatever belongs to a stūpa, even if it is only a single fringe that is given . . . that itself is a sacred object for the world together with its gods' (*yā staupikā antaśa ekadaśāpi . . . niryātitā bhavati / sā sadevakasya lokasya caityaṃ /*). That is to say, an object given to a stūpa becomes itself a sacred object (*caitya*). However, we know that there is only one way for objects to become sacred in a Buddhist context: they must be owned or used by a sacred *person*. In fact the Chinese version of the above passage translates *staupika* or 'belonging to the stūpa' by characters which mean 'belonging to the Buddha'.[70]

We should also notice that some of these Mahāyāna texts—exactly like the gateway inscriptions at Sāñcī—explicitly associate or equate taking property belonging to the stūpa with 'the five acts with immediate retribution'; for example, this is true of the *Ākāśagarbha-sūtra* and the *Upālipariprcchā*.[71] This, if nothing else, indicates the extremely serious nature of such an act as these five acts are the most serious offences known to the Indian Buddhist tradition. However, the association of theft or destruction of property belonging to a stūpa with this set of five offences is probably more than just a way of indicating its terrible seriousness. 'The five acts with immediate retribution' are taking the life of one's mother, taking the life of one's father, taking the life of an arhat, causing a division within the Sangha, and wounding or causing physical harm to a Buddha. Four of the five, then, have to do with seriously harming living persons of rank. That harm done to a stūpa or reliquary is explicitly equated with acts of this kind would suggest, again, that the stūpa was cognitively classified as a 'living person of rank'. If this were not the case it would be difficult to understand the extreme seriousness with which such 'harm' was viewed.

In noting that the stūpa or reliquary 'comme toute personne' had the right to, and did in fact, possess personal real property, and in noting that the ideas surrounding this right were both old and markedly tenacious, it is of some interest to point out that we find ourselves again in front of something noted elsewhere. Geary in discussing the 'Thefts of Relics in the Central Middle Ages' repeatedly insists that 'in a very basic sense, men in the Central Middle Ages perceived relics as being alive . . . relics were actually the saints themselves, continuing to live among men'. One body of evidence he uses to establish this view parallels exactly at least a part of what we have just seen in regard to the Buddhist stūpa. He says: 'Relics even had legal rights; they received gifts and offerings made specifically to them and owned churches and monasteries, which were technically the property of the saints who lay in their crypts'.[72]

THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE OF THE RELIC AND THE LIVING BUDDHA

If Buddhist reliquaries and the relics they contained were 'legal persons', that is to say, had and exercised the rights of living persons, and if harm done to them was explicitly equated with harm done to living persons of rank, then the reverse of the second equation in particular should also hold: honor or worship done to them should be explicitly equated with honor or worship done to living persons. And so it is. An instance of exactly this equation is found, for example, in a text now preserved in the Gilgit *Mūlasarvāstivādin Vinaya* which has the appearance of being very old. This text, in fact, seems to reflect a period prior to the development of the monumental stūpa when relics were simply buried in the ground at specific places.[73]

The text says the Buddha in company with Ānanda went to a place called Toyikā. When he arrived there there was a Brāhmaṇa plowing his field. This gentleman saw the Buddha and said to himself 'If I approach the Blessed One Gautama and pay honor to him my work will suffer; but if I do not approach him and pay honor to him my merit will suffer. What can I do to avoid both a loss of work and a loss of merit?' He decides—being a clever Brāhmaṇa—to remain where he is, but to pay honor to Gautama from a distance, which he does still—as the text pointedly notes—holding his goad. Gautama, of course, is not terribly impressed with this 'expedient'—the text calls it an *upāya*—and he says, in part, to Ānanda: 'Mistaken, Ānanda, is this Brāhmaṇa. Had he approached this spot then when he did honor here he would himself have known 'on this spot the undistributed mass of relics of the Perfect Buddha Kāśyapa is present'. Had he approached I would have been honored by him, indeed honor would have been done by him to two Perfect Buddhas. Why is that? Because, Ānanda, at this spot the undisturbed mass of relics of the Perfect Buddha Kāśyapa is present' (*kṣūṇa ānanda eṣa brāhmaṇaḥ / [anenopakramyāsmin pradeśe abhivādane kṛte] sati pratyātmaṃ jñānadarśanaṃ pravartate / etasmin pradeśe kāśyapasya samyaksaṃbuddhasyāvikopito 'sthisaṃghātas tiṣṭhatīti / aham anenopakramya vandito bhaveyam / evam anena* *dvābhyāṃ samyaksaṃbuddhābhyāṃ vandanā kṛtā bhavet / tatkasya hetoḥ / asminn ānanda pradeśe kāśyapasya samyaksaṃbuddhasyāvikopito 'sthisaṃghātaṣ tiṣṭhati /*).[74] The implications here are that there is no distinction between a living Buddha and a collection of relics—both make the sacred person equally present as an object of worship, and the presence of either makes available the same opportunity to make merit, but, in case his reader missed the point, the redactor of the text adds a set of verses which make it explicit in slightly different terms: 'He who would worship a living (Buddha), and he who would worship one who has entered final Nirvāṇa, having made their minds equally devout—between them there is no distinction of merit' (*tiṣṭhantaṃ pūjayed yaś ca yaś cāpi parinirvṛtam / samaṃ cittaṃ prasādyeha nāsti puṇyaviśeṣata* /78.8).

That such ideas were both common and durable would seem to be suggested by the fact that this same verse, or close variants of it, occurs in what Waldschmidt calls a 'sondertext' of the Sanskrit *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, in the *Caityapradakṣiṇa-gāthā* manuscripts of which have been found at Gilgit, in the 'Schenkungsformular' manuscript from Turkistan published by Lüders, and in the Khotanese text of the *Pradakṣiṇa-sūtra*.[75] Yet another version of this verse has come down to us in the work of the learned Monk Aśvaghoṣa: 'The learned should know the qualities of the Buddha, and that if one worships with similar devotion the Seer when he is present, or if one worships his relic after he has entered final Nirvāṇa, the result is the same' (*draṅ sroṅ bźugs ba la ni mchod pa sbyaṅ nas sam / yoṅs su mya ṅan 'das pa'i gduṅ la phyag byas nas / yid kyi daṅ ba mñam na 'bras bu mñan pa ste / saṅs rgyas yon tan rnams ni mkhas rnams śes par mdzod /*).[76] Notice that all these texts emphasize that the individual is to 'make his mind equally devout' in regard to the actual presence and the relic (*samaṃ cittaṃ prasādya*; *same cittaprasāde hi*; *sems dge ba ni mtshuṅs 'gyur na*; *yid kyi daṅ ba mñam na*). That is to say that one is to adopt the same frame of mind towards the relic as is adopted in regard to the living presence. For the believer they are to be taken as the same. They have the same function. They make possible the same result.

It is interesting, too, to note that one of the clearest expressions of these ideas is to be found in the *Mahāvaṃsa*, the 5th century Pāli 'chronicle' of Buddhism in Sri Lanka written by the monk Mahānama. The passage concerned is supposed to be the record of a conversation which took place in the 3rd century B.C.E. between the monk Mahinda, who is credited with the 'conversion' of Sri Lanka, and the reigning Sri Lankan King Devānaṃpiyatissa. Mahinda—who according to the *Dīpavaṃsa* is on the verge of leaving Sri Lanka—complains to the king: 'It is a long time since we have seen the Perfect Buddha, the Teacher. We have lived without a Master. There is nothing here for us to worship'. To which the king replies: 'But, sir, did you not tell me that the Perfect Buddha has entered Nirvāṇa?' The Monk Mahinda answers—and his answer perfectly condenses much of our discussion—'when the relics are seen (or: "are present"), the Buddha is seen (or: "is present")'. (*'ciradiṭṭho hi saṃbuddho satthā no manujādhipa / anāthavāsaṃ vasimha natthi no pūjiyaṃ idha // bhasittha nanu bhante me saṃbuddho nibbuto iti / āha dhātusu diṭṭhesu diṭṭho hoti jino iti*). The king, of course, promises to build a stūpa, and Mahinda appoints another Monk to fly to India to procure relics.[77]

THE PUBLIC VALUE PLACED ON RELICS

Before our findings up to this point are summarized, it is worth looking briefly at one final piece of evidence, not because it provides further indications that the relic was thought of as a living presence—that I think is already sufficently clear—but because it is an early piece of evidence for what we might call, in the absence of a better term, the communal or public value placed on relics. The evidence in question is an old tradition concerning what has come to be called 'the war of the relics'. Already in the oldest surviving Buddhist art—at Sāñcī, Bhārhut, Amarāvati and in Gandhāra—we have illustrations of this episode[78] although the narrative details are now known only from later texts: after the cremation of the Buddha the Mallas of Kusinārā 'surrounded the bones of the Exhalted One in their council hall with a lattice work of spears, and with a rampart of bows'; seven other groups representing distinct and apparently competing political entities came, however, armed for war to claim a share of the relics; they were initially refused; interestingly enough imminent conflict was avoided only by the intervention of a Brahmin who pointed out the incongruency of waging war over the remains of one who was a teacher of forbearance (*khanti-vāda*).[79]

We might note that this old tradition, however the details might fall, forcefully articulates in the strongest possible contemporary political idiom the extreme value placed on these 'remains'. Bareau has noted that 'qu'elle [this tradition] raconte un fait historique ou qu'elle soit pure légende, peu importe ici, l'essentiel pour notre propos est que . . . les fidèles, dont les hagiographes reflètent l'esprit, ont cru à la réalité de cet épisode, ont regardé comme parfaitement vraisemblable que le dévotion de leurs prédécesseurs ait poussé ces derniers à se disputer les restes corporels du bienheureux, les armes à la main. Cela prouve qu' au temps où la première version de ce récit fut composée, les fidèles trouvaient normal et même édifiant un tel excès de zèle . . .';[80] and, but for one small detail, Professor Bareau's remarks are very much to the point: unless he wants to assert that it was written by a layman—and I doubt that he would—'la première version de ce récit', or any other for that matter, can tell us nothing directly about some hypothetical and generalized 'fidèles'. What it can and does 'prove', however, is what 'les hagiographes' who composed it—almost certainly monks—'trouvaient normal et même édifiant'. This, of course, is a very different matter.

CONCLUSIONS

Several different kinds of data have been presented here. There is the archeological data which shows a seemingly characteristic, repeatedly encountered configuration of material remains at Buddhist sacred sites. This configuration consists of a central structure marking either a spot known to have been formerly in direct contact with the physical body of the Buddha, or housing an actual part of that physical body. Around this central structure are crowded in increasing disarray large numbers of smaller structures, a considerable number of which contain anonymous mortuary deposits—bone and ash—or other objects known to be associated with mortuary practices. These mortuary deposits have been purposely brought and placed here at different times. They do not form a part of an original or ordered plan.

In addition an old literary tradition exists which indicates that the Buddha was thought to be actually present at certain spots with which he was known to have had direct physical contact. There is also a whole series of epigraphical and literary documents which prove that the physical relic of the Buddha was thought to be possessed of 'life' or 'breath', and to be impregnated with the characteristics that defined and animated the living Buddha; that the relic or reliquary that contained it had and exercised the right to own personal property—that it was 'legally' a person—and that it was cognitively classified with living persons of rank. Some of these literary documents, at least one of which is very old, also establish that the presence of the relic was thought to be the same thing as the presence of the actual Buddha, that the two were religiously the same and the same behavior was required in regard to both.

This, in turn, means that the central structures at both types of Buddhist sacred sites contained or located the actual living presence of the Buddha and it was this presence that drew to it the secondary mortuary deposits and a host of subsidiary structures.

Another part of the same old literary tradition proves that it was thought that a death in the presence of the Buddha resulted in rebirth in heaven. In addition, there are the parallels in conception and mortuary practice in the Roman cities of Spain and Africa, and on Mt Kōyasan.

We have, it would seem, reason to believe that Indian Buddhists also practiced and believed in some form of what in the Latin West was called *depositio ad sanctos*, and that—regardless of what some canonical texts might occasionally suggest and some scholastic texts definitely state—the Buddha was and continued to be an actual living presence in the midst of the Buddhist community.

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NOTES

1 There have been other attempts to draw archeological and art historical sources into the mainstream of Buddhist Studies, most notably those of P. Mus [see the bibliography of G. Moréchand, 'Paul Mus (1902–69)', *Bulletin de l'école française d'extrême-orient*, 57 (1970) 25–42, but note that *Barabuḍur. Esquisse d'une histoire du bouddhisme fondée sur la critique archéologique des textes* (Hanoi: 1935) deux tomes, has since been reprinted by Arno Press (New York: 1978) both volumes in one]. There are, however, some very real problems with Mus' work. He ignored Indian epigraphy—which is surprising in light of the work he did in Indo-China—and he was very little concerned with chronology. He also used textual material very indiscriminately, citing texts of widely different periods and widely different provenances without ever asking if this material could ever have been known to any actual Buddhist in the pre-modern period. In religious studies, generally, the last published work of S. G. F. Brandon was also clearly moving in the direction of what I would call 'the Archeology of Religions' [*Man and God in Art and Ritual. A Study of Iconography, Architecture and Ritual Action as Primary Evidence of Religious Belief and Practice* (New York: 1975)].

2 The category 'the very special dead' is, of course, borrowed from Peter Brown [*The Cult of the Saints. Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity* (Chicago: 1981), 69 ff.]. Although he applied it to Christian saints as a whole, I will here be almost exclusively concerned not with Buddhist 'Saints' as a group, but with the historical Buddha Śākyamuni. This is not to say that there was not a 'cult of the saints' or other 'very special dead' in Indian Buddhism. There is both epigraphical and archeological evidence that indicates otherwise but a discussion of this material must await another time.

3 J. Bloch, *Les inscriptions d'Asoka* (Paris: 1950). The Prakrit cited here and below all comes from Bloch's edition. The two inscriptions in question are from Rummindei (Paderia), p. 157, and Nagali Sager (Nigliva), p. 158. Unlike the bulk of the Aśokan material these two inscriptions are not 'edicts'. They, at least together with the Barabar inscription, constitute the earliest surviving Indian donative inscriptions. Whether or not the Aśokan material establishes that Bodh-gayā was an established sacred site at the time of Aśoka depends very much on how one interprets the word *saṃbodhi* in the 8th Rock Edict. Since A. L. Basham re-opened the question, it has yet to be resolved ['Saṃbodhi in Aśoka's 8th Rock Edict', *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 2 (1979) 81–83]. Therefore, this is not taken into account here, although my own position is much closer to the one most recently expressed by R. Lingat, 'Encore *ayāya saṃbodhim* à propos de l'inscription gréco-araméenne d'Aśoka', *Journal asiatique*, (1967) 195–98.

4 On the Past Buddhas see J. Ph. Vogel, 'The Past Buddhas and Kāśyapa in Indian Art and Epigraphy', *Asiatica Festschrift Friedrich Weller* (Leipzig: 1954), pp. 808–816; R. Gombrich, 'The Significance of Former Buddhas in the Theravādin Tradition', *Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula*, edited by S. Balasooriya *et al.* (London: 1980), pp. 62–72; A. Vergati, 'Le culte et l'iconographie du buddha dīpankara dans la vallée de Kathmandou', *Arts asiatiques* 37 (1982) 22–27.

5 See, for example, Bloch, *Les inscriptions d'Asoka*, 49, 157 n. 2 and 4. Note that Aśoka here uses the absolutive form of *ā√gam* to describe his coming to Lummini and according to Bloch's index this root is used only here and in the related Nigali Sagar inscription. Both the Sanskrit and Pāli versions of our passage also use forms of *ā√gam*. Note too that while neither of the two instances of the

hida statement in Aśoka corresponds with the Pāli, the second, *hida bhagavaṃ jāte*, corresponds exactly with the Sanskrit *iha bhagavāñ jātaḥ*.

6 I here refer to, and cite throughout, the Sanskrit version of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra* edited by E. Waldschmidt [*Das Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, Teil I, II, III (Abh. DAW Berlin, Kl. f. Spr., Lit. u. Kunst, Jg. 1949, No. 1; Jg. 1950, No. 2 und Jg. 1950, No. 3) (Berlin: 1950, 1951, 1951); I cite the text according to Waldschmidt's 'paragraph' numbers]. Since the Sanskrit text is based primarily on the Turfan materials this means that we have actual manuscripts for it which are centuries earlier than anything we have for the Pāli text and, in this sense at least, its readings are the earliest actually attestable readings that we have for the text in an Indian language. On the Turfan manuscript material see L. Sander, *Paläographisches zu den Sanskrithandschriften der Berliner Turfansammlung* (Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Supplementband 8) (Wiesbaden: 1968). For Pāli Mss. see H. Smith, *Saddanīti, La grammaire palie d'aggavaṃsa* (Lund: 1928), p. v; 0. von Hinüber, 'On the Tradition of Pāli Texts in India, Ceylon and Burma', *Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries* (Abh. d. Akad. d. Wiss. in Göttingen, Philo.-Hist. Kl. Dritte Folge. No. 108); H. Bechert (ed.) (Göttingen: 1970), p. 48: 'The big gap between the first redaction of our Pāli-canon and the basis of the texts as we have them today, becomes evident at once, if we bear in mind that there is no manuscript older than about 400 years, with the only exception, as far as I know, of a tenth century Vinaya-fragment in Pāli found in Nepal'. More recently von Hinüber has said 'that most of the surviving manuscript material [for the Pāli Canon] is hardly older than the late 18th century'. He also refers to 'an extremely old manuscript dated as early as AD 1412', and adds 'if this date is correct, this would be the oldest dated Pāli manuscript known so far' [O. von Hinüber, 'Pāli Manuscripts of Canonical Texts From North Thailand—A Preliminary Report', *Journal of the Siam Society*,71 (1983) 78]. Note too that, in terms of Pāli literature, a slightly shorter version of the *Mahāparinibbāna* passage on pilgrimage also occurs at *Aṅguttara* ii 120. In light of these passages it is difficult to understand what A. Bharati meant when he said: 'Although pilgrimage figures importantly in the religions of India, it never had any canonical status in non-tantric traditions' [*The Tantric Tradition* (London: 1965), p. 85].

7 Waldschmidt's *anusmaraṇīyā* appears to be reconstructed on the basis of Tibetan *rjes su dran par 'gyur bar bya*. In fact in neither of the two manuscript fragments for 41.5 has the actual reading been preserved, but in the restatement of 41.5 that occurs in 41.10 the one manuscript in which the actual reading has been preserved has quite clearly *abhigamanīyā* (Teil I, p. 43, 113.2). Note that this passage of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-Sūtra* has been re-edited by F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader* (New Haven: 1953), pp. 34–35, cf. n. 14.

8 For the range of meanings of *saṃvejanīya*, 'to be powerfully experienced', see A. K. Coomaraswamy, '*Saṃvega*: Aesthetic Shock', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 7 (1943) 174–179 [Repr. in *Coomaraswamy* 1. *Selected Papers. Traditional Art and Symbolism*, edited by R. Lipsey (Princeton: 1977), pp. 179–185]. He translates *saṃvejanīya* from our passages of the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* as 'should be deeply moved'. For an interesting use of *vega/pravega* in Early Mahāyāna Sūtra literature see *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā* (edited by Conze) 14A: *atha khalv āyuṣmān subhūtir dharmavegenāśrūni* [the Gilgit text has *-pravegenā-*] *prāmuñcat*, etc.

9 J. Gonda has clearly demonstrated the antiquity of many of the ideas which most secondary literature associates only with the much later 'classical' bhakti

conception of *darśan* [*Eye and Gaze in the Veda* (Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. LetterKunds. Nieuwe Reeks–Deel 75) (Amsterdam: 1970)]; on *darśan* generally see the fine little book by D. L. Eck, *Darśan. Seeing the Divine Image in India* (Chambersburg: 1981). In light of the pervasiveness and age of these Indian ideas about 'seeing' and what it entails it would appear that many of our translations, at the very least, miss the nuance and may in fact miss the whole point. The exhortation that Ānanda was directed by the Buddha to deliver to the Mallas is a good example. Ānanda was told to go and tell the Mallas that the Buddha would enter *parinibbāna* during the last watch of that night, and he was supposed to say to them: *abhikkhamatha . . . abhikkhamatha . . . mā pacchā vippaṭisārino ahuvattha: amhākañ ca no gāmakkhette tathāgatassa parinibbānaṃ ahosi, na mayaṃ labhimhā pacchime kāle tathāgataṃ dassanāyâti*, which Rhys Davids translates as: 'Be favourable . . . be favourable. Give no occasion to reproach yourselves hereafter, saying:—"In our own village did the death of our Tathāgata take place, and we took not the opportunity of visiting the Tathāgata in his last hours" ' [T. W. and C.A. F. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part II (London: 1910), p. 162]. The Rhys Davids' translation is, of course, not really 'wrong', but unless the reader has the etymology of the English word clearly in mind, to translate *dassana* by 'visit' (from Latin, *visere* 'to go to see', *videre*, *visum* 'to see') is at best terribly flat. In a culture where 'casting one's eyes upon a person and touching him were related activities' (Gonda, p. 19), where there was strong 'belief in the beneficial results of visual contact' (p. 46), and where there were large numbers of old 'ritual texts prescribing a conscious and directed look by which the spectator was . . . believed to benefit, or ritual acts performed to derive some advantage from looking on a mighty being . . . to participate in its nature or essence, to be purified or raised to a higher level of existence by being *vis-à-vis* with such a man' (p. 55), in such a culture, to go to 'see' a man, especially an exceptionally holy man, clearly involves much more than a 'visit'. In fact 'the Upavāna Incident' in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta* makes it absolutely clear that for this text the important aspect of *dassana* was direct visual contact and that such contact was very highly valued. In this remarkable incident the Buddha is lying on his deathbed and the Monk Upavāna is standing in front of him fanning him. But then the Buddha 'spoke harshly' to Upavāna (*apasādesi*—a very strong verb and an action very uncharacteristic of the 'textual' Buddha) saying 'Get away, Monk! Don't stand in front of me! (*apehi bhikkhu mā me purato aṭṭhāsīti*)'. Ānanda is puzzled (shocked, cf. Skt. 35.4) and asks about the Buddha's behaviour. The latter calmly explains that the devas from all the ten directions have come together to gaze upon/behold/see him (*devatā sannipatitā tathāgataṃ dassanāya*), but they are 'grumbling' (*ujjhāyanti*), saying 'we have come from great distances to gaze on/etc. the Tathāgata . . . but this eminent Monk standing in front of the Blessed One is preventing it and we do not get to gaze on the Tathāgata in his final moments' (*na mayaṃ labhāma pacchime kāle tathāgataṃ dassanāyâti*). Clearly, here again the devas did not come simply 'to visit', and in fact here Rhys Davids was almost forced to translate *dassana* as 'behold'. It is also worth noting that there is Buddhist evidence for other aspects of the conception of *darśan* usually associated with mediaeval bhakti which is, relatively speaking, much earlier. Both Coomaraswamy [*Mediaeval Sinhalese Art*, 2nd edition (New York: 1956), pp. 70–75] and Gombrich ['The Consecration of a Buddhist Image', *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 26 (1966) 23–36] have pointed out that Buddhaghosa, already in the 5th century C.E., refers to the ritual empowerment of an image by painting in its eyes, and there is a clear allusion to the same idea in the *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā* (edited by Yuyama) VII.2 which is almost certainly several centuries earlier than Buddhaghosa.

10 A. Cunningham, *Mahabodhi or the Great Buddhist Temple under the Bodhi Tree at Buddha-Gaya* (London: 1892), pp. 82–83; B. M. Barua, 'Old Buddhist Shrines at Bodh-Gayā', *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, 6 (1930) 30–31. There may in fact have been several more inscriptions of roughly the same period which refer to *darśan* but it is not possible to be sure from Cunningham's presentation. He says that in slabs F and G 'The pilgrim offers his adoration to Mahābodhi, for the benefit of his father and mother', but he does not give the actual reading of the inscriptions. Since, however, he translates . . . *jina dasakena sri man mahābodhi bhandāraka darsana kritam yadatra punyam tad bhavati mātapittri purvaga* . . . (see Barua for a much better reading) by ' . . . Jina Dasaka . . . adoration was made at the Temple of Sri-man Mahābodhi, for the benefit of his father and mother, etc.' (p. 83), it is possible that F and G also had this same reading.

11 H. Lüders, *A List of Brahmi Inscriptions from the Earliest Times to about A.D. 400 with the Exception of Those of Asoka* (appendix to Epigraphia Indica, X) (Calcutta: 1912) no. 1223, a gift made by 'The Elder (*Thera*), the Chaitya worshipper (*Chetiyavaṃdaka*) *bhayaṃta* (*bhadanta*) Budhi'; no. 1263, a gift made by 'Papin (Pāpin), brother of *bhayaṃta* (bhadanta) Budhi (Buddhi), the Chaitya worshipper (*Chetiavadaka*)'. As both these inscriptions come from Amarāvati and are roughly contemporaneous, there is a good chance that the monk named Budhi referred to in both is the same person. But if this is true, there is an equally good chance that the monk Budhi who is called a *cetiyavandaka* in these two inscriptions is the same monk Budhi who is called a *mahāvinayadhara*, 'a great preserver/knower of the Vinaya' in two other contemporaneous Amarāvati inscriptions. [Lüders, *list*, no. 1270 and H. Sarkar, 'Some Early Inscriptions in the Amarāvati Museum', *Journal of Ancient Indian History*, 4 (1970–71) 9, no. 63], and a *dhamakathika*, 'a preacher of Dharma' in a third (Lüders, *List*, no. 1267). This would seem to indicate that some at least of the 'honorers of shrines' were the acknowledged transmitters of Buddhist doctrine and monastic rules and monks of considerable standing.

12 In the Pāli Canon, in the *Araṇavibhaṅgasutta* (*Majjhima*, Vol. iii, p. 237), the monk Subhūti is called a *kulaputta*; in the *Dhātuvibhaṅga-sutta* (*Majjhima*, Vol. iii, pp. 238–247) the monk Pukkasāti is repeatedly referred to as a *kulaputta*; in a recurring 'arhat formula' *kulaputtas* are the ones said to properly go forth from the house to the houseless state (*Aṅguttara*, Vol. i, p. 282; *Dīgha*, Vol. ii, p. 153, etc.); etc. In very early Mahāyāna Sūtra literature it is clear that not only did the title *kulaputra* apply both to monks and laymen, but it was also a title that could be applied to followers of both what we usually call the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna. In the *Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra byaṅ chub sems dpa' khyim pa 'am/rab tu byuṅ ba*, 'both householder and renunciant bodhisattvas', are equated with *rigs kyi bu 'am rigs kyi bu mo*, 'sons and daughters of good family' [P. M. Harrison, *The Tibetan Text of the Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra* (Tokyo: 1978), 7B; see also 8G (where *kulaputras* who seek arhatship are referred to), 9E (reference to *kulaputras* who are 'adherents of the *Śrāvakayāna*'); etc.]. Likewise in the equally early *Akṣobhyatathāgatasya-vyūha* we find *byaṅ chub sems dpa'i theg pa pa daṅ ñan thos kyi theg pa pa'i rigs kyi bu 'am/rigs kyi bu mo gaṅ dag khyim gyi gnas nas ṅes par byuṅ źiṅ rab tu byuṅ bar gyur pa dag* . . . Peking, Vol. 22, pp. 132-5-4; cf. 137-1-2, 154-4-6; 156-1-7, 2-3, 3-1, etc. On this important but until recently little studied text see now J. Dantinne, *La splendeur de l'inébranlable*

(*Akṣobhyavyūha*) T. I (Louvain-la-neuve: 1983). For a much later occurrence see *Suvikrāntavikrāmi-paripṛcchā* (edited by Hikata) 64.14.

13 Barua, 'Old Buddhist Shrines at Bodh-Gayā', 6 ff. (especially p. 20); B. M. Barua, 'A Bodh-Gayā Image Inscription', *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, 9 (1933) 416–19 (Kushan: The gift of a monk who is called a *dharmakathika*, 'preacher of Dharma' and who is associated with a *vinayadhara*, a 'preserver/transmitter of the Vinaya'); J. F. Fleet, *Inscriptions of the Early Gupta Kings and Their Successors* (Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum, III) (Calcutta: 1888), nos 71, 72, 76.

14 Wayman translates the Sanskrit *atrāntarā ye kecit prasannacittā mamāntike kālaṃ kariṣyanti*, etc., as 'among these places, whoever with pure thought will die in my presence, all those belong to heaven (*svarga*), whoever are with remainder' [A. Wayman, 'Buddhism', *Historia Religionum. Handbook for the History of Religions*, Vol. II, edited by C. J. Bleeker & G. Widengren (Leiden: 1971) p. 401] taking *kālaṃ kariṣyanti* as that which takes place *mamāntike* and not *prasannacittā*. This is worth noting because the Tibetan translation appears to do just the opposite: *kha cig ṇa la sems dad pas dus byas pa* (v. l. *te*) *de thams cad mtho ris su 'gro'o/ kha cig ni phuṇ po lhag ma daṇ bcas par ro*: 'some with devout thoughts in regard to me die, they all go to heaven. Some are possessed with a substratum (i.e. 'still have karma to work out')'. But the Tibetan is either translating a Sanskrit text which differs from the one we have or it is only a very loose rendering. It has nothing corresponding to *atrāntarā* and it suggests a text which read: *ye kecin mamāntike prasannacittāḥ kālaṃ kariṣyanti*. Gen. + *antike* can of course mean 'in regard to', but Edgerton's examples (*BHSD* 40) make it clear that the gen. + *antike* is always followed by the action concerned, never preceded (*daridrapuruṣas tasya gṛhapater antike pitṛsaṃjñāṃ utpādayet*, Sp 107.4; *devānām . . . antike cittāni pradūṣayitvā*, Mv i 30.9, etc.). This is the construction regardless of the sense in which *antike* is used and this makes it difficult to see in *mamāntike kālaṃ kariṣyanti* anything but 'those who will die in my presence'. To say 'those who will die in regard to/in reference to me' makes no sense. It is possible, however, that the Tibetan translation did not result from the fact that it was based on a different original, nor from a misunderstanding. It may represent an intentional alteration of the text. Notice that the Tibetan corresponding to 41.9, as well as—if not more so than—that corresponding to 41.14 [*kha cig ni sems dad pas dus byas pa* (v. l. *te*) *de thams cad mtho ris su 'gro'o/kha cig ni phuṅ po lhag ma daṅ bcas par ro/ ji ltar mṅon du 'gro bar bya ba de ltar rjes su dran par bya'o*] looks very much like an attempt to retain the benefit of rebirth in heaven while at the same time no longer requiring an actual pilgrimage. The Tibetan appears to want to make a 'mental pilgrimage' equal to the actual pilgrimage or at least to make the former an option. Notice that its *ji ltar mṅon du 'gro bar bya ba de ltar rjes su dran par bya'o* is clearly an addition. There is nothing corresponding to it in either Sanskrit or Pāli and, whilst we do not actually have manuscript readings for the Sanskrit of 41.5, where the Pāli has *dassanīyāni saṃvejanīyāni*, i.e. reference to direct visual contact, the Tibetan has *rjes su dran par 'gyur bar bya'o* = *anusmaraṇīya*, i.e. mental recalling or visualization. When we do have an actual manuscript reading for the Sanskrit, as in 41.10, it is *abhigamanīya*. The 'substitution' or option which the Tibetan translation appears to be introducing is also clearly visible in the Chinese version of the text translated by Waldschmidt: 'Wenn man an diesen vier Plätzen entweder persönlich seine Verehrung bezeigt oder (ihnen) aus der Ferne seine Achtung übermittelt, sehnsuchtsvoll und aufrichtig reinen Glauben entstehen lässt und beständig die Gedanken daran heftet, wird man nach Lebensende Geburt im Himmel erlangen'.

Here too one can *either* go in person to the four places *or* call them to mind from a far [cf. A. Bareau, *Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans les sūtrapiṭaka et les vinayapiṭaka anciens: II Les derniers mois, le parinirvāṇa et les funérailles*, T. II (Paris: 1971), pp. 29–32. Bareau, however, takes Waldschmidts' reconstructed *anusmaraṇīya* at 41.5 without comment and this affects some of what he says]. All of this would seem to suggest that as long as the text remained in India the original readings like *dassanīya*, *saṃvejanīya*, and, probably, *abhigamanīya*—all of which required actual pilgrimage—were not a problem, but that when the texts moved outside of India—where actual pilgrimage would have been extremely difficult—new readings, like *anusmaraṇīya*, and new options, like visualization 'aus der Ferne' had to be introduced into the text. It is in this light, I think, that the Tibetan translation and some of the Chinese translations of our passage are to be viewed. There were, of course, other ways of dealing with the problem of 'actual' pilgrimage. See, for example, the interesting paper by A. B. Griswold, 'The Holy Land Transported: Replicas of the Mahābodhi Shrine in Siam and Elsewhere', *Paranavitana Felicitation Volume*, edited by N. A. Jayawickrama (Colombo: 1965), pp. 173–222.

15 Cunningham, *Mahābodhi*, 46–49; for a recent study of the surviving 'minor' stūpas at Bodh-gayā see M. Bénesti, *Contribution à l'étude du stūpa bouddhique indien: les stūpa mineurs de Bodh-gayā et de Ratnagiri*, T. I. & II (Paris: 1981).

16 Marshall, *Taxila*, Vol. I, 235: Vol. III, pl. 45, for a clear ground plan of the whole Dharmarājikā complex.

17 Marshall, *Taxila*, Vol. I, 368–387; Vol. III, pl. 101, for the ground plan of Jauliāñ. A slightly fuller acccount of the excavations at Jauliāñ had been published earlier: J. Marshall, *Excavations at Taxila: The Stūpas and Monasteries at Jauliāñ* (Mem. of the Arch. Survey of India, 7) (Calcutta: 1921).

18 H. Cousens, *The Antiquities of Sind* (Arch. Survey of India, Vol. XLVI, Imperial Series) (Calcutta: 1929), pp. 82–97; D. R. Bhandarkar, 'Excavations near Mirpur Khās, *Progress Report of the Archaeological Survey of India, Western Circle, for the Year Ending 31st March, 1917*, pp. 47–48; D. Mitra, *Buddhist Monuments* (Calcutta: 1971), pp. 132–33.

19 J. Marshall, *A Guide to Sanchi* (Calcutta: 1918), pp. 87–88.

20 Marshall, *Taxila*, Vol. I, 240 ff. Marshall does not specifically describe all the earliest smaller stūpas, but of those that he does all contain bone or ash (i.e. R5, S8, S9, B6, B3). Other 'contemporary' stūpas that contain bone or ash are J2, N7 and Q1. Stūpas of varying date scattered around the complex which are specially said to contain 'relic' deposits are G4, G5, T12, K3, P6, S10, N11, N10, N9, P10, P12, U1.

21 See, for example 'The Piprāhwā Buddhist Vase Inscription' (Lüders, *List*, no. 931, with bibliography); G. Bühler, 'The Bhattiprolu Inscriptions', *Epigraphia Indica* 2 (1894) 323–29; J. Ph. Vogel, 'Prakrit Inscriptions from a Buddhist Site at Nagarjunikonda', *Epigraphia Indica*, 20 (1929–30) 1–36, where the stūpa itself appears to be repeatedly described as containing the relics of the Buddha, although Vogel, I think, has misunderstood this and the construction is somewhat odd; see Āyaka Pillar Inscriptions C3, B2, B4, B5, C2, C4, C5. The key instance for the correct interpretation of the construction appears to be the 1st Apsidal Temple Inscription E: *saṃma-saṃbudhasa dhātuparigahitasa mahāchetiya-pādamūle*); R. Salomon and G. Schopen, 'The Indravarman (Avaca) Casket Inscription Reconsidered: Further Evidence for Canonical Passages in Buddhist Inscriptions', *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 7 (1984) 107–23.

P. R. Srinivasan, 'Devni-Mori Relic Casket Inscription of Rudrasena, Kathika Year 127', *Epigraphia Indica*, 37 (1967) 67–69; etc.

22 Marshall, *Taxila*, Vol. I, All (p. 373), D5 (p. 373), A16 (p. 374). There was also at least one 'reliquary' found in the debris between stūpas A7 and A8.

23 Mitra, *Buddhist Monuments*, p. 133; Cousens, *The Antiquities of Sind*, p. 97.

24 Marshall, *A Guide to Sanchi*, p. 88.

25 Cunningham, *Mahābodhi*, pp. 48–49.

26 A. Ghosh (editor), *Indian Archaeology 1957–58—A Review* (New Delhi: 1958), pp. 39–41, pls. XLIX–LIII; D. Mitra, 'Ratnagiri. Unearthing of a New Buddhist Site in Orissa', *Indo-Asian Culture*, 9 (1960) 160–75; D. Mitra, *Ratnagiri (1958–61)*, Vol. I (Mem. of Arch. Survey of India, 80) (New Delhi: 1981). For the configuration and numbers of the smaller stūpas around the main stūpa at Ratnagiri see the site plan of the stūpa area, Mitra, *Ratnagiri*, p. 26, Fig. 3; this can be compared with that for Bodh-gayā published by Cunningham, *Mahābodhi*, pl. XVIII. For a study of the smaller stūpas at Ratnagiri see Bénisti, *Contribution à l'étude du stūpa bouddhique indien*, T.1, 93 ff., Figs 119 ff, and Mitra, *Ratnagiri*, pp. 44–138, pls. LX–LXXXI.

27 See Mitra, *Ratnagiri*, pls. IX, XX–XXI, XXXIV, XLII, LVI–LVIII, etc.

28 I-tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (A. D. 671–695)*, translated by J. Takakusu (London: 1896, reprinted, 1966), p. 82. An additional, but I do not think an alternative, explanation for the absence of a finial on *some* Buddhist 'votive' stūpas is suggested by U. Wiesner ['Nepalese Votive Stūpas of the Licchavi Period: The Empty Niche', *The Stūpa—Its Religious, Historical and Architectural Significance* (Bieträge zur Südasien-Forschung Südasien-Institut Universität Heidelberg 55), edited by A. L. Dallapiccola *et al.* (Wiesbaden: 1980), pp 170–172]. What Wiesner says about an intentional sectarian 'revision' of the form of the stūpa, however, *could* only apply to those found on the surface. The vast majority of the stūpas we are concerned with only came to light during excavation, having been covered over by newer levels of building.

29 Mitra, 'Ratnagiri, Unearthing of a New Buddhist Site', p. 166.

30 Notice that Mitra in the final excavation report (*Ratnagiri*, pp. 31–32) comes close to suggesting something similar. She says first that 'a limited number of these monolithic stūpas were doubtless used for enshrining the bone-relics of the departed: for this purpose they were provided with sockets, usually at the base, to hold charred bones'. However, she then adds that 'most of the sockets of these *śārīrika* stūpas were found empty, and only a few (stūpas 112 and 188 for instance), which were found plugged by stone blocks, retained the relics', raising the real possibility that many more might have contained relics, a possibility that she clearly states in discussing the structural stūpas as we will see below. Notice too that she incidently notes (p. 44n) that 'the relics were noticed mostly during the conservation of the stūpas', i.e. the possibilities of the presence of bone deposits was not in any way systematically studied.

31 G. Schopen, 'The Text on the 'Dhāraṇī Stones from Abhayagiriya': A Minor Contribution to the Study of Mahāyāna Literature in Ceylon', *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, 5 (1982) 100–108; G. Schopen, 'The Bodhigarbhālaṅkāralakṣa and Vimaloṣṇīṣa Dhāraṇīs in Indian Inscriptions: Two Sources for the Practice of Buddhism in Medieval India', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*, 29 (1985) 119–149. In the second of these papers I was able to show that the 'dhāraṇī-text' on the Cuttack Stone Inscription published by

A. Ghosh [*Epigraphia Indica*, 26 (1941) 171–174] was an incomplete Sanskrit version of a text called the Bodhigarbhālaṅkāralakṣadhāraṇī. Although Mitra refers to Ghosh (*Ratnagiri*, p. 31), she apparently did not recognize that the two dhāraṇīs found on eight plaques at Ratnagiri which she transliterated (pp. 43, 99) were the same dhāraṇī that he had transliterated. The same dhāraṇī is also found on at least two plaques from Nālandā and on a 'cachet' from Qunduz.

32 *'Phags pa 'od zer dri ma med pa rnam par dag pa'i 'od ces bya ba'i gzuṅs*, Pek. Vol. 7, 190-1-4. It is interesting to note that the two earliest known examples of printing—one from Korea and one from Japan—both contain the *Raśmivimala*, and in both countries were found inside stūpas; see, L. Carrington Goodrich, 'Printing: Preliminary Report on a New Discovery', *Technology and Culture*, 9 (1967) 376–378; T. F. Carter, *The Invention of Printing in China and Its Spread Westward*, 2nd edition revised by L. Carrington Goodrich (New York: 1955), pp. 46–53; B. Hickman, 'A Note on the Hyakumantō Dhāranī', *Monumenta Nipponica* 30 (1975) 87–93.

33 *'Phags pa las kyi sgrib pa thams cad rnam par sbyoṅ ba źes bya ba'i gzuṅs*, Pek. Vol. 11, 252-1-6. It is very likely that the *dhāraṇī* from this text was one of the *dhāraṇīs* deposited by the monk Bu Ston in the stūpa he built for his deceased mother, D. S. Ruegg, *The Life of Bu Ston Rin Po Che, With the Tibetan Text of the Bu Ston rNam Thar* (Serie Orientale Roma XXXIV) (Rome: 1966), Fol. 29a, 5 and p. 136.

34 T. Skorupski, *The Sarvadurgatipariśodhana Tantra* (Delhi: 1983). Notice that, although the *dramatis personae* and the setting differ in each case, the *Raśmivimalaviśuddhaprabha*, the *Samantamukhapraveśaraśmivimaloṣṇīṣaprabhāsasarvatathāgatahṛdayasamayavilokita* (Pek. Vol. 7, no. 206), and the *Sarvadurgatipariśodhanī-uṣṇīṣavijaya* (Pek. vol. 7, no. 198) *dhāraṇīs* and the *Sarvadurgatipariśodhana Tantra* (Skorupski, 4, 122.29 ff.) are all introduced by essentially the same thematic kind of narrative. [The introductions to the *dhāraṇīs* are summarized in *Mkhas Grub Rje's Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras. Rgyud sde spyiḥi rnam par gźag pa rgyas par brjod*, translated by F. D. Lessing and A. Wayman (The Hague: 1968), pp. 104–107, 115–117]. On *dhāraṇīs* in funerary rites in the *Sarvadurgati Tantra* see Skorupski p. 81, 242.22 ff.

35 Mitra, *Ratnagiri*, p. 28. For a brief description of three of the 'dislocated reliquaries' see pp. 28–29.

36 Mitra, *Ratnagiri* 43, 98–99. It should be noted that a more complete and systematic survey of Buddhist sites than the one I have been able to present here promises—despite the deficiencies of much of the published archeological literature—to produce much fuller evidence for the funerary functions of the minor stūpas found at almost all Buddhist sites. For now, I can only mention the following points. It is possible that 'les stūpa à 'avancée' or 'les stūpa à cella' which occur at both Bodh-gayā (Cunningham, *Mahābodhi*, p. 48, pl. XXIII.k; Bénisti, *Contribution à l'étude du stūpa*, t. i, 20–22; t. ii, Figs. 23–26, 28, 29, 31, 33) and Ratnagiri (Mitra, pls, XXIa. 102, XXIb.107, XLVII A. 228) and which have been taken—on very weak evidence—to have been meant for images, may, in fact, have been intended and used for funerary deposits. It has been reported, at least at Mainamati, that 'the hoard of miniature baked and unbaked clay stūpas' found there 'contained bone relics or small sealings or sometimes both' ('Mainamati Excavations', *Pakistan Archaeology*, 5 (1968) 173). These 'miniature' stūpas have a very wide distribution indeed (M. Taddei, 'Inscribed Clay Tablets and Miniature Stūpas from Gaznī', *East and West*, 20 (1970) 85–86). Finally, G. Fussman has already published two Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions which he thinks are funerary

['Une inscription kharoṣṭhī a Haḍḍa', *Bulletin de l'école française d'extrême-orient (BEFEO)*, (1969) 5–9]; 'Documents épigraphiques kouchans', *BEFEO*, 61 (1974) 58–61 (there are, according to a personal communication from Prof. Fussman, also a number of similar inscriptions from Haḍḍa which have yet to be published). A. H. Dani has also published a number of Kharoṣṭhī inscriptions which appear to be funerary ['Shaikhan Dheri Excavation (1963 and 1964 Seasons)', *Ancient Pakistan*, 2 (1965–66) 109–13]. All of these things deserve to be studied much more fully.

37 Mitra (*Ratnagiri*, p. 32), however, has indicated that at Ratnagiri at least there is some evidence to indicate that the 'portable monolithic stūpas' were made locally.

38 P. Ariès, *Western Attitudes Towards Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present* (Baltimore: 1974), pp. 16–17.

39 P. Ariès, *The Hour of Our Death* (New York: 1981), p. 34.

40 U. A. Casal, 'The Saintly Kōbō Daishi in Popular Lore (A.D. 774–835)', *Journal of Far Eastern Folklore. Folklore Studies*, 18 (1959), p. 143.

41 P. Geary, *Furta Sacra. Thefts of Relics in the Central Middle Ages* (Princeton: 1978), p. 33–34; see also S. Wilson, 'Introduction', *Saints and Their Cults. Studies in Religious Sociology, Folklore and History*, edited by S. Wilson (Cambridge: 1983), p. 10.

42 A. Lloyd, 'Death and Disposal of the Dead (Japanese)' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 4, edited by J. Hastings (Edinburgh: 1911), p. 491; see also Casal, 'The Saintly Kōbō Daishi', pp. 139, 143.

43 Y. S. Hakeda, *Kūkai: Major Works* (New York: 1972), p. 60.

44 O. Statler, *Japanese Pilgrimage* (New York: 1983), p. 94–96, 128, 175, etc., taking as his 'basic source' S. Gorai, *Koya Hijiri* (Tokyo: 1965).

45 Wilson, *Saints and Their Cults*, p. 11; see also P. Brown, *The Cult of the Saints. Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity* (Chicago: 1981), pp. 3–4.

46 Ariès, *The Hour of Our Death*, p. 33.

47 There is, of course, the old story of Kāśyapa awaiting the coming of Maitreya entombed in the 'Kukkuṭapada' or 'Gurupada' mountain which has some obvious similarities with some of the ideas connected with Kōbō Daishi [see T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, Vol. II (London: 1905), 143 ff. and literature cited therein], but this has nothing to do with relics as such. Outside of India, G. Obeyesekere refers to a 'Sinhalese myth which states that in the flood that heralds the destruction of this age all the Buddha dhātu found in various parts of the world will assemble together through ridhi and the Buddha himself will be refashioned out of these substances. He will then utter a last sermon' ['The Buddhist Pantheon in Ceylon and Its Extensions', *Anthropological Studies in Theravada Buddhism* (New Haven: 1966), p. 9], and M. E. Spiro cites several instances of a similar 'myth' in Burma: 'Just prior to his [Maitreya's] arrival, the relics of the present Buddha, Gautama, will be recombined to form his physical body. By worshiping him, the *weikza* will automatically achieve nirvana' [*Burmese Supernaturalism. A Study in the Explanation and Reduction of Suffering* (Englewood Cliffs: 1967), p. 231, 165–166, 191]. The Indian antecedents of the Sri Lankan and Burmese materials are very vague. Both are undoubtedly related to the *Anāgatavaṃsa* [J. Minayeff, 'Anāgatavaṃsa', *Journal of the Pāli Text Society* (1886) 36; cf. H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translation* (Cambridge: 1896), pp. 484–485], but this text is itself sometimes presented as a *sutta* (e.g. Minayeff's ms. B from Rangoon) while at other times it is considered an authored work attributed to a Coḷiyan monk named Kassapa who probably lived between C.E. 1160 and 1230

[J. Minayeff, 'The Gandha-Vaṃsa', *Journal of the Pāli Text Society*, (1886) 60–61, 66, 70; A. P Buddhadatta and A. K. Warder, *Mohavicchedanī Abhidhammamātikatthavaṇṇanā* (London: 1961), pp. x–xi, xvi-xviii]. The *Anāgatavaṃsa* itself clearly owes much to Buddhaghosa's *Manorathapūraṇī* [E. T. Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien des origines à l'ère śaka* (Louvain: 1958), p. 216]. To complicate matters even further, two versions of an *Anāgatavaṃsa* exist in the Tibetan Kanjur (Peking nos 751 and 1010) both of which were co-translated by a Sri Lankan Monk, Ānandaśrī, in the 13th century [see G. Schopen, 'Hīnayāna Texts in a 14th century Persian Chronicle: Notes on Some of Rashid al'Din's Sources', *Central Asiatic Journal* 26 (1982) 231 n. 9, and sources cited therein; add: S. Lévi, 'Maitreya le consolateur', *Études d'orientalisme publiées par le musée guimet à la mémoire de Raymonde Linossier*, T. II (Paris: 1932), pp. 379–380; Lévi's discussion of the Tibetan translations, p. 377, needs, in part, to be corrected]. Sorting all this out will require, and deserves, a good deal of future work, but it would appear, at this stage, that the ideas expressed in the *Anāgatavaṃsa* , etc., are too late to have had any real formative role in producing the archeological configuration that concerns us.

48 See, D. L. Eck, *Banaras: City of Light* (New York: 1982), p. 215: 'Those who die in Kāshī, assured of liberation, will be cremated on the banks of the river of Heaven at this most sacred of *tīrthas*. If one cannot die in Kāshī, then cremation by the Ganges anywhere along her banks is desirable. If even this is impossible, then relatives might later bring the ashes of the deceased to the Ganges at Kāshī, or even send them to Kāshī parcel post'.

49 N. G. Majumdar, 'The Bajaur Casket of the Reign of Menandar', *Epigraphia Indica* (*EI*), 24 (1937) 1–8; S. Konow, 'New Traces of the Greeks in India', *New Indian Antiquary*, 2 (1939/40) 639–648; Konow, 'Note on the Bajaur Inscription of Menandros', *EI*, 27 (1947–48) 52–58; D. C. Sircar, 'A Note on the Bajaur Casket of the Reign of Menander', *EI*, 26 (1942) 318–321; Sircar, *Select Inscriptions Bearing on Indian History and Civilization*, Vol. I, 2nd edition, (Calcutta: 1965), pp. 102–106; A. K. Narian, *The Indo-Greeks* (Oxford: 1957), pl. VI; Ét. Lamotte, 'De quelques influences grecques et scythes sur le bouddhisme', *Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres. Comptes rendus des séances de l'année 1956*, pp. 485–504, esp. 494; Lamotte, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, p. 464, 474 ff. (essentially a reworking of the first paper, much of what Lamotte says in both places in regard to 'influences grecques et scythes' is highly conjectural and some of it can now be shown to be wrong); on the historical setting of the inscription see most recently R. Salomon, 'The "Avaca" Inscription and the Origin of the Vikrama Era', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 102 (1982) 62–65.

50 I cite here, and below, Sircar's Sanskritized text from *Select Inscriptions*, p. 105. It should be noted that this inscription is very fragmentary and not all the inscriptions on the lid go back to the time of Menander.

51 First edited by H. W. Bailey, 'A Kharoṣṭrī Inscription of Senavarma, King of Oḍi', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, (1980) 21–29; edited anew, with much better results, by G. Fussman, 'Documents épigraphiques kouchans (III). L'inscription kharoṣṭhī de Senavarma, roi d'Oḍi: Une nouvelle lecture', *BEFEO*. 71 (1982) 1–46; yet another edition, by R. Salomon is forthcoming. I quote below Salomon's edition (Bailey line 7; Fussman 7a–7d).

52 G. Fussman, 'Nouvelles inscriptions śaka (II)', *BEFEO*, 73 (1984) 38 ['5. reliquaire (en l'honneur de?) Kopśakasa']; Fussman translates: 'ces reliques . . . parfumées de moralité, parfumées de concentration, parfumées de discernement'.

53 E. H. Johnston, *The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha*, Part II (Calcutta:

1935–36, reprinted Delhi: 1972), p. xvii; cf. F. Wilhelm, 'Kanika and Kaniṣka—Aśvaghoṣa and Mātṛceta', *Papers on the Date of Kaniṣka*, edited by A. L. Basham (Leiden: 1968), pp. 337–345; B. Bhattacharya, *Aśvaghoṣa: A Critical Study* (Santiniketan: 1976), p. 20.

54 On the important question of the role of 'le rédacteur' in Buddhist inscriptions see G. Fussman, 'Une inscription kharoṣṭhī à Haḍḍa' *BEFEO*, 56 (1969) 7 and his review of Th. Damsteegt, *Epigraphical Hybrid Sanskrit, Journal Asiatique*, (1980) 424.

55 See Johnston, *Buddhacarita*, part II, xxiv–lxxix.

56 Cantos XV–XXVIII of the *Buddhacarita* are known to us only in the Tibetan and Chinese translation. Johnston has published an English translation of the Tibetan text in 'The Buddha's Mission and Last Journey; Buddhacarita, XV–XXVIII', *Acta Orientalia*, 15 (1937) 26–111; 231–92. For the passage that concerns us, XXVIII, 77–79, I follow Johnston (p. 276). The Sanskrit 'equivalents' in parentheses are his; the Tibetan in parentheses is cited from Peking Vol. 129, no. 5656, 169–4-8 to 169–5-3, the only version that was available to me.

57 See, L. R. Lancaster, 'The Oldest Mahāyāna Sūtra: Its Significance for the Study of Buddhist Development', *The Eastern Buddhist*, 8 (1975) 30–41.

58 See G. Schopen, 'The Phrase "sa pṛthivīpradeśaś caityabhūto bhavet" in the Vajracchedikā: Notes on the Cult of the Book in Mahāyāna', *Indo-Iranian Journal*, 17 (1975) 147–181, especially 163–167, for the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*; also *Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra. Das Goldglanz Sūtra. Ein Sanskrittext des Mahāyāna Buddhismus* (Leipzig: 1937), pp. 6–19; G. Schopen, 'The Five Leaves of the Buddhabalādhānaprātihāryavikurvāṇanirdeśa-sūtra Found at Gilgit', *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 5 (1978) 329 ff. and Peking Vol. 34, 191-4-6 ff. The translation offered in *JIP*, 5 is a rather awful piece of English. This is, in part at least, because I tried to translate the Sanskrit and Tibetan at the same time—an exercise I would now never repeat—and because I tried to be unnaturally literal. But I also occasionally did not understand the text. One instance of this occurs on p. 332 where the passage beginning 'As-so-ever he sees . . . ' up to 'does not (exist in the Tathāgata)' should be translated (from the Tibetan): 'As he sees those beings who will not honor the Teacher, who do not have faith in the Tathāgata, who are the lowest dregs (*kaśaṭṭaka*) and who can (only) be trained through (his manifesting) a final nirvāṇa and through relics, as he sees those, just so he manifests a final nirvāṇa, but a Tathāgata does not come and does not go'. I am now working on a revised edition of the Sanskrit fragments and an edition of the complete Tibetan translation of the *Buddhabalā*.

59 U. Wogihara, *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā*, fas. 3 (Tokyo: 1934), pp. 272.16, 273.5.

60 The passage in question is *Milindapañho* (edited by Trenckner) 98; P. Demiéville, 'Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha', *BEFEO*, 24 (1924) 29, 34–35.

61 *Majjhima*, Vol. i, p. 104, 357; *Saṃyutta*, Vol. iii, p. 153; *Aṅguttara*, Vol. iv, p. 125, 176; *Vinaya*, Vol. iii, p. 3.

62 N. Dutt, Gilgit Manuscripts, Vol. I (Srinagar: 1934), pp. 50. 19, 50.6.

63 The text is cited from Majumdar's edition published in J. Marshall, A. Foucher and N. G. Majumdar, *The Monuments of Sāñchi*, Vol. I (Delhi: 1940), p. 342, no. 404; see also nos 389 and 396.

64 There is disagreement about the meaning of *ācariya-kula* here. I have followed Bühler ['Further Votive Inscriptions from the Stūpas at Sāñchi (II)', *EI* 2 (1894) 396 and n. 1], Lüders (*A List of Brahmi Inscriptions*, nos 340 and 350), and Sircar

[*Indian Epigraphical Glossary* (Delhi: 1966), p. 4]. Majumdar (*Monuments of Sāñchi*, Vol. I, p. 298), however, connects the term found in the Sāñcī inscriptions with the *ācariyavāda* found in the much later *Mahāvaṃsa* in a very different context [W. Geiger, The *Mahāvaṃsa* (London: 1908), p. 5.4 and 5.11; *ācariyakulavādakathā niṭṭhita* occurs as a kind of sectional colophon on p. 29] and then makes a number of very tenuous assertions concerning the demography of early Buddhist sects on the basis of his 'connection'. A. M. Shastri ['Buddhist Schools as Known from Early Indian Inscriptions', *Bharati. Bulletin of the College of Indology*, 2 (1957/58) 28–29] questions some of the assertions but not Majumdar's basic 'connection'. The whole question needs further study in light, especially, of other epigraphical imprecations and the now much richer inscriptional materials in which named 'schools' appear.

65 A. Bareau, 'La construction et le culte des stūpa d'après les Vinayapiṭaka', *BEFEO*, 50 (1960) 253, 257; cf. J. Gernet, *Les aspects économiques du bouddhisme dans la société chinoise du Ve au Xe siècle* (Paris: 1956), 61 ff., 159 ff. For literature other than the *Vinayas* see the remarks of M. Hofinger, 'Le vol dans la morale bouddhique', *Indianisme et bouddhisme. Mélanges offerts à Mgr. Étienne Lamotte* (Louvain-La-Neuve: 1980), p. 185, which indicate the existence of a broader range of opinions.

66 Professor Bareau did, however, point out that these interdictions were maintained regardless of whether a given sect maintained 'que le don au Buddha ou le culte rendu à un stūpa ne produisent pas de grands fruits'. In fact, of the schools that he named as holders of such a view—Mahīśāsaka, Vetullaka, Caitika, Pūrvaśaila and Aparaśaila—at least the last three are Mahāsāṅghika and it is just the Mahāsāṅghika who most explicitly and with the greatest detail 'interdisent de prendre ou d'utiliser les biens du stūpa' (Bareau, 'La construction et le culte des stūpa', p. 253).

67 F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, Vol. II (New Haven: 1953), pp. 608–609; *Śikṣā* 56.5, 170.3; *Bbh* 163.11, 166.20; *RP* 29.8; G: 228.21.

68 *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (edited by Bendall) 59.13, 63.15, 169.3, 269.4; P. Python, *Vinaya-Viniścaya-Upāli-Paripṛcchā. Enquête d'Upāli pour une exégèse de la discipline* (Paris: 1973), paragraphs 22 (*Śikṣā*, 169.3), and 25 (*Śikṣā*, 170.3).

69 Bendall's text here is mispunctuated; as a consequence the translation by Bendall and Rouse [*Śikshā-Samuccaya. A Compendium of Buddhist Doctine* (London: 1922, reprinted 1971), p. 57] is also off the mark, Cf. *Ratnarāśi-Sūtra*, Peking Vol. 24, 212–4–7 ff.

70 Bendall & Rouse, *Śikshā-Samuccaya*, p. 57, n. 2; cf. Gernet, *Les aspects économiques du bouddhisme*, p. 67 and n. 5.

71 *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (edited by Bendall), 54.13 ff. (*Ākāśagarbhasūtra*); *Vinaya-Viniścaya-Upāli-Paripṛcchā* (edited by Python), paragraph 22.

72 Geary, *Furta Sacra*, pp. 152–153.

73 I have discussed this interesting text in more detail in G. Schopen, 'Two Problems in the History of Indian Buddhism: The Layman/Monk Distinction and the Doctrines of the Transference of Merit', *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 10 (1985) 18–22.

74 N. Dutt, *Gilgit Manuscripts*, Vol. III, Part 1 (Srinagar: 1947), p. 73.9 (*Bhaiṣajyavastu* of the *Vinaya* of the Mūlasarvāstivādin; the same text also occurs twice in the *Divyāvadāna* (edited by Cowell and Neil), pp. 76.10–80.9, 465.10–469.18.

75 E. Waldschmidt, 'Der Buddha preist die Verehrungswürdigkeit seiner Reliquien

Sondertext I des Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra' *Von Ceylon bis Turfan* (Göttingen: 1967), p. 426; *Caityapradakṣiṇagāthā*, Peking, Vol. 39, 86–2–8 [cf. O. von Hinüber, 'Die Erforschung der Gilgit-Handschriften, Neue Ergebnisse', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 131 (1981) no. 13b; 13d, 60; H. Lüders, 'Weitere Beiträge zur Geschichte und Geographie von Ostturkestan', *Philologica Indica* (Göttingen: 1940), p. 613; H. W. Bailey, 'The Pradakṣiṇā-Sūtra of Chang Tsiang-Kuin', *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner*, ed. L. Cousins, *et al.* (Dordrecht: 1974), p. 16].

76 *Buddhacarita*, XXVIII.69; Tibetan text, Peking, Vol. 129, 171–5–4; cf. Johnston, *Acta Orientalia*, 15 (1937) 285.

77 *Mahāvaṃsa* (edited by Geiger) XVII.2–3; cf. W. Geiger, *The Mahāvaṃsa or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon* (London: 1912), XVII.2–3; H. Oldenberg, *The Dīpavaṃsa. An Ancient Buddhist Historical Record* (London: 1879; reprinted New Delhi: 1982), XV 1–5. (It should be noted that Pāli *diṭṭha*, though literally meaning 'seen', blends into—like *dṛṣṭa* in BhSkt.—'visible', 'present', 'here', cf. the idiom *diṭṭhe dhamme/dṛṣṭe dharme*, in contrast to *saṃparāya*.) The Sri Lankan Chronicles are rich in references to relics and a careful study of them would undoubtedly produce interesting results. On the other hand references to relics in the anthropological literature on Sri Lanka and South-east Asia generally are few and rather disappointing. A notable exception, however, are the remarks of G. Obeyesekere, 'The Buddhist Pantheon in Ceylon and its Extensions', p. 5–9.

78 Marshall *et al.*, *The Monuments of Sāñchi*, Vol. I. p. 214, pl. 61.2; A. K. Coomaraswamy, *La sculpture de Bharhut* (Paris: 1956), Fig. 15, planche V; C. Sivaramamurti, *Amaravati Sculptures in the Madras Government Museum* (Madras: 1977), pls. xiv. 2, xliii.1; A. Foucher, *Les bas-reliefs gréco-bouddhiques du gandhāra* (Paris: 1905), Figs. 31, 288, 289, 291–295, 297–300; H. Ingholt, *Gandhāran Art In Pakistan* (New York: 1957), Figs. 149–154, 158; etc.

79 For the literary sources and an analysis of them see A. Bareau, *Recherches sur la biographie du buddha dans les sūtrapiṭaka et les vinayapiṭaka anciens*: II. *Les derniers mois, le parinirvāṇa et les funérailles*, T. II (Paris: 1971), 265 ff.

80 A. Bareau, 'Le parinirvāna du buddha et la naissance de la religion bouddhique', *BEFEO*, 61 (1974) 287.

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ON REFERENCES TO THE TRANSCENDENT IN THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION: A QUALIFIED IDEALIST PROPOSAL

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This paper argues the philosophical and methodological feasibility of using the concept of 'references to the transcendent' to formally demarcate religious studies and circumvent the stumbling block of reductionism. There are three steps to the argument: (1) surveying the linguistic twist given to the problems of reductionism by recent developments in the philosophy of science; (2) delineating the new and more forceful case made for a 'hard reductionist' framework based on the epistemological insights of Ernest Gellner; (3) criticizing this hard reductionist framework through an extension of the epistemological speculations of Martin Hollis to the social scientific treatment of religious references to the transcendent.

THE CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT: REDUCTIONISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Religionswissenschaft is established, but its method is not. In the academic study of religion a humanist majority and a social scientific minority contend with each other, and their disagreements echo the traditional struggles between religion and science.[1] Recognizing this state of affairs, some students of religion have realized the need to ground their studies in more explicit insights from the philosophy of science.[2] On the whole, however, in religious studies, unlike sociology, anthropology, and even psychology, scholars have been slow to realize the value of seeking redress to fundamental methodological dilemmas at this level of analysis.[3] The positivism–humanism debate in sociology, for example, has been reworked in recent years with developments in the philosophy of science in mind.[4] Debate in religious studies over the parallel issue of reductionism has yet, though, to be affected significantly by such ideas.[5] Consequently, scholars in the field of religious studies continue to debate this pivotal methodological issue with an excessively restrictive understanding of the epistemological options available. In this paper, by way of illustration and partial adjustment of this state of affairs, one element of the reductionism debate: whether the social scientific study of religion can or

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cannot legitimately accommodate some 'references to the transcendent', will be examined, as framed by Ernst Gellner's and Martin Hollis' contrasting conceptions of the foundations of science.[6]

Neither Gellner nor Hollis deal directly with the question of whether references to the transcendent can be incorporated into the scientific study of religion. Nevertheless, the innovative views of these authors can be readily correlated with the methodological schism besetting religious studies. Indeed the sociologist of religion, Michael Cavanaugh, uses Gellner's understanding of science to criticize stringently the anti-reductionist attempt to found religious studies on a 'kind of technical competence about religion' which could 'rule out extra-religious claim testing'.[7] In other words, adapting the terminology of William James, Cavanaugh uses Gellner to provide new legitimation for a hard reductionist science of religion. This science categorically rules out any explanatory consideration of the references made by the religious to the transcendent, by blocking, in effect, the inclusion of any 'references to the transcendent' in the discourse of the scientific study of religion.

Hollis' views have not been similarly applied. In part this is because his primary concern, in the work focused on here, is to argue for an active (i.e. voluntarist) as opposed to a passive (i.e. determinist) 'model of man' in the social sciences by developing a 'method of science' which seeks to connect personal and social identity through an ambitious theory of rational action and *a priori* knowledge. In this context, however, he develops certain ideas which can be seen to provide valuable epistemological and methodological support for Donald Wiebe's programmatic suggestions for a soft reductionist science of religion: one which not only permits but necessitates the inclusion, at least initially, of the espoused references to the transcendent of the religious in the complete and scientific assessment of religious phenomena.[8]

Before this argument can be developed, a few important qualifications must be stipulated and kept in mind. In the first place, the phrase 'references to the transcendent' is being employed in this paper to place certain specific controls on the discussion. The referent of the phrase is the noun 'the transcendent'. That is, the focus is not 'transcendence' in its relative adjectival and verbal forms, as in 'The beauty of his painting clearly transcended my own feeble efforts' or 'Niebuhr stressed the unique capacity of humans to constantly transcend their circumstances'. Religious activities, I am implicitly specifying, are distinguished on the whole from other kinds of activities by a specific language usage, namely by conceptual reference, explicitly or implicitly, to a dimension of reality that is beyond and different from that of our ordinary, daily existence. Nothing more is being specified, however, than a purely ostensive differentia. My use of the phrase 'references to the transcendent' is not meant to entail any absolutizing or unifying tendencies. The precise and contrasting character of the transcendents to which different believers refer remains unknown and is not immediately relevant to this discussion.

Nor, secondly, is it immediately relevant whether the transcendent to which the religious refer truly exists (whatever that precisely means) or not. In this paper I am talking about the formal employment of a category, talk of the transcendent, to frame the subject matter of the academic study of religion. It is an argument, that is, for the justification of a certain metalinguistic convention; an argument which recommends itself precisely because it provides a partial solution to the hoary old problem of reductionism in the scientific study of religion without becoming liable to the charge of engaging in a crypto-apologetic endeavor. Precisely why I think formal usage of references to the transcendent is justified and advantageous is the point to be clarified in the methodological and epistemological analyses of the views of Gellner, Cavanaugh, Hollis, and Wiebe. Here let it be noted, however, that the argument being advanced does not represent an attempt to use the epistemological ambiguities born of the demise of simple inductivism and Logical Positivism to bolster the ontological plausibility of any claims made by religious individuals or groups. Such negatively formulated arguments (i.e. focusing on the limitations and deficiencies of the scientific method) cannot be used, convincingly, to establish positive ontological propositions. The use of such arguments, moreover, being philosophically dubious, only serves to widen the gap between religious explanations of religious behaviour and scientific explanations of the same behaviour by discrediting the methodological investigations of those students of religion who are striving to remain sympathetic to the former, through their very method of study. (Perhaps this would be clearer if the phrase were changed to read 'references to a transcendent', eliminating the definitive article. But this change might well only increase the likelihood of being misunderstood in the manner addressed by the next qualification.)

Third, and in a similar vein, the phrase specifically reads 'references (in the plural) to the transcendent', in order to avoid the implication of support for any particular mono-view. The category may be applied to the study of the beliefs and actions of polytheists and monotheists. In fact, I would argue for its application to almost all religions, including most populist forms of Buddhism.[9] However, to actually apply this terminology to atheistic religions like Buddhism and Confucianism, and perhaps even to primitive belief systems, would require more argument than can be accommodated here. Therefore, the issue must be side-stepped, and for the moment I will accept a limited reading of my proposal in the light of the study of the mainstream religious traditions of the West alone. The objective is to begin to see an old methodological problem in a new light, to point out the promise of a different perspective, and not to draw definitive conclusions.

Fourth, it must be cautioned, that this study is not intended an an investigation of the overall problem of reductionism. The issue is too ramified to be adequately treated here;[10] and to some extent, a thorough discussion of the philosophic debate over reductionism is precluded by the manner in which the problem has been treated in religious studies. With rare exceptions (most notably with regard to the views of Freud, and perhaps Durkheim) the struggle over reductionism in the academic study of religion has not been about the substantive reduction of religious phenomena to non-religious phenomena. The situation is not fully comparable, that is, to the classic debate over the reduction of biology as a science to chemistry and physics (although the consequences of this latter debate, with regard to conceptions of human consciousness, does have an obvious bearing on the truth or falsity of a wide range of religious ideas). Rather, the debate over reductionism in religious studies has been about the restrictions which can or cannot be placed on scientific discourse about religion and/or the need to be religious to understand the discourse of the religious.[11] The pertinent concern (though rarely identified in these terms), is the continued (but usually indirect) debate over the Logical Positivist attempt to eliminate metaphysics and unify the natural and social sciences through the reduction of scientific discourse to a phenomenalistic (i.e. sense data) linguistic grid.[12]

Admittedly, as Hollis comments, 'nowadays the verb "to be a positivist" appears to lack a first person singular for its present tense'.[13] Yet, as both Anthony Giddens and Percy Cohen surmize,[14] most social scientists continue to employ a method of science which is largely informed by the positivist project. And scholars concerned about reductionism in the scientific study of religion almost invariably identify the social scientific study of religion with a positivist method of science. With this state of affairs in mind, the present study is limitedly designed to suggest two things: first, that contrary to the implicit working assumption of most discussions of the issue in religious studies, the epistemological and linguistic framework of science need not be intrinsically reductionistic, at least with regard to the elimination of 'talk of the transcendent' from scientific accounts of religion; second, that nevertheless, unless careful attention is paid to the precise formulation of the epistemological and linguistic framework employed in the scientific study of religion, an unacceptable and perhaps even derisive ontological reductionism may be effected, though theoretically none is intended. These points will be established by favourably contrasting Hollis' qualified idealist method of science (my terms), and its contribution to framing the linguistic grid appropriate for the study of religion, with Cavanaugh's and Gellner's sophisticated new rendering of the positivist attempt to distinguish between supposedly legitimate and illegitimate scientific terms of reference.

As stated, the academic study of religion is marked by a methodological tension between humanistic and social scientific schools of thought. Objecting to the positivist underpinnings of the method of science most commonly evoked by social scientists, those scholars in religious studies which can be roughly grouped (according to their methodological sympathies) with the humanists in the sociological struggle, claim that the truth of religious experience requires something other or more than social scientific understanding. Seeking to guard the specific nature of religion from explanations which, it is thought, in the end explain it away, the scholars of this tradition stress the sui generis, esoteric, and self-interpretative character of religious beliefs. Yet unlike some contributors to the positivism–humanism debate in sociology,[15] these scholars have not gone so far as to exclude religious phenomena from scientific analysis *per se*. Rather they have chosen to fashion a new science which fits their subject matter: a non-reductionist, phenomenological descriptivism.[16] One of the objectives of this approach, an objective shared with the humanistic agenda in sociology,[17] is to remain true to the perceived open-ended character of the actions and experiences under study. The science in question, however, has been rendered without recourse to the philosophy of science or even, in effect, the philosophical phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.[18]

Consequently, other scholars, while equally leery of the pejorative implications of many of the classic theories of religion (e.g. Tylor, Durkheim, Freud), think that the phenomenological and non-reductionist option rests on insufficiently demonstrated *a priori* postulates and fails adequately to distinguish criteria for choosing between competing 'descriptions' of religious phenomena (i.e. it constitutes poor science). To fashion a true science of religion, these scholars argue, the demands of science must be given precedent to those of the subject of study. Therefore the spectre of reductionism probably cannot be avoided.[19] But as in the case of the non-reductionists, the force of these criticisms is undermined by the fact that, with the exception of a broad pattern of references to traditional empiricist and nomological principles of science, no precise formulation is given of the science invoked by these scholars as a standard. Yet it is only when this information is supplied that a reasonable decision can be made as to whether giving precedence to the demands of science necessarily entails, as both parties to the dispute seem to assume, accepting a reductionist method or, to be more specific, a reductionistic linguistic grid for the study of religion.

The exponents of the science-before-subject policy tend not to see reductionism as a problem, especially in the limited sense of excluding references to the transcendent from scientific accounts of religious phenomena, because they think that the reduction in question is strictly theoretical and not ontological.[20] Penner and Yonan give voice to this view in their oft cited article 'Is a Science of Religion Possible?':

> As we have shown, reduction is an operation concerned with theories or systems of statements, not with phenomena, data, or the properties of phenomena. . . . None

> of the scholars we have examined . . . states that reduction wipes out, levels, or demeans, the phenomena or data being explained. On the contrary, reduction in the sciences implies an *explanation* of one *theory* by the use of another in the same discipline (or, different disciplines). The sole purpose of reduction is to offer adequate theoretical explanations and to provide for the continued progress of scientific knowledge.[21]

Cavanaugh, we will see, seems to hold a similar view.

But those who lay claim to the irreducible nature of religious beliefs and practices are suspicious of this distinction, though they are rarely very methodologically articulate in stating their case.[22] The wholesale deductive reduction of explanations framed in religious terms to ones framed in terms applicable to psychic and/or social structures and processes entails, they implicitly argue, the displacement of religious claims as such from the universe of truly significant discourse. In other words, as I will likewise argue, theoretical reductionism does in fact result in ontological reductionism in all but name. But what is more, from the vantage of Hollis' epistemological insights, it becomes clear that this result is probably at odds with the actual procedure by which scientific fields of discourse are shaped and knowledge advanced.

There is no need to choose categorically between faithfulness to the perceived nature of one's subject matter (i.e. the traditional non-reductionist position) and commitment to the supposed standards of sound scientific practice (i.e. the traditional reductionist position). The true lesson learned from the philosophical demise of the positivist conception of science is that no statement, to employ the terms coined by the Logical Positivists, is simply analytical (i.e. abstract, theoretical) or simply synthetical (empirical, ontological). When pressed all statements are in some sense a complicated blend of the two elements. And by extension, no phenomenon susceptible in part to scientific study (e.g. human references to the transcendent) can be treated categorically as either beyond all possible knowledge (i.e. absolutely transcendent) or wholly the subject of phenomenal knowledge. Subjects such as this, which are close to the heart of the human condition, vary in manifestation and nature by a matter of degrees, and they cannot be neatly divided into exclusive kinds of reality. But recognition of this fact does not constitute a warrant for methodological anarchy. We do obtain servicable knowledge of all aspects of our world and how this occurs, by design or accident, can be systematically examined. This is precisely what Gellner and Hollis have done, though they have arrived at contrary conclusions.[23] But Hollis, to a greater extent than Gellner, and Gellner to a greater extent than Cavanaugh, seems to have appreciated the need to build a measure of openness systematically into the method of science used to treat such essentially open-ended phenomena as those human claims with metaphysical roots yet daily significance. In *Models of Man*, Hollis lays the groundwork for a systematic methodological openness in the social sciences to the possibility of human freedom. Something similar can and should be done *vis-à-vis* the treatment of human references to the transcendent. The possibility, we shall see, hinges on the role assigned to certain axiomatic terms of reference in the delineation of a discipline.

By way of initial elaboration of this point, let it be noted that the debate over reductionism in religious studies has been complicated by a sometimes explicit, more often implicit, political aspiration: to secure disciplinary status for the field of religious studies. What being a discipline entails is itself a very thorny issue. But it is safe to say that disciplines are demarcated by distinctive modes of discourse and methodological axioms which indicate (the acceptance of) the relative autonomy of a specified subject matter (e.g. economics, psychology, organic chemistry, and so on). Consider, for example, Durkheim's effort in *The Rules of Sociological Method* (published in 1895) to establish the *sui generis* character of social facts and hence a distinct set of methods and terms for their analysis. In religious studies the quest for disciplinary autonomy has been embodied in two discussions: the attempt to resolve the relationship of religious studies and theology,[24] and the attempt to resolve the relationship of the phenomenology of religion with, on the one hand, the history of religions, and on the other, the social scientific study of religion.[25] The aspiration, I think, is valid.[26] The discussion in religious studies, however, has proceeded in an introverted fashion. Debate has centred on specific historical and methodological differences, while largely ignoring the general epistemological and practical steps involved in the establishment of the existing social sciences. In particular, the role played by the creation of a consensus metalanguage has been neglected. But the qualified idealist proposal developed here, on the basis of Hollis' ideas, pinpoints the significance of this factor. It does so by arguing for the philosophical feasibility of using the concept of references to the transcendent to formally demarcate and focus religious studies as a discipline.

THE HARD REDUCTIONIST EXCLUSION OF REFERENCES TO THE TRANSCENDENT

Formally, with the demise of positivism as an operative philosophy of science, the threat of reductionism posed by the unified language thesis has dissipated. But in Gellner, Cavanaugh has found a new epistemological rationale for exclusively restricting the language of the scientific study of religion to matters open to empirical verification. In fact, taking up the Gellnerian theme of an inherent tension between the demands of valid cognition and human self-identity, Cavanaugh argues further that the scientific study of religion must inevitably undermine the viability of religious self-understanding as it can have no truck with claims to knowledge entailing reference to the preterhuman.

The theory of knowledge sketched in Gellner's *Legitimation of Belief* does present a formidable challenge to humanist readings of the methodological options open to students of religion. Beginning with the great shift in the 'ideological centre of gravity' effected by Kant's Copernican revolution, Gellner traces the origins of our present standards of valid knowledge with an eye to demonstrating that we have no recourse but to accept the anti-metaphysical and hence (within the Gellnerian framework) the dehumanizing implications of a new style empiricism.

Since Kant, Gellner argues, it has become increasingly apparent that as the constant creators of our cognitive environment we cannot discover conclusive proofs for our choices of fundamental beliefs. Our recognition of the depths of the problems of circularity and the infinite regress of premises has revealed that epistemologies are not so much descriptions of the nature of cognition as prescriptions for the habits of cognition. Yet, he stresses, it should be noted that when it comes to basic issues of 'cognitive legitimacy' there are still 'reasonable' grounds for preferring one set of beliefs over another. Focusing on this fact, Gellner suggests that over the last three hundred years philosophers have attempted to delineate the grounds of cognitive legitimacy in two ways: either as 're-endorsement theories' or as 'selector theories'. Under the former heading Gellner groups all theories which, after careful reflection, end up endorsing the existing bank of beliefs 'simply in virtue of it *being* the existing bank of beliefs . . . not in virtue of satisfying some unique criterion imposed from outside . . .'. Under the latter heading he groups theories that 'set up some criterion, some touchstone or sifter, which is to sort out the cognitive sheep from the goats'. This criterion 'claims to be independent of the current and local set of beliefs . . . and to be endowed with an authority external to that set . . .'.[27]

As re-endorsement theories, Gellner identifies all species of relativism, evolutionism, and what he calls negative re-endorsements (views which argue that our beliefs would be essentially correct with the removal of some 'big error', e.g. the influence of class interests or the bewitchment of language). As selectors, he identifies three approaches: empiricism, mechanistic-materialism, and philosophies of logical form. Or as he refers to them: the Ghost, the Machine, and the Skeleton. After scrutinizing these theories he gives a vote of confidence to just two of the selectors: the Ghost and the Machine.

The Ghost asserts that 'a claim to knowledge is legitimate only if it can be justified in terms of experience'. The Machine asserts that 'a claim to knowledge is legitimate only if it is a specification of a publicly reproducible structure'.[28] In Gellner's estimation it is the systematic convergence and application of these two epistemological principles that accounts for the demise of the traditional (i.e. religious) worldview and the rise of modern Western science and culture. This is largely because, relative to the other theories, these principles (in combination) cut the Gordian Knot of circularity and infinite regress with the least risk of being 'secretly in the pay of this vision or that'.[29] But a price is paid for the heightened reliability of the knowledge generated by these selectors: any genuine explanations, as such, become dehumanizing.[30] We must acknowledge, Gellner concludes, that 'the price of real knowledge is that our identities, freedom, and norms, are no longer underwritten by our vision and comprehension of things. On the contrary, we are doomed to suffer from a tension between cognition and identity'.[31]

Cavanaugh invokes this Gellnerian scenario in the article 'Pagan and Christian: Sociological Euhemerism Versus American Sociology of Religion' to undergird a critique of the non-reductionist approach. In recent years, Cavanaugh points out, 'a raft of briefs' have been submitted for 'an anti-reductionist imperative' in American sociology of religion.[32] Mistaking the demise of strict empiricism for an opportunity to 'readmit religious metaphysics into knowledge', the authors in question, he states, offer a 'religious realism' which 'holds religious phenomena to be self-demarcating and idiomatic'.[33] But sound sociological practice, he counters, is 'euhemeristic'.[34]

Neither can it be shown that there is a definitive and idiomatic religious consciousness, nor that the endorsement of such a consciousness is a necessary qualification for understanding religion. In our post-positivist age, 'both religious and scientific claims are messy social constructions and . . . there is neither empyrean nor clairvoyant knowledge'. In the last analysis, 'euhemeristic disenchantment is a necessary condition for analytic power because *thought remains sharp in measure as it remains disconsolate*'.[35] The dispoilers of religious realism *par excellence*, Cavanaugh proposes, are Weber and Kant. Weber disrupts the romaticism of religious realism with the sweep of his sober assessments of religion in societies both ancient and modern, eastern and western.

> Weber's great service was to remind scholarship that any general conception of religion must be broad enough to cover what is innerworldly, ascetic, rationalist, churchly, stimulating, and world-rejecting, as well as what is otherworldly, mystic, mytho-poetic, sectarian, opiating, and world-accepting. This very breath should obviate ideas like . . . 'symbolic realism', which portray religion as uniformly idiomatic or otherworldly.[36]

More importantly, Kant has 'press[ed] the difference between noumena and phenomena in such a manner that . . . concepts [like religious realism] become . . . oxymoronic'. At one time, phenomena, as merely sensible, were thought to 'bar knowledge of intelligible reality'. Kant demonstrated, however, that the intelligibility of all things is rooted wholly in the phenomenal world. All knowledge is the product of perception. But perception is, as Cavanaugh says, 'simultaneously logico-empirical'. Sensory data are rendered intelligible by categories and concepts which form an irreducible component of the process of perception itself. Therefore, the act of knowing occurs 'strictly within this world of historically constructed experience'. This means 'by *noumena* we no longer mean *that which is not visible*, but rather, *that which we cannot know*'. By definition then, 'the objects of our knowledge and discourse cannot be non-phenomenal, non-empirical or other-worldly'.[37]

If Kant's account is correct, and recent philosophy supports it, then religious realism is untenable. It is inadequate, moreover, for the same reason that undermines its nemesis, Logical Positivism. The latter 'has been judged uncritical for regarding observation as primordial and naive. Religious realism is equally uncritical for regarding claims to non-empirical experience the same way'.[38] No matter how one attempts to equivocate, Cavanaugh concludes, since all religious phenomena entail reference to preterhuman phenomena, the claims of religions cannot be endorsed—at least not as self-understood. Religious apologetics, he asserts, have no place in social science, the consolation of religious realism must be stoically placed aside in favour of sociological 'paganism'.

Specifically, Cavanaugh suggests, sociologists should interpret religious phenomena with three conclusions in mind.[39] First, 'the claims of modern sociological paganism are epistemic before they are ontic'. Sociological paganism does not argue that gods do not exist, only that we cannot know them and hence preterhuman indeterminacy should not be permitted to muddle phenomenal explanations. Second, modern sociological paganism does not 'relegate religion to non-rational or preintellective status. . . . Modern paganism takes religious claims not as utterly false, but as *distorted communication* . . . [it] recognizes the social reality of religion and seeks to explain that reality, including its distorted self-images, as a human product'. Third, 'the values of modern paganism are built into the structure of the sociological interpretation of religion'. For the sociologist as sociologist there is no 'extrinsic requirement for a realist conception of *religion*', hence there is no methodological reason to work with anything other than a nominalistic and, in some instances, explicitly reductionistic conception of religion. The concern is not with religion *per se*, but with the role of religious variables in the social and historical life of humanity. Accordingly, '*religion* is not some pre-demarcated thing to which we then adjust our concepts. Rather, *religion* (like totemism) is merely the name we give to a congeries of phenomena with rough family resemblances'.[40]

In sum, Cavanaugh states, religious realism is but a 'species of what Gellner identifies as "the concordat" between post-modern thought and enchantment'.[41] The realists are reverting to re-endorsement theories which cannot truly advance our knowledge. Worse, Cavanaugh warns, they are 'bound to produce an habitual and assiduously cultivated sociological gullibility', sanctioning every belief someone is committed to and labels religious.

THE SOFT REDUCTIONIST ACCEPTANCE OF REFERENCES TO THE TRANSCENDENT

The British philosopher Martin Hollis is in full agreement with Gellner's diagnosis of our present epistemological lot: we do suffer from a tension between cognition and identity. In *Models of Man*, however, he rejects the kind of resignation or, to put a better face on it, stoicism which Gellner appears to be advocating in the face of the disjunction of modern modes of self-understanding and understanding of the world. His concern in this regard, however, is the claim to human freedom. The notion of free human agency is simply too central to a whole network of ideas and institutions that define the human condition (i.e. ethics, education, law, politics, and religion), Hollis suggests, to be categorically excluded from the explanatory endeavor of the sociologist. Therefore Hollis has attempted to set the foundations for a method of social science which systematically takes into account the free nature of some human actions. Here, as indicated, it will be argued that some of the epistemological principles Hollis uses to undergird his argument can be profitably transferred to a critique of Cavanaugh's attempt to restrict the scientific study of religion to a strictly naturalistic linguistic grid. The values of 'modern paganism', contrary to what Cavanaugh thinks, are not 'built into the structure' of the social scientific study of religion; and reference to the transcendent are too central to the conceptualization of religious beliefs and practices to be categorically excluded from any systematic study of religious phenomena. Demonstrating this claim will involve linking the epistemological principles of Hollis' argument with some of Donald Wiebe's methodological suggestions for the scientific study of religion.

In his numerous writings on the fundamental methodological tensions of the academic study of religion, Wiebe has struggled to overthrow the existing pernicious polarity of views. Wiebe denies, in effect, the need to choose between 'disconsolate knowledge' and 'unjustifiable consolation' and argues both that the reductionists must drop their out-moded identification of empiricism with knowledge *in toto* and that the non-reductionists must abandon their epistemologically regressive claims to privileged access. The critical study of religion, Wiebe argues, presses on all fronts for well-grounded ideographic and nomothetic accounts of religious phenomena, while explicitly acknowledging the metaphysically and scientifically open-ended character of the religious studies enterprise.[42]

Ultimately, Wiebe asserts, the metaphysical question of the truth or falsity of religious beliefs is 'one of great importance in coming to a theoretical understanding of the nature of religion'.[43] We do know more about a religious belief and those who believe it, we have a better description (in fact a sufficient explanation, I would say) of the belief, if we cannot only say that A believes p, but that p is a true belief.[44] But, Wiebe stresses, 'to admit this is not to capitulate to the wholly different claim that the very study of religion requires a conclusive answer [to this question] before it can be embarked upon'.[45] The question is still subject to dispute and to explicitly or implicitly take-on an ontological commitment, by either declaring that religious phenomena are *sui generis* or that they are purely human products, is to contradict the intent, logical scope, and wisdom of the common employment of the principle of the *epoche* in religious studies. A true interpretative science of religion would leave the study of religion equally open to both the possibility of reductionist explanations and the possibility of non-reductionist explanations.

This open-ended policy is epistemologically more responsible than Cavanaugh's. Cavanaugh is on the right track, I think, when he suggests that the first principle of a sound method for the study of religion is the realization that its claims 'are epistemic before they are ontic'. Much like the non-reductionists he criticizes, however, he does not appreciate the full extent of this principle. By identifying epistemological insight simply with Kant he, in effect, passes an ontological judgement when he further concludes that all preterhuman claims are illegitimate and consequently all religious claims are but distorted communications of social realities. He does not understand the degree to which the 'relativizers have been relativized';[46] a peculiar failing for a sociologist. Unlike his mentor, Gellner, he does not recognize that Weber relativized not only the religious realists but Kant as well.[47] The Kantian edifice cannot remain impervious to the onslaughts of sociologists of knowledge and conventionalist philosophies of science without reverting to something like synthetic *a priori* truths.

However, Cavanaugh, holding true to the main thrust of Gellner's perspective, rules out the latter possibility. Within his sharply dichotomized scheme such a notion bears too close a resemblance to the claims of the non-reductionists. Rejecting this perception of matters, here it will be argued, combining Wiebe's views with the philosophical speculations of Martin Hollis, that there is an epistemological link between entertaining the possibility of non-reductionist explanations of religion and the possibility of *a priori*-like truths, and formal openness to these possibilities does not constitute a 'concordat with enchantment' (i.e. an abandonment of the critical edge of 'selector theories' in favour of a strategy of 're-endorsement'). To make the point we must rudimentarily summarize Hollis' qualified idealist perspective and then draw a few constructive correlations with Wiebe's thoughts on the place of references to the transcendent in the academic study of religion.

Hollis' qualified idealist conception of the method of social science hinges on three sequentially related propositions. First, developments in the philosophy and sociology of science have undermined the traditional empiricist (or positivist) conception of science.[48] A belief in given, independent, objective facts can no longer serve as a crucial constraint on what it is rational to accept.

Both verificationist and falsificationist scenarios are overly circular and blocked by Hume's problem of induction. Second, if something like science is to proceed nevertheless, we must be able to distinguish the law-like from the accidental. This entails at least implicitly invoking a notion of natural necessity, and in a way that goes beyond Hume's mere psychological correlation of causality and regularity. Third, this state of affairs confronts social scientists with the need to choose between two conceptions of the necessity undergirding scientific analyses: is it ontological or epistemological? 'The strategic choice', Hollis observes, 'is whether to locate the necessity in the world and then pick out the sort of theoretical statements which reflect it or whether to discern it in theoretical truths and argue from what is theoretically true of experience to what is therefore true in it'.[49]

There are two variants of the ontological approach: arguments for a physical necessity or for an experiential necessity. The former type of argument undergirds Realist philosophies of science.[50] As summarized by Keat and Urry,[51] the Realist argues that on the basis of scientific experience the discovery of regular relationships between events constitutes sufficiently strong evidence for the postulation of real causal connections and the presence of some intervening mechanisms whereby a cause actually produces an effect. To date, however, the Realists have been unable to advance an analysis of the connections entailed sufficient to render their view more than supposition (as is readily admitted by Realists like Keat and Urry[52]). Use of the latter type of argument Hollis illustrates through reference to the second edition of Lionel Robbin's celebrated *Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (1935). Robbin treats economic theory as a set of linked statements based on deductions from 'almost universal facts of experience' known through introspection. Taking a dim view of such a position Hollis comments that 'perhaps some Cartesian would care to extend the clear and distinct perception of *cogito* to almost universal facts. . . . Short of such heroics, we shall have to treat necessities in experience as problematic'.

Alternatively, Hollis finds the epistemological approach to natural necessity 'more promising than is usually thought'.[53] The idea is to trace 'the necessities to which human action is subject back to axiomatic or definitional statements introducing . . . key concepts'. On this view, resolving a social problem simply involves 'applying a model which yields values for some variables, given the values of others'. The model constitutes 'a convenient device for assembling all the predictive, explanatory, programming and productive roles of theory in mechanics, economics or any other science'. The model, that is, can provide several services, 'depending on which values are given and what questions are asked'.[54] Despite appearances this view does not amount, however, to a pragmatist or conventionalist interpretation of science. On the contrary, Hollis circumvents this fate through a curious twist of logic. Given the under-determination of theories by experience, Hollis reasons, the statements in the model are either mere empirical generalizations (i.e. not natural laws) or empty tautologies. Given the rampant circularity of such models, as the harshest of critics might assert, they are in fact more likely the latter. Therefore, he boldly conjectures, 'the most promising line is, in effect, to deny that tautologies need be empty' and to look upon these statements as 'real' and not just 'nominal' definitions of the subject under study. Specifically he suggests:

> The statements of [the model] are not tautologies, if a tautology is defined as a statement whose truth is guaranteed by logic alone. Although there is dispute about the exact scope of logic it is safe to say that [in neo-Classical micro-economics, for example] concepts like 'force', 'utility', 'scarcity', and 'integration' are not concepts of logic. Any formal system with a domain . . . includes concepts which mark its domain (for instance 'utility'). The concepts are essential both to the axioms and to the implications of the system.[55]

Now if this is the case, then 'what makes a formal system an economic theory is the essential presence of economic concepts throughout. What makes an economic theory true is that some of its axiomatic statements are unconditionally true'.[56] Can something comparable be said about the academic study of religion? Is it also circumscribed by certain axiomatic concepts?

The question may appear too simple to be taken seriously. Surely we have surpassed the quest for the essence of religion? In fact, however, in these turbulent philosophical times it is precisely the simple and traditional questions that have re-emerged with a new significance, but also in a new guise (i.e. as epistemic and not ontic concerns). The demise of the foundational approach to knowledge has introduced a new need to secure at least a point of equilibrium amidst the rising tide of cognitive relativism. Open-ended systems are the order of the day, from quantum physics through to post-structuralist literary criticism, yet all such systems remain parasitically dependent on the structures and styles of thought they have tried to supersede. Elsewhere, for example, I have argued that sociologists are not free to choose between voluntaristic and deterministic linguistic grids as a conceptual commitment to a model of rational human agency constitutes a necessary presupposition of all sciences of human action.[57] Unlike Hollis, however, I refrain from seeing the necessity in question as being necessarily *a priori* in nature.[58] Like Gellner, I recognize that the base assumption of rational human agency is probably prescriptivist in nature. Yet practically I can forsee no recourse to the instrumental use of the notion, explicitly or implicitly, in the full explanation of human actions (including religious ones). Therefore, development of the model continues to be crucial to the social scientific enterprise, though probably interminable in scope and indefinite in its implications. (Note, the claim is not that humans are indeed free agents, but that it is necessary, given the social facts at our disposal and the limits of our epistemological competence, to assume, at least initially, that in some instances, and potentially all, humans are free.)

To reiterate, the concern here is whether there are similar axiomatic concepts, subject to like qualifications, in the field of religious studies. With Wiebe I would say that in all probability the study of religion is demarcated by at least one central concept—references to the transcendent; and consequently, the hard reductionist stance is not only unnecessary, it is epistemologically errant.

Unlike most students of religion interested in promoting the scientific study of religion, Wiebe has argued for a substantive/real and not a functional/nominal definition of religion,[59] and the idea of references to the transcendent figures prominently in his definition. Wiebe acknowledges the real problems standing in the way of defining such an elusive phenomenon. Yet, he states, 'unless some preliminary definition . . . some kind of intuitive understanding of the nature of religion susceptible of verbal formulation, is possible, no study of religion can ever be launched'. And the specification of the reason for one's initial choice of criteria, he suggests, always involves one 'in providing a *real* rather than a merely operational (i.e. nominal) definition of religion'. But this does not mean that the student of religion is locked into locating once and for all the essence of religion. Rather it just means that he must seriously formulate certain assumptions about the type of phenomena that are to 'count as' religious. These assumptions may be stipulative, to a degree, but through the application of certain criteria they can be shown to be anything but arbitrary. In this regard, Wiebe cites the criteria specified by Spiro and Ferré. Melford Spiro proposes the two criteria of 'cross-cultural applicability' and 'intracultural intuitivity' (i.e. the assumption cannnot be counterintuitive). Fredrick Ferré suggests the three criteria of 'responsibility of public intelligibility' (i.e. a parallel to Spiro's intracultural intuitivity), 'responsibility of scope' (i.e. Spiro's cross-cultural applicability), and the 'responsibility of cruciality'. The latter criteria, Ferré states (cited by Wiebe[60]), takes into consideration the fact that

> . . . there are discoverable uniformities or resemblances in our experiences, with various degrees of pervasiveness, obviousness or importance for shared human interests. These are the uniformities which have been given names by having general terms applied to them, and it is at major intersections of such uniformities that we are likely to find our most crucial interests delineated.

Consequently, if an assumption taps into these crucial interests, and is satisfactory on the other two counts, then it must be taken to be fundamental and informative in some sense and not entirely arbitrary. Definitions in logic and mathematics may be truly stipulative, but Wiebe concludes, 'it is still the case that in other contexts definitions can be actually either true or false'.[61] In words which call Hollis to mind, Wiebe states that in these other contexts all studies begin with certain 'necessary assumptions' about the delimitations of the subject matter. Therefore, in a subtle but very important way, Cavanaugh is wrong in suggesting that our concern need not be with religion *per se*. Methodologically, whether we choose to respond to the situation in a positive or a negative manner, explicitly or implicitly, we do proceed as if religion were 'some pre-demarcated thing to which we then adjust our concepts', at least with regard to certain fundamental concerns (e.g. references to the transcendent).

Cavanaugh has merely responded to this long standing, though perhaps always implicit, fact of life of the academic study of religion in a negative manner. He has reacted against it, that is, because he believes that he must in order to hold the social scientific study of religion to a strictly epistemological viewpoint (i.e. avoid unwarranted ontological commitments). Wiebe knows that this end can be served better by adopting a less extreme and more positive reaction. While he has not articulated his position in this manner, it seems to me that he has realized that there can be an autonomous study of religion because conceptually religion is at root an autonomous subject.

Elaborating on this let us look at the substantive definition of religion offered by Wiebe:[62] 'The three elements that jointly make a cultural phenomenon a religious one', he proposes, 'are transcendence, human limitation, and salvation',[63] In this approach the most significant component, he admits, is the reference to the transcendent. But he carefully stipulates:

> To see religion as involving a belief in the transcendent or even the supposition of an experience of the transcendent is not to endorse the truth of such a belief or assumption but only to recognize the 'cultural postulation' of such a being or entity.[64]

Going a step further I would argue, as indicated, that openness to the possibility of a transcendent referent in explaining religious phenomena can be legitimately maintained because the field of religious studies is necessarily conceptualized and demarcated in terms of such a referent. The concept of references to the transcendent in religious studies is on a par with the concept of rational human agency in a field like micro-economics, or even more rudimentarily the principle of lawfulness undergirding science. It is a conceptual primitive, a given, which can be systematically deleted from the analysis of religious phenomena only at the risk of losing the implicit intersubjective (though perhaps only linguistically so) base of ordinary and scholarly discourse. Only when this is appreciated will the academic study of religion be protected from the distorting effects of the covert ontological commitments of the non-reductionists or the hard reductionists. This is how I have chosen to read the challenge set out by Wiebe when he stipulated that even the sceptic, the non-believing interpreter, must be 'willing . . . to move in counterinductive and counterintuitive ways when well-trodden paths seem to lead nowhere'.[65]

THE MORAL OF THE STORY

It is time to end the debate over the formal incorporation of references to the transcendent in social scientific accounts of religious phenomena. The metaphysical issue underlying the debate cannot as yet be resolved in a manner favourable to either the reductionist or non-reductionist camp. Yet the demarcation of religious studies necessarily entails working with the concept of references to the transcendent. Focusing the analytic framework of religious studies on these references to the transcendent constitutes the first step towards deferring the threat of reductionism, in both its substantive and linguistic forms, and hence deflecting disciplinary entropy. Formally, talk of references to the transcendent is as epistemologically and methodologically legitimate for the academic student of religion as it is for the believers they study. The position, to borrow and adapt a category employed by Peacocke, is one of 'epistemological anti-reductionism'.[66] 'References to the transcendent' is being treated as a conceptual primitive. It is neither a *sui generis* given in all supposedly religious contexts, nor a merely vacuous analytical construct to be filled-in, in a relativistic manner, with distinct descriptions of the objects of different soteriologies. It is a delimiting principle of the field of religious studies, and as such it must initially figure in all explanations advanced in that field. Its nature, to use the Logical Positivist terminology of the introduction once again, is neither synthetic nor analytic, but a complicated blend of the two.

Contrary to Peter Berger's suggestion,[67] then, the choice between the use of a substantive and functional definition of religion does not fall under the maxim *de gustibus*. The precise working notion of the references to the transcendent called upon and studied by a student of religion at any one time, in any one context, however, does conform in a sense to such a maxim. To borrow a phrase used by Hollis in reference to judgements of the rationality of an agent's actions (i.e. in judgement of an act's degree of freedom), in each concrete analysis the student of religion must 'lay his bets' about the nature, effects, and viability of the references to the transcendent at issue. But hopefully the configuration of the bets laid will be fleshed-out through feedback from the continued philosophical and empirical study of the apparent and claimed manifestations of that which is deemed transcendent.[68]

In the last analysis, however, I suspect that references to the transcendent, like those to human freedom, will always resist the full disenchanting thrust of academic inquiry. But we cannot know this, so in the interim I think we are obliged to identify and to systematically study the elements of phenomenal objectivity associated with references to the transcendent from Otto's mysterium tremendum to Weber's charisma.[69] A new and more sophisticated phenomenology of religion, of espoused dealings with the transcendent, must be undertaken. The task may seem hopelessly ideal, but in attenuated form every serious student of religion (and not just some historical, social, or literary subspecialty) is explicitly or implicitly engaged in some measure in the collective construction of an ideal typology of references to the transcendent. Here, however, I have argued for something much more limited and preliminary: the philosophical feasibility of using the concept of references to the transcendent to formally demarcate and focus religious studies as a discipline.[70]

I would like to thank Ivan Strenski for his many helpful suggestions in preparing this article for publication.

NOTES

1 The literature of religious studies is laced with introspective accounts debating the feasibility and merits of applying the methods of science to the subject of study. Here are a handful of representative references from 1970 on: F. J. Streng, 'The Objective Study of Religion and the Unique Quality of Religiousness', *Religious Studies* 6 (1970) 209–19; Robert Bellah, 'Between Religion and Social Science', in R. Bellah, *Beyond Belief*, New York, Harper and Row, 1970, pp. 237–59; John Y. Fenton, 'Reductionism in the Study of Religion', *Soundings* 53 (1970) 61–76; Reinhard Pummer, '*Religionswissenschaft* or Religiology?' *Numen* 19 (1972) 91–127; I. Hammet, 'Sociology of Religion and the Sociology of Error', *Religion* 3 (1973) 1–12; Charles Davis, 'The Reconvergence of Theology and Religious Studies', *Studies in Religion* 4 (1975) 205–21; Wilfred Cantwell Smith, 'Objectivity and the Humane Sciences: A New Proposal', in W. Oxtoby (ed.), *Religious Diversity: Essays of Wilfred Cantwell Smith*, New York, Harper and Row, 1976, pp. 158–80; K. K. Klostermaier, 'From Phenomenology to Metascience: Reflections on the Study of Religion', *Studies in Religion* 6 (1977) 551–64; C. W. Kegley, 'Theology and Religious Studies: Friends or Enemies?' *Theology Today* 35 (1978) 273–84; E. H. Pyle, 'Reduction and the Religious Explanation of Religion', *Religion* 9 (1979) 197–214; Donald Dougherty, 'Is Religious Studies Possible?' *Religious Studies* 17 (1981), 295–309; N. Ross Reat, 'Insider and Outsider in the Study of Religious Traditions', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 61 (1983) 457–76. Other relevant references are given in the notes below.

2 Compare Frank Whaling, 'Additional Note on Philosophy of Science and the Study of Religion', in F. Whaling (ed.), *Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religion, Volume I: The Humanities*, New York, Mouton, 1984, pp. 379–90.

3 See, for example, Ian C. Jarvie, *Concepts and Society*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972; Russell Keat and John Urry, *Social Theory as Science*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975; Richard J. Bernstein, *Restructuring Social and Political Theory*, Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976; Kenneth J. Gergen, *Toward Transformation in Social Knowledge*, New York, Springer-Verlag, 1982; William Outwaite, *Concept Formation in Social Science*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983; and Stanley R. Barrett, *The Rebirth of Anthropological Theory*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1984.

4 See, for example, Anthony Giddens, 'Positivism and Its Critics' in A. Giddens, *Studies in Social and Political Theory*, London, Hutchinson, 1977, pp. 29–89;

Percy S. Cohen, 'Is Positivism Dead?' Sociological Review 28 (1980) 141–76; Paul Tibbetts, 'The Positivism–Humanism Debate in Sociology: A Reconsideration', *Sociological Inquiry* 52 (1982) 184–99.

5 The reductionism debate in religious studies parallels, or in fact actually overlaps with, the positivism–humanism debate in sociology in two respects. First, both debates centre on two related yet distinct questions: What method of study best serves to explain the phenomena under study (i.e. religious phenomena in the first instance, social in the second)? Are the phenomena in question in fact susceptible to scientific treatment at all? Second, with few exceptions, the anti-reductionists in the field of religious studies look to the humanities for methodological guidance, while the reductionists favour the techniques and concerns of social sciences like sociology.

6 Ernest Gellner, *Legitimation of Belief*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1974; Martin Hollis, *Models of Man*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.

7 Michael Cavanaugh, 'Pagan and Christian: Sociological Euhemerism Versus American Sociology of Religion', *Sociological Analysis* 43 (1982) 110.

8 Those familiar with the work of Dr Wiebe may be surprised by this classification. In religious studies circles in Canada, Wiebe has a reputation as a hardline exponent of the reductionist position. He has often criticized the non-reductionist agenda. I would argue, however, that his position is more subtle and moderate than most of his critics presume.

9 See Melford Spiro, *Buddhism and Society*, New York, Harper and Row, 1970.

10 As pointed out by Ivan Strenski in 'Reduction and Structural Anthropology', *Inquiry* 19 (1976) 73, in the broadest sense, 'reductionism is a special view about the way scientific knowledge grows'. That is, reductionism is a theory of theory change in science, and given the contemporary focus of debates in the philosophy of science on this very issue, it is, then, in effect a philosophy of science itself, complete with its own theory of knowledge. In fact, as there are variant interpretations of the process of reduction whereby one theory is legitimately reduced and superceded by another, there are actually a number of reductionist philosophies of science.

Historically, however, Ernest Nagel's treatment of reductionism has exerted a paradigmatic influence (Nagel, *The Structure of Science*, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1961, Chap. 11). Summarizing this view, C. A. Hooker comments ('Part I: Towards a General Theory of Reduction', *Dialogue, Canadian Philosophical Review* 20 (1981) 38–9):

> [For Nagel] the aims of reduction are deductive and explanatory unification. Nagel's treatment of reduction belongs in the positivist–empiricist tradition that dominated philosophy of science in the first six decades of this century. Since in that tradition one has only the resources of deductive logic and sensation with which to capture science . . ., it was natural to construe reduction as a purely formal relation (deduction) plus epistemic/operational conditions of some sort. This is what the austerely positivist model of Kemeny/Oppenheim . . . provided, reduction becoming merely a deduction relation among sets of observation sentences together with a purely formal requirement of increased systematicity. Nagel's later empiricist model remained true to this tradition, reduction amounting to deduction of the laws and observation statements of the reduced theory from the reducing theory

> plus connecting principles, provided the latter two are empirically supported and all operational procedures and results can be retained in the process.

Though highly influential, in the philosophy of science this view has been criticized from within the positivist–empiricist tradition itself. Carl Hempel, for example, has argued that 'Nagel's conditions (let alone those of Kemeny and Oppenheim) are too weak to ensure the dispensibility of either the reduced theory's conceptual apparatus or its ontology' (Hooker, *op. cit.*, 39). Many other efforts have been made to supply stronger and more feasible conditions (see Hooker's account). However, with the demise of positivism and a revolt underway against empiricism in the philosophy of science, the theory of reductionism has become even more complex and controversial, and certainly too unwieldy to be examined here. For concise overviews of the issues consult K. F. Schaffner, 'Approaches to Reduction', *Philosophy of Science* 34 (1967) 137–47; F. J. Ayala and T. Dobzhansky, *Studies in the Philosophy of Biology*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974; A. R. Peacocke, 'Reductionism: A Review of the Epistemological Issues and Their Relevance to Biology and the Problem of Consciousness', *Zygon* 11 (1976) 307–36; and C. A. Hooker's full three part discussion, 'Part I: Towards a General Theory of Reduction', 'Part II: Identity in Reduction', and 'Part III: Cross-Categorical Reduction', *Dialogue* 20 (1981) 38–59, 201–36, 496–529.

11 This situation is divergently represented in, for example, William Garrett, 'Troublesome Transcendence: The Supernatural in the Scientific Study of Religion', *Sociological Analysis* 35 (1974) 167–80; Eugene Combs and Paul Bowlby, 'Tolerance and Tradition', *Studies in Religion* 4 (1974) 315–34; W. C. Smith, 'Methodology and the Study of Religion: Some Misgivings', in R. Baird (ed.), *Methodological Issues in Religious Studies*, Chico, California, New Horizons Press, 1975; Robert Segal, 'The Social Sciences and the Truth of Religious Belief', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 48 (1980) 401–13; H. M. Kuitert 'Is Belief a Condition of Understanding?' *Religious Studies* 17 (1981) 233–43; Margret M. Poloma, 'Toward a Christian Sociological Perspective: Religious Values, Theory and Methodology', *Sociological Analysis* 43 (1982) 95–108; Charles Davis, 'Wherein there is no ecstacy', *Studies in Religion* 14 (1984) 393–400; Donald Wiebe, 'The Failure of Nerve in the Academic Study of Religion', *Studies in Religion* 14 (1984) 401–22; T. Patrick Burke, 'Must the Description of a Religion be Acceptable to a Believer?' *Religious Studies* 20 (1984) 631–6; as well as many of the articles listed in Note 1.

12 For example, Rudolf Carnap, 'Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science', in O. Neurath et al. (eds), *Foundations of the Unity of Science. Volume I*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1938; Otto Neurath, 'Empirical Sociology', in O. Neurath, *Empiricism and Sociology*, Boston, Dordrecht and Reidel, 1973.

13 Hollis, p. 42.

14 See articles cited in Note 4.

15 For example, Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958; Michael Simon, *Understanding Human Action*, Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 1982.

16 For example, R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1958 (original 1917); G. van der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1938 (original 1933); William B. Kristensen, *The*

Meaning of Religion, The Hague, Martin Nijhoff, 1960; C. J. Bleeker, 'The Relation of the History of Religions to Kindred Religious Sciences, particularly Theology, Sociology of Religion, Psychology of Religion and Phenomenology of Religion', *Numen* 1 (1954) 142–52 and 'Methodology and the Science of Religion', in his book *The Rainbow*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1975, pp. 1–11; Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, New York, Meridian, 1963 and *The Quest*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969; W. C. Smith, 'Comparative Religion: Whither and Why?', in M. Eliade and J. Kitagawa (eds), *The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1959, pp. 31–58, and *The Meaning and End of Religion*, New York, Macmillan, 1962.

17 For example, Peter L. Berger, *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective*, New York, Doubleday, 1963; Paul Filmer, Michael Philipson, David Silverman, and David Walsh, *New Directions in Sociological Theory*, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1972.

18 See George A. James, 'Phenomenology and the Study of Religion: The Archaeology of an Approach', *Journal of Religion* 65 (1985) 311–35.

19 For example, Hans Penner and Edward Yonan, 'Is a Science of Religion Possible?' *Journal of Religion* 52 (1972) 107–33; Robert Segal, 'The Social Sciences and the Truth of Religious Belief', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 48 (1980) 401–13 and 'In Defense of Reductionism', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 61 (1983) 97–124; Donald Wiebe, 'Does Understanding Religion Require "Religious Understanding"?' in W. Tyloch (ed.) *Current Progress in the Sciences of Religion Methodology*, Polish Society for the Study of Religion, forthcoming (originally for the *International Association for the History of Religions* conference on methodology, Warsaw, 1979), *Religion and Truth: Toward a New Paradigm for the Study of Religion*, New York, Mouton, 1981, and 'The Failure of Nerve in the Academic Study of Religion', *Studies in Religion* 13 (1984) 401–22.

20 In other words, they have essentially adopted Nagel's understanding of the process of reduction (see Note 10).

21 Penner and Yonan, pp. 130–1.

22 To establish the point would entail writing another article. Here I will simply note my agreement with Daniel Pals when he comments: 'The surprising thing amid all these endorsements of "irreducible religion" is that the doctrine has been so seldom subjected to thorough-going analysis' ('Reductionism and Belief: An Appraisal of Recent Attacks on the Doctrine of Irreducible Religion', *Journal of Religion* 66 (1986) 18–36). Pals ultimately argues for the viability and value of a non-reductionist stance in religious studies, but his article documents some of the careless and misleading ways in which figures like Bellah, Berger, and Eliade have overstated their case: a flaw which has allowed critics like Segal to launch scathing but ultimately erroneous criticisms of their position.

23 As both Gellner and Hollis are self-consciously writing in a post-positivist climate of opinion, they each acknowledge the largely conventional nature of science. Yet neither adopts a straightforwardly constructivist view of the nature of science (unlike, for example, Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method*, London, Verso, 1975; Nelson Goodman, *The Structure of Appearance*, 3rd edn., Boston, D. Reidel, 1977; and Kenneth Gergen, *Towards Transformation in Social Knowledge*, New York, Springer-Verlag, 1982). In different ways each postulates the existence of real restraints of the formulation and practice of the scientific method, and it is the differences in the nature of the restraints envisioned that determines their attitude to the religious language of 'references to the transcendent'.

24 For example, C. J. Bleeker, 'Comparing the Religio-Historical and the Theological Method', *Numen* 18 (1971) 9–29; A. D. Galloway, 'Theology and Religious Studies—The Unity of Our Discipline', *Religious Studies* 11 (1975) 157–65; Schubert M. Ogden, 'Theology and Religious Studies: Their Difference and the Difference It Makes', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 46 (1978) 3–17; Joseph M. Kitagawa, 'Humanistic and Theological History of Religions With Special Reference to the North American Scene', *Numen* 27 (1980) 198–221; and several of the references in Note 1.

25 For example, Erwin R. Goodenough, '*Religionswissenschaft*', *Numen* 6 (1959) 77–95; Ugo Bianchi, 'The Definition of Religion (On the Methodology of Historical-Comparative Research)', in U. Bianchi *et al.* (eds), *Problems and Methods of the History of Religions*, Leiden, E. J. Brill 1972; R. J. Zwi Werblowsky, 'On Studying Comparative Religion', *Religious Studies* 11 (1975) 145–56; Kurt Rudolph, 'Basic Positions of *Religionswissenschaft*', *Religion* 11 (1981) 97–107; and several of the references from Note 1.

26 Paul Wiebe 'Search for a Paradigm', *Journal of Religion* 64 (1984) 348–62.

27 Gellner, p. 47.

28 Ibid., p. 56.

29 Ibid., p. 109.

30 Ibid., p. 106.

31 Ibid., p. 207.

32 Cavanaugh cites the following books and articles: Robert Bellah, 'Between Religion and Social Science', *op. cit.*, and 'The New Religious Consciousness and the Secular University', in *Religion and the Academic Scene*, Waterloo, Ontario, Council on the Study of Religion, 1975; Peter L. Berger, *A Rumour of Angels*, New York, Doubleday, 1969, 'Some Second Thoughts on Substantive Versus Functional Definitions of Religion', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 13 (1974) 125–33, and *The Heretical Imperative*, New York, Doubleday, 1980; William Garrett, 'Troublesome Transcendence: The Supernatural in the Scientific Study of Religion', *op. cit.*, Pierre Hegy, 'Images of God and Man in a Catholic Charismatic Renewal Community', *Social Compass* 25 (1978) 7–21; David Moberg, 'Presidential Address: Virtues for Sociology of Religion', *Sociological Analysis* 39 (1978) 1–18; Ninian Smart, *The Science of Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973.

33 Cavanaugh, pp. 109–10.

34 The term refers to Euhemerus of Messene (ca. 340–260 B.C.), author of the *Hiera Anagraphie*, which argues that the gods are nothing more than heroic mortals who have been elevated by mythic embellishment to the rank of deities.

35 Cavanaugh, pp. 110–11.

36 Ibid., p. 112.

37 Ibid., p. 113.

38 Ibid., p. 118.

39 Ibid., pp. 115–16.

40 Ibid., p. 117.

41 Ibid., p. 113.

42 Donald Wiebe, 'Beyond the Sceptic and the Devotee: Reductionism in the Scientific Study of Religion', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 52 (1984) 157–65.

43 Donald Wiebe, 'Does Understanding Religion Require "Religious Understanding"?' *op. cit.*, p. 7 of original manuscript.

44 Donald Wiebe, *Religion and Truth*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

45 Wiebe, 'Does Understanding Religion Require "Religious Understanding"?' p. 7

46 Peter L. Berger, *A Rumour of Angels*, New York, Doubleday, 1969.

47 Gellner, p. 190.

48 For a good summary discussion of developments in the philosophy of science consult the first six chapters of William Newton-Smith, *The Rationality of Science*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981. For an insight into developments in the sociology of science consult Karin D. Knorr-Cetina, *The Manufacture of Knowledge*, Oxford, Pergamon, 1981.

49 Hollis, p. 57.

50 For example, J. J. C. Smart, *Philosophy and Scientific Realism*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963; Rom Harré, *The Principles of Scientific Thinking*, London, Macmillan, 1970; Rom Harré and E. J. Madden, *Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1975.

51 Russell Keat and John Urry, *Social Theory as Science*, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–45.

52 Ibid., p. 42.

53 In a general sense Gellner also develops an epistemological approach, but on the question of the nature of necessity he really represents a more subtle version of the ontological position in its experiential form. The appeal of his position, like Hollis', lies however, in the very fact that it appears to bridge the traditional divisions within the philosophy of science and epistemology.

54 Hollis, pp. 59–62.

55 Ibid., p. 62

56 Ibid., p. 63.

57 Lorne L. Dawson, ' "Free-Will Talk" and Sociology', *Sociological Inquiry* 55 (1985) 348–62.

58 In fact Hollis most carefully couches his a priori theory of knowledge in conditional terms (pp. 63–5) and refers his readers to Arthur Pap, *Semantics and Necessary Truth*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1958, for a more thorough statement of the view which he favours (I would also refer the reader to Nicholas Rescher, 'Lawfulness as Mind-Dependent', in N. Rescher *et al.* (eds), *Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel*, Boston, D. Reidel, 1969). Yet it is clear that he has confidence in the validity of his speculations (p. 65 and Martin Hollis, 'The Social Destruction of Reality', in M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds), *Rationality and Relativism*, Cambridge, MA., M.I.T. Press, 1982, pp. 82–5). Seeing fallibilism as an equally important limit to the nature of social science, the idealist method I would support is even more qualified than the model adopted by Hollis (cf. John Skorupski, 'Relativity, Realism and Consensus', *Philosophy* 60 (1985) 341–58).

59 Donald Wiebe, *Religion and Truth*, Chap. 1.

60 Ibid., p. 13.

61 Ibid., p. 16.

62 Ibid., p. 15.

63 Wiebe's use of the term 'transcendence' in his definition runs the risk of creating the terminological confusion discussed in the opening pages of this paper (i.e. our reference is to 'the transcendent' and not to 'transcendence'). However, the quotation which immediately follows, and which fleshes out his meaning, shows his use of the term to be in conformity with that adopted here.

64 Donald Wiebe, *Religion and Truth*, p. 19.

65 The appropriate reference is to Donald Wiebe ('Beyond the Sceptic and the Devotee: Reductionism in the Scientific Study of Religion', p. 164) who has yet, to my knowledge, to spell out just what he has in mind.

66 A. R. Peacocke, 'Reductionism: A Review of the Epistemological Issues and Their Relevance to Biology and the Problem of Consciousness', *op. cit.*, p. 323.

67 Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, New York, Doubleday, p. 177.

68 To safeguard, in the only way available, against the generation of a merely conventionalist understanding, let us search out those widely distributed features of references to the transcendent that appear to 'constrain' our conceptualization of the 'religious'. The crucial point is to establish an agreement of 'reactions', and not of 'choices'. The existence of such constraints implicitly undergirds the activities of both the student of religion and the missionary, just as the presumption of universal reference to rationality undergirds the growth and spread of science.

69 Compare William Garrett, 'Troublesome Transcendence: The Supernatural in the Scientific Study of Religion', *op. cit.*; Paul Heelas, 'Some Problems with Religious Studies', *Religion* 8 (1978) 1–14; W. Richard Comstock, 'A Behavioral Approach to the Sacred: Category Formation in Religious Studies', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 49 (1981) 625–43; Karel Werner, 'The Concept of the Transcendent', *Religion* 13 (1983) 311–22; Lucy Dupertuis, 'How People Recognize Charisma: The Case of Darshan in Radhasoami and Divine Light Mission', *Sociological Analysis* 47 (1986) 111–24.

70 In a recent article on the reductionism debate, Daniel Pals (*op. cit.*, pp. 29–30) arrives at a complimentary conclusion: 'The question of whether Eliade (or anyone else) has "proved" religion irreducible seems to be badly framed. If it is true, as it seems to me, that such a thesis acts at a high level of abstraction as a kind of disciplinary axiom, directing our attention to a certain aspect of the world and life, then it certainly will not be provable—or refutable—in any simple way. … Like biology's claim to be autonomous over and against the reductions of chemistry and physics, it will have to prove itself over a long run by the quality of its fruits.'

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PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MYSTICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF EARLY QUAKERISM: WILLIAM JAMES AND RUFUS JONES[1]

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William James' discussion of early Quakerism profoundly affected subsequent interpretations of the group by the prominent scholar and Quaker writer, Rufus Jones. Jones utilized James as a major exponent of the divine origins of George Fox's doctrinal beliefs and social protests. The major claims of James and Jones, however, are not sustained by more recent critical scholarship on Quakerism's early days. By examining and refuting these claims, this article argues that interpretations of Quakerism (and by extension, of other religious collectivities) should be based primarily upon historically grounded, social-psychological frameworks.

INTRODUCTION

After William James' death in 1910, his wife, Alice, sent a letter of appreciation to Rufus Jones (1863–1948), the prolific Quaker historian, educator, and author. Thanking Jones for the obituary that he had written about her husband in *The American Friend*,[2] Alice indicated that 'Many voices have been raised in affectionate memory of a man who truly loved his kind but no one has spoken more justly or with finer appreciation than yourself'.[3] Jones' sensitive obituary bespoke the enormous respect in which the Quaker held James, a respect that dated back over a decade and a half to when Jones first read James' classic text, *The Principles of Psychology*.[4] Even in his wood-panelled study, a reconstruction of which now stands in Haverford College's library, Jones had a picture of William James hanging on his wall.

Many of Jones' contemporaries shared his admiration of James' work, and James' sympathetic interpretation of religion and religious experience had a particularly far-reaching effect on the Quakers. Coinciding with James' publication of *Varieties of Religious Experience* in 1902 was a revitalization movement within British and American Quakerism that was striving to re-establish the primacy of 'The Inner Light' within Quaker thought and experience,[5] and Rufus Jones was one of the movement's most

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active participants. In contrast to a Calvinistic strain of rigid credalism and Biblical literalism that dominated the faltering Society in the late Victorian period, this new, liberal movement believed that a return to Quakerism's reputedly mystical roots would ignite a spiritual rejuvenation among Friends. Despite its avowedly psychological orientation, James' *Varieties* became a source of inspiration for most of these Quaker innovators, especially Rufus Jones.

The mystical interpretation of early Quakerism assumed that the Society of Friends had supernatural, not natural origins, and was based upon an experience of God in the form of 'the Light within'. This perspective was in keeping with wider trends in the study of religion at that time, as evidenced by the number of contemporary studies that focused on mystical experience.[6] The Quaker belief in the Inner Light that was to be experienced through silent worship provided interpreters with a religious framework in which to explain Quakerism as another example of an outbreak of mysticism, the antecedents of which stretch back into nascent Christianity as well as into non-Christian religious traditions. The fact, however, that James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* influenced the mystical interpretations of Quakerism suggests the extent to which the book's psychological pragmatism was buried beneath the sheer number of rambling but interesting quotations from Western mystics. No single non-historical work, in fact, can rival James' book for its influence on early 20th century interpretations of emerging Quakerism, even among members of the Society of Friends itself.

While James' *Varieties* remains a widely read text among students of religion throughout the English-speaking world, both his psychological interpretation of early Quakerism and the competing mystical interpretation to which it contributed no longer receive scholarly validation. Using the same sources as did the psychologist James and the 'mystic' Jones, more recent scholarship has portrayed the early period of Quakerism in a very different light. Rather than viewing Quakerism as the consequence of either people's direct experience of God or of their uniquely sensitive emotional constitutions, contemporary emphasis on mid-17th century English society identify Quakerism as merely one of several reactions to social, political, and economic tensions that pervaded England during that era. Many of the insights from earlier psychological and mystical interpretations are subsumed within historically rooted social–psychological and sociological perspectives on Puritan religious sectarianism, and the perspectives of James and Jones appear as enthusiastic assertions whose essential claims have not been sustained. However, by returning to the mystical and psychological interpretations of Quakerism that first appeared in the early years of this century, we can trace the history of once-prominent perspectives on an important religious group, and by doing so make a case for utilizing broader, social-psychological perspectives for the analysis of historically based religious collectivities.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF QUAKER RELIGIOSITY: WILLIAM JAMES

Initially written for presentation as the 1901–1902 Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh, James' psychological interpretation of religion, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, has become a classic. While he insisted in it that religious experience had to be studied by its practical consequences, and could not be comprehended or appreciated as either a physio-neurological malfunction or the product of 'perverted sexuality',[7] he nonetheless showed that an intimate relationship existed between mental distress or illness and religious insight.[8] He asserted, for example, that an intelligent individual who also suffered psychological problems was more likely to 'make his mark and affect his age, than if his temperament were less neurotic'.[9] As evidence for this claim, he discussed the personality of George Fox, who is the person commonly thought to have 'founded' Quakerism. James introduced Fox by insisting that:

> Even more perhaps than other kinds of genius, religious leaders have been subject to abnormal psychical visitations. Invariably they have been creatures of exalted emotional sensibility. Often they have led a discordant inner life, and had melancholy during a part of their career. They have known no measure, been liable to obsessions and fixed ideas; and frequently they have fallen into trances, heard voices, seen visions, and presented all sorts of peculiarities which are ordinarily classed as pathological. Often, moreover, these pathological features in their career[s] have helped to give them their religious authority and influence.[10]

James claimed that Fox was the quintessential example of this type of unstable but religiously sensitive personality, yet even his contemporaries, including Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658), widely acknowledged his personal power.[11] To support his assessment that mental instability was the handmaiden of religious insight, James quoted a long passage from Fox's *Journal* in which the religious leader, while standing outside of Lichfield (a town that is presently within Staffordshire) in 1651, heard a voice from the Lord commanding him to remove his shoes and walk barefoot through its streets crying 'Wo to the bloody city of Lichfield'. As he did this, Fox saw 'a channel of blood running down the streets, and the marketplace appeared like a pool of blood'. Only later did Fox learn, so he told us in his *Journal*, that a thousand Christians had been martyred there during the time of the Roman Emperor, Diocletian.[12]

The neurotic and psychological material that James presented in his analysis of the predispositions toward religious insight stood in striking contrast to his discussion of mysticism and its inherent qualities. In a statement that has endeared him to generations of religious practitioners, James asserted that, 'The kinds of truth communicable in mystical ways . . . are various . . .; but the most important revelations are theological or metaphysical'.[13] Once again, Fox served as an illustration of this point. James quoted Fox's description in which he claimed to have experienced the condition of Paradise before the fall of Adam, and in doing so had the Lord reveal to him 'the nature and virtues of all created things. As a result of his revelation, Fox even considered undertaking 'the practice of physic [that is, medicine] for the good of mankind'.[14] In the same footnote James also pointed out that Jakob Boehme (or Jacob Behmen [1575–1624]), the famous German mystic, had received a similar revelation about the properties of herbs and grasses, and later wrote about it that 'In one quarter of an hour I saw and knew more than if I had been many years together at an university. For I saw and knew the being of all things, the Byss and the Abyss, and the eternal generation of the Holy Trinity, the descent and original of the world and of all creatures through divine wisdom'.[15] This association that James made between Fox and Boehme was to influence other interpretations of Quakerism for many years.

On another topic, 'Saintliness', James discussed the Quakers with regard to 'the impulse for veracity and purity of life', and argued that:

> The battle that cost them most wounds was probably fought in defense of their own right to social veracity and sincerity in their thee-ing and thou-ing, in not doffing the hat or giving titles of respect. It was laid on George Fox that these conventional customs were a lie and a sham, and the whole body of his followers thereupon renounced them, as a sacrifice to truth, and so that their acts and the spirit they professed might be in more accord.[16]

He supported this interpretation with long quotes from both Fox and another early Quaker, Thomas Ellwood (1639–1713), as well as from an 18th century colonial Friend, John Woolman (1720–72).[17] Along these same lines, James even used Fox's description in his *Journal* of his lonely and painfully self-reflective youth[18] to support his (disputable) claim that religion was best studied in terms of individual experiences rather than in terms of ecclesiastical institutions.[19] If his approving use of material about early Quakerism left any doubts about his opinion of the group, James removed them when he gave his personal interpretation of it. 'The Quaker religion which [Fox] founded is something which it is impossible to overpraise. In a day of shams, it was a religion of veracity rooted in spiritual inwardness, and a return to something more like the original gospel truth than men had ever known in England'.[20]

James' influence on interpretations of Quakerism was enormous, despite the fact that his psychological reductionism would not have been appreciated by most of the people who praised his work. While many of the writers, for example, who gave mystical interpretations to early Quakers' (particularly Fox's) experiences, cited James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, none presented an important statement from his conclusion:

> Let me then propose, as an hypothesis, that whatever it may be on its *farther* side, the 'more' with which in religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on its *hither* side the subconscious continuation of our conscious life. Starting thus with a recognized psychological fact as our basis, we seem to preserve a contact with 'science' which the ordinary theologian lacks. At the same time the theologian's contention that the religious man is moved by an external power is vindicated, for it is one of the peculiarities of invasions from the subconscious region to take on objective appearances, and to suggest to the Subject an external control. In the religious life the control is felt as 'higher'; but since on our hypothesis it is primarily the higher faculties of our own hidden mind which are controlling the sense of union with the power beyond us is a sense of something, not merely apparently, but literally true.[21]

'God is real', James concluded, 'since he produces real effects'.[22] The measure of legitimate mysticism, therefore, was simply the extent of its practicality.

MYSTICISM AND QUAKER SELF-DEFINITION: JOHN WILHELM ROWNTREE AND RUFUS JONES

James' discussion of the mystical elements of early Quakerism had a major impact on the Quakers' interpretations of both their religious founder and the group as a whole. A Quaker publication that was edited by Rufus Jones, *The American Friend*, asserted that '*Varieties of Religious Experience* is one of the most notable scientific studies of religion which has ever come from the press'.[23] Liberal British Quakers apparently were quickened by James' positive interpretation of early Quakerism's vitality, and their major publication, *Present Day Papers*, referred to his *Varieties* as 'a treasure-house for "Friends", justifying to them once more, if any justification were needed, their own belief in "The Inner Light", that light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world'.[24] The most prominent British Quaker of this period and founder of the *Present Day Papers*, John Wilhelm Rowntree, referred to James' 'eloquent testimony' about Fox and his work.[25] Likewise, *The British Friend* said that 'Prof. William James is one of the most brilliant philosophical writers the Anglo-Saxon race has produced . . . ', and expressed the wish that his *Varieties* 'could be placed in all our Meetinghouse libraries, that every minister might have access to it'.[26] James even urged, so the review insisted, 'that the modern method of explaining [religious conversions], as due to the welling up into the conscious life of forces long incubated in a subconscious region of the personality, is not inconsistent with the view that they are in some real sense the result of a Divine and "supernatural" operation'.[27]

So enthusiastic were some of the liberal British Quakers that they, through Rowntree, contacted Rufus Jones about getting James to present lectures to Quakers in their summer educational program. Regarding lecturers for upcoming sessions, Rowntree wrote to Jones, on 2 December 1902: 'We are asking [Adolph] Harnack [a Biblical scholar] and also want James. I am to ask you whether you can get James for us? You will know what fees he will require. What we want from him is lecturing along the line of his book . . . '.[28] Nine days later, however, the plan to get James to lecture fell apart. One of the Quakers who was influential in liberal circles, William Littleboy (1853–1936), apparently felt that James' *Varieties* reduced religion to mere psychological components. On 11 December 1902, Rowntree dashed off another letter to his American friend.

> William Littleboy, since we fixed on James, has read the book, & it has seriously alarmed him. It came up yesterday at the committee. [Edward] Grubb and I were strong for James, but I feel unity more important than James, and suggested the cable which was sent. I deeply regret it, but at this stage we must have unity. If you have not approached James do not therefore do so. If you *have*, but in such a way that you can withdraw without offence do so, but if you have & feel delicacy in withdrawing please let me know & in the last event do not act.[29]

Although Littleboy may have held a minority opinion about James, his objections were enough to kill the project. It seems likely, however, that James was at least mentioned in several summer school lectures, particularly those given by the American Quaker psychologist, Edwin D. Starbuck (1866–1947), and by Jones himself.[30]

Jones was the most prestigious and prolific Quaker of this century, and James' influence on him had widespread effects on Quaker scholarship for decades to come. At their very first meeting in mid-June 1897, Jones and Rowntree agreed to write histories of Quakerism, since they both believed that the Society of Friends had to understand the power of its original message if it were to free itself from the stifling influence of evangelicism and become a salient force in the modern world.[31] Jones' specific task was to relate Quakerism to other Christian mystical movements,[32] an undertaking that he already had been considering for several years. John Wilhelm Rowntree's tragic death in 1905, however, became the catalyst for Jones and several other Quaker historians to begin serious work on the early periods of the Society, and the series of books that emerged on Quaker history was financed by a trust fund that the Rowntree family established for this purpose. Jones wrote two books on European mystics and mystical groups in The Rowntree Series of Quaker Histories, in which he attempted to show that European mysticism was 'at least one of the great historical sources of the Quaker movement'.[33] In these studies, James' *Varieties* played a significant role.

Jones had spent the 1900–1 school year at Harvard, where James taught, but at that time James was in Europe preparing his Gifford Lectures (which were published in 1902 as *The Varieties of Religious Experience*).[34] By 1894 Jones had read thoroughly James' *Principles of Psychology* in preparation for the psychology course that Jones taught at Haverford College (a Quaker College near Philadelphia and his alma mater).[35] Around 1900 Jones 'consulted' with James about his career plans.[36] Later Jones learned that James had read his 1902 book, *A Boy's Religion from Memory*, and was struck by Jones' autobiographical account of his Quaker childhood.[37] Nevertheless, Jones' first academic love remained the field of mysticism. In 1886, he wrote his Haverford graduation thesis on mysticism,[38] and continued to investigate the subject for the rest of his life. In 1917 Jones wrote the essay on Christian Protestant Mysticism for the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*,[39] and he even claimed to have had three different mystical experiences himself.[40] Because he taught psychology, Jones was conversant with basic psychological material, so it is not surprising that, as he began writing about mysticism, he responded to many of the contemporary psychological interpretations of religious experience. Unfortunately, his relative neglect of the social forces that helped shape Quaker doctrine and practice severely limited the value that his work might have had for posterity.

His first major study of mysticism was entitled *Studies in Mystical Religion.* In this 1909 work, Jones acknowledged that many types of mystical experience 'may, and often do, pass over the border-line of normality and occasionally, at least, exhibit pathological phenomena'.[41] He nonetheless insisted that 'the *real* mystic' was one 'who, by conformity to the goal of life revealed in Christ, has realized his life upward in full union with God—a way of living which is as normal as healthy breathing'.[42] He argued further that mystical experiences 'offer a very weighty ground for believing that there is a More of Consciousness continuous with our own—a co-consciousness with which our own is bound up, and that constructive influences do come into us from beyond ourselves'. As evidence for this assertion, Jones cited James' *Varieties of Religious Experience.*[43] While this is the only direct reference that Jones made to James in his *Studies in Mystical Religion*, James' influence may have been a factor on one other issue: the reputed association between George Fox and Jakob Boehme. Jones was unequivocal about the association, stating that 'Both Fox and [Gerrard] Winstanley bear the marks of direct influence from Boehme'.[44] This assertion takes on greater meaning when we realize that, in the introduction to his book, Jones had quoted the same phrase from Boehme that James had used to show that both men had had mystical experiences in which they claimed to have gained knowledge of creation, including all of the properties of plants. He even used the same book that James did, and it seems quite possible that, given this source's early date (1691), he simply borrowed James' quote but did not indicate that he took it from the psychologist's study.[45]

In 1912, Jones published the 'Introduction' to a comprehensive history of early Quakerism by William Charles Braithwaite, a book that was the cornerstone of the Rowntree Series of Quaker Histories. Jones' introduction contained a complicated blend of current psychological notions fused with mystical interpretations. While Jones did not mention William James by name, at least two parts of his introduction resonated with James' language. For example, Jones spoke about religious ideas that 'often rise above the threshold suddenly, and burst into consciousness as though they had originated in another world'.[46] Psychologically speaking, Fox had '"peculiar psychological traits"'[47] and was 'plainly of a very unstable sort'.[48] yet his 'fixity of will and moral purpose' were (paradoxically) 'the very core of normality'.[49]

Despite these psychological traits, if not because of them, Jones still insisted that Fox, along with several other early Quakers, were mystics.[50] Jones also claimed, however, that Fox was a prophet who felt himself to be 'under commission to utter the will and purpose of God to his age'.[51] Counterbalancing the mystical strains and prophetic tendencies of Quakerism, Jones realized, was the movement's 'moral earnestness',[52] and in this vein he believed that Fox's '*awakening* in his nineteenth year [was] not over his own sins, but over the moral conditions and the social customs about him'.[53] While he misrepresented the era by stating that 'it was in this focussing upon moral effort that the Quakers differed most from other sects of the Commonwealth period', he knew that 'their "views" were not novel or original [as] every one of their peculiar ideas had already been proclaimed by some individual or by some religious party'. This aspect of Quakerism, Jones argued, must be studied along with its mysticism.[54] In subsequent publications, however, Jones did not follow his own advice, and he continued to concentrate on what he felt were the group's mystical dimensions.

Jones' 1914 publication, *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, demonstrated his continued interest in the study of mysticism. Not surprisingly, therefore, he intended this book as a companion volume to his earlier, *Studies in Mystical Religion* (1909), as both works were part of the Rowntree Series. In this new publication he distinguished more precisely the difference between his 'mystical' perspective on religious experience and the psychological interpretations of religion, although he did not cite any of the psychological studies that he wished to challenge. He insisted that a psychologists's science, 'can deal only with an order of facts which will conform to the scientific method, for wherever science invades a field, it ignores or eliminates every aspect of novelty or mystery or wonder, every aspect which cannot be brought under scientific categories, i.e., every aspect which cannot be treated quantitatively and causally and arranged in a congeries of interrelated facts occurring according to natural laws'.[55]

Notably important is his interpretation of Boehme's influence on Fox. There Jones' use of a source by Boehme provides further evidence that he drew the association between the two religious figures from William James' work. He devoted an entire chapter to 'Jacob Boehme's Influence in England', and in it spent several pages discussing the question of 'whether Boehme exercised any direct influence upon the early Quaker movement'.[56] He admitted that '[t]here is at present no way of proving that George Fox, the chief exponent of the [Quaker] movement, had actually read the writings of the Teutonic philosopher or had consciously or unconsciously absorbed the views of [Boehme]'. He nonetheless insisted that 'there are so many marks of influence apparent in the *Journal* that no careful student of both writers can doubt that there was some sort of influence, direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious'.[57] Once again he compared Fox's account from his *Journal* of gaining knowledge of all creation's properties and thereby considering the occupation of 'physic' (i.e. medicine), and Boehme's experience of acquiring knowledge of all creation's properties of plants.[58] He quoted from three translations or commentaries from the late 1640s about Boehme to substantiate his association of the two figures, and he also cited this same association made in an 1876 work by the renowned Quaker historian, Robert Barclay of Reigate.[59]

Because Jones footnoted Barclays's discussion of Fox and Boehme in which Barclay printed parallel texts of the two figures, Goeffrey Nuttall was to claim some years later that Jones was following Barclay's assertion that Fox was influenced by the German mystic.[60] Indeed, Barclay quoted Boehme from an unnamed 1648 source, and Jones, in his *Spiritual Reformers*, quoted a passage from John Sparrow's 1648 translation of Boehme entitled *The Three Principles*, the only book by Boehme printed that year. On the basis of Jones' citation of Barclay,[61] Nuttall deduced that Jones was following the late 19th century author's association of the two men. He failed to point out, however, that when Jones had made this association five years earlier, he had quoted the same text on Boehme that James had used in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Having examined Jones' copy of *Varieties* in The Quaker Collection of Haverford College, I know that this passage had caught Jones' eye because his characteristic pencil-line appears in the margin next to it. If Jones had been influenced exclusively by Barclay's discussion, then he would have used Sparrow's 1648 source in his 1909 discussion. Since he did not do so, we may conclude that the earliest influence on him regarding the association between Fox and Boehme was William James' *Varieties*, and that Barclay influenced him only after he started to research the question in depth.[62]

In response to a psychological study that James Leuba published in 1925,[63] Jones' animosity increased toward exclusively psychological interpretations of early Quakerism. Two years after Leuba's work appeared, Jones published *New Studies in Mystical Religion*, and in it he expressed his hostility in no uncertain terms. Leuba connected, in his *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, Jones' mystical interpretations of religion with James' and then criticized both of them.[64] They had attempted to distinguish between 'mystical experiences which are divine and those which are not',[65] but Leuba insisted that 'a line of demarcation between influxes of moral energy which are from God, and those which have an ordinary, natural origin, have never been satisfactorily drawn'.[66] While he realized that Jones had interpreted early Quakerism as a movement whose members 'were no less profoundly conscious of a *Divine Presence* than they were of a world in space',[67] he nonetheless concluded that 'there need be no differences between religious and non-religious ecstasies other than those due to a different interpretation—the interpretation being itself the cause of important affective and volitional phenomena'.[68] 'The mystical experience', Leuba said bluntly, 'is not of a nature other than that of the rest of conscious experience'.[69]

In Jones' 1927 publication, which he saw as a further extension of his 1909 examination of mysticism, he wasted no time in presenting to the reader his opposition to Leuba's work. In the very first sentence of the book Jones stated that '[t]he main attack in recent years on the validity of mysticism as a religious experience is the characteristic attack of the psychologist'.[70] As an example of what he meant Jones footnoted Leuba's *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*. While he acknowledged that the discipline of psychology has 'taught us to discriminate *facts* in that obscure region within us',[71] he nonetheless promised to:

> raise my word of protest only when the empirical scientist goes out beyond the obvious limits of his field and pronounces, authoritatively, on matters which do not belong within it, and about which he has no expert knowledge that qualifies him to speak. Psychological training *alone* gives no one authoritative ground to construct with finality theories of knowledge or to settle dogmatically the problems that arise out of our experience of spiritual values.[72]

In Jones' subsequent discussion of mysticism, William James again played a prominent role,[73] as did Evelyn Underhill (1875–1941).[74] At one point he even spoke of the two writers as both telling us 'that to be a genuine mystic one must form "new pathways of neural discharge"'.[75] As in his earlier works, Jones associated Boehme and Fox.[76]

On one important point, however, Jones attempted to extend James' discussion of mysticism, and that was with regard to its solitary nature.[77] 'I am convinced', Jones asserted, 'that mysticism flourishes best in a group, and that it can, if left to itself, produce out of its experience a type of organization that favors its growth and increase in depth and power'.[78] Not surprisingly, the clearest example of such a religious organization was early Quakerism. 'The Society of Friends offers, perhaps, the best historical example, especially in its formative period, of a mystical body with an organization adapted to promote mystical experience in its membership'.[79] Jones had made this same point some years earlier in his 1919 introduction to Braithwaite's second contribution to the Rowntree Series, *The Second Period of Quakerism.* 'With all its limitations, this Society . . . has proved to be the most impressive experiment in Christian history of a group mysticism'.[80] For Jones, therefore, early Quakerism's organizational development reflected the mystical content of its members' message rather than, as I will argue, the protest element of their social doctrines.

PSYCHOLOGY AND MYSTICISM: AN ASSESSMENT

The psychological and mystical interpretations of early Quakerism developed by James and Jones attempted to identify the relation between mental activities and religious, often mystical, insight. However influential these interpretations were in both academic and devotional circles, they nevertheless were marred by methodological and philosophical assumptions that undermined both their basic assertions and their factual interpretations. Most damaging were their ahistorical and acultural assumptions about the nature of religious experience, since these assumptions removed religion from the social context that is necessary to understand it properly. Moreover, their interpretations concentrated on the psychological and 'mystical' activities of George Fox, and by doing so assumed that his experiences, as he related them primarily in his *Journal*, were normative for *all* Quakers during the 1650s.[81] Added to this problem is the fact that very little is actually known about Fox as a youth and adolescent, and all that we do know comes from reconstructions of his life by the mature Fox. Although these reconstructions permit us to make some intriguing speculations with regard to the psychological forces at play during his early development, we simply cannot stretch the interprefations very far.[82] To see early Quakerism as the projection into society of the poorly documented psychological dynamics of one young man is to simplify hopelessly a very complex interplay between social, political, and religious forces in which Quakerism emerged and evolved. Finally, modern research into 17th century radical Puritanism unintentionally has reinterpreted many of the facts upon which James and Jones built their psychological and mystical interpretations. When viewed within these new interpretations, James' and Jones' facts take on wholly new dimensions.

RELIGION AND MALE SEXUAL URGES

Discussions about possible connections between Fox's religious searchings and his sexual urges provide a good example of the way in which modern historical scholarship has reinterpreted the material that earlier psychological or mystical interpreters had utilized to support their arguments. Fox wrote about 'temptations' that apparently beset him for several years when he was in his early twenties, and this was the very period of his life that he was undergoing intense religious struggles. Both James and Jones undoubtedly saw these struggles as strictly religious ones, and thereby ruled out the possibility that they might have involved important sexual questions. James insisted that 'religious consciousness' was 'wholly disconnected . . . in the main from the content of the sexual consciousness', and Jones asserted that, 'Fox had his first *awakening* in his nineteenth year, not over his own sins, but over the moral conditions and social customs about him'.[83] A respected researcher of 17th century dissenting sects, however, suggests that these temptations were in fact related to struggles over sexuality, and supports his claims with historically-grounded psychological evidence. After reading Fox's account of the spiritual turmoil during his late teens and early twenties, Michael R. Watts believes it 'probable' that it was 'associated with the awakening of sexual desires'.[84] Fox admitted, for example, that when he was nineteen 'temptations grew more and more and I was tempted almost to despair'. Given what we know about the nature of these 'temptations' within several men from the mid-17th century (including the Quaker, William Ames) and within a few male Methodist leaders a century later, they probably had to do with masturbation.[85] A desire, therefore, among some late adolescent bible-reading males to escape the 'demon' of sexual urges (especially the 'sin' of Onan [Gen. 38: 8–10]) may have been one factor that predisposed them to investigate religious questions during that period of their lives.[86]

BOEHME AND FOX: A RE-EVALUATION

The identification of Fox's probable struggle with questions of sexuality is one example of the way in which modern historical scholarship has reinterpreted the material that either the psychological or the mystical interpreters used to support their positions. Another dramatic example of this reinterpretation involves the question of Boehme's possible influence on Fox. Both psychological and mystical interpreters of early Quakerism argued that Fox had been influenced by the German mystic.[87]

This interpretation, however, has been discredited by more recent scholarship, and even Jones himself expressed doubts about the connection in his later work. In his 1932 study, *Mysticism and Democracy in the English Commonwealth*, Jones conceded that 'it is quite likely that Fox had pretty much found his trail before he was consciously aware of the light of Boehme's torch', even though he still insisted that 'Boehme's influence is certainly apparent in Fox's *Journal*'.[88]

Even *that* influence, however, has been challenged by Geoffrey Nuttall. Nuttall pointed out that Jones, as well as Barclay of Reigate, insisted that Fox's use of the phrase, 'the flaming sword', in his statement, 'Now was I come up in spirit through the flaming sword into the paradise of God', indicated Boehme's influence on Fox, at least by the time that he wrote his *Journal*. Nuttall disclosed, however, that Fox's use of the phrase simply indicated that he, like Boehme, had read Gen. 3: 24.[89] Nuttall's interpretation of the 'flaming sword' passage was accepted by the prominent Quaker historian, Henry J. Cadbury, who cited it in (gentle) refutation of Jones in his 'Additional Notes' to the second edition of Braithwaite's *The Beginnings of Quakerism*.[90] Jones' 'mystical' interpretation of early Quakerism, in which he connected the first Quakers to various Continental 'mystical' groups, fell into such disrepute that Quaker scholars decided to omit Jones' introductions to both of Braithwaite's histories in their second editions.[91] Given the fact that Jones had been the editor of the Rowntree Series of which Braithwaite's books were a part, the elimination of his introductions from both of Braithwaite's second editions is remarkable. Jones' mystical interpretation of early Quakerism simply has not withstood the tests of time because, as David Petegorsky charged in 1940, he 'has not adequately appreciated the social basis of the movements he seeks to describe'.[92]

THE LICHFIELD INCIDENT AS SOCIAL PROTEST

As the limitations of Rufus Jones' work indicate, a recurrent problem with the mystical and psychological interpreters' use of facts is that they paid too little attention to the social and political conditions in which Quakerism emerged and developed. Take, for example, the psychological and mystical interpretations given to Fox's barefooted walk through 'bloody Lichfield', an event that James cited as evidence of Fox's psychopathology.[93] As early as 1912, when the first edition appeared of William Charles Braithwaite's still-standard study, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*, Quaker historians gave Fox's Lichfield incident an interpretation that located it within a social and historical context. Braithwaite suggested that 'the sight of the spires threw him into a fever of spiritual exaltation, and the nearer view of the cathedral, scarred and ruined from the Civil War, suggested to his deeply sympathetic nature the blood-guiltiness of the city'. He added that, just twelve years before Fox's birth, Edward Wightman had been burnt there for religious heresy (apparently Unitarianism), as had Mrs Joyce Lewis (for her Protestant views) in 1557.[94] Fox would have been particularly concerned about religious persecution at this time, since he had just suffered nearly a year's imprisonment in Derby as the result of his own religious beliefs.[95] Seen in its social setting, therefore, Fox's behavior was, albeit highly emotional, probably not pathological. It nevertheless represented an act of 'social protest' against a town whose history symbolized the forced conformity of the established churches against which Quakers protested throughout the 1650s.

'HAT-HONOUR' REFUSAL AND PLAIN SPEECH [THEE-ING AND THOU-ING] AS SOCIAL PROTEST

Failing to see Quakerism in its social setting, psychological and mystical interpreters of the group presented 'facts' in support of their positions that actually mitigate their claims. James, for example, asserted that the Quakers used the pronouns, 'thee' and 'thou', when addressing others, and refused to either give 'hat-honour' or use titles of respect because they considered these social conventions to be 'a lie and a sham', and were against their 'impulse for veracity and purity of life'.[96] Historians now view these refusals as aspects of the widespread radical agitation for social and political reforms, particularly against the clerical system and the class system that supported it.[97] In 1646, for example, the Leveller leader, John Lilburne (1614–57), refused to remove his hat when he was brought, against his will, before the House of Lords for having printed reputedly insulting and slanderous material about its Speaker, Lord Manchester (1602–71).[98] Richard Overton (fl. 1646), another Leveller leader, also refused to uncover his head when he was brought before a committee of the House of Lords.[99] Two Diggers, Gerrard Winstanley (1609–76) and William Everard (fl. 1649), refused to remove their hats when General Thomas Fairfax (1612–71) visited their community.[100] Nor did the radical Fifth Monarchist and plotter, Thomas Venner (d. 1661), remove his hat for Oliver Cromwell, the Lord Protector, when Cromwell was questioning him about his subversive plans in 1657.[101] Christopher Hill points out that, even a century before the Quakers appeared, the Marian martyrs refused to remove their hats when they were in front of their accusers. Refusal to give 'hat honour' was, in sum, 'a long-standing gesture of popular social protest' in a social environment that was riddled with class and status distinctions,[102] and claims about its religious origins must be seen in this light.

Use of the pronouns, 'thee' and 'thou', was also a recognized form of social protest,[103] and the Quaker historian Hugh Barbour points out that 'The stigma of social inferiority was the real issue behind the Quaker testimony' concerning them.[104] The Quakers' insistence on lay ministry, and their rejection of the formal training system that many of the state-supported ministers had undergone at Oxford or Cambridge, also was part of a long-standing and deeply felt anti-clericalism that was shared by numerous radical and antinomian groups.[105] To assert, therefore, that Quakers developed and maintained these customs simply as a consequence of their religious convictions is to remove their activities from the social environment in which they were performed and in which they acquired meaning.

RELIGION AND ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT

After placing the evidence used by psychological and mystical interpreters of early Quakerism within the social and historical context of mid-17th century England, the limitations of these two perspectives become obvious. Quakerism should be seen as the consequence of historically and culturally distinctive forces, and it cannot be understood through psychological or mystical approaches that ignore its social setting. When given a cultural context, however, psychology can make a contribution to interpretations of Quakerism, and herein lies the value of *social* psychology. Social psychology assumes that a dynamic relationship exists between the processes of the mind and the socio-cultural environment, and therefore insists that behavior and beliefs, including religious ones, are the result of this interplay. The social and cultural environment provides the channels through which individuals' psychological forces manifest themselves. As the Canadian psychologist of religion, Bruce Hunsberger realizes, 'The theoretical basis of the psychological study of religion has typically been weak or non-existent . . . , and social psychology's theories and experience in the development of theories of social phenomena would be valuable if applied to the study of religion'.[106] The most fruitful analysis, therefore, of why people develop and acquire religious beliefs takes place on the level of social psychology rather than on the level of psychology *per se*. Likewise, mysticism, when examined within clear historical and cultural boundaries, can provide valuable insight into the development of religious conceptions and experiences. Geoffrey Nuttall did this admirably well in his unsurpassed work, *The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience*, in which he insisted that 'it is imperative to allow the characters so far as possible to speak for themselves, within the ambit of their own age, interest, and experience, and not to introduce extraneous comments, similarities or contrasts from the detachment of another century'.[107]

Put concisely, religion is a cultural system, and therefore should be studied as a socio-cultural phenomenon. This perspective, which a number of recent historical accounts of religion have used, does not deny the reality of 'psychological forces', but simply 'gets them out of any dim and inaccessible realm of private sensation into [a] well-lit world of observables . . .'.[108] Nor does it necessarily deny the reality of mysticism, but maintains that:

> The recognition and exploration of the qualitative difference—an empirical, not a transcendental difference—between religion pure [i.e., mysticism] and religion

> applied . . . will take us further toward an understanding [of religion] . . . than either a theory of primitive mysticism in which the commonplace world disappears into a cloud of curious ideas or of a primitive pragmatism in which religion disintegrates into a collection of useful fictions.[109]

Among the most promising social-psychological concepts through which to interpret early Quakerism is that of relative deprivation. By applying this concept to explain the appearance and development of early Quakerism, we can specify the congruence between the Quakers' customs and activities and their religious ideology. The particular content of Quakers' religious beliefs reflected their sense of having been unfairly denied the opportunity to implement deeply held, culturally specific social, political, and religious reforms, especially regarding tithe abolition.[110] Quakerism's reputed mysticism both emerged out of and reflected its adherents' psychologically felt but socially rooted frustrations and reformist hopes, and the content of their religious experiences remained bound by the cultural dimensions of mid-17th century England. To the extent that we can recover the psychological dimensions of the early Quakers, we should remain cognizant of the cultural milieu in which people first expressed and interpreted those dimensions. Such an awareness was lacking among the early psychological and mystical interpretors of early Quakerism, and these interpretations reveal perhaps as much about the history of ideas on religion in their periods as they do about the actual content of the historical material that these writers addressed.

NOTES

1 I sincerely thank Sharon Ingram and Marie MacLean for their editorial comments, and the Issac Walton Killam Foundation of the University of Alberta for its generous financial support. I am also grateful to Elisabeth Potts Brown, Quaker Bibliographer of the Quaker Collection, Haverford College Library, and the librarians at Friends' House Library, London, for their consistent and cheerful assistance.

2 Rufus Jones, 'Editorial Letter', *The American Friend*, (Ninth Month [September] 15, 1910): 583. In it Jones referred to James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* as having been 'coined by a stroke of genius, which will enrich the religious vocabulary forever.' Briefer mentions of his death appeared in *The American Friend*, (Ninth Month [September] 1, 1910): 566, 579, and in *The British Friend*, (September 1910): 232.

3 The Quaker Collection (henceforth QC), Haverford College Library, Collection no. 1130, Box 6 (Letters to Rufus M. Jones, 1908–10), reprinted in Jones, *The Trail of Life in the Middle Years*, New York, (1934): 9.

4 William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, 2 vols. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1890.

5 For discussion on this movement see Richard Rempel, 'Edward Grubb and the Renaissance in Britain, 1880–1914', Paper Presented at the Western Victoria Studies Association Conference, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 1978; Thomas Kennedy, 'History and Quaker Renaissance: The Vision of John

Wilhelm Rowntree', *Journal of The Friends' Historical Society* 55 (1 & 2) (1983 & 1984): 35–56.

6 See Eric J. Sharpe, *Comparative Religion: A History*, p. 117. London, Duckworth.

7 William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* p. 11 and see pp. 10–12. London, Longmans, 1902 (revised 1902, reprinted 1909).

8 James, *Varieties*: 22–5.

9 James, *Varieties*: 22–3.

10 James, *Varieties*: 6–7.

11 James, *Varieties*: 7.

12 James, *Varieties*: 7–8. As William Charles Braithwaite and Henry Cadbury point out, a number of books in Fox's time attest to the fact that in Lichfield a thousand Christians had died under Diocletian. These historians do not, however, cite a reliable source as verification for the claim, and Cadbury even suggests that the story about the town might have been a myth. I have not been able to document the story myself. See Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*, p. 56 edited and reviewed by Henry J. Cadbury, foreword by Hugh Doncaster. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1912 (2nd Edn. 1955 pp. 549–50). For an alternative explanation of why Fox called Lichfield 'bloody', see Beatrice Saxon, 'Notes and Queries: 'Woe to the Bloody City of Lichfield', *Journal of the Friends' Historical Society* 41 (2) (1949): 86–7, who relates a story from 1649 in which a pool near Lichfield mysteriously turned blood-red (possibly from algae-growth?).

13 James, *Varieties*: 410.

14 James, *Varieties*: 411 n. 2, quoting George Fox, *The Journal of George Fox*, edited by John L. Nichalls, Introduction by Geoffrey F. Nuttall and epilogue by Henry J. Cadbury, (London, Religious Society of Friends, 1975, reviewed and edited version of 1694): 27. This passage, however, is not in the critical edition of *The Journal of George Fox*, 2 vols, edited by Normal Penney, (New York: 1975 reprint of the 1911 Edn of 1694). The different content of Fox's journals is the result of the manuscripts used for the modern editions. Penney's edition of Fox's *Journal* was based upon the original Spence MSS, on file in Friends' House Library, London, and is referred to as the *Cambridge Journal*. Fox probably began composing it during his imprisonment in Worcester jail in 1673–74, during which time he began dictating sections to a fellow Quaker prisoner, Thomas Lower (1633–1720), who was also his son-in-law. It was completed at Swarthmore Hall, Ulverston (presently in Cumbria), which was Fox's home after his marriage in 1669 to the widowed Margaret Fell (1614–1702). Before publication of the account, however, Friends assigned to the Quaker, Thomas Ellwood (formerly John Milton's amanuensis), the task of editing Fox's work. The *Journal*, with Ellwood's editions, finally was printed in 1694. As Ellwood's edition contained Fox's reminiscences on his youth and religious activities during the 1640s, they also appear in Nickall's edition of the *Journal*. The original manuscripts upon which these are based, however, have been lost, so that Penney's edition, which reproduces the Spence MSS, begins with events in late 1649. For discussions of this editing, see Nickall's Preface in Fox, *Journal*: vii–xvi; Penney's Introduction in Fox, *Journal*: xxxi–xli; and Henry J. Cadbury, 'The *Editio Princeps* of Fox's *Journal*', *Journal of the Friends' Historical Society* 53 (3) (1974): 197–218. For a discussion of the way in which Fox's *Journal* might have given posterity an embellished interpretation of both

Quaker history and Fox's importance for the group during its early years, see Wintrop Hudson, 'A Suppressed Chapter in Quaker History', *Journal of Religion* 24 (2) (April 1944); 108–18;) Henry J. Cadbury's response, 'An Obscure Chapter of Quaker History', *Journal of Religion* 24 (1944); 201–13; and Hudson's rejoinder in, 'Notes and Communications-Quaker History: Dr Hudson Replies', *The Journal of Religion* 24 (4) (October, 1944): 279–81.

15 James, *Varieties*: 410–1 n. 2; quoted from Edward Taylor, *Jacob Behmen's Theosophic Philosophy Unfolded*, pp. 425, 427. London, Thomas Salusbury, 1691.

16 James, *Varieties*: 291–2. 'Doffing the hat' or 'hat-honor' customarily took place when two men greeted one another, and when a man of lower social rank was in the presence of a man of higher social rank. When people of unequal social rank were conversing, the lesser ranked individual was expected to address the superior with the pronoun, 'you', while the higher ranked person responded by using 'thee' and 'thou'. These points are discussed in Hugh Barbour, *The Quakers in Puritan England*, pp. 163–5. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964.

17 James, *Varieties*: 292–6; see Fox, *Journal*, edited by Nickalls: 36–7.

18 James, *Varieties*: 335–6.

19 James, *Varieties*: 31, 334–5.

20 James, *Varieties*: 7. Jones' copy of James' *Varieties*, which is housed in the Rufus M. Jones Collection on Mysticism in the Haverford College Library, has this section bracketed in pencil. Presumably Jones did this himself.

21 James, *Varieties*: 512–3.

22 James, *Varieties*: 517.

23 *American Friend*, 'Some Recent Studies of Religion', (Tenth Month [October] 16, 1902): 805.

24 Catherine Albright, 'Review of James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*', *Present Day Papers* 5 (15 September 1902): 292. Jones, by the way, commented briefly on his opinion of Albright's review in a letter to Rowntree. 'The [book] reviews are good, though C. A. [i.e., Catherine Albright] has not caught James. Her review is, however, suggestive'. QC, Collection 1130, Letters from [Rufus M. Jones], 1875–1904, Folder: 'Jones, Rufus Matthew and E. B. Jones to Lowell C. Jones *et al.*', 1902 [Letter to John Wilhelm Rowntree, September 1902]. In August of the same year Jones had complained to his wife that 'James' chapter on mysticism, though good, did not satisfy me. It gave little new insight' (QC, Collection 1130, Box 38D, Letters from [RMJ] 1899–1902, folder: 'Letters from RMJ to EBJ', 1902, dated 8/5 1902).

25 John Wilhelm Rowntree, *John Wilhelm Rowntree: Essays and Addresses*, edited by Joshua Rowntree, London, Headley Brothers, 102, reprinted from an essay that appeared in 1902–3. On Rowntree, see Richenda C. Scott, 'Authority or Experience: John Wilhelm Rowntree and the Dilemma of 19th Century British Quakerism', *Journal of the Friends' Historical Society* 49 (2) (Spring, 1960): 75–95; Kennedy, 'History and Quaker Renaissance . . .'.

26 *The British Friend*, (10th Month [October], 1902): 262, 263.

27 *The British Friend*, (1902): 262.

28 QC, Collection 1130, Box 3: Letters 1899–1902, Folder: Letters to [RMJ], 1902 [John Wilhelm Rowntree to Jones, 2 December 1902].

29 QC, Collection 1130, Box 3: Letters 1899–1902, Folder: Letters to [RMJ], 1902 [John Wilhelm Rowntree to Jones, 11 December 1902], emphasis in the original letter.

30 The summer school lectures were programs on religion, usually Quakerism or early Christianity, as well as topics from modern science that liberal Friends believed would edify and educate their fellow Quakers and the public at large. Many were held at Woodbrooke, Selly Oak, Birmingham, but others were held in various parts of England. See Elizabeth Gray Vining, *Friend of Life. The Biography of Rufus M. Jones*. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, (1958): 69, 100–2, 113, 115, 117, 139. The surviving lecture programs are housed in the Friends' House Library, London England, in *Summer School & Week End Programmes, etc.* In its first season, in 1903, Jones gave ten lectures, and the preliminary program indicates that he probably lectured on topics which included, 'The Subconscious Life', 'The Testimony of Mysticism', and 'The Wider Intimations of Self-Consciousness'. Starbuck was also tentatively scheduled to lecture between 30 July to 6 August, but his topic was unannounced. See vol. 1, 'Summer School for Religious Study, "Woodbrooke", Selly Oak' 23 July to 3 September 1903) [pamphlet No. 40]. In 1908, Jones delivered a lecture entitled, 'The Mysticism of Quakerism', for the Summer School at Kendal (vol. 2, pamphlet No. 16). In 1910, Jones also gave a lecture, 'The Meaning and Reality of Mysticism', to a conference near Helmsly in Yorkshire (vol. 2, pamphlet No. 39). It seems likely that James was mentioned in some of these lectures, but, unfortunately, no copies of them survive in the Quaker collections in Haverford College, Friends' House Library, London, or Woodbrooke College, Selly Oak, Birmingham. Jones and Starbuck knew each other, and both attended a conference in Toronto in 1904. Jones seems to have liked him. See QC, Collection 1130 Box 38D, Letters from [RMJ], 1899–1902, Folder: 'Letters from RMJ to EBJ', 1902, (R. M. Jones to Elizabeth Jones, Toronto, 8/16, 1904; and R. M. Jones and E. B. Jones to Lowell C. Jones *et al*, 1902 (15 August 1904, addressed, 'My dear Lilychen'). On Starbuck's Quaker background, see Edwin D. Starbuck, 'Religion's Use of Me', in *Religion in Transition*, edited by Vergilius Ferm, pp. 204, 207–215. New York, Books for Libraries Press, 1937 (reprinted 1969).

31 See Vining, *Friend of Life*: 72; Kennedy, 'History and Quaker Renaissance . . .'.

32 Vining, *Friend of Life*: 72.

33 Rufus M. Jones, *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, p. v. Boston, Beacon Press, 1914 (reprinted 1959).

34 Gay Wilson Allen, *William James: A Biography*, pp. 415–428. New York, The Viking Press, 1967.

35 Vining, *Friend of Life*: 66–7, 85–6.

36 In 1932 Jones wrote, 'As soon as I discovered that William James was at work on the nature of mystical experience for his Edinburgh Gifford Lectures, I began to consult with him about my work and my plans. It was always amazing to me the way this busy man welcomed a younger quester and gave himself to him as though his main purpose in life was to help somebody get his feet upon the sun-road to truth. He saw more capacities in a person than the person himself did. He interpreted a man's potentialities to the man himself and awakened his expectation until one came to believe in the belief of the great professor and to act upon his estimate. Though never a disciple of his and though never able to accept in anything like fullness his central positions, I always felt that he gave me the stimulus of his friendship and I acknowledge now, with joy and loyalty, the immense debt I owe him.' Rufus Jones, 'Why I Enroll With the Mystics', in *Contemporary American Theology*', edited by Vergilius Ferm', vol. 1, p. 196. New York, Round Table Press, 1932.

37 In the mid 1920s Jones stated, 'Some years ago I wrote a little book entitled *A Boy's Religion from Memory* . . . . I had the pleasure of knowing that William James loved it . . .'. See Jones, *Finding the Trail of Life*, p. 9. London, George Allen & Unwin, 1926. 9. It is impossible to determine from these passages whether James and Jones actually met or simply corresponded. I checked with Elizabeth Ann Falsey of the Manuscript Department of The Houghton Library, where the William James Collection is located, and she informed me that no letters are on file between James and Jones (personal correspondence, 25 September, 1984).

38 Vining, *Friend of Life*: 39.

39 Rufus Jones, 'Mysticism (Christian, Protestant)', in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. 9, pp. 101–103. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917. Jones also wrote the introductory essay, 'Mysticism', and the section on 'Mysticism-Christian New Testament'. See *Encyclopedia*: 83–4, 89–90.

40 Vining, *Friend of Life*: 51, 99, 201, 249–50. Good discussions of Jones' imprecise definition of the term, 'mysticism', include Melvin B. Endy, 'The Interpretation of Quakerism: Rufus Jones and His Critics', *Quaker History*, 70 1 (Spring, 1981): 3–21; Hal Bridges, *American Mysticism*, New York, Harper & Row (1970): 24–37; Daniel E. Bassuk, 'Rufus Jones and Mysticism', *Quaker Religious Thought* 17 (4) (Summer, 1978): 4–9; and J. Calvin Keene, 'Historical Quakerism and Mysticism', *Quaker Religious Thought* 7 (2) (Autumn, 1963): 2–9. Bridges mistakenly indicates that James overlooked Quakers in his chapter on mysticism (Bridges, *American Mysticism*: 24). Apparently he failed to notice James, *Varieties*: 410–1 n. 2.

41 Rufus Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*, p. xxv. London, Macmillan, 1909. In 1938, Jones wrote that, 'I see now, as I did not see in the early period, what a large pathological factor there has been in the lives of many mystics in the long historical line' (quoted in Vine, *Friend of Life*: 126).

42 Jones, *Studies*: xvii, see xviii.

43 Jones, *Studies*: xxix, citing James, *Varieties*: 515, see 508.

44 Jones, *Studies*: 495.

45 Jones, *Studies*: xxvi n. 2; see James, *Varieties*: 410–11 n. 2. Additional support for this argument comes from the fact that Jones did not own this edition of Boehme in his collection of mystical books, and therefore must have either borrowed a copy or cited the passage from another source. A card file index of books on mysticism that John Wilhelm Rowntree sent to Jones can be found in the Quaker Collection, Haverford College Library, Rufus M. Jones Collection, Collection on Mysticism. Jones sent Rowntree a letter of thanks for these books on 9 February 1904 (Vining, *Friend of Life*: 117).

46 Rufus Jones, 'Introduction', to William C. Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*, xxvii, London, Macmillan and Company, 1912: See James, *Varieties*: 236 n. 1. It is worth mentioning that, by 1934, Jones seemed to have reduced the role of the subconscious in his conception of mysticism. He admitted that 'I went too far in my early period toward the adoption of [James'] theories of the religious significance of the subconscious, though I never did accept the central principles of his pragmatism as a sound theory of truth'. See Jones, *Trail*: 8.

47 Jones, 'Introduction' to *Beginnings*: xxviii.

48 Jones, 'Introduction' to *Beginnings*: xxxi.

49 Jones, 'Introduction' to *Beginnings*: xxxiii; see James, *Varieties*: 199. For a concise summary of how James influenced Jones in his early interpretations of

religion and the subconscious, and Jones' gradual modification of his initial views, see Bridges, *American Mysticism*: 29.

50 Jones, 'Introduction' to *Beginnings*: xxxv–xxxviii.

51 Jones, 'Introduction' to *Beginnings*: xxxviii.

52 Jones, 'Introduction' to *Beginnings*: xlii.

53 Jones, 'Introduction' to *Beginnings*: xlii.

54 Jones, 'Introduction' to *Beginnings*: xliii, xliii–xliv.

55 Rufus Jones, *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, pp. xviii–xviii Boston, Beacon Press 1914, (reprinted 1959). Basically for Jones mysticism 'was a psychological matter made up of experiential and non-rational experiences' (Bassuk, 'Rufus Jones and Mysticism': 7).

56 Jones, *Spiritual Reformers*: 220, see 220–234.

57 Jones, *Spiritual Reformers*: 220.

58 Jones, *Spiritual Reformers*: 222–3.

59 Robert, Barclay of Reigate, *The Inner Life of the Religious Societies of the Commonwealth*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, (1876, 3rd Edn., 1879): 214–215.

60 Geoffrey F. Nuttall, *The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, (1946): 16 n.13.

61 Jones, *Spiritual Reformers*: 220 n.1.

62 The copy of Barclay that Jones owned apparently had been passed on to him from his uncle, Eli Jones, and it is now in the private collection of Haverford College Library's Director and respected Quaker scholar, Edwin Bonner. In this book, Barclay insisted that 'not only was Fox conversant with Boehme's writings, but appears in his journal to presuppose a knowledge of Boehme's method of stating spiritual experience' (Barclay, *Inner Life*: 214n.). Barclay then put quotes from Boehme (and a Boehme biography) and Fox side by side, and next to most of them in the margins of Jones' copy is Jones' characteristic pencil marks for emphasis (*Inner Life*: 214–215). Worth noting, however, is that Barclay concluded his discussion on the religious language and fervor of the late 1640s by saying that 'The air was thick with reports of prophecies and miracles, and there were men of all parties who lived on the border land between sanity and insanity' (*Inner Life*: 216). I have no indication that James used Barclay when preparing his *Varieties*, and if this is true then he must have come to the comparison between Fox and Boehme through other means.

63 Jones revealed how well he was versed in the psychological literature by mentioning the terms, 'introvert/extrovert' which came from Carl Jung's 1921 publication, *Psychologische Typen*, which had been translated into English in 1923. See Jones, *George Fox: Seeker and Friend*, p. 32. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1930.

64 See Bridges, *American Mysticism*: 31–2.

65 James H. Leuba, *The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1925. 260, 281 n.4 citing Jones, *Studies*: xxix–xxx and James, *Varieties*.

66 Leuba, *Psychology*: 260.

67 Leuba, *Psychology*: 281, 303, quoting Rufus Jones, *Social Law in the Spiritual World: Studies in Human and Divine Interrelationship*. p. 161 Philadelphia, The John C. Winston Co., 1904.

68 Leuba, *Psychology*: 315.

69 Leuba, *Psychology*: 316; see also James Leuba, 'The Making of a Psychologist

of Religion', in *Religion in Transition*, pp. 173–200, edited by Vergilius Ferm, New York, Books for Libraries Press, 1937 (reprinted 1969).

70 Rufus Jones, *New Studies in Mystical Religion*, London, Macmillan and Company, (1927): 9.

71 Jones, *New Studies*: 11.

72 Jones, *New Studies*: 13–14.

73 Jones, *New Studies*: 20, 62, 80–1, 85, 146, 197.

74 Jones, *New Studies*: 66, 78, 203.

75 Jones, *New Studies*: 78.

76 Jones, *New Studies*: 198.

77 Jones, *New Studies*: 146.

78 Jones, *New Studies*: 148.

79 Jones, *New Studies*: 165.

80 Jones, 'Introduction', to William C. Braithwaite, *The Second Period of Quakerism*, p. xxx. London, Macmillan and Company, 1919.

81 Keep in mind that there may have been between 30 000 and 40 000 Quakers after the group's first decade (Braithwaite, *Beginnings*: 512). Jones did make occasional references to Quakers other than Fox: see 'Introduction', to *Beginnings*: xxxvi–xli; and *New Studies*: 166.

82 One is reminded of Roland Bainton's criticism that Erik Erikson constructed his story about the youthful Martin Luther despite 'the sparsity of evidence' with which the psychoanalyst had to work. See Roland H. Bainton, 'Luther: A Study in Psychiatry', review of Erik Erikson, *Young Man Luther*, *The Yale Review*, 48 (1958–59): 409.

83 James, *Varieties*: 12 n.; Jones, 'Introduction', to *Beginnings*: xlii–xliii.

84 Michael R. Watts, *The Dissenters*, vol. I., p. 187. Oxford, 1978. 187.

85 Watts, *Dissenters*: 418; see Paul Delany, *British Autobiography in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 59, 61, 71. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul,. 1969. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, p. 366 n. 2. New York, Vintage Books, 1963 (1966 Edn).

86 This is conjecture on my part, but one of the few historians on the 17th century to address the issue, Lawrence Stone, tentatively comes to a different conclusion. Basing his evaluation on admittedly 'very fragmentary evidence' about masturbation (which was almost exclusively from males), Stone, in an unfortunate choice of words, concludes, 'it would seem that in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries even the most Calvinistic of children, brought up in fear of hell-fire, nevertheless were not too deeply disturbed by the problem of handling their early sexual impulses, no more so, at any rate, than children at any period in history . . .'. See Stone, *The Family, Sex and Marriage In England 1500–1800*, pp. 513–14 New York, Harper & Row, 1977. He acknowledges later, however, that '[d]uring the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century [sic], internalized repression was undoubtedly aided by the moral pressures of Puritanism' (Stone, *Family*: 615). In 1657, for example, George Fox admonished other Quakers to 'Keep down the unchaste, keep down the adulterous eye, and keep down the lust of the flesh, which is not of the Father but of the world . . .'. See George Fox, *A Collection of . . . Epistles, Letters and Testimonies* . . . vol. 1, [*The Works of Georg Fox*, vol. 7], p. 145. Philadelphia, Marcus T. C. Gould, 1831.

87 James, *Varieties*: 411 n. 2; Jones, *Studies*: 495; *Spiritual Reformers*: 220, *New Studies*: 146.

88 Rufus Jones, *Mysticism and Democracy in the English Revolution*, p. 140. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1932. I do not know whether the claim made in the *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* that the Behmenists 'later amalgamated with the Quakers' somehow is based upon a misinterpretation of Jones, but Jones, as well as James and the Quakers, has a separate article in it. See F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone, editors, *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, pp. 182–3, 726, 756, 538–9. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2nd corrected Edn, 1974. An early study on Boehme's influence in England states that 'It is no doubt most important . . . , to remember that many volumes of Boehme's works were published intermittently in Sparrow's and Ellistone's admirable translations between the years 1647 and 1663—years which were so formative to the Quaker movement, and it is quite likely that one or more of these fell into the hands of Fox and others. Nevertheless in the absence of direct quotations it is unwise to assume any borrowing from the printed page'. See Stephen Hobhouse, 'Jacob Boehme's Influence in England', *Journal of the Friends' Historical Society*, 33 (1936): 54.

89 Fox, *Journal*, edited by Hicknalls: 27; Jones, *Spiritual Reformers*: 221–2; Barclay, *Inner Life*: 214; Nuttall, *Holy Spirit*: 16 n. 13. Likewise, it seems probable that both Fox's and Boehme's claims to have gained knowledge of the properties of plants was based upon Gen. 1:28–30 and 2: 19–20.

90 Cadbury in Braithwaite, *Beginnings*: 548 n. 3, see 40.

91 L. Hugh Doncaster's 'Preface' to Braithwaite, *Beginnings*: vii; Frederick B. Tolles's 'Introduction' to Braithwaite, *Second Period*: xxix, xxxii n. 1; see Vining, *Friend of Life*: 194; Donald F. Durnbaugh, 'Baptists and Quakers—Left Wing Puritans?', *Quaker History*, 62 (2) (Autumn, 1973): 67–82.

92 David W. Petegorsky, *Left Wing Democracy in the English Civil War*, p. 65 n. 2. London, Victor Gollancz, 1940.

93 James, *Varieties*: 7–8.

94 Braithwaite, *Beginnings*: 56 and n.; Barbour, *Quakers in Puitan England*: 117. The battle for Lichfield in 1643 was recounted as early as 1704 in Clarendon's famous account of the English Civil War. See Edward Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England . . .*, vol. 3, pp. 454–6. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1704 (reprinted 1826).

95 Braithwaite, *Beginnings*: 53–4.

96 James, *Varieties*: 292.

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98 Don M. Wolfe, *Milton in the Puritan Revolution*, p. 145. New York, Humanities Press, 1941 (reprinted 1963). H. H. Brailsford, *The Levellers and the English Revolution*, edited by Christopher Hill, pp. 92–3 Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1961. Pauline Gregg, *Free-born John: A Biography of John Lilburne*, pp. 140–3. London, George G. Harrap & Company, 1961.

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101 Brailsford, *Levellers*: 46; B. S. Capp, *The Fifth Monarchy Men*, p. 143. London, Faber and Faber, 1972.

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104 Barbour, *Quakers*: 164; see 163–6.

105 Margaret James, 'The Political Importance of the Tithes Controversy in the English Revolution, 1640–60', *History*, (June 1941): 1–18; James Fulton Maclear, 'Popular Anticlericalism in the Puritan Revolution', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 17(4) (October 1956): 443–70; Hill, . . . *Upside Down: passim.*

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PROTESTANTISM, AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY: A COMPARISON OF THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA

David Jacobson

Protestantism took on a similar Calvinist cast among ascendent Dutch during the Reformation to the Puritans in America, and the Afrikaners in South Africa. These three societies, however, developed very different political systems. The social and historical reasons for these differences are traced. Elements in Protestantism that could potentially lead to different forms of liberal democracy on the one hand, or to authoritarianism on the other, are explored. The different patterns of secularization, or lack thereof, are also delineated in each of the cases.

INTRODUCTION

The Dutch, the Americans, and the South African Afrikaners all have Calvinist roots. Today, however, the United States is a democracy and South Africa is a racist and authoritarian polity. The Dutch, after an ambiguous mixture of tolerance and persecution of the large Catholic minority, extended universal rights in 1848, and the Netherlands has since developed its own specific democratic polity. Each of these countries has had a different pattern of secularization or lack of secularization as a result of industrialization. In the Netherlands, a number of integrated sub-cultural blocs developed, and today secular and religious cultures co-exist. American religiosity has maintained itself despite industrialization. And it appears that the Afrikaners, for different reasons from the American case, have *not* secularized.

In this essay, I will attempt to show how, in each of the three countries, Calvinism interacted with the specific historical circumstances and gave rise to different political structures. In the Dutch case, I will consider the roots of the Reformation and the subsequent nature of Protestantism, the reasons for the rise of Calvinism in the Netherlands, and the development of both an orthodox Calvinist and a latitudinarian Protestant stream. Finally, the transposition of the Dutch cultural pattern into an industrial society will be illustrated.

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In the American case I will seek to explain the erosion of Puritan Calvinism in favour of a more latitudinarian Protestantism, and the reasons for the continuation into the present of American religiosity will be clarified. In the South African case, the potential in Protestantism and Calvinism that allowed a racist polity to develop will be delineated. I will attempt to show how the specific historical circumstances in South Africa realized that potential, and the reasons behind the lack of substantial secularity among the Afrikaners will be sought.

THE REFORMATION

Johan Huizinga wrote that toward the end of the Middle Ages, there was a tendency for all religious thought to embody itself in images. Huizinga noted that . . .

> . . .Every thought seeks expression in an image, but in this image it solidifies and becomes rigid. By this tendency to embodiment in visible forms all holy concepts are constantly exposed to the danger of hardening into mere externalism. For in assuming a definite figurative shape thought loses its ethereal and vague qualities and pious feeling is apt to resolve itself in the image . . . .[1]

This stifling multiplication of images, the exaggerated categorization of religious life and the concomitant strengthening of church organization sowed the dialectical reaction: a search for the Totality, the All-in-All. 'To be uplifted to the clarity of ecstasy, to wander on the solitary heights of contemplation stripped of forms and images, tasting union with the only and absolute principle . . .'.[2]

The underlying force of the Protestant Reformation was an attempt to reach a *unio mystica*, to break down the categorization of religious life, and to experience the absolute. Luther, like the Baptists and the Anabaptists, sought to dismantle a church whose elaborate system of laws made it too much of this world and too concerned with the political realm.[3] In this spirit the Protestants swept away the mediatory symbols and the mediated salvation of the Roman Catholic church.

But the Reformation was more than the ending of the Church's mediation of salvation. The Catholic Church structure separated sacred and worldly concepts of time. Through *unio mystica*, the Protestant fused worldly activity with sacred time. The Protestant is caught up in the speed of time, on a (sacred) progression toward a salvational eschaton. By separating worldly from sacred concepts of time, the Catholic Church created a static view of the world. For the Roman Catholic, existence in this world is, in a sense, a period of waiting to cross from the temporal to the spiritual.

Thus, there is for the Protestant a mystical and transcendent absorption into the absolute. This is, almost by definition, a highly individualistic soteriology.

This transcendence, however, is balanced by, and has a paradoxical relationship with, intense inner-worldly ascetic activism, in the Weberian sense. This latter aspect is, I would suggest, logically intertwined with the Protestant fusion of worldly activity with sacred time. Progress to salvation must be seen to happen in this world. There is constant pressure to advance, to go forward. These two elements, mystical transcendence and the intense inner-worldly activism, give rise to what Roland Robertson has called inner-worldly ascetic mysticism.[4]

THE DUTCH REVOLT

Calvinism drained Protestantism of its mystical content by its emphasis on political organization and on control of the earthly kingdom. Thus Calvinism became the ultimate basis of the Dutch revolt against the occupation by Catholic Spain. However, in the spirit of the early Reformation, Dutch Protestantism in the 1540s and 1550s was mainly Baptist.[5] This reflected the underlying Protestant drive for *unio mystica* together with the belief that salvation lies with the individual.[6]

The shift of Protestant loyalties from Baptism, Lutheranism, and Anabaptism to Calvinism began in the 1550s and 1560s. This shift followed the severe oppression of Protestants by Emperor Charles V. The oppression worsened under Philip II who became king of Spain in 1556. Philip continued the centralization of the Low Countries begun by his predecessor and, concomitantly, he prescribed a dogmatic Catholicism, making the Church more rigid and sterile for its followers. This, in turn, gave further impetus to the reformation. In 1564, Philip enforced the decisions of the Council of Trent which required a stricter adherence to the Catholic creed. In response, much of the Dutch nobility moved into active opposition.[7]

In August 1566, throughout the central and northern provinces, a popular destruction of Church icons began. Calvinists, mainly preachers, led the mobs. It is significant that the first *action* of the Revolt was this Breaking of the Images.[8] Treasured symbols and ornaments of the Catholic Church were destroyed in a frenzy that spread from village to village.[9] Was the specific nature of this attack an expression of the widespread discontent with the *religious* sterility of the Church?

Even before the Breaking of the Images, Philip had dispatched a punitive force from Spain under the Duke of Alva. From 1567 to 1573 Alva waged religious, political, and economic war on the Netherlands. A reign of terror under Alva's special court, known as the Council of Blood, triggered the revolt in Holland and Zeeland from 1572 to 1576. This phase of the Revolt was started by a Calvinist minority, but it has been claimed that the rebels found a wide response.[10] The Spanish failed to subdue the Calvinists, and by 1593 the division between the Dutch Republic and the Hapsburg Netherlands had, in the main, taken shape. The provinces north of the river belt were largely Protestant, while in the south Flanders and Brabant remained Catholic.[11] In 1609 Spain agreed to a 12-year truce with the Dutch Republic.

ORTHODOX CALVINISTS AND LATITUDINARIAN PROTESTANTS

Why was there a transition from an individualistic sectarian Protestantism to Calvinism with its collectivist soteriology, a transition from a relatively mystical and universalistic Protestantism to a churchly, dogmatic, and particularistic Protestantism?

Clearly, the conditions were not propitious for an apolitical sect-type Protestantism. Protestant sects are, paradoxically, more dependent upon this world than Protestant churches. Their mysticism is viable only as long as their worldly base is secure. This position is similar to the mystic who, as Max Weber observed, is in a sense more dependent upon this world than the ascetic. Furthermore, the uncompromizing nature of any monotheistic religion at least implies a latent political assertiveness. In the historical circumstances of the Netherlands of the 16th century, only the Calvinists were capable of resisting Spain and the Catholics. Pieter Geyl noted:

> If the Baptists' faith has been little more than an episode in Netherlands history, making room for Calvinism almost without a struggle as soon as the critical times of Philip II began, it was no doubt mainly due to the political sense of Calvinism being more strongly developed.[12]

While the conditions that gave rise to Calvinism in the Netherlands are fairly clear, it is more difficult to locate the dynamic. The transformation from an individualistic quest for salvation to a collectivistic soteriology is a profound one. In the former case there is an emphasis on the individual soul and God, and in the latter an emphasis on salvation through the fellowship of man. Salvation for the Calvinist is a personal matter because every Christian is a responsible member of the church, but salvation is never an individual matter. The Calvinist believed that there is no salvation outside the church (*extra ecclesiam nulla salus*). Hence, institutional structures are needed to maintain the solidarity of the group, and to ensure political control.[13] By contrast, the Baptists of the period favoured an anti-structural 'organization'.

Calvinism rejects the universalism of Catholicism, and it rejects the Roman Church's hierarchical distribution of grace. Walzer has noted that Calvinist clergy continued to exercise considerable power, but they no longer had a personal superiority.[14] Their position was one of function, and no innate grace was imputed to them. The breakdown of the Catholic hierarchy meant that every Calvinist shared God's grace equally. Within the band of saints everybody is equal. However, the particularistic nature of Calvinism, and the belief that salvation is only possible for those within the Calvinist church, has resulted in a particularly authoritarian sense of chosenness.[15]

What happens to the Protestant seeking after Totality, of the absolute, among the Calvinists? It is replaced by, I suggest, the *frisson* of conflict and struggle. 'The imagery of warfare was constant in Calvin's writing . . .' Walzer has pointed out, '[and it evidences] the tendency of Calvinist energy to organize itself for worldly struggle'.[16] It is interesting to note, as we shall see, that Calvinist doctrine eroded where there was no external threat of conflict.

After the Truce of 1609, the Protestants strengthened their positions in the North, and the Spanish strengthened the Catholic position in the South. Though there was persecution in both North and South of Catholics and Protestants, respectively, the Spanish were the more determined to eradicate religious opposition.[17] Consequently, there are today fairly large Catholic minorities in the North, but almost no Protestants in the South.[18] This situation is indicative of the universalism of the Catholic church. No other church could exist within its ambit. The particularism of the Calvinists allows for a paradoxical 'tolerance'. Catholics and other religious groups were persecuted and had a subordinate status in society, but their 'reality' was accepted. Eventually under the individualistic and universalistic latitudinarian Protestants, a positive and even legally enforced religious freedom prevailed.[19]

The Dutch were in an ambiguous position during the Truce. They had established the Dutch Republic and consolidated their hold on the North. On the other hand, there was a great deal of uncertainty. The threat of a renewed Hapsburg onslaught remained together with a fear created by the large Catholic population in the Republic.[20] The ambiguity produced two responses among the Protestants. The relative security of the Republic allowed an individualistic and Arminian spirit to develop, while the internal and external threats reinforced an orthodox Calvinism.

A confrontation evolved between these two Protestant streams and reached its climax at the Synod of Dordrecht in 1618–19, a Synod composed exclusively of orthodox Calvinists. The Church was defined, in accordance with Calvinist doctrine, as the community of the elect. But the relationship of Church and State was not settled. The generally Remonstrant (latitudinarian Protestant) State was not prepared to cede its rights or powers to the Church.[21]

Although the Dutch Reform Church formally became the state church in 1651, it was never supported by the State, or allowed a public monopoly of religion. Huizinga has written '. . . if you like it was the Church of the State, but it was never a state church in the full sense of the word'.[22] The regent class was purged of openly Remonstrant and Catholic elements. However, it did not lose its 'regent spirit'. Catholics were persecuted and dismissed from positions of authority but orthodox intolerance was blunted in the long run by the latitudinarian State.[23]

The Dutch cultural pattern after the Synod of Dordrecht and the Peace of Munster remained more or less set until the late 19th century. Three blocs coalesced: the latitudinarian Protestants, the orthodox Calvinists, and the Catholics. Among the Protestants two 'images' formed, an individualistic image associated with the latitudinarians, and a collectivistic image associated with the orthodox Calvinists. The latitudinarians were identified with the State, and the orthodox were identified with the Church.

It is difficult to discern why certain Protestants became Calvinist and others latitudinarian. The latitudinarians were generally regents, merchants and others from the commercial classes. The Calvinist adherents were generally from the 'common people'.[24] However, it is not an intrinsic quality of merchants to be liberal, or of the 'common people' to be Calvinist. One cannot deduce a religious outlook from class. Class has to be located in a wider ontological framework. It is possible that geopolitical factors partly determined the type of Protestant affiliation. Orthodox Calvinist areas generally, but not always, have bigger Catholic minorities than liberal Protestant areas.[25] However, the ultimate reasons for the different Protestant affiliations are not clear.

SECULARIZATION AND 'PILLARIZATION'

With increasing industrialization in the mid-19th century, the liberals came to be more secular and even anti-clerical. At first the orthodox Calvinists were not militant and hoped to reverse the 'modernist' trends from within the establishment. The Catholics did not want to jeopardize their newly gained legal freedoms—freedom of religion had been institutionalized under the 1848 constitution—and consequently they trod carefully.[26]

However, after 1870, conflict broke out over the 'schools issue'. Due to social and economic rationalization, the liberals tried to extend a secular and rational education to the general population. State subsidies were granted to state (i.e. liberal) schools, and not to confessional schools. The Calvinists and Catholics co-operated in successfully combating such liberal ideas about education. In the constitution of 1917, public and private education were placed on an equal footing.[27]

The schools struggle gave rise to the phenomenon of 'pillarization'. Three broad 'pillars' or blocs arose: Calvinist, Catholic, and secular. There were two main Calvinist groups, the Dutch Reformed Church and the *Gereformeerde Kerk*, each of which had its own political party. The latter arose out of a split from the Dutch Reformed Church in 1886, rejected because of its perceived liberalization. The third, secular pillar consisted of Liberals and Socialists.[28] Each pillar had its own integrated sub-culture. Elites negotiated for each sub-culture, forming coalitions between different pillars depending on the issues involved. Each pillar had its own political organizations, schools, trade unions, media, welfare, health, and leisure bodies.[29] The pillars cut through all socio-economic classes.[30]

From 1889 to 1960 the Catholic proportion of the population increased from 37·1%–40·4%. In the same period, affiliation to the Dutch Reformed Church dropped from 48·7% to 28·3%. The *Gereformeerde* increased its membership from 4·0% to 9·8%. Those not affiliated with any church rose from 0·1% in 1889 to 18·4% in 1960. Non-affiliation was lowest in the southern Catholic provinces, and highest in the north.[31]

The point to be emphasized here is the *form* of secularization in the Netherlands. The existence or non-existence of secularity for present purposes is indicated by belief and church-going. Only a small group of liberal or nominal Catholics belonged to the secular bloc, but a majority of Dutch Reformed (the liberal wing and nominal members) belonged and so did those who are not members of any church.[32] In other words, *that group which was identified with the state*, the liberal Protestants, *has secularized*. Furthermore, the individualistic image has been transposed from a religious latitudinarian Protestant cultural context to a secular liberal culture.

The Catholics and orthodox Calvinists, on the other hand, until the 1960s, maintained themselves as churchgoing groups. The Calvinists have maintained their collectivistic orientation. Neither of these groups were associated with the State, and, indeed, have been in conflict with it.

How, then, does one explain the rise of the Socialists in the late 19th century? Up to the Second World War the Socialists had a strong collectivistic (in a secular sense) ethos. Socialism arose when the churches identified with the establishment, and, for instance, when the churches condemned labour opposition to industrial conditions. Indeed, one of the first active Socialists was an ex-clergyman, F. Domela Nieuwenhuis, who was elected to parliament in 1888.[33] Identification of church with the State leads to secularization for a number of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, the modern state is characterized by its rationalization of administration in which citizens' rights supplant rules of religious loyalty. Universalistic and impersonal formality prevails.[34]

Since the late 1950s there has been a decline in church-going among the Dutch Reformed (but not among the *Gereformeerde*). Among the Catholics church-going has declined dramatically, especially since the 1960s.[35] This suggests what could be called 'second stage secularization'. This may be induced by the *internal* rationalization of these churchs' organizational bodies. This would apply especially to a country such as the Netherlands, where the churches run so many of the welfare institutions.

Pillarization reached its peak in the 1960s. Since then there has been some depillarization along with other political and social changes. These include increasing pluralization among the Christians, the growth of the non-affiliated, and the appearance of new immigrant religions. The unification of the three largest Protestant and Catholic parties into one Christian party is one effect of these developments.[36]

THE UNITED STATES

One of the most remarkable aspects of American history is the shift from collectivistic Calvinist churches to individualistic Protestant denominations. From the beginning of white settlement of America in the 17th century until the Revolution, the biggest Protestant groups were the Presbyterian and Congregationalist churches. By 1850 the biggest Protestant groups were the Methodists and Baptists, once only dissenting sects.[37]

How can one account for such a dramatic change? Seymour Martin Lipset has argued that the Calvinist stress on the 'elect' and on predestination could hardly survive the Arminian emphasis on the personal attainment of grace and on hope for all men.[38] Furthermore, evangelical revivalistic religion called into question the doctrine of special election.[39] But there are problems with such arguments. Lipset's claim that the doctrine of the 'elect' could not endure the Arminian stress on achievement of grace presupposes an ontological context that favours egalitarianism. Equality is not an *a priori* ontological reality of human existence. Pointing to evangelical religion begs the question: Why was there a revival? What were the social and historical circumstances that gave rise to an individualistic and (in the North) universalistic Protestantism?

The 'great events' of American history, from Roger Williams, the First Great Awakening, and the fading of the Federalists, to the Second Great Awakening, mark the demise of a collectivistic, extremely ascetic and repressive Puritanism. These events also mark the growth of an individualistic and relatively mystical Protestantism. They do not, however, necessarily mark a trend towards a greater universalism, to more democracy. In the North, the individualistic trend was linked to a more universalistic spirit. In the South individualism came to be tied to a virulent particularism. This distinction, of course, has to be kept in mind when tracing the development of American Protestantism.

The conditions that gave rise to Calvinism in the Netherlands, or in South Africa, did not exist in America. In colonial America, the Catholics were a tiny minority. There was, of course, no aristocracy. The Indians, in the long run, were not a serious threat. They certainly did not have the numbers, in proportional terms, that the black tribes had *vis-à-vis* the Afrikaners in southern Africa. Therefore, conditions permitted the changes that may have taken place in the Puritan outlook.

However, conditions, in this case, do not constitute the dynamic. Indeed, why should the Calvinist framework have changed at all in such circumstances? Why was the *status quo* not maintained?

It was in such circumstances, I suggest, that the latent dynamism of Protestantism could be liberated. The Protestant seeking of individual union with God, of breaking down dogma in order to experience Totality, could be expressed. Once more the Protestant could sense the sacred progression to the eschaton, driving him or her to an intense inner-worldly activity. The shackles of a collectivistic and highly political Puritanism could be broken. The Calvinist obsession with worldly struggle and warfare became irrelevant.

H. Richard Niebuhr contrasted this Protestant 'movement' with the Catholic emphasis on order. In a passage that is worth quoting at length, he wrote,

> Between the polarities of order and movement, of structure and process, the Protestant finds himself and his communities always driven to the dynamic side. It seems to him that his particular partner in Christendom, the Catholic, orients himself with equal constancy to the opposite pole. Does not this Catholic have a sense, expressed in all his actions and utterances, of being part of an established order of things, member of an enduring and fundamentally unchanging church, recipient of a truth once and for all revealed, believer in a well defined and articulated 'true religion', subject of constant and known laws, follower of leaders who stand in an unchanging office and succession? Does not the individual believer seem to 'pass through things temporal' as through a well-mapped territory, under the guidance of shepherds who know not only in what direction to lead but are acquainted with the forks in the road, the traps and ambushes beside it? To the Protestant, however, life seems a pilgrim's progress which, whether made solitary or in a company, proceeds through unpredictable contingencies and crises toward the destination beyond life and death where all the trumpets blow.[40]

Roger Williams' theory of the church reflected the individualistic drive of Protestantism. He rejected the idea that the church was an expression of communal religious ideals, and saw it rather as a voluntary association of individuals. His beliefs were strongly universalistic. 'Papists', Protestants, Jews, and Moslems could live in his commonwealth. Williams' minimalist view of the state must be viewed as a function of his individualistic soteriology and his relatively mystical views.[41]

The activities of Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson reveal the rapidity with which the Protestant dynamic manifested itself when the conditions were suitable. Massachusetts Bay had barely survived its first 20 years when it was shaken by Anne Hutchinson's actions. But it was not until early in the 18th century that the Protestant movement to an individualistic ascetic mysticism became a major force.[42] The First Great Awakening began in 1720 in New Jersey, and then spread to the Middle Colonies. Revivalism appeared in New England in 1734. George Whitefield started his evangelistic missions in 1738 and 1739. He 'could send an audience into paroxysms by pronouncing "Mesopotamia"' and thousands came to hear him preach.[43]

For the Puritans a rational understanding of doctrine was considered to be essential. Church activities were to be conducted in an orderly fashion. The minister's relationship with his congregation was stable and formal. The Puritan appealed to the head but not to the heart.[44] The revivalists, on the other hand, rejected a dogmatic approach to religion. They sought to tear down doctrinal categorization and replace it with an experiential and a spiritual 'totality'. Revivalist preachers confronted their listeners with direct appeals and dispensed with written sermons (with the exception of Jonathan Edwards). The audiences would be sent into 'fits and seizures, the shrieks and groans and grovelings, the occasional dementia characteristic of later revivalism . . .'[45]

The revival, and the individualism it engendered, was a manifestation of the mystical impulse in Protestantism. Ascetic, collectivistic Puritanism seemed increasingly precarious and began to lose its hold. It is in this context that we must view the Arminian questioning of the doctrine of predestination, and it is in this same context that the erosion of the churchly groups can be understood. In the First Great Awakening there was a substantial erosion of the Congregationalists, especially in New England. Ninety-eight 'Separate' Congregationalist churches were formed whose overwhelming tendency was Baptist. In addition, 130 Baptist groups were formed by disaffected Congregationalists.[46]

Later revivalism moved from the East to the South and the West. It became more emotional and 'ecstatic'. Nevertheless, until the Revolution, the Puritan churches remained numerically strong.

Both streams of Protestantism, the Puritan and the Baptist (the Methodists were numerically negligible at this time), co-operated in the struggle against the English. Sperry has claimed that churchly groups like the Presbyterians and the Anglicans fought for political liberty. The Baptists were mainly interested in religious liberty. 'For the moment the sacred cause of freedom threw them into each other's arms, but they had no basic affinities and drifted apart as soon as the cause was won.' The Quakers, on the other hand, did not participate. Their radical mysticism led to an avoidance of the political realm.[47]

The idea of an established church became untenable after the Revolution.[48] Separation of church and state was, of course, instituted in the Constitution in 1787. Nevertheless, it could be claimed that the Constitutional Congress was, to an extent, a compromise between churchly groups and sectarian groups. The former sought a stronger central government in line with the Calvinist belief in strong political institutions. (The main representative for this group was, in effect, Hamilton.) The sects wanted a stronger but limited federal government to strengthen the rights of the *individual*, and to prevent a 'tyranny of the majority'. (This view was represented by the Jeffersonians.)

However, the Federalists, who largely represented the Calvinist churches, never regained office after their defeat in 1800. They lost to the Jeffersonians. As Lipset has noted, though the Federalists were republican by European standards, they sought to limit egalitarian principles in property relations, religion, and suffrage.[49] Their defeat was a further symptom of the gathering momentum of the 'movement' that was pushing Protestant America forward.

The Second Great Awakening in 1812 followed a period of spiritual quiet that had existed since the Revolution. Like the First Great Awakening, this revival appealed to the emotions and its Arminian influence promised the possibility of salvation for all. Unlike the First Awakening, the revival took place only in the West. Significantly while it was largely Presbyterian in its origins, the Methodists and Baptists gained the most in new members.[50] It was during this period that Massachusetts, in 1833, the last state to do so, ratified an amendment placing all religious groups on equal footing. There was to be no established state church. This amendment was favoured by a majority of ten to one, although it had been overwhelmingly defeated by the electorate only 12 years before.[51]

Perhaps the most important effect of the Second Great Awakening was the schism in the Presbyterian church. The individualistic and underlying mystical drive of Protestantism eroded churchly groups and favoured the denominations. The Calvinist dogma in the Presbyterian church itself began to come undone. The New School Presbyterians, who split off from their Old School opponents in 1837, emphasized revivalism, moral reform, and evangelical piety. They took a more tolerant doctrinal stance than the dogmatic Calvinists of the Old School. The New School was prepared to make doctrinal changes if this would ensure man's eternal salvation more readily.[52]

After 1840 there were no major religious schisms due to theological disagreements. Schisms would occur next in the larger churches over the slavery issue.[53] That there were no more theological schisms is indicative of the erosion of Calvinism in the United States. The individualistic and ascetic mysticism of Protestantism had become dominant. It is in this period, in the Age of Jackson, that the concept of individualism becomes explicit in the American consciousness. The term, Yehoshua Arieli has noted, was synonymous with selfishness in the Old World. In the United States individualism was now identified with self-determination, moral freedom and liberty.[54]

There was not only a movement from church to denomination, however. There was also a movement from sect to denomination (and, indeed, from church to sect to denomination). Hofstadter notes that the Methodists and Baptists lost much of their sectarian spirit and became more 'respectable' churches. They sought to balance the revivalist impulse with a certain formality.[55] Hofstadter has noted that,

> . . . at the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth religious groups, that had begun as dissenting sects, developed into firm organizations, less formal than the churches of the past, but too secure and well organized to be considered sects. The promoted sects and the demoted establishments . . . settled down into what has come to be called denominationalism.[56]

Possibly the Protestant inner-worldly ascetic mysticism has the effect of reigning in 'overly' sectarian mystical orientations, as well as eroding ascetic churchly orientations. The aspect of this dialectic that expresses itself depends on the historical circumstances. There is also, of course, an internal tendency to balance mysticism with structure and structure with mysticism.

Roland Robertson has noted that denominationalism in the United States allows for an individual mystical expression combined with a commitment to this world and to the institutions of society.[57] The denomination lies on a mid-point on the church-sect axis, but draws on certain aspects of both the church and the sect.

By the eve of the Civil War, Calvinism had dissipated as a major force in American religion. However, ascetic mystical Protestantism was not necessarily linked with universal values. It is difficult to explain why the racist particularism of the South was tied to the denominations. Even if we accept that 'the theologically more conservative denominations are much more likely to be concerned with their personal conduct before God than with right conduct before their fellow humans', it does not tell us *why* those denominations became conservative or why the particularism was expressed in racist terms.[58]

Interestingly, those groups that maintained a Calvinist dogma, like the Old School Presbyterians, were less prone to abolitionism. The New School campaigned vigorously against slavery.[59] All denominations, with the exception of a few small groups like the Quakers, divided into pro- and anti-slavery factions before the Civil War. The Methodists split in 1844, the Baptists in 1845 and the Presbyterians in 1858 and again in 1861.[60] The victory of the North meant, however, that the universalist Protestant pattern became dominant. In short, a national democracy had emerged.

SECULARIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The denominational pattern that emerged in the United States saved American Protestantism from widespread secularization. Here, again, secularization is understood as a decline in the belief in God, and/or a decline in church-going. Because no group or image was (or is) associated with the (Federal) State, Protestant religiosity survives. Just under half of the adult population in the United States attends a place of worship at least once a week. Among the Protestants there have been fluctuations in churchgoing but no consistent decline. A fall in church-going in the 1960s was followed by a rise in the 1970s.[61] Over 90% of Americans believe in God.[62]

It has been argued that church-going in the United States lacks specific content or special meaning, that the churches themselves have secularized.[63] However, such criticism usually stems from what can be called a 'Catholic' or 'Calvinist' understanding of religion. A religion, according to this view, should have a systematic doctrine. The religious institution should be intertwined with political institutions, and should embrace all society in its ambit. Consequently, more mystically oriented religions, where doctrinal content is secondary to an experiential union of the individual soul with God, are by definition 'not really religions'. Furthermore, any loss of political control by a religious body is seen as a stage in secularization.[64]

Ironically, the separation of church and state in the United States has been essential to the continuing survival of American religion. Denominations with the greatest uncertainty about God show the steepest rates of decline in church-going in recent years.[65] This suggests that church-going is *not* simply a habit expected of the upright citizen who, it is claimed, has no real religious commitment to the institution. The existential element in church-going *is* central.

While there have been *changes* in American religiosity due to the heavy industrialization that followed the Civil War, these changes are not to be equated with decline. The generally Protestant Progressive movement was prepared to sanction a stronger state in order to control industrial trusts and to ensure the preservation of individualistic values. It emphasized worldly concerns such as environmental protection.[66] One could, perhaps, claim that 'religion stops at the factory gate'. But Protestant religiosity in the United States, as such, has been maintained. This conclusion is reinforced by the Middletown study which showed no decline in religious belief or practice. Indeed, the authors have stated that members of the churches are even more zealous than their predecessors two generations back.[67]

The American Catholics, on the other hand, have been affected by 'second-stage' secularization. This is similar to the Dutch Catholic case, and occurred in the same period. Between 1964 and 1974 church-going among the Catholics dropped sixteen points to 51%. The Protestant decline in the same period, in contrast, was only 1%.[68] The Protestants have *not* been influenced by second-stage secularization because there is no integrated sub-culture like that of the Dutch Calvinists. A sub-culture bloc, as I already noted in the Dutch case, can produce an internal rationalization, a bureaucratization, which in turn causes religious erosion.

It is difficult, however, to find the historical roots of the secular humanists in the United States. Although numerically small, this group has played an important role in the United States culturally and politically.[69] Clearly, these individuals share the liberal values of latitudinarian Protestantism.

A group that has not accepted the impact of the industrial age is, of course, the fundamentalists. Twentieth-century fundamentalism has its roots in the revivalism and evangelicalism of pre-Civil War America. New School Presbyterianism, for example, contributed to fundamentalism as well as to liberalism. But, Marsden has noted, 'the lines of continuity become hopelessly blurred as the twentieth-century issues replace those of the nineteenth century'.[70]

Nevertheless, the sociological roots of fundamentalism can, to some extent, be noted briefly. Hofstadter has pointed out that, to a considerable measure, the Revivalists withdrew from intellectual encounters with the area of rational studies.[71] Perry Miller has written that the revivalists generally abandoned 'the idea of a people in a national covenant with their Maker, [instead] these insurgents proposed to salvage Protestant solidarity by the main force of spiritual persuasion'.[72] In other words, most of the revivalist Protestants managed to compartmentalize their religion from science and industry.

The fundamentalists, however, were (and are) not prepared to make that division. The fundamentalist has what Hofstadter has called the 'one-hundred per cent mentality'. Such a person will 'tolerate no ambiguities, no equivocations, no reservations . . .'.[73] This organic view of society is a carry-over from Calvinism. Marsden has written that Calvinism nearly always demanded intellectual assent to its statements of religious truth. Nearly all fundamentalist groups, Marsden has pointed, have Calvinist origins.[74]

SOUTH AFRICA

In attempting to locate the social and historical sources of institutionalized racism, it is of no use to point to economic, power, prestige, or psychological causes. All such instrumental explanations are predicated on an overarching ontological racism. Such instrumental explanations may be correct in themselves, but we need to find the basis, the macrosociological categories, that delineate the possible modes of behaviour.

There were two general orientations taken by the Christian nations when colonizing or confronting 'heathen' peoples. One could be called a Chosen People orientation and the other a missionary orientation. These orientations are, of course, ideal types and can be viewed as the two polar cases at different ends of a continuum of possible attitudes. These orientations arise out of the logic of a monotheistic religion. Such religions are uncompromizing and will not accept any other Truths. Monotheists can thus try to convert the heathen to God, or they can take the stance that they, as monotheists, are 'special', for God has revealed Himself exclusively to them.

Which position is taken depends on the type of church involved. Evangelical Protestants have a strong missionary impetus. Indeed, they have a strong 'crusading spirit' in general. The Calvinists on the other hand, only mildly engage in proselytizing, and generally impute a certain chosenness to themselves. So, for example, in the United States, the New School Presbyterians were filled with missionary zeal abroad and at home. Their crusading spirit also favoured interdenominational co-operation, prohibition and abolitionism. In contrast, the Old School Calvinists were hostile to such activities.[75] What was true for the New School Presbyterians was true for other evangelical groups as well. In the Netherlands, the Calvinists likewise lacked proselytizing fervour once they had gained the upper hand after 1618.[76] Similarly, the

Afrikaner Calvinists, as we shall see, had little missionary spirit but had a strong sense of chosenness about themselves.

What is the source of this difference? The latitudinarian groups, as I mentioned earlier, are caught up in a perceived (sacred) progression toward the eschaton. This means there is a need for progress to be seen and to 'happen'. Christianity has to be spread around the world. A new moral responsibility must become evident. Tasks must be *completed* in a methodical way. (Indeed, more attention should be given to the latitudinarian Protestants in the discussion about rationalization, scientific achievement, and capitalism. This would account for the economic success of latitudinarians in the Netherlands, and of *expatriate* Calvinists who were freed of group constraints.[77] E. D. Baltzell has noted that, while the Quakers in Philedelphia, for example, showed limited interest in government, they did show a strong business sense. The Puritans displayed the reverse case; more emphasis on authority, less on commercial gain.[78] Calvinists as a group are, perhaps, over-rated as a force for capitalism for reasons that are given below. It is significant that greater stress on controlling the worldly kingdom is *inversely* related to the capitalist spirit. Similarly, the roots of creativity and innovation can be found in latitudinarian Protestantism, flowing from a unique dialectic between the ability to *break* social categories [stemming from the mystical impulse] on the one hand, together with a rational and methodical drive, on the other. The ability to break or look beyond existing categories is, of course, intrinsic to creativity. Among the latitudinarian Protestants an ethos existed to capitalize on this creativity.)

The Calvinists, in contrast to the latitudinarian Protestants, are extremely ascetic. They have, as I noted above, withdrawn from a mystical union with God. They have less of a need to perceive and ensure progress in this world. The Calvinist is not 'caught up in the speed of time' in the sense that the latitudinarian Protestant is. There is less impetus to missionary activity, and less drive toward a moral crusade. The Calvinist's vision is apocalyptic rather than progressive.

But there is another reason for the Calvinists' lack of missionary endeavour. It lies in the *volkisch* religio-nationalism of the Calvinist collective group. The hierarchical division of grace in Catholicism is replaced by the internally egalitarian infusion of grace in the Calvinist collective as a whole. It is through the collective, through the *volk*, that one finds salvation. And because the universal church has been broken down, it is the particular groups that are graced. They are a Chosen People. The heathen are damned. It is this aspect of Calvinism that the roots of Afrikaner racism, and of the *herrenvolk* polity, are to be found.

(It is interesting that only a mild racism, and no institutionalized racism, developed in areas colonized by Catholic countries. For example, the Spanish conquests in Latin America were brutal but only a very limited racism came about.[79] The missionary zeal stems from the universal nature of the Catholic Church. However, it must be noted that the universalism of the Catholics also meant it was intolerant of other religious groups in its ambit. In contrast, the latitudinarian Protestants, though they have a strong missionary drive, are generally tolerant of other religious groups. The latitudinarians are *universalistic* in their attitudes, but do not claim to have an ontological monopoly as a *universal church*.)

The attitudes of a Christian group which views itself as chosen will vary when faced with other Christian 'peoples'. Their relationship with other Protestant groups can be positive; they have a role in ultimate salvation. A sort of global civil religion of different Protestant peoples is projected. Each people will separately strive toward salvation, but the sum of their efforts will make a greater 'whole'. However, if the 'Chosen' are in conflict with another Protestant group, the attitude of the former to the latter will be ambivalent. Such was the case, as we will see below, of the Afrikaners *vis-à-vis* the English.

In trying to explain the situation in South Africa, some sociologists have extended the Weber thesis to Afrikaner racism. Van den Berghe wrote:

> . . . Weber argues that a belief in predestination leads to anxiety about one's salvation, and that one tries to resolve the uncertainty by seeking outward signs of God's grace . . . Accepting the urge to seek an outward sign of salvation, skin-colour seemed the most obvious, indeed almost the inevitable choice in South Africa, all the more so that practically all dark-skinned people were in fact 'heathens' . . .[80]

Explaining racism with the concept of predestination is problematic. While proselytization among the blacks in South Africa has been extremely limited, there are some black members of the Afrikaner Calvinist churches. (Some 3% of the black population belongs to one of the three Afrikaner churches.[81]) This means that black members of these churches can be part of the elect in the sense that they can be saved. It is believed they can be saved despite the segregation of the ecclesiastical organization of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa from 1857.[82] Luther, who after all did not carry the baggage of Calvinist dogma, saw the heathen as damned also. This is in contrast to the Catholic Church which places those who have not heard the 'Word of God' in a state of limbo.[83]

It must be emphasized that black members of the Afrikaner Reformed churches have a subordinate status. One has to distinguish between the chosen *volk* and the *ecclesium*. Blacks can become members of the *ecclesium* and thus be saved, but they can never become part of the *volk*. Afrikaner Calvinists are always, of course, members of the *ecclesium*. Calvinism, as opposed to Lutheranism, *is* important to the development of racism through its, *inter alia*, fusion of the temporal and spiritual spheres. This gives a particularly organic form to the *volk*.

CALVINISM AND THE ROOTS OF APARTHEID

The first permanent European settlement in South Africa was in 1652. The Dutch East India Company sent Jan van Riebeeck to establish a refreshment station at the Cape of Good Hope for Dutch vessels travelling between the Netherlands and the East Indies. The company servants were Dutch or German Protestants, generally from the lower social and economic strata of Europe.[84] Calvinism did not apparently have much sway over the settlers in this period. The Dutch Reform Church had little influence in the colony. Indeed, the Church was under the Company's control. Church attendance was low. Furthermore, the Church displayed little missionary activity.[85] This lack of proselytizing effort is concordant with the practice of a churchly group like the Calvinists, as we noted before.

The Company's policy toward the local Khoikhoi, whose land they had partly occupied, was relatively liberal. The Khoikhoi are not considered by historians to have been a serious threat to white settlement, although there were skirmishes between the two groups. In the late 17th century, the Company feared much more an attack by sea from the French (which did not materialize) than any threat from the Khoikhoi.[86]

For the first 100 years or so of white settlement, no strongly collectivist Calvinism developed. Race in this early period played little or no part in social relations. Differences of religion were much more important in determining attitudes. Religious differences did, of course, generally coincide with racial divisions. Hermann Giliomee and Richard Elphick have noted that the settlers were frequently scornful of the Khoikhoi and of the mostly Asian slaves. However, there was no attempt to categorize all 'non-Europeans' together. Derision was usually directed at language and customs, and not at biologically determined features. Khoikhoi were, nevertheless, considered heathen and on this basis they could be exploited.[87] At this stage, even after the arrival of the strictly Calvinist Huguenots in 1688, Calvinism, such as it was in South Africa, could have eroded away to be replaced by a more latitudinarian Protestantism, as was happening to American Puritanism in this period.

But a *volkisch* Afrikaner Calvinism began to develop in the period between 1770 and 1820. In this period the *Trekboers*—independent white frontier farmers—moving north and east met the much larger Xhosa peoples moving south. A series of frontier wars ensued between the two groups.

Before this conflict, the *Trekboers* were characterized by a strong egalitarianism and a fierce individualism.[88] Status was not absolutely clear, 'Europeans were not all masters, non-Europeans were not all servants'.[89] There was even a degree of co-operation between blacks and whites. Frontier society in the early period, Giliomee has written, evidenced less prejudice than more established areas of white settlement.[90]

The wars between the Boers and the Xhosa brought about fundamental changes in social relations. Racism became evident; blacks came to be discriminated against because they were black. Legislation on racist lines appeared on local law books for the first time. Local authorities in the frontier zone decreed that the Khoikhoi had to carry 'passes' when travelling in order to determine whether they were 'deserters' or not.[91] The boundaries of a community began to form. In the last quarter of the 18th century the use of the term 'Afrikaner' became firmly established.[92] An increasing stratification *within* the Boer community became apparent, a stratification that was political, economic and social.[93]

The continuing threat of the black tribes had brought about an Afrikaner Calvinism. In a way similar to the rise of Dutch Calvinism, the threat of an external group gave impetus to a collectivist, radically ascetic and strongly political religion. Thus it is that at the end of the 18th century the beginnings of an Afrikaner *volk* can be observed. These circumstances produced an intersection of the ideas of Christianity, the Chosen, the *volk* and race. Similarly, a collectivistic soteriology ensued, a soteriology that was expressed in the concept of *volksbondheid*; only through the *volk* can the individual realize him or herself.[94]

The second outgroup whose presence would further foster Afrikaner religio-nationalism, the British, captured the Cape in 1795 and permanently established themselves in 1806. The British government strengthened its position through English immigration, its support of the London Missionary Society, and by a series of liberalizing measures that culminated with the abolition of slavery in 1834, measures which angered the Afrikaners.[95]

The British engendered further Afrikaner hostility through their programme of anglicization which began in 1813. It began with a proclamation that English was compulsory for admission to the Civil Service. From 1827 onward only English could be used in the courts. In 1839 it was decided that preference would be given to those who preached in English, even in appointments to the Dutch Reformed Church. The Church, nevertheless, remained the primary custodian of the developing Afrikaans language in this period. Anglicization, as a policy, was put into effect at a time when the Afrikaners (whose identity as a collective was only in its nascent stages) outnumbered the English eight to one, and of whom there were barely 400 out of 60,000 who could speak English.[96]

Calvinist hostility to proselytization manifested itself in Afrikaner opposition to the latitudinarian English missionaries. The missionaries, besides trying to convert the blacks to Christianity, pressured the British government to create, *inter alia*, the Black Circuit courts in 1812. The Black Circuit judges investigated alleged Boer crimes against the Khoikhoi and the blacks. The Boers abhorrence of the missionaries, wrote I.D. Macrone, stemmed from the missionary effort…

> . . . to impart to the heathen the very special and exclusive possession [of Christianity] which had hitherto marked off the [Boers] from all those by whom they were surrounded. The comparative failure of these first missionary efforts was regarded as a proof that such people were not fitted for Christianity . . .[97].

Boer resentment of British legislation abolishing slavery and setting Khoikhoi and blacks on an equal footing with Christians, contributed to the Great Trek. The Trek took place in two stages, in 1835 and in 1843, and ended with the establishment of a number of independent Boer republics in the South African interior.[98]

The discovery of mineral wealth in the Boer Republics brought an influx of white non-Boer *Uitlanders* (aliens). Conflicts between these *Uitlanders* and the Boer Republics became the pretext for British intervention which ultimately led to the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. Although Britain won the war, the settlement that followed gave the English and the Afrikaners equal political status. Both languages were recognized equally. No black languages were recognized. No franchise was extended to the blacks in the former Boer Republic areas, whereas there was a qualified non-racial franchise in the Cape. The qualifications were raised by Cecil John Rhodes to entrench white control *vis-à-vis* the growing non-white vote.

Afrikaner ambivalence towards the (Protestant) English was reflected in the split on whether to co-operate with the English after 1902. Two of their great Boer War generals—Jan Smuts and Louis Botha—adopted the cause of the Empire. Many Afrikaners supported South African English parties loyal to the Crown to one degree or another. However, there was always a strong religio-nationalist Afrikaner stream and this came to the fore in 1948. In that year the National Party came to power and began to enforce a policy of rigid *apartheid* and promotion of Afrikaner interests, politically and economically.

AFRIKANER RELIGIOSITY

Published work on the degree of religiosity in South Africa is very limited, and the studies that have been made focus on particular populations.[99] However, the available studies indicate that the Afrikaner Calvinist churches and the Catholic Church have maintained the highest rates of church-going. In a survey of white married women in Johannesburg in 1957–58, 57% of the Afrikaner respondents attended church 'often', as did 54% of Catholics. In contrast, 33% of English Protestants attended church 'often'. *This is the case in spite of the fact that the Afrikaner churches* (with the Anglican churches) *are the most urban* compared to other religious groupings.[100] Thus the Afrikaner case deviates from the general assertion that urbanization is correlated with secularization. To my knowledge, data are not available to suggest that there is (or is not) substantial second-stage secularization.

Whence the continuing religiosity of the Afrikaner Calvinists? The State was associated with the Afrikaners' enemy, the British, from well before the beginning of industrialization and on through the 1948. Indeed, industrial machinery was introduced into the Boer Republics by the *Uitlanders*.[101] Britain was identified with capitalism and rationalism as well as with the State. After the discovery of gold in 1886, the Afrikaners linked British imperialism with capitalism. Capitalist interests, especially mining interests, were caricatured in the gross figure of 'Hoggenheimer' in the Afrikaans press, who was English speaking, imperialist, and Jewish.[102]

The National Party's rise to power in 1948 and the subsequent entrenchment of Afrikaner control of and identification with the State, do not seem to have caused any great secularization. Two factors can be suggested for this. First, the English were associated with the formative stages of industrialization, as I noted above, and by the time the Afrikaners took power South Africa was already an industrialized country. Second, the Afrikaners do make a distinction between *volkspolitiek* and *partypolitiek*.[103] Perhaps this limited separation of church and state (a separation that takes place within the canopy of the *volk* as a whole) protects the Dutch Reformed Church from secularizing influences.

There are very revealing differences in the racial compositions of the different religious groups. There is considerable 'over-representation' of whites in the Afrikaner Calvinist churches. There is to a lesser extent an over-representation of whites in the Presbyterian and Anglican churches. Apart from the totally black Separatist churches, there is black over-representation among Methodists and Lutherans. The Roman Catholic Church comes closest to reflecting the country's racial composition in its membership.[104]

This reveals the propensity of a 'Chosen People' group such as the Afrikaner Calvinists not to proselytize. This is also partly true for churchly groups like the Presbyterians and the Anglicans although they are not as extreme as the Afrikaner churches. The Methodists, imbued with an activist inner-worldly ascetic mysticism, have converted a disproportionate number of blacks compared with their original white membership. The Lutheran case is interesting and less easy to explain. Their separation of the temporal and spiritual would have suggested that Lutherans lie in between the churchly groups and the latitudinarian Protestants and would have fewer black members than the Lutherans do in fact have. The universality of the Catholic Church is manifested in the proportional representation of the different racial groups.

The English have steadily become less and less of a threat to Afrikanerdom following the inclusion of the Afrikaners as political equals early in this century. Clearly, the *swart gevaar* (black peril) remains very real for the Afrikaner. This conflict with the blacks sustains and reinforces the rigid Calvinist character of Afrikaner Protestantism. Apparently the essentially religious basis of Afrikaner authoritarianism continues intact.

CONCLUSION

The Reformation's destruction of the Church hierarchy, the universal sharing of grace, brought about two pivotal and contrasting visions. There was, on the one hand, a humanism unprecedented in its explicit tolerance for different faiths and cultures. Paradoxically, this grace could also infuse people with a chauvinism, a collectivist supremacy, which brought about an oppressive authoritarianism. The humanism that latitudinarian Protestantism had brought forth was characterized by individualism, a certain mysticism, a methodical rationalism and by a utopic belief in ongoing progress. The Calvinist vision was strongly collectivistic and political. The Calvinist withdrew from union with God and organized for worldly struggle. This inner-worldly ascetism meant that the Calvinist community was clearly defined; roles were defined, authority was defined, truth was defined. This emphatic delineation was complemented by an ethic of outer-directed violence and conflict. Violence was the ultimate expression of politics. Inherent in such a vision was an image of an apocalyptic eschaton, of a war between the children of light and the children of darkness.

The latitudinarian Protestant end to church mediation also eroded the distinction between morality and *realpolitik*. The *unio mystica* thus instilled in the latitudinarians, together with a sense of progressive dynamism, a strong moralistic drive. It became important to do what was morally right (in liberal terms) and not simply to do what was 'pragmatic'. This moralistic sense has an imperiousness that is in an uncertain relationship with the latitudinarian tolerance. Inner-worldly ascetic mysticism involves a breakdown of dogma, a sense of mystical union, which draws fewer borders and tolerates a range of creeds. The political commitment intrinsic to this system of belief can result, in contrast, to the strict drawing of boundaries, to a more exclusive definition of the collective self.

The warp and woof of mysticism and inner-worldly activism, of cultural relativism and moral imposition, characterizes American society since the latitudinarian Protestant rise to dominance. Different religions and different cultures were equally swept up in America's rush to freedom and salvation. However along the way, moral crusades and witch hunts intermittently scorched the earth.

In the Netherlands the latitudinarian Protestant, and later liberal, control of the State were offset by the influence of the Calvinists and Catholics. Consequently, the more domineering aspect of latitudinarianism was never realized. However, the latitudinarian State ensured democratic openness. This particular constellation of forces—a liberal regime limited by different sub-cultural groups—allowed for a remarkably open democracy. Dutch society is perhaps the only society in the world where there is such tolerance of such diverse political cultures, religious and secular, Calvinist and Catholic, liberal and socialist.

In South Africa's Afrikaners, we have a near paradigmatic Calvinism; an inner-worldly asceticism, a collectivistic soteriology, a *volkisch* chauvinism expressed in racial terms, and an apocalyptic vision of the future. The Dutch Reform Church, as an expression of the *volk*, does not make a distinction between the moral domain and the arena of politics. Rather, the earthly struggle casts morality in Hobbesian terms. The recent changes in South Africa do not necessarily mark the beginning of the end for a Calvinist polity. The question arises; can the Afrikaners accept the possibility of being 'just' another sub-cultural group among many, like the Calvinists in the Netherlands today? The problem of reformist Afrikaners would then be to ensure the continued cultural and political existence of their *volk* without racial supremacy.

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NOTES

1 J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, London, Penguin Books, 1982, p. 147.
2 Ibid., p. 215.
3 K. W. Underwood, Protestant Political Thought, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Chicago, 1968, Vol. 12, pp. 599–600.
4 R. Robertson, *Meaning and Change: Explorations in the Cultural Sociology of Modern Societies*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1978, pp. 103–43.
5 P. Geyl, *The Revolt of the Netherlands 1555–1609*, London, Ernest Benn Ltd, 1958, pp. 56–7.
6 A mystically oriented group that saw salvation as a *collectivist* phenomenon was the Anabaptists in the Netherlands (among other countries). But it seems that the collectivistic orientation of such millenialist groups arose out of the belief that salvation was imminent. This, as we shall see, is different from the collectivist soteriology of Calvinists.
7 Geyl, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–8.
8 Schöffer places the Breaking of the Images as the beginning of the Revolt. See, I. Schöffer, 'The Dutch Revolt Anatomized', Some Comments, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, **III**(4), 1961: 470–77.
9 Geyl, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
10 Schöffer, *op. cit.*, p. 474.
11 A. G. Dickens, *The Age of Humanism and Reformation*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1972, p. 238.
12 Geyl, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–9.
13 Underwood, *op. cit.*, p. 601.
14 M. Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University, 1965, p. 52.
15 Calvinist authoritarianism is directed toward outgroups, but the collectivist soteriology produced an internal oppression as well. See Walzer, *ibid.*, pp. 301–2.
16 *Ibid.*, p. 65.
17 P. Geyl, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century: Part One 1609–1648*, London, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1961, p. 17.

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23 Geyl, *loc. cit.*, pp. 78–9.

24 Johan Goudsbloom, *Dutch Society*, New York, Random House, 1967, pp. 17–8.

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56 Ibid., pp. 81–2.

57 See Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

58 Quote from Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

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60 Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

61 Ibid., pp. 399–401.

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63 See, for example, Peter L. Berger, *The Social Reality of Religion*, London, Faber, 1969, pp. 107–8. Berger has, of late, retreated somewhat from his secularization thesis. He now perceives the 'majority of Americans' as being 'furiously religious as ever' and has noted the 'perduring religiosity of most of the American people'. It is interesting, however, that Berger has not come to terms with the *non-establishment* and latitudinarian roots of contemporary American religiosity. Secular humanists and the 'New Class' are antagonistic towards religion; liberal 'mainline' Protestant denominations are, in his view, marginal to the nation's religious life. Berger believes that the strict separation of Church and State '*flies in the face of* a social reality that remains persistently, stubbornly religious' (emphasis added) and that such separation deprives society of its legitimating symbols. See Peter L. Berger, 'Religion in Post-Protestant America', *Commentary*, May 1986, pp. 41–6.

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83 See, Salvation. Necessity of the Church for, in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. 12, Washington, Catholic University Press, 1967, p. 996.

84 L. Guelke, 'The White Settlers, 1652–1780', in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee, *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652–1820*, Cape Town, Longman, 1979, pp. 41, 43.

85 Hermann Giliomee and Richard Elphick, The Structure of European Domination at the Cape, 1652–1820, in Elphick and Giliomee, *op. cit.*, pp. 270, 363–4.

86 E. A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa*, London, Longman, 1968, p. 33.

87 Giliomee and Elphick, The Structure of European Domination at the Cape, 1652–1820, in Elphick and Giliomee, *op. cit.*, p. 367. See also G. M. Fredrickson, *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study in American and South African History*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 17–19.

88 Hermann Giliomee, The Growth of Afrikaner Identity, in H. Adam and H. Giliomee, *Ethnic Power Mobilized: Can South Africa Change?*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979, p. 89.

89 Hermann Giliomee, The Eastern Frontier, 1770–1812, in Elphick and Giliomee, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

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92 Giliomee, The Growth of Afrikaner Identity, in Adam and Giliomee, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–99.

93 Giliomee, The Eastern Frontier, 1770–1812, in Elphick and Giliomee, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

94 A. Du Toit is the most prominent critic to have challenged the traditional Calvinist 'paradigm' to explain Afrikaner nationalism. He claims that only in the late 19th century were Calvinist ideas articulated by Afrikaners—and then the theological sources are Dutch. While the traditional Calvinist explanation for Afrikaner racism is flawed, Du Toit seems to make a number of errors himself in rejecting Calvinism as a central factor in Afrikanerdom's rise. Most importantly, Du Toit seems to seek a one-to-one relationship between theological precepts and social reality—when in fact every community's system of beliefs will be mediated by particular historical circumstances. The changes the Boers went through in the late 18th century, referred to above, clearly suggest a Calvinist impetus in this Protestant people. Just because no theology evolved in tandem with these changes does not imply that these people were not developing a Calvinist community. It was, as S. N. Eisenstadt suggested to this writer, a 'taken-for-granted' Calvinism. The theological articulation came later. See A. Du Toit, Puritans in Africa? Afrikaner 'Calvinism' and Kuyperian Neo-Calvinism in Late Nineteenth-Century South Africa, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, **27**(2), 1985: 209–240.

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98 It is interesting that the Boers trekked as collective units. This is clearly congruent with their Calvinist collectivist pattern. In contrast to this, the American movement west was very individualistic. See S. M. Lipset, *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, *op. cit.*, pp. 119–20.

99 E. Higgins, South Africa, in H. Mol, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

100 Ibid., pp. 443, 448.

101 Patterson, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

102 Moodie, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

103 Ibid., p. 72.

104 Higgins, *loc. cit.*, p. 442.

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पुस्तकालय
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JUNG AND GNOSTICISM

Robert A. Segal

Carl Jung interprets Gnosticism the way he interprets alchemy: as a hoary counterpart to his analytical psychology. As interpreted by Jung, Gnostic myths describe a seemingly outward, if also inward, process which is in fact an entirely inward, psychological one. The Gnostic progression from sheer bodily existence to the rediscovery of the immaterial spark trapped in the body and the reunion of that spark with the immaterial godhead symbolize the Jungian progression from sheer ego consciousness to the rediscovery of the unconscious within the mind and the integration of the ego with the unconscious to forge the self. For Jung, Gnostics are the ancient counterpart to present-day Jungian patients. Both constitute a psychological elite. Where most persons are satisfied with traditional means of connecting themselves to their unconscious, Gnostics and Jungians are sensi tive to the demise of those means and are seeking new ones. Where, alternatively, most other persons are oblivious to the existence of the unconscious altogether, Gnostics and Jungians are preoccupied with it. Gnostics project their unconscious onto the cosmos and are therefore striving to connect themselves to something external, not just, like Jungians, to something internal. Interpreting in Jungian terms the Gnostic myth *Poimandres*, I argue that Jungian psychology makes enormous sense of the myth, but not in the way that Jung envisions. Upon rediscovering his spark, the Gnostic seeks to reject his body altogether rather than to mesh the two. He does strive to reunite with the godhead, but the godhead is immateriality itself rather than, like the body, matter. Indeed, the godhead, taken psychologically, is only a projection of the unconscious onto the cosmos, so that the unconscious is thereby reuniting with itself. The Gnostic's uncompromising rejection of the body and, more, of the whole material world therefore symbolizes not, as Jung assumes, the Jungian ideal of wholeness but the Jungian nemesis of inflation or, worse, psychosis. I suggest that Jung misconstrues Gnosticism because he parallels it to alchemy, which does fit the Jungian ideal.

INTRODUCTION

Carl Jung, I contend, misconstrues Gnosticism. Understood psychologically, it espouses not individuation, as Jung believes, but the Jungian malady of inflation, the severest form of which is outright psychosis. I will first explain the place of Gnosticism in Jung's thought and then interpret a representative Gnostic myth, the *Poimandres*, in Jungian terms.

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JUNG'S INTEREST IN GNOSTICISM

In his autobiography, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Jung describes his search for objective evidence of the collective unconscious—evidence beyond his own experience of it:

> As my life entered its second half, I was already embarked on the confrontation with the contents of the unconscious. . . . First I had to find evidence for the historical prefiguration of my inner experiences. That is to say, I had to ask myself, 'Where have my particular premises already occurred in history?' If I had not succeeded in finding such evidence, I would never have been able to substantiate my ideas.[1]

Jung found that evidence in two sources: alchemy and Gnosticism. Interpreted psychologically, both served as hoary counterparts to his brand of psychology and so as evidence of its objectivity:

> The experiences of the alchemists were, in a sense, my experiences, and their world was my world. This was, of course, a momentous discovery: I had stumbled upon the historical counterpart of my psychology of the unconscious. The possibility of a comparison with alchemy, and the uninterrupted intellectual chain back to Gnosticism, gave substance to my psychology.[2]

To be sure, Jung considered alchemy a more important prefiguration of his psychology than Gnosticism. Though he discusses both Gnosticism and alchemy throughout his writings, he devotes several whole volumes to alchemy[3] but only one essay to Gnosticism, and even this essay deals mostly with parallels to alchemy.[4] As he explains, he found Gnosticism too distant a phenomenon to be tied directly to modern psychology and saw alchemy as the medieval nexus between the one and the other:

> But the Gnostics were too remote for me to establish any link with them in regard to the questions that were confronting me. As far as I could see, the tradition that might have connected Gnosis with the present seemed to have been severed, and for a long time it proved impossible to find any bridge that led from Gnosticism—or neo-Platonism—to the contemporary world. But when I began to understand alchemy I realized that it represented the historical link with Gnosticism, and that a continuity therefore existed between past and present. Grounded in the natural philosophy of the Middle Ages, alchemy formed the bridge on the one hand into the past, to Gnosticism, and on the other into the future, to the modern psychology of the unconscious.[5]

The remoteness of Gnosticism for Jung stemmed partly from the paucity of texts available to him. Working before the discovery of Gnostic texts at Nag Hammadi, he was, as he says, dependent largely on the writings of the Gnostics' adversaries:

> Since we possess only very few complete texts, and since most of what is known comes from the reports of Christian opponents, we have, to say the least, an

> inadequate knowledge of the history as well as the content of this strange and confused literature, which is so difficult to evaluate.[6]

Yet the remoteness of Gnosticism for Jung surely goes deeper. Gnosticism may, for him, be simply too otherworldly. Perhaps because alchemy combines the ancient, Gnostic focus on the immaterial and transcendent soul with the modern, scientific-like focus on the transformation of matter, it serves to link the two.

Despite his professed closer kinship to alchemy, Jung interprets it and Gnosticism virtually identically.[7] Indeed, he interprets alchemy as not just the link to Gnosticism but the outright continuation of it: 'In spite of the suppression of the Gnostic heresy, it [Gnosticism] continued to flourish throughout the Middle Ages under the disguise of alchemy'.[8] For Jung, the alchemical process of extracting gold from base metals is a continuation of the Gnostic process of liberating fallen souls, or sparks, from matter. Both processes are seemingly outward, physical or metaphysical ones which in fact are inner, psychological ones. Both represent a progression from sheer ego consciousness to the ego's rediscovery of the unconscious and reintegration with it to forge the self: in alchemy a progression from base metals to the distillation of vapor out of them and the return of that vapor to the metals to form gold; in Gnosticism a progression from the Gnostic's sheer bodily existence to the release of the immaterial spark within his body and the reunion of that spark with the godhead. In both cases the state truly sought lies within man—between his ego and his unconscious—rather than outside him—between the vapor and the metals or the spark and the godhead. The human state simply gets projected onto the external world.[9]

Jung's psychological approach to Gnosticism is really two-fold. On the one hand he interprets Gnostic myths psychologically because he interprets all myths psychologically. On the other hand he interprets Gnostic myths psychologically because he considers Gnosticism, together with alchemy, a distinctive effort at unraveling the unconscious: 'My enthusiasm arose from the discovery that they [Gnostics] were apparently the first thinkers to concern themselves (after their fashion) with the contents of the collective unconscious'.[10] Jung goes so far as to declare that 'Gnosis is undoubtedly a psychological knowledge whose contents derive from the unconscious'[11] and that '. . . it is clear beyond a doubt that many of the Gnostics were nothing other than psychologists'.[12]

On the one hand Jung acknowledges that the Gnostics and the alchemists were probably unaware of the psychological meaning of their beliefs. What he says here of the Gnostics he says elsewhere of the alchemists as well: 'It seems to me highly unlikely that they [Gnostics] had a psychological conception of them [archetypical images]'.[13] They thought that they were dealing primarily with the cosmos, not themselves: 'The Gnostics projected their subjective inner perception . . . into a cosmogonic system and believed in the [metaphysical] reality of its psychological figures'.[14]

On the other hand Jung denies that the existence of the unconscious is a recent discovery:

> Since all cognition is akin to recognition, it should not come as a surprise that what I have described as a gradual process of development had already been anticipated, and more or less prefigured, at the beginning of our era. We meet these images and ideas in Gnosticism . . . The alchemists . . . in their own way knew more about the nature of the individuation process than we moderns do . . . The same knowledge, formulated differently to suit the age they lived in, was possessed by the Gnostics. The idea of an unconscious was not unknown to them.[15]

If, however, Jung not only interprets all myths psychologically but also deems the Gnostics and the alchemists unaware of the psychological meaning of their myths, it remains to be seen how either they or their myths were closer to his views than other believers and other myths.[16]

JUNG'S HISTORY OF THE PSYCHE

Tracing Jung's history of the psyche will help pinpoint the significance of Gnosticism for him. Jung divides the psychological history of man into four stages: primitive, ancient, modern, and contemporary. To be sure, he make this division only implicitly and uses other terms for some of the stages.[17]

According to Jung, man at birth is entirely unconscious. Only out of his unconscious does consciousness slowly emerge.[18] Because man's initial state is unconscious, his unconscious is natural rather than, as for Freud, artificially created by repression. Where for Freud the unconscious arises out of consciousness, for Jung consciousness arises out of the unconscious.[19]

By 'consciousness' Jung means awareness of oneself as a subject, or 'I', distinct from both the external world and the unconscious. The initial center of consciousness is the ego, so that the development of consciousness means initially the development of the ego.

Because the consciousness of mankind has developed slowly, the ego of primitive man[20] is weak. To say that primitive man's ego is weak is to say that he projects himself onto the world.[21] He thereby encounters his unconscious rather than the world and so is differentiated from neither. Indeed, not until the ego is distinct from the unconscious does it encounter the world itself rather than the projections of the unconscious.

In projecting himself, as a personality, onto the world, primitive man creates a religious world—a world ruled not by impersonal forces like atoms but by personalities, or gods. Events in that world are not merely caused but willed.[22]

So weak is the ego of primitive man that he not only projects himself onto the world but identifies himself with it. Like an infant, of which he is the phylogenetic counterpart, primitive man has no firm sense of himself 'over against' the world. He does not distinguish between subjectivity and objectivity. He experiences himself objectively, as part of the world itself:

> Thanks to our one-sided emphasis on so-called natural causes, we have learned to differentiate what is subjective and psychic from what is objective and 'natural'. For primitive man, on the contrary, the psychic and the objective coalesce in the external world. In the face of something extraordinary it is not he who is astonished, but rather the thing which is astonishing. . . . What we would call the powers of imagination and suggestion seem to him invisible forces which act on him from without. . . . Primitive man is unpsychological. Psychic happenings take place outside him in an objective way. Even the things he dreams about are real to him; that is his only reason for paying attention to dreams. . . . The simple truth is that primitive man is somewhat more given to projection than we because of the undifferentiated state of his mind and his consequent inability to criticize himself.[23]

In identifying himself with the world, primitive man identifies himself with the gods he has projected onto it. He and they are one. Between him and them, and therefore between him and the world, there exists what Lucien Lévy-Bruhl terms *participation mystique*.[24]

The world with which primitive man identifies himself includes other human beings as well as gods. Because the primitive identifies himself with them, too, he has no sense of individuality either. Identifying himself with the group, he is what Jung calls a 'herd animal'.[25]

The difference between ancient and primitive man is that ancient man has a sturdier ego. Because even his ego is shaky, he, too, projects himself onto the world in the form of gods, but he does not identify himself with those gods and so with the world. He worships the gods but deems them distinct from him. He, too, experiences the world through his unconscious and so is not truly separated from either, but he nevertheless has a budding sense of himself *vis-à-vis* both.

The term 'ancient' man, which is doubtless misleading, refers to man not just immediately beyond the primitive stage but up to modern times. Apart from primitive man, ancient man means religious man. Ancient man includes Egyptians, Mesopotamians, Greeks, Romans, Jews, and Christians.[26] It does not, however, include mystics. For Jung, Eastern mystics are striving to dissolve the ego and return to the pristine stage of sheer unconsciousness. Conversely, Western mystics are striving to integrate the ego with the unconscious and thereby reach the final stage of 'selfhood'.

To the extent that ancient man forges an ego, he creates a split within himself between it and his unconscious, from which it has emerged. That split is not, however, antagonistic. In developing his ego, ancient man does not forsake his unconscious. Like primitive man, he continues to tend to it through religion. As Jung says repeatedly:

> Whenever there exists some external form, be it an ideal or a ritual, by which all the yearnings and hopes of the soul are adequately expressed—as for instance in a living religion—then we may say that the psyche is outside and that there is no psychic problem . . . .[27]

The difference between modern[28] and ancient man is that modern man possesses a fully independent ego. By withdrawing his projections from the world,[29] he has largely 'demythicized' it. He thereby experiences the world itself, unfiltered by his unconscious, and so is differentiated from both.

Invariably, modern man not merely separates himself from his unconscious but rejects it altogether. He thereby pits himself—his ego—against his unconscious, from which he is thus severed. Modern man regards himself as wholly rational, unemotional, scientific, and atheistic. Religion, through which earlier man had realized his unconscious, he dismisses as a pre-scientific delusion. The unconscious itself he similarly dismisses as a pre-scientific delusion. He identifies himself entirely with his ego: '. . . nowadays most people identify themselves almost exclusively with their consciousness, and imagine that they are only what they know about themselves. . . . Rationalism and doctrinairism are the disease of our time; they pretend to have all the answers'.[30] Where primitive man identifies himself wholly with the world, which in fact means with his unconscious, modern man identifies himself wholly with his ego, which *deals with* the world but is distinct from it.

Modern man's dismissal of the unconscious does not, however, eliminate it. He still partly projects it onto the world—for example, in superstitions,[31] which perpetuate *participation mystique*, and in the quintessentially modern belief in flying saucers.[32] Moreover, he continues to project his unconscious onto other persons:

> Modern science has subtilized its projections to an almost unrecognizable degree, but our ordinary life still swarms with them. You can find them spread out in the newspapers, in books, rumours, and ordinary social gossip. All gaps in our actual knowledge are still filled out with projections. We are still so sure we know what other people think or what their true character is. We are convinced that certain people have all the bad qualities we do not know in ourselves or that they practise all those vices which could, of course, never be our own. We must still be exceedingly careful not to project our own shadows too shamelessly; we are still swamped with projected illusions.[33]

Even though modern man projects his unconscious, his conscious dismissal of a non-rational side to himself means rejection of the unconscious: merely to express the unconscious is not, for Jung, to tend to it. Where the religiosity of primitive and ancient man constitutes recognition of a non-rational side to life, even if it gets projected onto gods, the atheism of modern man constitutes denial of even a projected non-rational side.

To convince modern man otherwise the unconscious forces itself upon him in the form of neurosis:

> When in the Babylonian epic Gilgamesh's arrogance and hybris defy the gods, they create a man equal in strength to Gilgamesh in order to check the hero's unlawful ambition. The very same thing has happened to our patient: he is a thinker who has settled, or is always going to settle, the world by the power of his intellect and reason. His ambition has at least succeeded in forging his own personal fate. He has forced everything under the inexorable law of his reason, but somewhere nature escaped and came back with a vengeance . . . . It was the worst blow that could be dealt to all his rational ideals and especially to his belief in the all-powerful human will. . . . Being highly rationalistic and intellectual he had found that his attitude of mind and his philosophy forsook him completely in the face of his neurosis and its demoralizing forces. He found nothing in his whole *Weltanschauung* that would help him to gain sufficient control of himself.[34]

The difference between contemporary[35] and modern man is that contemporary man is conscious of his non-rational side, whether or not of its Jungian source. Like modern man, who corresponds crudely to 19th-century man, contemporary, or 20th-century, man dismisses religion as a pre-scientific delusion. Unlike modern man, however, he is not satisfied with his scrupulously rational life, which he inherits from modern man, and yearns for the kind of fulfillment which religion provided. He seeks new, non-projective outlets to replace the dead, projective ones of religion.[36] He does not, like modern man, boast of having transcended the need which religion once fulfilled:

> But the conscious, modern [= contemporary] man can no longer refrain from acknowledging the might of the psyche, despite the most strenuous and dogged efforts at self-defence. This distinguishes our time from all others. We can no longer deny that the dark stirrings of the unconscious are active powers, that psychic forces exist which, for the present at least, cannot be fitted into our rational world order. . . . The revolution in our conscious outlook, brought about by the catastrophic results of the World War, shows itself in our inner life by the shattering of our faith in ourselves and our own worth. . . . The rapid and worldwide growth of a psychological interest over the last two decades shows unmistakably that modern man is turning his attention from outward material things to his own inner processes. . . . The psychological interest of the present time is an indication that modern man expects something from the psyche which the outer world has not given him: doubtless something which our religion ought to contain, but no longer does contain, at least for modern man.[37]

In identifying contemporary man with 20th-century man, Jung is deeming him not the average but the distinctive 20th-century man. Most persons living in Jung's time are either 'moderns', who are oblivious to any non-rational needs, or 'ancients', who are satisfied with traditional, projective means of fulfilling them. Because 'contemporaries' are sensitive to both the existence of non-rational needs and the demise of past means of fulfilling them, they comprise a select minority:

> . . . the man we call modern [= contemporary], the man who is aware of the immediate present, is by no means the average man. . . . The modern man—or, let us say again, the man of the immediate present—is rarely met with, for he must be conscious to a superlative degree. . . . Even in a civilized community the people who form, psychologically speaking, the lowest stratum live in a state of consciousness little different from that of primitives. Those of the succeeding strata [= ancients] live on a level of consciousness which corresponds to the beginnings of human culture, while those of the highest stratum [= moderns] have a consciousness that reflects the life of the last few centuries. Only the man who is modern in our meaning of the term really lives in the present; he alone has a present-day consciousness, and he alone finds that the ways of life on those earlier levels have begun to pall upon him. . . . [O]nly the man who has outgrown the stages of consciousness belonging to the past, and has amply fulfilled the duties appointed for him by his world, can achieve full consciousness of the present.[38]

Because contemporary man, unlike modern man, consciously experiences rather than ignores his non-rational needs, he does not suffer from ordinary neurosis, or threats to his ego from an ignored unconscious. Rather, he suffers from a sense of emptiness, or meaninglessness. Like modern man, he is severed from his unconscious, but unlike modern man he strives to overcome the severance. He is severed not because, like modern man, he spurns his non-rational side but because, as the heir of modern man, he does not know how to reconnect himself with it:

> Most of [my patients] already have some form of psychotherapeutic treatment behind them, with partial or negative results. About a third of my cases are not suffering from any clinically definable neurosis, but from the senselessness and aimlessness of their lives. I should not object if this were called the general neurosis of our age.[39]

As the quotation makes clear, distinctively Jungian patients are not moderns, who correspond more to Freudian patients, but contemporaries.[40]

The connection between this history of the psyche and Gnosticism is that Jung considers Gnostics, together with alchemists, the ancient counterpart to contemporaries and so to Jungian patients. Jung therefore sees his patients as the contemporary counterparts to ancient Gnostics. Like Gnostics, they feel alienated from their roots and are seeking to overcome the alienation.

As contemporaries, they feel alienated from something internal rather than external. They do not, like Gnostics, project their alienation onto the cosmos.

GNOSTICISM

Gnosticism is definable in various ways. Defined most narrowly,[41] it is an ancient Christian heresy. It arose out of Christianity in the 2nd century and eventually died out.

Defined more broadly,[42] Gnosticism is still a wholly ancient phenomenon, but it is not merely a Christian one. It is also both pre-Christian and non-Christian. It spans the whole ancient world and, indeed, encompasses Christianity rather than is encompassed by it. The Nag Hammadi discovery[43] establishes Gnosticism as at least a non-Christian, whether or not a pre-Christian, phenomenon.

Gnosticism here is the belief in radical, or antithetical, dualism: the opposition between immateriality, which is good, and matter, which is evil. In its fullest form it is, more specifically, the belief in radical dualism in man, the cosmos, and god; the primordial unity of all immateriality; the yearning to restore that unity; the present entrapment of a portion of immateriality in man; the need for knowledge to reveal to man that entrapment; and the need for a savior to reveal to him that knowledge.

Defined most broadly,[44] Gnosticism is a perennial phenomenon rather than merely an ancient, dead one. It is the belief in man's alienation from his true self, whether or not from any true world or god. It is the belief in man's alienation not from a specifically immaterial self, world, or god but from a true one of any kind.

Implicitly, Jung defines Gnosticism as an ancient but not merely Christian movement, and this second definition will be used here. Jungian psychology is therefore the contemporary counterpart to Gnosticism rather than the contemporary version of it. At the same time Gnosticism becomes the ancient version of something itself recurrent: man's alienation from his unconscious, which in Gnosticism is symbolized by man's alienation from his immaterial self.

Jung is not, to be sure, saying that because this alienation is recurrent, it is therefore universal. It still characterizes only a few at only certain times. For by alienation Jung means the feeling, not merely the fact, of severance from the unconscious. He therefore means neither modern man's obliviousness to his severed unconscious nor ancient man's merely indirect link to it through religious projection. He means the *awareness* of severance, whether or not the awareness of its source. Gnostics are alienated from their unconscious not because they, as ancients, would always experience it projectively but because they, like contemporaries, are presently unable to experience it even projectively.

The difference between contemporaries and Gnostics is that contemporaries overcome their alienation non-projectively. Through Jungian psychology they discover their true selves within rather than outside. In this additional sense they alone fully overcome their alienation.

THE POIMANDRES

The *Poimandres*, the myth which I will be interpreting in Jungian terms, is the first tractate of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, a collection of 14–18 ancient Greek philosophical texts. The Corpus is part of the Hermetica,[45] an array of Greek and Latin texts written in Egypt during the Greco–Roman period. The views of the Hermetica are disparate. The *Poimandres* is the Hermetic work most radically dualistic and so most Gnostic.[46]

Interpreted as a Gnostic myth, the *Poimandres*[47] is a revelation to the narrator, a searching Gnostic, by Poimandres, the highest god. The myth is a literal explanation of the beginning and the end of both the cosmos and man. It describes the origin of the material world by or from the immaterial godhead, the fall of immaterial Primal Man into that world, and the need to retrieve his human descendants from it.

The myth preaches radical dualism: the severance of all ties between immateriality and matter. Because those ties began with the emergence of the material world, if not of matter itself, the myth bemoans the creation of that world and preaches its dissolution. Only by escaping from it can the bits of immateriality trapped in human bodies be saved.

A JUNGIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE POIMANDRES

Understood psychologically, the *Poimandres* describes the development not of the world or even of man as a whole but of man's psyche. Its literal account of the development of the world must be made not merely human but psychological: not only must the cosmic level be reduced to the human, which simply projects itself onto the cosmos, but the human level must in turn be reduced from the external to the internal, from the physical to the mental.[48]

At the outset of the *Poimandres* there exists, or at least appears, only the immaterial godhead. Jung would say that it symbolizes the unconscious. As a symbol of the unconscious, it is primordial. Whatever its origin, if any, it is the source or agent of everything else and so, *vis-à-vis* everything else, is pre-existent. Having yet emanated nothing, it lacks nothing. It is whole, self-sufficient, perfect. It thus symbolizes the unconscious before the unconscious produces consciousness and thereby loses part of itself.[49]

As a symbol of the wholeness of the unconscious, the godhead is androgynous rather than exclusively male or female.[50] Ordinarily, for Jung, the initially androgynous godhead becomes a female god, whose bearing of a son symbolizes the emergence of consciousness out of the primordial unconscious.[51] The fact that in the *Poimandres* the godhead remains androgynous even after the emergence of a female Nature, a male Word and Demiurge, and an androgynous Primal Man suggests an insufficiently independent, or differentiated, consciousness. This state foreshadows the regression to unconsciousness preached subsequently by the myth.

As a symbol of the unconscious, the godhead is at least partly an impersonal principle. Like most of the archetypes which compose the unconscious, its emanations are largely personalities.

The emergence of raw matter alongside the immaterial godhead symbolizes the beginning, but only the beginning, of the emergence of ego consciousness out of the unconscious. Inert matter itself scarcely symbolizes ego consciousness, which requires a reflective, thinking entity conscious of itself as a subject *vis-à-vis* the external world. In contrast to raw matter, Nature is a living personality and thereby represents a later stage in the development of ego consciousness. But Nature, like the Word, the Demiurge, and Primal Man, is still a collective rather than individual personality. Not until there exists an individual subject *vis-à-vis* not only the natural world but also humanity collectively is there truly an ego. It emerges only with the birth of individual human beings out of the union of Primal Man and Nature.[52]

Man's ego is symbolized not by his soul but by the thinking part of his body, the unspecified center of his thoughts and actions in the natural world. Man's soul, as his link to the forgotten godhead, symbolizes the unconscious. As long as man remains unaware of the existence of his soul, he is an unrealized self. As long as his values are wholly material, he is merely an ego.

Because Jung's interpretation of myth is psychological, it collapses the literal distinction in the *Poimandres* between the outer world and man. Both matter and the body symbolize the development of the ego—raw matter symbolizing the beginning of the process and the thinking part of the body the end. Likewise both the immaterial godhead and man's soul symbolize man's unconsciousness, if also at opposite stages of development.

The ego, for Jung, emerges not just alongside the unconscious but also out of the unconscious, which initially exists alone. In the *Poimandres* the godhead, through its emanations, creates the material world out of matter, but it is not clear whether the godhead creates matter itself. The godhead *appears* alone at first but may not *exist* alone at first. If matter originates in the godhead, the *Poimandres* is expressing the true relationship between the ego and the unconscious: the dependence of the ego on the unconscious. If, alternatively, matter is pre-existent and merely comes into contact with the godhead, the myth is perhaps expressing the dissociation of the unconscious from the ego and is thereby foreshadowing the problems that this dissociation will spell.

The unconscious, for Jung, is naturally creative. It produces the ego spontaneously. Insofar as the godhead is an impersonal principle, its creation is willful. Still, the Jungian stress on the naturalness of creation abets the resolution of the key Gnostic paradox: why the godhead creates a world which it then seeks to undo.

The emergence of the ego is, for Jung, a gradual process. The *Poimandres*, to be sure, has no parallel to the stage between conception and birth: the 'uroboric' stage.[53] No sooner does the godhead conceive an emanation than it emanates it. Moreover, the *Poimandres* contains none of the long chains of emanations found in some other Gnostic myths. Still, not only the transformation of raw matter into Nature but somehow also the consecutive emanations of the Word, the Demiurge, and Primal Man, followed by the creation of the seven 'post-primal' androgynes, symbolize the gradualness of the transition from unconsciousness to ego.[54]

The emergence of the ego is not only a gradual process but also a difficult one. If, on the one hand, the unconscious is created spontaneously, on the other hand it clings possessively to its progeny. The ego, for its part, wants to be independent of the unconscious yet simultaneously clings to it for security.[55]

In the *Poimandres* the godhead freely and knowingly responds to matter by emanating parts of itself yet then strives to reclaim those parts from matter. In turn, matter, as Nature, yearns both to create and to be absorbed by the godhead. This mutually ambivalent relationship between the godhead and matter symbolizes well the relationship between the unconscious and the ego.

Once the ego has become independent, it inevitably forgets, if not rejects, it roots. As Marie-Louise von Franz says:

> . . . in every human being we meet with the same fact, namely, a pre-conscious totality in which everything is already contained, including consciousness, and at the same time something like an active tendency towards building up a separate consciousness, which, then, sometimes, in a Luciferian gesture, turns back to the pre-conscious totality and says: 'I was not created by you, I made myself'.[56]

As the symbol of an independent ego, material man is appropriately the first not only to be conscious of himself but also to forget his origin. Not Primal Man but only his human descendants identify their entire selves with their material selves and the entire world with the material world.

Like the emergence of the ego out of the unconscious, the forgetting of the unconscious by the ego is a gradual process. Parallel to the slow transition from primitive to modern man, the process is symbolized by the transition from Primal Man through the seven androgynes to ordinary human beings.

In the *Poimandres* non-Gnostics, who also possess souls, are not just ignorant of the true, divine nature of themselves and the world but also satisfied with the false, material nature of both. Their complacency makes them apt counterparts to moderns. Gnostics, as typified by the narrator, have also forgotten the true nature of themselves and the world, but they are nevertheless dissatisfied with the existing nature of both. Their dissatisfaction makes them suitable counterparts to contemporaries.

If, in the *Poimandres*, ignorance alone is what ultimately keeps man tied to the material world, knowledge is what ultimately frees him from it. Because man is ignorant, that knowledge must come from outside him. Because the material world is ignorant, too, that knowledge must come from outside it as well. The knowledge can come from only the godhead. Man's dependence on the godhead to reveal itself to him symbolizes the dependence of the ego on the unconscious to reveal itself to it.

In the *Poimandres* the Gnostic's response to the revelation, as typified by the narrator's, parallels the response of contemporary man: gratitude. For the revelation provides the fulfillment, projective or otherwise, which he has been seeking. His identification of himself with the revealed soul and godhead symbolizes his identification of himself with the unconscious and thereby parallels at least the inclination of contemporary man. Of contemporaries Jung can thus say:

> I do not believe that I am going too far when I say that modern [= contemporary] man, in contrast to his nineteenth-century brother, turns to the psyche with very great expectations, and does so without reference to any traditional creed but rather with a view to Gnostic experience.[57]

The presumable response of the non-Gnostic to the revelation parallels that of modern man: fear. For the revelation, which applies to him as well as to the Gnostic, shatters his vaunted image of both himself and the world.

On the one hand Jung says that all myths reveal the existence and significance of the unconscious. On the other hand he says that no believers in myth, including Gnostics, are aware of its psychological meaning. For all of them, myth, as a projection, reveals primarily an external, not internal, reality. What, then, distinguishes Gnostics from other believers in myth? How are they distinctively concerned with cultivating the unconscious? What makes them more like contemporaries than like other ancients? What makes their myths different from those of other ancients?

Nothing in fact distinguishes Gnostic myths from those of non-Gnostics. Myths for both reveal the existence and significance of the unconscious. The real difference is between Gnostics and non-Gnostics themselves. Gnostics may be no more aware of the unconscious than non-Gnostics, but they, as symbolized by the narrator, feel unfulfilled and so, like contemporaries, are consciously seeking new myths to provide the fulfillment traditional ones once gave:

> The psychological interest of the present time is an indication that modern [= contemporary] man expects something from the psyche which the outer world has not given him: doubtless something which our religion ought to contain, but no longer does contain, at least for modern man .... That there is a general interest in these matters cannot be denied.... I am not thinking merely of the interest taken in psychology as a science, or of the still narrower interest in the psychoanalysis of Freud, but of the widespread and ever-growing interest in all sorts of psychic phenomena, including spiritualism, astrology, Theosophy, parapsychology, and so forth. The world has seen nothing like it since the end of the seventeenth century. We can compare it only to the flowering of Gnostic thought in the first and second centuries after Christ. The spiritual currents of our time have, in fact, a deep affinity with Gnosticism.... What is striking about these Gnostic systems is that they are based exclusively on the manifestations of the unconscious .... The passionate interest in these movements undoubtedly arises from psychic energy which can no longer be invested in obsolete religious forms.[58]

Non-Gnostics feel no discontent. Those non-Gnostics who are nonbelievers are like moderns: they scorn the conscious need myth fulfills for believers. Those non-Gnostics who are believers are like ancients: their existing myths fulfill the conscious need they feel. Because Gnostics, other believers, and non-believers alike remain unaware of the psychological meaning of myth, the differences among them are over the conscious meaning of myth.

The *Poimandres* preaches man's total identification of himself with his newly discovered divinity. Because that identification symbolizes the Gnostic's identification with his unconscious, Jungian psychology would consider it as lopsided and as dangerous as the non-Gnostic's identification of himself with his ego consciousness. Jungian psychology would consider both attitudes unbalanced. It would say that the non-Gnostic, like modern man, suffers from an exaggerated persona: his ego identifies itself wholly with his conscious, public self. It would say that the Gnostic, whether or not contemporary man, suffers from an exaggerated, or 'inflated', ego, which, conversely, identifies itself wholly with the rediscovered unconscious.[59] The consequence of inflation is, minimally, excessive pride in the presumed uniqueness of one's unconscious; maximally, psychosis, or the utter dissolution of ego consciousness:

> ... the great psychic danger which is always connected with individuation, or the development of the self, lies in the identification of ego-consciousness with the self. This produces an inflation which threatens consciousness with dissolution.[60]

Despite faddish interpretations the Jungian aim is in fact no more to reject ego consciousness for the unconscious than, like the modern aim, to reject the unconscious for ego consciousness. The aim is, rather, to balance the two. This point will prove decisive.

In the *Poimandres* knowledge itself is liberating: the revelation of the existence of a higher reality automatically diminishes the hold of the lower one. Recognizing matter for what it is, the Gnostic ceases to grant it the status he had till now, even when he had been discontented with it. The freedom from matter given him by the revelation symbolizes freedom from ego consciousness and parallels that given contemporary man by his revelation.

With the revelation the Gnostic is at last free, not to say obliged, to forsake the material world altogether. With his revelation contemporary man, however, is not likewise free, let alone obliged, to forsake ego consciousness. His doing so would spell inflation. This continuing difference will, again, prove central.

For Jung, the cultivation of the unconscious involves a break with the present state of consciousness and a return to the unconscious. The goal is not, however, reversion to the original state of sheer unconsciousness but, on the contrary, the elevation of the unconscious—better, the symbols of it—to consciousness. Man returns to the unconscious for the purpose of raising it to consciousness, not for the purpose of regressing to unconsciousness:

> Man's worst sin is unconsciousness, but it is indulged in with the greatest piety even by those who should serve mankind as teachers and examples. When shall we stop taking man for granted in this barbarous manner and in all seriousness seek ways and means to exorcize him, to rescue him from possession and unconsciousness, and make this the most vital task of civilization?[61]

As Jolande Jacobi says of the return to the unconscious:

> Once the psyche reaches the midpoint of life, the process of development demands a return to the beginning, a descent into the dark, hot depths of the unconscious. To sojourn in these depths, to withstand their dangers, is a journey to hell and 'death'. But he who comes through safe and sound, who is 'reborn', will return, full of knowledge and wisdom, equipped for the outward and inward demands of life.[62]

Man does seek a re-unified state, as he possessed at birth, but now he seeks the integration of the unconscious with ego consciousness, not the restoration of sheer unconsciousness.[63] He now seeks to make the unconscious conscious, not the reverse. As Jung says of therapy:

> Accordingly, the therapeutic method of complex psychology consists on the one hand in making as fully conscious as possible the constellated unconscious

> contents, and on the other hand in synthetizing them with consciousness through the act of recognition.[64]

To exactly the extent that, for Jung, man can never make the unconscious completely conscious—'. . . the psychic wholeness comprehended in the unity of consciousness is an ideal goal that has never yet been reached'[65]—he falls short of his goal.

Alas, the goal in the *Poimandres* is the opposite: reversion to the original state of man and the cosmos, not the transformation of either. The goal is a return to the state prior to the emergence of both the material world and, as a separate entity, man himself. The goal is reversion to the state of a unified godhead: man's prescribed ascent culminates in his union with God. In Jungian terms, the goal is sheer unconsciousness, the state prior to ego consciousness. The state sought parallels not that of contemporary man but that of primitive man – and, even earlier, the uroboric state before birth. In shedding not simply his inert body but also his material values, man is shedding ego consciousness altogether. So enraptured, or inflated, is the author of the myth by his rediscovery of the unconscious that he abandons ego consciousness for it.

Accordingly, the *Poimandres* does not urge man to alter his soul or the godhead. It does not urge him to alter his body or the material world either. It most certainly does not urge him to fuse his soul with his body or the godhead with the material world. Rather, it urges him, which means his soul, to escape entirely from both his body and the material world and to restore both himself and the godhead to their pristine state. That state *is* one of unity, but the unity is of all divinity, not of divinity with matter. In two respects, then, the *Poimandres* preaches the opposite of Jung's psychological ideal: the return, first, is to the original state and, second, involves the rejection of the present one.

What for Jung is only a means to an end—return to the unconscious—is for the *Poimandres* equivalent to the end itself. What for Jung is the end—the integration of the unconscious with ego consciousness—is for the *Poimandres* equivalent to the present predicament itself: the association of divinity with matter. Conversely, what for the *Poimandres* is the end—the severance of the link between divinity and matter—is in Jungian terms the predicament: the dissociation of the unconscious from ego consciousness.

It is true that in the *Poimandres*, in contrast to many other Gnostic myths, creation is intentional. To that extent the *Poimandres* violates Jung's ideal less than other Gnostic myths do. Creation does, however, prove evil, and the aim remains to escape from it and to return to a state of sheer divinity.[66]

It is true that Nature, despite her chronic dependence on the godhead, scarcely wants simply to revert to either divinity or raw matter. She also wants to be a second creator herself. Indeed, in many other Gnostic myths the ruler of the material world and the highest god are rivals. At least in her desire to maintain her independence Nature in the *Poimandres* fits the proper state of consciousness for Jung. The myth itself, however, opposes her desire and seeks to topple, not bolster, her—the opposite of the Jungian aim.

It is true that at least in the *Hymn of the Pearl*,[67] among Gnostic myths, the final state of the psyche, as symbolized by the child, is different from the original one. The child not merely changes but matures: the robe he cast off at the beginning has grown by the end to accommodate his new size. His growth symbolizes the growth of his personality, which now ideally encompasses the raised unconscious as well as ego consciousness. In few, if any, other Gnostic myths, however, is there any permanent change in divinity, and the *Poimandres* itself hints of none.

It is true that in many Gnostic myths, including perhaps the *Poimandres*, matter originates out of divinity. One might, then, say that the Gnostic goal of reversion to the pristine state of the cosmos means the reunification of divinity with matter rather than their severance—escape from the material world as the means somehow aside. But in fact matter is not originally part of divinity, which originally exists alone. Matter does emerge out of divinity, but it does not lie latent in divinity. Its emergence constitutes a paradox: that sheer divinity, which is both omniscient and omnipotent, produces matter. Even in Gnostic myths which espouse primordial dualism, and so the initial separation of divinity from matter, the paradox exists: that divinity, still omniscient and omnipotent, succumbs to matter.

For Jung and the *Poimandres* alike, myth has a three-stage plot. Stage one, for both, postulates a pre-existent monolith: for Jung, of unconsciousness; for the *Poimandres*, of either sheer divinity or divinity isolated from matter. Stage two, for both, marks the beginning of creation and thereby of division: for Jung, into ego consciousness and unconsciousness; for the *Poimandres*, into either matter and divinity or material world and divinity. Either immediately or eventually, the division becomes an opposition.

Stage three, for both, resolves the opposition, but in antithetical ways. For the *Poimandres*, there is a complete return to stage one, the time before the emergence of either matter or the material world. For Jung, however, there is, ideally, the establishment of a new state, one which completes rather than undoes the realization of consciousness begun in stage two. Jung's progressive ideal is thus at odds with the regressive one of the *Poimandres*.[68]

JUNG'S INTERPRETATION OF GNOSTICISM

So far, it has been assumed that Jung equates divinity with the unconscious and matter—better, the unspecified thinking part of man's material self—with the ego. Certainly in his essay on Gnosticism he makes these equations, though he singles out Primal Man rather than ordinary man as the symbol of the ego.[69]

Jung first describes the primordial godhead:

> For instance, Epiphanius quotes an excerpt from one of the Valentinian letters, which says: 'In the beginning the Autopator contained in himself everything that is, in a state of unconsciousness [lit., "not-knowing": ἀγνωσία].'... So the 'Father' is not only unconscious and without the quality of being, but also *nirdvandva*, without opposites, lacking all qualities and therefore unknowable. This describes the state of the unconscious. . . . In him was Ἔννοια, consciousness . . . . But the presence of Ἔννοια does not prove that the Autopator himself is conscious, for the differentiation of consciousness results only from the syzygies and tetrads that follow afterwards, all of them symbolizing processes of conjunction and composition. Ἔννοια must be thought of here as the latent possibility of consciousness.[70]

Clearly, the godhead symbolizes the initial state of sheer unconsciousness.

Jung elsewhere uses the term 'God' for this initial state, but more often he applies that term to the final state, the state of the integration of the unconscious with ego consciousness. The godhead, which for Jung is largely an impersonal principle, embraces the whole psyche because it is not yet divided, or differentiated, into opposites. God, who for Jung is a full-fledged personality, encompasses the whole psyche because he reconciles opposites within himself. He thereby symbolizes the ideal state of wholeness, selfhood, or 'individuation':

> . . . these [Gnostic] symbols [of God] have the character of 'wholeness' and therefore presumably *mean* wholeness. As a rule they are 'uniting' symbols, representing the conjunction of a single pair or double pair of opposites, the result being either a dyad or a quaternion. They arise from the collision between the conscious and the unconscious . . . . The circle and quaternity symbolism appears at this point as a compensating principle of order, which depicts the union of warring opposites as already accomplished . . . . [T]his symbolism uses images or schemata which have always, in all the religions, expressed the universal 'Ground', the Deity itself.[71]

Jung identifies the 'Anthropos' ('Primal Man' or 'Original Man'), 'Christ', and the 'Son' with God. Exactly as in the *Poimandres*, the Anthropos begins as part of the unconscious godhead, emerges as an independent ego, eventually forgets his unconscious origin, must be reminded of it by the godhead, and then returns to it to form a unified self. Misleadingly identifying the Demiurge with the Anthropos, Jung says:

> The primordial image of the quaternity coalesces, for the Gnostics, with the figure of the demiurge or Anthropos. He is, as it were, the victim of his own

> creative act, for, when he descended into Physis, he was caught in her embrace. The image of the *anima mundi* or Original Man latent in the dark of matter expresses the presence of a transconscious centre which, because of its quaternity character and its roundness, must be regarded as a symbol of wholeness.[72]

As Jung says more clearly of Christ:

> This Gnostic Christ . . . symbolizes man's original unity and exalts it as the saving goal of his development. By 'composing the unstable', by bringing order into chaos, by resolving disharmonies and centring upon the mid-point, thus setting a 'boundary' to the multitude and focusing attention upon the cross, consciousness is reunited with the unconscious, the unconscious man is made one with his centre, . . . and in this wise the goal of man's salvation and exaltation is reached.[73]

Just as Jung associates the godhead with the unconscious and 'God', 'Anthropos', and 'Christ' with the self, so he ordinarily associates the Demiurge, together with the material side of man, with the ego. For example, he first compares the doctrine of the Sethian Gnostics, as described by Hippolytus, with that of the alchemists:

> It expounds, in Hippolytus' words, a theory of 'composition and mixture': the ray of light from above mingles with the dark waters below in the form of a minute spark. At the death of the individual, and also at his figurative death as a mystical experience, the two substances unmix themselves. This mystical experience is the *divisio* and *separatio* of the composite . . . . The separation or unmixing enables the alchemist to extract the *anima* or *spiritus* from the *prima materia*. . . . The result of the unmixing is that what was previously mixed up with the 'other' is now drawn to 'its own place' and to that which is 'proper' or 'akin' to it, . . . 'like iron to the magnet' . . . . In the same way, the spark or ray of light, 'having received from the teaching and learning its proper place, hastens to the Logos, which comes from above in the form of a slave . . . more [quickly] than iron [flies] to the magnet'.[74]

Like the Logos, Christ, the savior sent by God the Father, 'is the magnet that draws to itself those parts or substances in man that are of divine origin, the πατρικοὶ χαρακτῆρες (signs of the Father), and carries them back to their heavenly birthplace'.[75]

> 'This magnetic process', he then says, revolutionizes the ego-oriented psyche by setting up, in contradistinction to the ego, another goal or centre . . . . The myth of the ignorant demiurge who imagined he was the highest divinity illustrates the perplexity of the ego when it can no longer hide from itself the knowledge that it has been dethroned by a supraordinate authority.[76]

The toppling of the Demiurge by the true God symbolizes the toppling of the ego by the self as the center of consciousness:

> Gnosticism long ago projected this state of affairs into the heavens, in the form of a metaphysical drama: ego-consciousness appearing as the vain demiurge, who fancies himself the sole creator of the world, and the self as the highest, unknowable God, whose emanation the demiurge is. The union of conscious and unconscious in the individuation process . . . was projected in the form of a drama of redemption and, in some Gnostic systems, consisted in the demiurge's discovery and recognition of the highest God.[77]

As the quotation suggests, the ego is in fact less replaced than supplemented by the self, which subsumes it under itself. The aim, of therapy and Gnosticism alike, is, again, the integration of ego consciousness with the unconscious, not the rejection of either one for the other:

> When, in treating a case of neurosis, we try to supplement the inadequate attitude (or adaptedness) of the conscious mind by adding to it contents of the unconscious, our aim is to create a wider personality whose centre of gravity does not necessarily coincide with the ego, but which, on the contrary, as the patient's insights increase, may even thwart his ego-tendencies. Like a magnet, the new centre [= self] attracts to itself that which is proper to it, the 'signs of the Father', i.e., everything that pertains to the original and unalterable character of the individual ground-plan [for realization of the self]. All this is older than the ego and acts towards it as the 'blessed, non-existent God' of the Basilidians acted towards the archon of the Ogdoad, the demiurge . . . .[78]

As a magnet, Christ, for Jung, serves not to uproot the souls, or sparks, from their material state of ego consciousness and restore them to their primordial state of sheer unconsciousness but, on the contrary, to integrate the two states. Even if the sparks return to 'their heavenly birthplace', they return transformed: having developed into egos through their sojourn on earth, they now become integrated wholes, or selves.

On the one hand Jung recognizes that the magnetized Gnostic spark is part of divinity and so is distinct from the material world in which it lies. What he overlooks is that the return of the spark to the godhead thereby symbolizes the abandonment of ego consciousness and reversion to sheer unconsciousness—hardly the goal of therapy.

On the other hand Jung states that the goal of therapy is the development of a 'wider personality', in which the unconscious supplements, not supplants, the ego, even if the raised unconscious supplants the ego as the center of the psyche. What he overlooks here is that the spark is distinct from the matter in which it is embedded and that its escape from matter and return to the godhead therefore symbolize, again, the abandonment by the unconscious of ego consciousness, which the Demiurge and material man both symbolize, and reversion to sheer unconsciousness—hardly the enlargement of personality.

Despite Jung's acknowledgment that the sparks lie trapped in matter he fails to distinguish the two. He equates the awakened sparks as well as the threatened material entities with ego consciousness. Both may derive from the godhead, but they derive separately, and the return of the sparks means the rejection of everything material.

As long as the Demiurge, together with the material side of man, symbolizes ego consciousness, the final Gnostic state spells the rejection of it. The Gnostic's recognition of his divinity entails his rejection of his materiality and its creator. What Von Franz says of those Gnostic myths which deem the Demiurge evil applies nearly as fully to the *Poimandres*:

> In Gnosticism, there were several sects which believed that there was Elohim, a high God who was good and completely spiritual and who was not involved in creation, which was brought about by the evil Jahweh, whom they interpreted as being a Luciferian, devilish figure. This explained why creation is evil, so that, according to Gnostic teaching, Christ had to come down to redeem the people and lead their souls back to Elohim, to the highest and good God, who had never been involved in creation. . . . There you see that, in contrast to our [i.e., orthodox Christian] enormously positive evaluation of creation, i.e., consciousness, even in those times, there was this other evaluation that the passive one, the one who retired, the one who stayed out, is the positive figure, and the active one, the one who carried out creation, is a devilish, destructive agency. . . . This Gnostic idea is based on a feeling experience of [material] reality as being evil. Those who feel that creation and human life are a complete failure and should not have happened, that it is deplorable that there is such a thing as the reality in which we live, will attribute the predicate of evil to the creator of our world. Probably in this Gnostic myth there is a certain amount of Far Eastern influence; in Buddhistic teaching reality is looked on as being evil, and ego consciousness is evil. The aim of life is to escape from it.[79]

Jung may be interpreting Gnosticism through alchemical eyes. For, as noted, he considers the Gnostic process of liberating the immaterial sparks from matter the counterpart to the alchemical process of extracting gold from base metals. Where, however, gold is produced out of the metals, the sparks are scarcely produced out of matter. They presently lie in it, but imprisoned in it. Far from originating in matter, they have fallen into it and await release.

By contrast, gold originates in the metals. It lies not imprisoned in them but latent in them. It awaits not release but realization. Saying, then, that gold, like the sparks, is produced by extraction is misleading. Gold is produced not by shedding but by transforming the metals.

Indeed, gold is produced not merely by the distillation of vapor out of the metals but by the return of that vapor to the metals. Rather than escaping from them, the vapor is fused with them.

By contrast, the sparks, once liberated from matter, flee from it. They return not to matter but to the immaterial godhead, their true origin. A severance, not a fusion, occurs.

For Jung, the base metals, like the thinking side of the Gnostic's body, symbolize ego consciousness. Similarly, the vapor, like the sparks, symbolizes the unconscious. Where, however, the fusion of the vapor with the metals symbolizes the forging of the self, the reunion of the sparks with the godhead symbolizes, or should symbolize, reversion to primordial unconsciousness.

The reunion of the Gnostic with the godhead does mean reunification, but of a single side of man with itself, not with another side. To say, alternatively, that not matter but the Gnostic spark symbolizes ego consciousness, which then gets reintegrated with the unconscious, is to leave matter unexplained.

The equation of the godhead with ego consciousness and unconsciousness combined proves no more helpful. If at the outset the godhead is, as perfection, a fully realized self, then psychologically creation is superfluous. Moreover, the restoration of the pristine state of perfection still involves the rejection of matter, which still goes unexplained. If, alternatively, the godhead is only unconscious at the outset and realizes itself through creation,[80] then, contrary to the *Poimandres*, the end is different from the beginning. Indeed, if the godhead must, psychologically, create the world in order to realize itself, then creation is necessary rather than superfluous, beneficial rather than harmful, and so laudable rather than lamentable—the antithesis of the Gnostic view.

To say that the *Poimandres*, interpreted psychologically, violates rather than supports Jung's psychological ideal is scarcely to say that Jung cannot still interpret it. As stated earlier, Jung *should* say that, in psychological terms, the *Poimandres* evinces inflation, not individuation. He should say that it espouses the ego's rediscovery of the unconscious as an end in itself, not, as in the Jungian ideal, merely the means to an end. As Victor White says of Gnostic teachings:

> It is not, I think, difficult for the psychologist to see in these very doctrines the expression, we may say, a rationalisation, of a familiar psychological condition: indeed the symptoms of that tricky phase of inflated introversion which is a commonplace in most deep analyses, and which indeed is often stabilised in certain paranoiac psychoses. In analysis it is a critical juncture, for it is at once the moment of intensest inward vision, but also the moment of greatest danger when the very fascination of the power of that vision threatens to swallow consciousness and to alienate it from its environment. . . . Ego is identified with the newly activated function of inward vision, intoxicated, overwhelmed by it . . . . The subject is now indeed a gnostic, a Knowing One: one who sees that 'Inner World of Man' which is hidden from Tom, Dick and Harry: nay (and here lies the danger) may fancy himself its lord and master in the very fact of consciously assimilating it; and in seeking to master and possess it he is in danger of becoming increasingly mastered and possessed *by* it.[81]

If in his essay on Gnosticism in general Jung equates differentiated matter with ego consciousness and the godhead with the unconscious, in his passing discussion of the Gnostic *Hymn of the Pearl* in particular he reverses himself. Matter, here in its raw rather than differentiated state, now symbolizes the unconscious and the godhead ego consciousness. The question is not whether for Jung the same symbols can have opposite meanings within the same myths but whether, even if they can, the reversal of their meanings solves the problem their opposites pose.

Jung begins by stressing that the *Hymn of the Pearl* obliges man to descend to the material world in order to realize his divine, immaterial nature:

> We must surely go the way of the waters, which always tend downward, if we would raise up the treasure, the precious heritage of the father. In the Gnostic hymn to the soul, the son is sent forth by his parents to seek the pearl that fell from the King's crown. It lies at the bottom of a deep well, guarded by a dragon, in the land of the Egyptians—that land of fleshpots and drunkenness with all its material and spiritual riches. The son and heir sets out to fetch the jewel, but forgets himself and his task in the orgies of Egyptian worldliness, until a letter from his father reminds him what his duty is. He then sets out for the water and plunges into the dark depths of the well, where he finds the pearl on the bottom, and in the end offers it to the highest divinity.[82]

Cautioning that 'The descent into the depths always seems to precede the ascent',[83] Jung then describes a dream in which the dreamer, eager to climb a mountain, learns that he must first descend into the waters below: 'Here again the dreamer, thirsting for the shining heights, had first to descend into the dark depths, and this proves to be the indispensable condition for climbing any higher'.[84] This message

> . . . meets with violent resistance from the conscious mind, which knows 'spirit' only as something to be found in the heights. 'Spirit' always seems to come from above, while from below comes everything that is sordid and worthless. For people who think in this way, spirit means highest freedom, a soaring over the depths, deliverance from the prison of the chthonic world, and hence a refuge for all those timorous souls who do not want to become anything different. But water is earthy and tangible, it is also the fluid of the instinct-driven body, blood and the flowing of blood, the odour of the beast, carnality heavy with passion. The unconscious is the psyche that reaches down from the daylight of mentally and morally lucid consciousness into the nervous system that for ages has been known as the 'sympathetic'.[85]

Clearly, the descent to which Jung is referring is not, as in his essay on Gnosticism, the birth of the ego out of the unconscious but, on the contrary, the re-entry of the ego into the unconscious for the purpose of raising it to consciousness.[86] The birth of the ego described in the essay on Gnosticism is now presupposed and becomes the starting point rather than the end point of the journey. Matter now not only already exists rather than emerges but symbolizes the unconscious rather than the ego, which is now symbolized by divinity.[87]

Applied to the *Poimandres*, these new equations only reverse, not solve, the problems the original ones posed. First, the return of the newly independent ego to the unconscious should be for the purpose of raising it to consciousness, but in the *Poimandres*, as in the *Hymn of the Pearl*, the descent of the savior is for the purpose of extricating the sparks ensnared in matter. Rather than getting raised to consciousness, the unconscious therefore symbolically gets abandoned. As Jung's analysis of the *Hymn of the Pearl* makes clear, he conflates the pearl, which symbolizes the sparks, with the matter in which it is trapped, so that the retrieval of the pearl means the retrieval of matter.[88] In actuality, the pearl and matter are antagonists, so that the retrieval of the pearl means the rejection of matter. The return of the child to his parents is the equivalent of the reunion of ego consciousness with itself, not of the unconscious with ego consciousness.

Second, the return of the child in the *Hymn* may involve his transformation rather than his mere restoration, but in the *Poimandres*, as in other Gnostic myths, the return of Primal Man does not. The rejection of ego consciousness aside, the end cannot therefore represent the establishment of a new state of the psyche.

By this alternative interpretation the *Poimandres* compounds the psychological problems of the first interpretation. In the first interpretation man, living in ego consciousness, discovers the existence of the unconscious, out of which he came, which he once knew, which is true reality, which he must accept, and to which he must return. By this interpretation man returns permanently to the unconscious and thereby rejects ego consciousness.

In the second interpretation man likewise is living in ego consciousness and likewise discovers the existence of the unconscious. But in discovering the unconscious, man is not discovering that he fell into it from elsewhere and that it is false reality. He does discover that he must return to the unconscious, but only in order to extricate the 'pieces' of ego consciousness trapped in it. He does return permanently to ego consciousness, but exactly upon his rejection of the unconscious.

Where, by the first interpretation, the *Poimandres* succumbs to the unconscious, by this second one it spurns the unconscious, or at least tries to do so. Jung would clearly fault the second psychological state at least as severely as the first. It is the state of modern man: the state of the ego's identification with the persona.

Though Jung was working long before the Nag Hammadi discovery, familiarity with its contents would likely not have altered his views. Because he implicitly defines Gnosticism broadly, as radical dualism rather than as an exclusively Christian heresy, the discovery of above all non-Christian Gnostic texts would only have confirmed the appropriateness of his definition. Surely his skewed interpretation of Gnosticism as the resolution of the dualism would not have changed. Other issues raised anew by Nag Hammadi—notably, that of the historical origin of Gnosticism—would not seem germane. The discovery of so many primary Gnostic texts might, however, have made Gnosticism more accessible and so have enabled Jung to use it more fully than he does.

APPENDIX

The text of the *Poimandres*:[89]

(1) Once, when I had been reflecting on the things that are, and my thought had soared very high while the senses of my body had been curbed—like those asleep who have been weighed down by overeating or physical fatigue—it seemed to me that some exceedingly large, infinite being was calling my name and saying to me: What do you wish to hear and see and, having understood, to learn and know?

(2) I said: Who are you? I am, he said, Poimandres, the mind of absolute authority. I know what you wish, and I am with you everywhere.

(3) I said: I want to learn about the things that are, to perceive their nature, and to know God. How [much], I said, I wish to hear! He said to me again: Hold fast in your mind what you want to learn, and I will teach you.

(4) Having said this, he changed his form, and immediately all things opened up to me at once, and I saw a limitless sight: everything had become light, serene and happy. I fell in love with the sight. But shortly afterwards there appeared in one part [of the light] a darkness hanging downwards, dreadful and gloomy, coiling sinuously, so that to me it resembled a snake. Then the darkness changed into a kind of moist Nature, indescribably agitated and giving off smoke, as if from a fire, and uttering a kind of unutterable, mournful sound. Then an inarticulate cry went forth from it, as if it were a voice of fire.

(5) From out of the light a holy Word [i.e., Logos] mounted on Nature, and pure fire leaped out of the moist Nature upwards to the height. It [i.e., fire] was light, swift, and active all at once, and the air, being light, followed the fire, rising up from the earth and the water to the fire, so that it seemed to hang from it [i.e., fire]. The earth and the water [, however,] remained mingled, so that one could not see the earth [apart] from the water. But they were moved to obedience by the breath-like Word hovering over them. [Or: But they were kept in motion by hearing the breath-like Word hovering over them.]

(6) Poimandres said to me: Do you understand what this vision means? Yes, I said: I shall [i.e., resolve to] understand it. That light, he said, is I, Mind [i.e., Nous], your God, who antedates the moist Nature which appeared out of the darkness. The bright Word from Mind is the son of God. What then, I said? Know this: that which in you sees and hears [i.e., your word] is the Word of the Lord, and the mind [in you] is God the Father [i.e., Father Mind]. For they are not separated from each other. Rather, their union is [i.e., constitutes] life. Thank you, I said. [Poimandres:] Now, then, fix your mind on the light and familiarize yourself with it.

(7) With these words he gazed at me for a long time, such that I trembled at the sight of him. Then, when he had raised his head, I beheld in my mind the light which [now] consisted of countless powers and which had [now] become a limitless cosmos. The fire was encompassed by a great power and, having been subdued, stood still. This is what I saw, understanding it through the word[s] of Poimandres.

(8) As I was still astonished, he said to me again: You saw in the Mind the archetypal form, which antedates the infinite beginning. Thus Poimandres said to me. I said: From where, then, have the elements of Nature come? To this he said again: From the Will of God, which, having received the Word and having beheld the beautiful [archetypal] world, imitated it, making a world out of her own elements and [out of] her offspring, the souls.

(9) But the mind, God, being androgynous and life and light, brought forth, by means of a word, another Mind, the Demiurge, who, as god of fire and air [or: wind], fashioned seven Governors, who encompass the material world in their spheres. Their government is called Fate.

(10) At once the Word of God leaped out of the downward hanging elements into the pure [part of the] created [i.e., material] world and was united with the Demiurgical Mind, for it [i.e., Word] was consubstantial [with the Demiurge]. The downward hanging elements of Nature were left behind, deprived of reason, so that they were [i.e., became] sheer matter.

(11) Together with the Word, the Demiurgical Mind, encompassing the spheres and spinning them in a whirl, set his creations revolving and let them turn from an indeterminate beginning to an infinite end, for it [i.e., their revolution] begins where it ends. Their revolution, as the Mind wanted, brought forth from the downward hanging elements irrational living beings, for he did not grant them reason: the air brought forth birds, the water fish, and—the earth and the water having been separated from each other, as the Mind wanted—the earth brought forth from herself the animals which it had in itself: quadrupeds and reptiles, both wild and tame beasts.

(12) But the Mind, the Father of all, who is life and light, brought forth a [Primal] Man [i.e., Anthropos] equal to himself. He loved Man as his own son, for he [i.e., Man] was very beautiful, since he possessed the image of his Father. Actually, it was his own form which God loved. He [i.e., God] handed over to him all his creations.

(13) Having beheld what the Demiurge had created in the fire, Man wished to create as well, and the Father consented. So entering the Demiurgical realm, where he was to have full power, he beheld his brother's creations. The Governors loved him, and each gave him a share of his own position. After he had mastered their essence and had received a share of their nature, he wished to break through the bounds of their spheres and to learn well [or: subdue] the power of him who rules over the fire.

(14) So he [i.e., Man] who had full power over the world of mortal beings and irrational living beings bent downward through the harmony [of the spheres], having [already] broken through its exterior, and showed to downward hanging Nature the beautiful form of God. When she saw that he possessed insatiable beauty and every power of the Governors plus the form of God, she smiled with love. For she saw the image of the most beautiful form of Man in the water and its shadow over the land. When he [in turn] saw the form similar to himself existing in her in the water, he loved it and wished to inhabit it. Immediately

with the wish came the deed, and he [thus] inhabited the irrational form. When Nature had received her beloved, she embraced him completely, and they mingled, for they were lovers.

(15) For this reason man, distinct from all [other] living beings on earth, is two-fold: mortal through the body, immortal through the essential man. For although he is immortal and has power over all, he suffers mortality, for he is subject to Fate. Although he is above the harmony [of the spheres], he has become a slave to the harmony. Although he is androgynous, for he is from an androgynous father, and although he is sleepless, for he is from a sleepless father, he is conquered by love and sleep.

(16) After this [I said:] Oh my Mind. I, too, love [your] word [i.e., teaching]. Poimandres said: This is the mystery kept hidden until this day: Nature, having had intercourse with Man, brought forth the most wonderful wonder. Since he himself possessed the nature of the harmony of the seven, which, as I said to you, are of fire and air [or: wind], Nature did not delay but immediately brought forth seven men, corresponding to the natures of the seven Governors, androgynous and standing upright. After this [I said:] Oh, Poimandres, I have now had a great desire, and I desire to hear. Do not run away. Said Poimandres: Be quiet. I have not yet unfolded to you the first point. I said: I am quiet.

(17) The birth of these seven happened as follows, as I [i.e., Poimandres] said. The earth was the female and the water the male. From fire Nature took ripeness and from ether breath and brought forth the body corresponding to the form of Man. From life and light Man became soul and mind: from life soul and from light mind. All things in the material world remained thus until the end of a period of time and the beginnings of kinds.

(18) [Poimandres:] Hear the remaining point which you desire to hear. When the period ended, the bond binding all things was loosened by the will of God. All living beings, being androgynous, were separated at the same time as man. Some became males, others females. Immediately, God, through a sacred word, said: Increase in increase and increase in increase, all you creatures and creations. Let him who is thoughtful recognize that he is immortal and that the cause of death is love. And [let him recognize] all things that exist.

(19) When he [i.e., Poimandres] had said this, Providence, through Fate and the harmony [of the spheres], made the intercourses and established the generations, and all things were multiplied according to their species. He who has recognized himself comes into abounding good, but he who, out of the error of love, has loved the body remains in the dark straying, suffering through the senses the things of death.

(20) What sin so great, I [i.e., narrator] said, have the ignorant committed to be deprived of immortality? [Poimandres:] Indeed, you seem not to have heeded what you heard. Did I not tell you to think? [Narrator:] I am thinking and remembering and at the same time I am thankful. [Poimandres:] If you have thought, tell me, Why do those who are in death deserve death? [Narrator:] Because prior to the individual body is the gloomy darkness, from which [came] the moist Nature, of which the body was composed in the material world, by which death is watered.

(21) [Poimandres:] Indeed, you have understood correctly. But how does 'he who has recognized himself go toward him', as the word of God has it? I said: Because the Father of all things is composed of light and life, and from him Man is born. [Poimandres:] You have spoken well. Light and life are God and Father, from

whom Man was born. If, then, you learn that he [i.e., Man] is [composed] of light and life and that you [i.e., narrator] are [composed] of them, you will go back to life. This is what Poimandres told me. I said. But tell me yet, How will I go to life, oh my Mind? For God says, 'Let the thoughtful man recognize himself'.

(22) [I said:] Do not all men possess mind? [Poimandres:] Be quiet, you there who are chattering. I myself, Mind, am present with holy, good, pure, merciful, and pious men, and my presence proves helpful [to them]. Immediately they recognize all things, propitiate the Father with love, and give thanks, praising and hymning him regularly with love. Before handing over the body to its proper death they loathe the senses, for they know their effects. Even more so, I myself, Mind, will not permit the effects which attack the body to be fulfilled. As the gatekeeper, I will close off the entrances to the evil and shameful effects by cutting off the[ir] imaginations.

(23) But to the foolish, evil, wicked, envious, selfish, murderous, and impious ones I am far away, giving way to the avenging demon. By increasing the sharpness of the fire, he attacks one through the senses and prepares him for more lawless actions, so that he may meet with more tortures. He does not cease having his desire for inordinate desires, which fight in the dark insatiably, and this tortures [him] and further increases the fire in him.

(24) [I said:] You have taught me well all things, Oh Mind, as I wished. But tell me yet of the ascent which takes place. To this Poimandres said: First, upon the death of the material body you hand over the body itself for alteration, and the form which you had becomes invisible. You hand over your [now] inactive character to the demon. The senses of the body return to their own sources, becoming part [of them] and rising together again in their [i.e., sources'] energies. Passion and desire go to the irrational nature.

(25) In this way man then rushes up through the harmony. At the first zone he gives up the power to grow and decrease; at the second, malice, [hereafter] powerless; at the third, lust, [hereafter] powerless; at the fourth, pride, [hereafter] without surplus; at the fifth, audacity; at the sixth, covetousness [growing out] of wealth, [hereafter] powerless; and at the seventh zone, deceit.

(26) Then, having been stripped of the effects of the harmony, he comes to the eighth nature [i.e., zone], possessing his own power, and with the beings there hymns the Father, and those who are present rejoice at his [i.e., man's] presence. Having been made like those who are with [him], he also hears certain powers beyond the eighth nature [i.e., zone], hymning God in a sweet voice. Then, in order, they go up to the Father, hand themselves over to the powers, and, having become powers, enter into God. This is the good end for those who possess knowledge: to be deified. Why do you delay further? Since you have received everything, will you not become a guide to the worthy, in order that through you the human race may be saved by God?

(27) Having said this, Poimandres mingled with the powers. After I had thanked and praised the Father of all things, I went free from him, having been strengthened and taught [by him] the nature of everything and the greatest vision. I began to proclaim to men the beauty of piety and of knowledge: Oh people, earthborn men, you have surrendered yourselves to drunkenness and sleep and to ignorance of God. Be sober, cease your debauchery, spellbound as you are by irrational sleep.

(28) When they had heard, they came in unanimity. I said: Why, earthborn men, have you surrendered to death when you have the power to share in

immortality? Repent, you who have journeyed with error and have shared in ignorance. Leave the dark light and, having forsaken death, share in immortality.

(29) Some of them, chattering on, withdrew, surrendering themselves to the way of death. But others cast themselves at [my] feet and begged to be taught. I raised them up and became the guide of the race, teaching the words, how and in what way they will be saved. I planted in them the words of wisdom, and they were nourished by immortal water. When evening came and the ray of the sun began to sink, I exhorted them to thank God. When they had fulfilled their thanksgiving, each man went to his own bed.

(30) I wrote down for myself [or: I inscribed in my memory] the kindness of Poimandres, and having been filled with what I had desired, I greatly rejoiced. The sleep of the body became the wakefulness of the soul, the closing of the eyes true vision, my silence pregnant with the good, and the utterance of the word the offspring of good things. This happened [to me] when I received from my Mind—i.e., Poimandres—the word of absolute sovereignty. Being divinely inspired by the truth, I came. Therefore with all my soul and strength I give praise to God the Father.

(31) Holy is God, the Father of all.
Holy is God, whose will is done by his own powers.
Holy is God, who wants to be known and is known to his own.
Holy are you, who through the Word have created what exists.
Holy are you, of whom all nature became an image.
Holy are you, whom nature has not formed.
Holy are you, who are stronger than every power.
Holy are you, who are greater than every excellence.
Holy are you, who are better than praises.

Accept rational, pure sacrifices from a soul and heart which stretch out toward you, [oh] unspeakable, ineffable one named in silence.

(32) I pray that I may not fall from the knowledge of that which is appropriate to our being: grant me [this] and strengthen me. With this grace I will enlighten those of [my] race who are in ignorance—my brothers, your sons. Therefore I believe and bear witness. I go to life and light. Blessed are you, Father. Your man wishes to sanctify [together] with you, just as you have given over to him all authority.

NOTES

1 C. G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, Aniela Jaffé (ed.), translated by Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), 200. See also Jung, *Alchemical Studies*, The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Sir Herbert Read, Michael Fordham and Gerhard Adler (eds), translated by R. F. C. Hull, Leopold Stein and Diana Riviere, Bollingen Series XX, XIII (Princeton: Princeton University, 1968), 3.

2 Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 205.

3 See Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy*, The Collected Works, XII, second Edn (Princeton: Princeton University, 1968), *passim; Alchemical Studies, passim; Mysterium Coniunctionis*, The Collected Works, XIV, second Edn (Princeton: Princeton University, 1970), *passim*. See also Jung, 'The Psychology of the Transference', in his *The Practice of Psychotherapy*, The Collected Works. XVI, first Edn (New York: Pantheon, 1954), 162–323; 'The Fish in Alchemy', 'The

Alchemical Interpretation of the Fish', and 'Background to the Psychology of Christian Alchemical Symbolism', in his *Aion*, The Collected Works, IX, part 2, second Edn (Princeton: Princeton University, 1968), chapters 10–12.

4 See Jung, 'Gnostic Symbols of the Self', in his *Aion*, chapter 13. See also Jung, 'Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious', in his *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, The Collective Works, IX, part 1, second Edn (Princeton: Princeton University, 1968), 18; 'Religion and Psychology: A Reply to Martin Buber', in his *The Symbolic Life*, The Collected Works, XVIII (Princeton: Princeton University, 1976), 663–670; 'The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man', in his *Civilization in Transition*, The Collected Works, X, second Edn (Princeton: Princeton University, 1970), 83–84; reply, in Howard L. Philp, *Jung and the Problem of Evil* (London: Rockliff, 1958), 235–239; reply, in Richard I. Evans, *Jung on Elementary Psychology*, revised Edn (New York: Dutton, 1976), 67–70; *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 200–201, 205; *Alchemical Studies*, 3–4; Foreword to Victor White, *God and the Unconscious* (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1961), 20–21; Foreword to Erich Neumann, *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*, in his *The Symbolic Life*, 621–622; Foreword to Gilles Quispel, *Tragic Christianity*, ibid., 651–653; 'Address at the Presentation of the Jung Codex', ibid., 671–672, 826–829. See also Jung's own Gnostic myth, 'Seven Sermons to the Dead', in his *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 378–390.

5 Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 201. See also Jung, *C. G. Jung Speaking*, William McGuire and R. F. C. Hull (eds), Bollingen Series XCVII (Princeton: Princeton University, 1977), 350; *Alchemical Studies*, 3–4.

6 Jung, *Alchemical Studies*, 3. Jung gives an additional reason for the greater accessibility of alchemy: that 'the Gnostic systems consist only in small part of immediate psychic experiences, the greater part being speculative and systematizing recensions' (ibid.). Cf. Jung, *Letters*, Gerhard Adler and Aniela Jaffé (eds), translated by R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XCV (Princeton: Princeton University, 1973), I, 553–554.

7 See Jung, 'Psychology and Religion', in his *Psychology and Religion: West and East*, The Collected Works, XI, first Edn (New York: Pantheon, 1958), 98–102; *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, 290, 301, 346, 437; 'Transformation Symbolism in the Mass,' in his *Psychology and Religion: West and East*, 209.

8 Jung, 'Psychology and Religion', 97. See also ibid., 96; 'Background to the Psychology of Christian Alchemical Symbolism', 173, 181; 'The Structure and Dynamics of the Self', in his *Aion*, 232–233; *Psychology and Alchemy*, 24–25, 372; *Alchemical Studies*, 4, 147, 204, 205, 220. On the influence of Gnosticism on alchemy see H. J. Sheppard, 'Gnosticism and Alchemy', *Ambix*, 6 (December 1957), 86–101.

9 On Jung's interpretation of alchemy see Walter Pagel, 'Jung's Views on Alchemy', *Isis*, 39 (May 1948), 44–48; Philip Mairet, 'Dr. Jung and the Alchemists', *Fortnightly*, 181 (January 1954), 55–61; Aniela Jaffé, *From the Life and Work of C. G. Jung*, translated by R. F. C. Hull (New York: Harper, 1971), chapter 2; Mircea Eliade, *The Forge and the Crucible*, translated by Stephen Corrin (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971), 156–166, 195–198, 221–226; Luther H. Martin, Jr., 'A History of the Psychological Interpretation of Alchemy', *Ambix*, 22 (March 1975), 16–20.

10 Jung, 'Psychology and Religion: A Reply to Martin Buber', 664.

11 Jung, 'The Structure and Dynamics of the Self', 223.

12 Ibid., 222. See also Jung, 'The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man', 83–84;

'Address at the Presentation of the Jung Codex', 672, 828–829; 'On the Psychology of the Unconscious', in his *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, The Collected Works, VII, second Edn (Princeton: Princeton University, 1966), 66, 77; *Psychological Types*, The Collected Works, VI (Princeton: Princeton University, 1971), 241–242. See also Hans Schaer, *Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology*, translated by R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XXI (New York: Pantheon, 1950), 165–166, 182–183.

13 Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 201. On alchemists as unconscious of the psychological meaning of their activities see Jung, *Psychology and Alchemy*, 244–245; 'The Psychology of the Transference', 208.

14 Jung, *Psychological Types*, 19.

15 Jung, 'Gnostic Symbols of the Self', 184, 190.

16 Various interpreters consider Jung's affinity with Gnostics not only psychological but also metaphysical. Martin Buber (*The Eclipse of God*, translated by Maurice S. Friedman and others [New York: Harper, 1952], chapters 5 and 9) deems Jung Gnostic on the grounds that the Gnostic elevation of man to god is no different from what he deems Jung's atheistic reduction of god to man. Conversely, Stephan A. Hoeller (*The Gnostic Jung and the Seven Sermons to the Dead* [Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing, 1982], *passim*) considers Jung Gnostic on the grounds that the Theosophical tradition in which Jung purportedly believes includes Gnosticism, along with every other instance of mysticism. Thomas J. J. Altizer ('Science and Gnosis in Jung's Psychology', *Centennial Review*, 3 [Summer 1959], 304–320) labels Jung Gnostic on the grounds that Jung rejects rational, scientific knowledge of the external world for mystical knowledge of the unknown self. Maurice Friedman (*To Deny Our Nothingness* [New York: Dell, 1967], chapter 9) calls Jung a distinctively modern Gnostic: like ancient Gnostics, espousing salvation by knowledge, rejection of the external world for the inner world of the self, and the divinity of the self; unlike ancient Gnostics, substituting the self alone for the union of it with an external deity. In response to these metaphysical assessments Jung continually insists that he is only a psychologist: see 'Religion and Psychology: A Reply to Martin Buber', 663–670; Foreword to White, *God and the Unconscious*, 20–21; reply, in Philp, 235–239; *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 348; *Letters*, II, 570–573, 583–584. See also James W. Heisig, *Imago Dei* (Cranbury, NJ: Bucknell University, 1979), 185n98.

17 Jung explicitly distinguishes the first three stages: see the references in notes 20 and 28. See also Erich Neumann, *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, translated by R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XLII (Princeton: Princeton University, 1970), *passim*. The distinction between modern and contemporary is only implicit, and Jung uses the term 'modern' for both.

18 See, for example, Jung, *Analytical Psychology* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 6–7; *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 348–349; 'The Stages of Life', in his *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, The Collected Works, VIII, second Edn (Princeton: Princeton University, 1969), 387–391. See also Neumann, 5–127; M. Esther Harding, *The 'I' and the 'Not-I'*, Bollingen Series LXXIX (New York: Pantheon, 1965), chapters 1–3; Gerhard Adler, *Studies in Analytical Psychology* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1969), 120–136.

19 See Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, 8–9.

20 On primitive man see Jung, 'Archaic Man', in his *Civilization in Transition*, 50–73. Although Jung refers to primitive man throughout his writings, this

essay is his sole work on primitive man alone. See also Jung, 'Approaching the Unconscious', in Jung and others, *Man and His Symbols* (New York: Dell Laurel Editions, 1968), 6–8; 'The Psychology of the Child Archetype', in Jung and Carl Kerényi, *Essays on a Science of Mythology*, translated by R. F. C. Hull, Bollingen Series XXII (Princeton: Princeton University, 1969), 72–73. See also Adler, 127–129; Schaer, 103–106; Harding, 38–40; Harding, *Psychic Energy*, second Edn, Bollingen Series X (Princeton: Princeton University, 1963), 332–333; Antonio Moreno, *Jung, Gods, and Modern Man* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1970), 9–14.

21 On projection see Jung, *Analytical Psychology*, 153–154. See also Harding, *Psychic Energy*, 331–334.

22 See Jung, 'Archaic Man', 55–68.

23 Ibid., 63–65.

24 On *participation mystique* see the references in note 20 and Heisig, 206n40.

25 See, for example, Jung, 'The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man', 79.

26 Jung devotes no single work to ancient man, whom he discusses throughout his writings.

27 Jung, 'The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man', 79.

28 On modern man see Jung, 'Psychology and Religion', 5–105. See also Jung, *The Undiscovered Self* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1957), *passim*. On the change from ancient to modern man see Adler, chapter 7.

29 See, for example, Jung, 'Psychology and Religion', 83; 'Approaching the Unconscious', 85.

30 Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 300.

31 See, for example, Jung, 'Approaching the Unconscious', 86.

32 See Jung, *Flying Saucers*, translated by R. F. C. Hull (New York: Signet Books, 1969), *passim*. Jung deems flying saucers distinctively modern because they are technological rather than, like religion, supernatural phenomena and therefore fit modern man's scientific self-image.

33 Jung, 'Psychology and Religion', 83.

34 Ibid., 16, 31–32.

35 On contemporary man see Jung, 'The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man', 74–94. Despite the title this essay is Jung's chief writing on contemporary, not modern, man. See also Jung, 'Psychotherapists or the Clergy', in his *Psychology and Religion: West and East*, 327–347. On the distinction between contemporary and modern man see Peter Homans, *Jung in Context* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979), 185–186.

36 See, for example, Jung, *The Undiscovered Self*, 122–124; *Flying Saucers*, 115.

37 Jung, 'The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man', 80–83.

38 Ibid., 74–76.

39 Jung, 'The Aims of Psychotherapy', in his *The Practice of Psychotherapy*, 41. See also Jung, 'Approaching the Unconscious', 76–78, 84; *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, 140, 143–144, 250–253, 340; 'Psychotherapists or the Clergy', 330–331, 335–338; 'Problems of Modern Psychotherapy', in his *The Practice of Psychotherapy*, 70; 'Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology', in his *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 356. See also Schaer, 166–193; Aniela Jaffé, *The Myth of Meaning*, translated by R. F. C. Hull (New York: Penguin, 1975), 146–148.

40 See Anthony Storr, *C. G. Jung*, Modern Masters Series (New York: Viking, 1973), 76–78.

41 See, notably, Adolf Harnack, *History of Dogma, I*, translated by Neil Buchanan *et al.* I (Boston: Little, Brown, 1899), chapter 4; Carsten Colpe, *Die religionsgeschichtliche Schule* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1961), *passim*; A. D. Nock, 'Gnosticism', *Harvard Theological Review*, 57 (October 1964), 255–279; anonymous 'Proposal for a Terminological and Conceptual Agreement with Regard to the Theme of the Colloquium', in *Le Origini dello Gnosticismo*, Ugo Bianchi (ed.), Supplements to *Numen*, No. XII (Leiden: Brill, 1967), xxvi–xxvii.

42 See, notably, Wilhelm Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1907), *passim*; Richard Reitzenstein, *Poimandres* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1904), *passim*; Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, translated by Kendrick Grobel, I (New York: Scribner, 1951), chapter 15; Kurt Rudolph, *Gnosis*, translated by Robert McLachlan Wilson, P. W. Coxon and K. H. Kuhn (San Francisco: Harper, 1983), esp. 56–59.

43 See James M. Robinson (ed.), *The Nag Hammadi Library in English* (San Francisco: Harper, 1977), esp. 6, 9, 10.

44 See, notably, Hans Jonas, *Gnosis und spätantiker Geist*, first Edn, II, part I (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1954), *passim*; Jonas, 'Myth and Mysticism: A Study of Objectification and Interiorization in Religious Thought', *Journal of Religion*, 49 (October 1969), 315–329; Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, second Edn (Boston: Beacon, 1963), 'Epilogue'.

45 On the Hermetica see above all A.-J. Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, 4 vols (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1944–1954), *passim*; Joseph Kroll, *Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. XII, parts 2–4 (Münster: Aschendorf, 1914), *passim*; Wilhelm Kroll, 'Hermes Trismegistos', in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, VIII, part I (1912), 792–823; Walter Scott and A. S. Ferguson, *Hermetica*, 4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924–1936), *passim*; G. R. S. Mead, *Thrice-Greatest Hermes*, 3 vols (London and Benares: Theosophical Publishing, 1906), *passim*; Arthur D. Nock and A.-J. Festugière, *Corpus Hermeticum*, Budé Series, 4 vols (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1945–1954), *passim*; J. M. Creed, 'The Hermetic Writings', *Journal of Theological Studies*, 15 (July 1914), 513–538; St. George Stock, 'Hermes Trismegistus', in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, James Hastings (ed.), VI (1913), 626–629. For Nag Hammadi Hermetic texts see Robinson, 292–307.

46 To be sure, by the narrowest definition, the one adopted at Messina, the *Poimandres* qualifies as only proto-Gnostic: see 'Proposal for a Terminological and Conceptual Agreement with Regard to the Theme of the Colloquium', xxvii–xxviii.

47 On the *Poimandres* see, in addition to the references in note 45, Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, *passim*; H. Gundel, 'Poimandres', in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, XXI, part I (1951), 1193–1207; C. H. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks* (London: SPCK, 1935), part II; Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, chapter 7; Frank Granger, 'The Poemandres of Hermes Trismegistus', *Journal of Theological Studies*, 5 (April 1904), 395–412; Ernst Haenchen, 'Aufbau und Theologie des "Poimandres"', *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 53 (1956), 149–191; H. Ludin Jansen, 'Die Frage nach Tendenz und Verfasserschaft im Poimandres', in *Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Gnosticism*, Geo Widengren (ed.) (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksells, 1977), 157–163; Birger A. Pearson, 'Jewish Elements in *Corpus Hermeticum* I

(Poimandres)', in *Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religions*, R. van den Broek and M. J. Vermaseren (eds) (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 336–348.

48 For Jungian interpretations of Gnosticism see Gilles Quispel, 'C. G. Jung und die Gnosis', *Eranos-Jahrbücher*, 37 (1968), 277–298; Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion*, first Edn (Zurich: Origo, 1951), *passim*; Quispel, 'Gnosis and Psychology', in *The Rediscovery of Gnosticism*, Bentley Layton (ed.), Supplements to *Numen*, No. XLI, I (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 17–31; Quispel, 'Gnostic Man: The Doctrine of Basilides', in *Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks*, Joseph Campbell (ed.), translated by Ralph Manheim, Bollingen Series XXX, VI (Princeton: Princeton University, 1968), 210–246, in which, to be sure, Quispel deems Basilides' experience more mystical than psychological; Victor White, 'Some Notes on Gnosticism', *Spring* (1949), 40–56; White, *God and the Unconscious*, chapter 11; Marie-Louise von Franz, *Patterns of Creativity Mirrored in Creation Myths* (New York: Spring, 1972), 75–76, 124–130, 139–140, 195–197; Luther H. Martin, 'Jung as Gnostic', in *Essays on Jung and the Study of Religion*, Luther H. Martin and James Goss (eds) (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1985), chapter 4. For a brief quasi-Jungian interpretation of Gnosticism see F. C. Burkitt, *Church and Gnosis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1932), 43 ff. On this interpretation see C. H. Dodd, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1953), 107nl.

49 See Neumann, 5–9.

50 See ibid., 13, 18.

51 See Jung, *Symbols of Transformation*, The Collected Works, V, second Edn, (Princeton: Princeton University, 1967), part II. See also Neumann, *passim*, esp. 125; Neumann, *The Great Mother*, translated by Ralph Manheim, Bollingen Series XLVII (Princeton: Princeton University, 1972), *passim*..

52 To be sure, Jung himself interprets both the Demiurge and at times Primal Man as symbols of a full-fledged ego. See below, pp. 329–334.

53 See Neumann, *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, 5–38.

54 See Von Franz, 190–213.

55 See Jung, *Symbols of Transformation*, 171–305, esp. 235–236, 271, 297–298, 303–304, 355–356. See also Neumann, *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, 39–191, esp. 114–115.

56 Von Franz, 73.

57 Jung, 'The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man', 84.

58 Ibid., 83–84.

59 On inflation see Jung, 'The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious', in his *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, 139–147. See also Jaffé, *The Myth of Meaning*, 81–82; Jolande Jacobi, *The Way of Individuation*, translated by R. F. C. Hull (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1967), 57.

60 Jung, 'Concerning Rebirth', in his *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, 145.

61 Jung, 'The Phenomenology of the Spirit in Fairytales', in his *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious*, 253–254. See also Jung, reply, in Philp, 10–14.

62 Jolande Jacobi, *Complex/Archetype/Symbol in the Psychology of C. G. Jung*, translated by Ralph Manheim, Bollingen Series LVII (Princeton: Princeton University, 1967), 186. See also ibid., 183–185. See also Jung, *Symbols of Transformation*, 347–348.

63 Thus if Jung praises the introverted East, in contrast to the extraverted West, for its attention to the unconscious, he faults it for one-sidedly seeking to

return to the unconscious altogether rather than to raise it to consciousness: see *Psychology and Religion: West and East*, part II, esp. 493.

64 Jung, 'Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious', 40.

65 Jung, 'On the Nature of the Psyche', in his *The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*, 175.

66 David Cox (*Jung and St. Paul* [London: Longmans, Green, 1959], 126–127) denies that Jung is Gnostic on exactly this ground: that where for Jung the 'move' from unconsciousness to even ego consciousness is positive, for Gnosticism the 'move' from 'pre-creation' to even pre-fallen creation is negative.

67 On the *Hymn of the Pearl* see Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, chapter 5.

68 Jung's progressive ideal fits Theosophy far better than Gnosticism, so that Hoeller should not argue that Jung is a Theosophist because he is a Gnostic.

69 For these same equations see White, 'Some Notes on Gnosticism', 44–51; White, *God and the Unconscious*, 209–219; Cox, 126–127; Von Franz, 75–76. On the godhead as a symbol of the unconscious see Jung, *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, 462. See also Neumann, *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, 118–119. See also Jung's 'Seven Sermons to the Dead', which describes the emergence of ego consciousness out of the unconscious, its forgetting of the unconscious, and its consequent need to reintegrate itself with the unconscious. On the 'Seven Sermons' see Heisig, 31–33; Heisig, '*The VII Sermones*: Play and Theory', *Spring* (1972), 206–218; Judith Hubback, 'VII Sermones ad mortuos', *Journal of Analytical Psychology*, 11 (July 1966), 95–111; June Singer, *Boundaries of the Soul* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972), 328–334; Robert S. Steele, *Freud and Jung* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 287–290.

70 Jung, 'Gnostic Symbols of the Self', 190–191.

71 Ibid., 194–195.

72 Ibid., 197–198.

73 Jung, 'Transformation Symbolism in the Mass', 292.

74 Jung, 'Gnostic Symbols of the Self', 187.

75 Ibid., 185–186.

76 Ibid., 189.

77 Jung, Foreword to Neumann, *Depth Psychology and a New Ethic*, 621–622.

78 Jung, 'Gnostic Symbols of the Self', 189–190.

79 Von Franz, 75–76.

80 Jung interprets God this way in 'Answer to Job', in his *Psychology and Religion: West and East*, 357–470.

81 White, *God and the Unconscious*, 210–211.

82 Jung, 'Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious', 18.

83 Ibid., 19.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid.

86 As Jung says, 'Water is the commonest symbol for the unconscious' (ibid., 18).

87 Of the drowning of the Egyptians at the Red Sea Jung says, similarly, that they symbolize the ego which, oblivious to the unconscious to which it descends, is overwhelmed by it: see *Mysterium Coniunctionis*, 199–200. The child himself in the *Hymn of the Pearl* nearly succumbs for the same reason.

88 See, similarly, Jung's parallel interpretation of a patient's dream of descent to the sea to find buried treasure, which, however, is part of the sea rather than something distinct buried in it: see *Psychology and Alchemy*, 117–120. See also

Jung, *Symbols of Transformation*, 330–331. See also Neumann's interpretation of the hero's liberation of the captive or the treasure from the archetypal dragon: both the captive and the treasure are part of the unconscious world from which they are liberated. See *The Origins and History of Consciousness*, 195–219.

89 The translation, based on the text of Nock and Festugière, is my own. For other translations see Scott and Ferguson, I, 114–133; Mead, II, 3-20; Festugière, in Nock and Festugière, I, 7–19; Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, 148–153; William R. Newbold, in *Selections from Hellenistic Philosophy*, ed. Gordon H. Clark (ed.) (New York: Appleton–Century–Crofts, 1940), 192–200; F. C. Grant, in *Gnosticism*, Robert M. Grant (ed.) (New York: Harper, 1961), 211–219; Robert Haardt, in *Gnosis*, Robert Haardt (ed.), translated by J. F. Hendry (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 167–176; Werner Foerster, in *Gnosis*, Werner Foerster (ed.) translated by R. McL. Wilson, S. G. Hall, David Shill and G. C. Stead, I, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 328–335.

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THE TREE OF LIFE AND THE TREE OF DEATH: A STUDY OF GNOSTIC SYMBOLS

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This article is an analysis of the symbol of the Tree in Gnostic religion. The most striking characteristic of this symbol is that its qualities and functions are determined more by anthropology than by botany. In Gnostic religion the physiological processes of human fertilization and gestation are used as metaphors for the process of making a spiritual man. The Tree is life-giving, and can be perceived as being either female or male. In the latter case, the male generative Tree is opposed by a female Tree of death. The symbol of the Tree is applied both in Christian Gnostic systems and in systems which are not Christianized. The Tree can be personalized and may be associated either with Jesus or with Eve. In the Conclusion, the problem of the Tree as a universal symbol is discussed.

INTRODUCTION

The tree is one of the universal symbols and is prominent in Gnostic religion. Like the Christian symbol of the Tree, the Gnostic one has its roots in Judaism. These three religions influenced each other mutually in the 2nd and 3rd century A.D., and the development of the Gnostic symbol took place both dependently and independently of the other two religions. Their common source is the Paradise myth of Genesis with the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge. The Gnostics reinterpreted and re-evaluated the myth and made it a corner-stone in their mythical systems. The main characteristic of these systems is their dualistic world-view. This dualism is reflected in Gnostic theology as an opposition between the transcendent God and the god who made this world. The Gnostics identified the God of the Old Testament with the evil creator of the material world. In the Genesis account they detected symbols which were channels of communication with the transcendental world. These symbols were connected with their re-evaluation of Genesis, and with their conclusion that what was forbidden and guarded by the demiurge and his angels must be valuable for the Gnostics. Thus, both the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge became mediators of instruction and sacrament.

In Gnostic religion, the symbol of the Tree draws together different levels of existence, structures the Gnostic conceptual universe and formulates the

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Gnostic world-view. It is both sensory and ideologically determined, with its roots in human biology and its branches in Gnostic ideology.[1] The most striking characteristic of the symbol is that its qualities and functions are determined more by anthropology than by botany. It is not primarily woody but human. It is intimately connected with human biology and human physiological processes, with sexual values and with male and female lines of orientation. If the values of the symbol were placed on a continuum, at one end of the continuum the Tree is linked with seed, milk and blood, at the other it is linked with spiritual generation, spiritual growth and spiritual nourishment. A distinction can be made between two different forms of the symbol, one where weight is laid on human biology and another where weight is laid on personalization: the Tree may be associated with seed and milk, spiritual generation and nourishment, or it may be associated with the spiritual Eve and the fruits of wisdom or with Jesus and his teaching. In the case of Eve and Jesus, there is a distinction between a person who metamorphoses into a Tree, and a person who talks from the Tree. Both are Instructors, and as such givers of spiritual life.

The species of the Tree seems to be of minor importance. Where it is specified, the Tree tends to be an olive tree, a fig tree or a date palm. Often it is not specified, or the Tree bears characteristics of different trees, which underlines that it is not primarily a factual tree with arboreal characteristics, but a symbol associated with human qualities. To a certain degree, a distinction is made between the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge, either as conjunction or as contrast. When the two trees complement each other they represent stages in the process of acquisition of knowledge, but when they oppose each other they represent the contrast between spiritual life and biological life. Whether the Tree of Life or the Tree of Knowledge represents the negative pole in the opposed pair follows no fixed pattern, but varies in the different texts. Sometimes two groups of trees, corresponding to two types of Paradises, confront each other: the Paradise of Eros is confronted with the Paradise of Justice in the *Origin of the World*,[2] and the Paradise is confronted with the Garden of Joseph the Carpenter in the *Gospel of Philip*.[3] In the respective paradises, the trees are in conjunction, and represent different aspects of the process of salvation or of life in the material world.

According to the special Gnostic dualistic world-view with its contrast between matter and spirit, the human being must develop into a spiritual being. The physiological processes of human fertilization and gestation are therefore apt metaphors for the process of spiritualization. At the same time, the dualistic world-view of Gnosticism is naturally opposed to human sexuality and develops a polarity between the male and the female related to the contrast between spirit and matter. Thereby the female tree becomes ambiguous: it is alternatively a symbol for maternal fertilization and nourishment associated with spiritual wisdom and spiritual love, and a symbol of female sexuality and conception associated with desire and death.

In this investigation, several textual sources of Gnostic religion are explored with regard to their use of the symbol of the Tree. The sources consulted are those Gnostic texts in which the symbol is prominent, supplemented by the accounts of the Church-fathers.[4] As in Gnostic religion in general, iconographic representations are lacking.[5] The first two parts of the investigation are concentrated upon Gnostic elaborations of the trees of Genesis, with no attempt made to be exhaustive. Considerations about the Tree as a universal symbol, will be left for the conclusion.

THE TREE OF SPIRITUAL LIFE

A basic meaning of the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life is that of communicating spiritual insight, often associated with a female life-giver. In the *Hypostasis of the Archons* both trees are female trees connected with the female Spirit. The Spirit is primarily a giver of life and mythologically determined through a female fertility symbolism. When the archons, the angels of the world-maker, try to rape the spiritual Eve to catch her spiritual element, she escapes and metamorphoses into the Tree of Life. In the form of the Serpent she talks to man from the Tree of Knowledge.[6] The Trees and the Serpent thus become vehicles for the Spirit. By eating from the Tree, man receives the knowledge of how to discern between spiritual reality and its material shadow, and is able to perceive his own lack of spirit. This is a necessary precondition for spiritual progress. In *Hypostasis of the Archons*, the Tree of Knowledge represents the preliminary knowledge, whereas the Tree of Life symbolizes the highest knowledge and is identified with the Holy Spirit. The two trees thus represent an ascending curve through which the process of salvation is completed and true life is obtained.[7] Characteristic of both trees is personalization. They are both fused with a female revealer from whom they achieve their symbolic meanings. The spiritual female has both a generative and a nourishing function, she is the mother of Adam who gives him life and soul and who gives him spiritual knowledge to nourish his soul.

The personalized tree needs not be female, Jesus also speaks from the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life. He is not, however, fused with the Tree, but is identified with the serpent, or with an eagle as in the *Apocryphon of John.*[8]

Male and female life-giving functions are brought together in the Tree of Life, as is the case in the *Megale Apophasis*, an exposition of or a paraphrase over Simonian *gnosis*.[9] Here the physiological foundation of the symbol is stressed. This exposition views man as an unformed creature developed as a foetus in the womb, allegorically described as the Garden of Eden.[10] In the 'garden' the child 'neither takes nourishment with the mouth nor breathes with its nostrils'. To be completed, man must be both generated and nourished.

Both functions have their basis in the first principle of being, which is likened to fire. This fire is turned into two parts just as blood is turned into seed in the male and into milk in the female, i.e. the generative power and the nourishment for what is generated. This fire is like the flaming sword which turned itself about to guard the way to the Tree of Life. Like the sword, man must turn himself to come to the Tree of Life. Because man is not fully formed in the womb, he must come to the Tree of Life to be both generated and nourished, and thus become 'a perfect fruit fully formed'. The male symbolism plays upon *sperma* and *logos spermatikos*. The female symbolism plays upon milk and spiritual nourishment. Both are drawn together in the Tree of Life. The female aspect of the symbol is deepened in the allegory of 'Molly'—the plant of Circe:[11] this plant has a fruit like milk whose power is to turn beasts into men, to remould and reform them.

The version of the Tree of Life which is found in *Megale Apophasis* is an example of a symbol which is not personalized, but which is strongly rooted in human biology. The symbolic meanings of spiritual generation and spiritual growth are built upon explicitly expressed biological and physiological references connected directly with the Tree. In this case it is not mediated through a person such as through Eve and Jesus. *Hypostasis of the Archons* and *Megale Apophasis* give a personal and a biological formulation of the same symbol, respectively. These two formulations are not opposites, but rather complement each other. For instance in *Hypostasis of the Archons* the biological aspect lies implicit in the symbolic meanings of Eve as a spiritual life-giver and a spiritual consort. A biological undercurrent gives power and value to the symbol. Both in its biological and in its personal formulation the symbol may have either male or female values, or both.

The Tree is not only a cognitive symbol, but also has cultic connotations. It is either a ritual symbol or a symbol with ritual aspects. In Gnostic religion it is usually connected with oil or chrism,[12] but it may also be associated with the eucharist. In the first case, it is part of a male system of symbols with meanings in the *continuum* from seminal generation to spiritual perfection. When the Tree is connected with the eucharist, it may be identified either with the Tree of the Cross and associated with Jesus or with the Trees of Knowledge and Life and associated with the spiritual Eve.

Characteristic of the sacramental chrism is the stress laid on its whiteness and formative qualities. It gives form to that which hitherto has lacked form, i.e. has lacked spiritual quality. In the *Gospel of Philip* spiritual generation is affected by the chrism and through Christ. This spiritual generation is seen in contrast to carnal generation. The first gives form, the second does not. The contrast between that which has form and that which has not is symbolized in the contrast between man and beast, and connected with the two opposed trees. The Tree of Knowledge is the tree from which Adam ate and which bears beasts. It made Adam into an animal, and he in turn also brought forth animals. It also created death for those who ate of it. In other words, the Tree of Knowledge is here made equivalent to a Tree of Death. The Tree of Life, on the other hand, is the one whose fruits bear men.[13] The contrast between form and lack of form is further interpreted as a contrast between being a son or not, which is a typical Valentinian concept of man as a female creation lacking form, who must be begotten again by the male in order to receive form. It is a main point in the theology of the *Gospel of Philip* that one must become a son to receive salvation: 'For things are not imperishable, but sons are. Nothing will be able to receive imperishability if it does not first become a son'.[14] The giving of form is effected through the chrism,[15] which comes from the Tree of Olives.[16,17]

Related ideas are found in the ritual and the Diagram of a Gnostic group called Ophians.[18,19] The Tree of Life is the dominant symbol both in the ritual and in the Diagram. This symbol has its origin in the spiritual world. In the ritual, the neophyte, called Young Man and Son, is anointed by one who is called Father. The neophyte answers: 'I have been anointed with white ointment from the Tree of Life'.[20] The relationship between the cultic father and the cultic son mirrors the relationship between the Father and the Son in the world above. When the neophyte is anointed with the chrism, he no longer belongs to the domain of the archons' power, but has become 'a perfect work for the Son and the Father'. The function of the anointing is to purify, generate and nourish, with stress on generation as expressed through the Father/Son relationship.

Both the *Gospel of Philip* and the ritual of the Ophians connect the chrism with the Tree of Life and with spiritual begetting. The biological and physiological basis of the symbol is the male semen and the act of begetting. From this basis it expands its area of references towards the meaning of spiritual perfection.[21,22] It may also have reference to Jesus, and thus have a personal aspect.

The chrism from the Tree of Life is closely related to the fruits from the Tree of Knowledge. The 'fruits from the Tree of Knowledge' is used in a similar way both as a metaphor for spiritual wisdom, and as a sacramental symbol. As a sacramental symbol it is particularly associated with the eucharist; it is connected either with Jesus or with the Spirit (the spiritual Eve), and stands thus in a clearly personalized context. Jesus is seen as the one who taught men to eat from the Tree of Knowledge.[23] In *Pistis Sophia* he teaches from both the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge:[24] 'Because even for the righteous themselves who have never done evil, and have not committed sins at all, it is necessary that they should find the mysteries which are in the Books of Jeu, which I caused Enoch to write in Paradise when I spoke with him from the Tree of Knowledge and from the Tree of Life'. Alternatively Jesus is identified with the fruits of knowledge. The Tree of the Cross is hereby associated with the Tree of Knowledge.[25] The female Spirit is identified with the Serpent who taught from the Tree or with the Tree from which Adam and Eve ate the spiritual knowledge. Chronologically it seems as if this female personalization is the original in Gnosticism and that the Christian version is an elaboration of this.[26]

The symbolism of eating and, thereby, incorporating the fruits of knowledge may also find its expression in an eucharistic celebration. The common Christian interpretation did not make sense in the Gnostic eucharist. The understanding of the eucharist as containing the flesh and the blood of the Lord was meaningless in a Gnostic context, and it could even be blasphemous. In Gnosticism the eucharist developed other symbolic meanings, especially meanings which were fruitful in relation to the common Gnostic pattern of symbolism. The bread and the wine, the flesh and the blood, became symbols of the spiritual realities of *logos* and *pneuma*.[27] Gaffron has convincingly demonstrated how the eucharist in the *Gospel of Philip* became a symbol for the mysterious presence of the Syzygos, the spiritual half of the fallen soul.[28] In the eucharist, the eschatological union of the soul with the archetypal angel is anticipated and expressed in an eucharistic prayer: 'You who have joined the perfect, the light, with the Holy Spirit, unite the angels with us also the images'.[29,30] One context from which the mythologemes of the cross and the eucharist derive their meaning in Gnosticism, is the Gnostic interpretation of Genesis and the account of the Tree of Knowledge whose fruits were eaten.

There is a curious example of Gnostic communion without Christian reference, which corresponds to the mythology of eating the fruits of the Tree of Knowledge. It is handed down by Epiphanius, and has been regarded as a late and foreign element in Gnosticism, brought in by the mystery-religions and deriving both its external form and its symbolic meaning from them.[31] The rite is attributed to the Ophites: according to Epiphanius, the members of this sect had a serpent which they kept in a chest. At their eucharist, they brought the serpent out of the chest and made it crawl upon a table covered with loaves of bread. They then ate the bread and kissed the serpent on its mouth. After that they fell down before the serpent. The rite ended with a hymn to the Father Above.[32]

The mystery-religions may have played a part in the development of this rite, but one context of the rite is the Gnostic interpretation of Genesis and the myth of the Tree of Knowledge. Through the different Gnostic interpretations, we are well acquainted with the Gnostic plays on words which identified the spiritual Eve, the Serpent and the Tree of Knowledge or Life. Their common denominator is the Spirit. It is the Spirit in the form of Eve who was taken out of Adam's side. It is the spirit in the form of the serpent who teaches man to eat of the Tree of Knowledge. And it is the Spirit who metamorphoses into the Tree of Knowledge or Life.[33] In Gnostic religion the Serpent is a prominent spiritual symbol, as is revealed in the Gnostic self-designations (*ophites, ophians, naasenes*). The spiritual Eve is the heavenly counterpart of man and is identified with the serpent. The symbolism of the attempted union with the heavenly counterpart is in this ritual expressed through kissing the mouth of the serpent and by eating the bread, symbolizing the fruits of the Tree. It is a symbol for obtaining *gnosis* and life in a visible form, and thus a means of integrating the person into the Gnostic community. The sexual aspect of the communion is crudely concrete in one of the scandal stories of Epiphanius: according to him a Gnostic group in Egypt identified the semen with the body of Christ while the menstrual blood was identified with His blood. The last identification was supported with the allegory of the Tree of Life in *Rev.* 22:2: 'I saw a tree which bears twelve fruits each year, and he said to me, "This is the Tree of Life"'.[34] In this case spiritualization is thought of both as fertilization through the white male seed and as fertilization through the red female blood.[35]

The eating of the fruits of the Tree, realized in a sacrament or implied in a myth, has several related meanings: to awaken the soul from the stupor in which it was cast by the demons[36] and from its sleep,[37] to discover lack of spirit and acquire saving knowledge, expressed as an anticipation of the spiritual union with the co-image of the fallen soul. The last meaning points to the Valentinian sacrament of the bridal-chamber and makes the eucharist a natural expression of the Gnostic ritual pattern related to the spirit/fertilization symbolism.

THE TREE OF DEATH

The variation between the Tree of Knowledge being associated with the female Spirit or with the male Jesus is connected with another type of variation: when the Tree of Knowledge is associated with the female Spirit, it tends to be in conjunction with the Tree of Life as two stages in an ascending curve of salvation. When, on the contrary, it is associated with Jesus, it tends to be in opposition to a female Tree of Death. The symbol of the Tree thus becomes the source of a mythology expressing the basic polarization of existence. Gnostic thinking is a reflection on opposites and results in polarities along male and female lines of orientation.

The concept of the evil Tree is found in several of the Gnostic writings.[38] It is connected directly with the archons as a symbol of their existence and of mundane life.[39] Fundamentally this tree is a tree of ignorance connected with sexuality, death and darkness which are the prime characteristics of material existence,[40] contrasted with *gnosis*, life and light. When the evil Tree is opposed to the true Tree of Life, it is a further contrast between female and male, beast and human, serpent and eagle. In the *Book of Baruch*, the good

Tree of Life is identified with the paternal angel, Baruch, while the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil is associated with the maternal angel Naas ('serpent'). The evil mother of Naas is both female, bestial and serpential. Naas and the maternal angels are especially connected with sexuality and all sorts of sexual defilements.[41] In other words, *Baruch* associates material existence, sexuality, femaleness and bestiality and contrasts them with spiritual existence, asceticism, maleness and humanness. The contrasts are symbolized through the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Life. In the *Apocryphon of John*, the serpent is associated with the evil Tree of Life, while the eagle is associated with the good Tree of Knowledge.[42] In this case, the two trees have cosmological connotations: the Tree of Life, in reality a Tree of Death, has its roots in the underworld, is spoken from by the serpent and attended by woman, while the Tree of Knowledge is spoken from by the Saviour in the form of an eagle and attended by man. Thus these two trees reflect the Gnostic comprehension of a dualistic cosmos with its world-tree split asunder. Material existence, as opposed to spiritual existence, is expressed by the contrasted trees. Material existence is described as female/bestial and spiritual existence is described as male/human.[43]

In Valentinian Gnosticism, with its stress upon tripartite divisions of existence into material, psychic and spiritual elements, the polarity of the two trees can be substituted for the typical Valentinian trinity. The Paradise is conceived of as a Garden with three-fold order and with food from three kinds of trees. The creator only wants Adam to eat from the evil trees, not from the tree with the double fruit, which is the psychic, and even less from the Tree of Life which is the spiritual.[44]

The evil Tree may have explicit sacramental connotations and be opposed to the Tree of instruction and life. In the *Origin of the World*, for instance, there is a fully developed symbolism of evil sacramentalism. According to *Origin of the World*, both the grapevine and Eros sprouted up from the blood of the world-maker's female angel (Pronoia). The blood of this virgin is honoured by the archons. Sexual intercourse is derived from Eros, and those who drink from the grapevine acquire the desire for intercourse.[45] The Paradise of Eros with its different trees is contrasted with the Paradise of Justice containing the Tree of Immortal Life, the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Olives.[46] The blood of the virgin is an example of a gynecological symbol which has received a negative value in Gnosticism.[47] It has become an archontical sacramental substance and is connected with the Paradise of Eros, with the grapevine and with intercourse. It is explicitly contrasted with the holy, life-giving water which purifies. This makes a ritual circle of blood, grapevine and intercourse which is the polar opposite of the ritual circle of the sacraments, the trees and spiritual generation. To the circle of evil is attached the female sphere of earth, woman, marriage, reproduction and death.[48]

In the *Gospel of Philip* the evil tree has developed still another dimension. Besides being the tree of carnal generation which leads to death, it is also identified with the Law and has become the tree of the Law: 'That one (the Tree of Knowledge) killed Adam, but here the Tree of Knowledge made men alive. The Law was the tree. It has power to give the knowledge of good and evil. It neither removed him from evil, nor did it set him in good, but it created death for those who ate of it. For when he said 'Eat this, do not eat that', it became the beginning of death'.[49] Here the Law is drawn into the context of evil with its symbolism of femaleness, intercourse, and death and its sacramental overtones. In like manner in the *Gospel of Philip*, Judaism is contrasted with Christianity, symbolized along the male/female lines: 'When we were Hebrews we were orphans and had only our mother, but when we became Christians we had both father and mother'.[50] The different aspects of this symbolism are interrelated. From a Gnostic point of view, there exists a direct connection between the sphere of sexuality and the Law. This connection has its roots in the anthropogony of Genesis and in the destiny God laid down for man. Of the different prescriptions and prohibitions, the command 'Be fruitful and multiply' became for the Gnostics the special characteristic of the Law and of its maker. The Law is regarded as an expression and initiator of a pattern of behaviour characteristic of the state of fall. This pattern is expressed in condensed form in sexual behaviour which thereby became its chief symbol.[51]

The theological dualism fundamental to Gnostic thinking, is also symbolized in the opposed trees: in Marcion, for instance, the God of the Old Testament is identified with the Evil Tree, while the father of Jesus is identified with the Good Tree.[52]

A main determinant of the Gnostic symbol of the Tree is the male/female lines of orientation. This orientation is part of a general Gnostic system of symbols. For analytical clarity it is desirable to distinguish between two main formulations of this system, found both in Christian-gnostic texts and in Gnostic texts without Christian connotations. The two systems [(a) and (b) below] appear mixed.

(a) Lack of spiritual insight is conceived of as the lack of the quality of life. The spiritual life is connected with a female life-giver. Either the maternal aspect of the life-giver or her sexual aspect can be stressed—or these two aspects can be mixed. This system is present when the spiritual Eve, being both mother and spouse, is associated with the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge.

(b) Lack of spirit is conceived of as the lack of fertilizing *sperma*. The world below and what belongs to it are conceived of as products of the womb and likened to abortions. They may then be categorized as works of the feminine. Their opposite is the male life-giving principle, which may even be conceived of in the symbol of an ityphallic god.[53] According to this system man is an abortion, because he is a product of the female and lacks spirit/sperma. However, the abortive state also includes an aspect of potentiality. When the abortion is fertilized, it becomes a living child and a product of the male. Alternatively or in addition, the need of a male partner rather than a father in the process of spiritualization can be stressed: the fallen female soul must be united with its male spiritual counterpart, as expressed in the eschatological wedding of the fallen Sophia and the Saviour. According to this system, the Tree is generative and male, a sacramental symbol which transforms a beast into a human being and an abortion into a child. Thereby the neophyte is given a new identity and integrated into the Gnostic community. There is a tendency to lay stress on male symbolism in ritual connections, especially in the Valentinian branch of Gnostic religion. This is probably a consequence of institutionalization. According to Green, 'if one placed all the Gnostic movements on a continuum, those subscribing to Valentinian Gnosticism may have been most institutionalized'.[54] Rituals often presuppose organization and hierarchy, authority and social control, and those in power are those who formulated ideology. This may suggest an interrelationship between the male-dominated organization and the male-dominated theology.

The contrast between the two trees stresses the dynamism inherent in the symbolic system, its power to invoke change and development. The member of the Gnostic community proceeds from material existence to spiritual existence. Gnostic religion thus is a clear example of the fundamentally religious process of transcending the biological nature. The Evil Tree of procreation and death contrasted with the Good Tree of spiritual generation and life is one set of Gnostic symbols which conceptualizes the tension between the two poles of being, their inherent dynamism and, thereby, gives nourishment to the process.

CONCLUSION

In the history of religions there have been two extremes in the analysis of symbols. According to the first, a religious symbol can be examined as part of *one* cultural system of symbols. According to the second it can be examined as part of a universal system of symbols. In the first case, the religious symbol is seen as meaningful only in relation to other symbols in the cultural system. In the second case, the meaning of the symbol is clarified only by comparison with similar symbols in a universal system of symbols. This second approach is especially advocated by Mircea Eliade, by many regarded as the leading historian of religions in the post-war period. In his symbol theory, he has concentrated on the Cosmic Tree as a chief example of a universal or archetypal symbol.[55] In the present investigation the symbol of the Tree has been examined in its Gnostic context. It is of use here to make a few comments on the Tree as a universal symbol and Eliade's point of view.

According to Eliade,

> 'it is impossible to understand the meaning of the Cosmic Tree by considering only one or some of its variants. It is only by the analysis of a considerable number of examples that the structure of a symbol can be completely deciphered. Moreover, one can understand the meaning of a certain type of Cosmic Tree only after having studied the most important types and varieties. Only after an elucidation of the special meanings of the Cosmic Tree in Mesopotamia or in ancient India can one understand the symbolism of Yggdrasil or the Cosmic Trees of Central Asia and of Siberia. In the science of religions, as elsewhere, comparisons are made in order to find both parallels and distinctions.'[56]

The network of latent or manifest associations and meanings in the symbol are revealed when it is analyzed in relation to the universal archetype. If Eliade's concept is applied to Gnostic religion, it would involve an interpretation of the local Tree symbols in the Gnostic religion using the archetypal symbol of the Cosmic Tree. In at least one case this would appear to be useful. In the analysis of the Tree of Life and the Tree of Knowledge in the *Apocryphon of John*, the serpent and the eagle are related to different trees. According to Eliade, the Cosmic Tree is a symbol which connects different levels of Cosmos. The conjunction of the Serpent and the Eagle 'express in iconography or in myths, the mystery of the totality of cosmic unity'.[57] When the two trees of the *Apocryphon of John* are seen in this context, it becomes clear that they represent a Cosmic Tree which has been split in two. No single Cosmic Tree can bridge the gap in the Gnostic dualistic Cosmos. This interpretation is based upon Eliade's archetypal Cosmic Tree and upon the symbol of *coincidentia oppositorum*.

However, another procedure could be pursued, i.e. to use an historical approach in an analysis of the Gnostic system of symbols. The Gnostic sources repeatedly reveal that their authors were well acquainted with contemporary mythological and philosophical thinking. What they have done in the case of the *Apocryphon of John*, is to explore the possibilities of symbols of Trees and of polarities of Serpent and Eagle found in different connections in surrounding religions, and fused them with the Trees of Genesis. This type of interpretation uses a limited historical approach and not the broad comparative approach which would include Yggdrasil and the Siberian Cosmic Tree.

It could be questioned why the Tree is a universal symbol (in the sense that it occurs in many religions), and what kind of significance it has as a universal symbol. Even if Eliade admits that almost everything could be used as a symbol, his many works in the history of religions emphasize certain 'basic patterns in comparative religion'. Some symbols are used more frequently than others, and are called archetypal.[58] According to Eliade, symbols of wide circulation, like the Cosmic Tree, have been diffused from a few centers or even from one center of origin: 'In this case, we might be permitted to hope that one day the *history* of the Cosmic Tree may be reconstructed, by pinning down the center of origin, the path of diffusion, and the different values with which this symbol has been endowed during its migrations.'[59] Thus, Eliade sees symbols as universal because of their historical diffusions.

To Eliade, the symbol of the Tree expresses both man's experience of his own existence and man's experience of his place in the world in relation to the real, that is, the Sacred. For him symbols in general have a cosmological character, and are not primarily concerned with human biology and physiology. He stresses the capacity of a symbol to reveal a profound structure of the world. The Cosmic Tree '*reveals the World as a living totality*, periodically regenerating itself and, because of this regeneration, continually fruitful, rich and inexhaustible' (his italics).[60] Because of its form, qualities and manner of development, it is an analogy of this living world. It is a symbol that displays the Sacred in all its modalities.[61]

In Gnostic religion, however, the Tree is primarily connected with the microcosmos, man, and only secondarily with the macrocosmos, the world. The symbol is rather based on human physiology and biology than on cosmology. This is perhaps one important universal feature in the Tree symbol. Its global occurrence can be seen as depending mainly on the similarities between the tree and the human being, only secondarily on the similarities between the Tree and macrocosmos, and not on historical diffusion on a large scale. Like man, the tree is an erect growing organism, and is easy to associate with human qualities and a natural system of symbols based on the human body and processes of the body.

Victor Turner explored the basic structure of symbols, and related it to human physiology and biology.[62] He stressed three important properties of ritual symbols.[63] According to the third property, 'polarization of meaning', the value of a symbol lies in a continuum of meaning. The one pole of this continuum is called 'the ideological pole', and the other is called 'the sensory pole'. At the sensory pole the meanings are closely related to the form of the symbol. The meanings of this pole lend themselves to stimulation of feelings and desires. They are often of a physiological type, as milk, blood, semen. The norms and values which control and rule the members of the society are found at the ideological pole. This type of symbolic thinking is exemplified in Gnostic religion when, for instance, the sacramental chrism is brought into the context of the Tree of Life, is associated with sperm (on the sensory pole) and with forming, being a son, maleness, ascetism, spirit and salvation (on the ideological pole). Turner's theory of the structure of symbols is more in accordance with Gnostic thinking on religious symbols than is Eliade's theory. Gnostic symbols invite an investigation of their foundations in conscious and unconscious elaborations upon human biology and physiology, rather than an investigation of how they reveal the Sacred. These different types of investigations are parallel to the division between Freudian and Jungian psychology (even if Turner drew a firm borderline between social anthropology and psychoanalysis and Eliade emphasized his distance from Jung[64]). They reflect two opposite hermeneutic directions: the first moves from the spiritual to the carnal, while the second moves from the carnal to the spiritual. It is not easy, or perhaps impossible, to reach a common consensus about interpretations which move in the second direction. This I think, is the main reason why Eliade's theories of religious symbols, and therefore also of the Cosmic Tree, even as full of insight and important as they have been for the history of religions, have been less easy to apply to concrete material.[65]

A FINAL PROBLEM

When the Gnostic symbol of the Tree gains its deepest significance and importance as a symbol for man because of its human qualities, why take the detour of the Tree? Why not use the human body, parts of the body or processes of the body directly as symbols? As it is, the Tree functions in Gnostic religion as the mediator between human biology and spiritual values. This, however, is a general characteristic of symbols, they offer a sort of disguise, not ony for meanings, but also for the basis upon which meanings are built. For instance, the symbol of the Tree with its sacramental ointment can be seen as a substitute for semen and the physiological processes of generation with the associated meaning of spiritual semen and spiritual begetting. When the original source of meaning is disguised in the symbol, the symbol evades the danger of concreteness, which may destroy it. At the same time, it can represent several different meanings at the sensory level as, for example, semen and milk unified in the Tree of Life. The anxiety aroused by the affects connected with the original sources of meaning is avoided, and unconscious processes can be exploited to create powerful religious symbols. Therefore, when the human meanings of the symbols are given a resonance in something not human, in this case the Tree, its possibilities as an effective symbol are expanded and strengthened. The particular form of the symbol is thus correlated to its purpose which is transcending over biological nature, and in the case of Gnostic religion, the making of a purely spiritual man.

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NOTES

1 See Victor Turner's discussion of symbols in *The Forest of Symbols*. London: Cornell University Press 1981, pp. 19–47.

2 *Origin of the World* 109:25–111:8.

3 *Gospel of Philip* 71:22–34; 73:8–19.

4 The most important primary sources are in this case the *Hypostasis of the Archons* (*Hyp. Arch.*), the *Origin of the World* (*Orig. World*), the *Gospel of Philip* (*Gos. Phil.*) and the *Apocryphon of John* (*Ap. John*), supplemented with the *Gospel of Truth* (*Gos. Truth*), *Tractatus Tripartitus* (*Tri. Trac.*), *the Gospel of Thomas* (*Gos. Thom.*), *Pistis Sophia* and the *Books of Jeu* (*Jeu*). The secondary sources used are mainly the *Book of Baruch* (*Baruch*), the *Megale Apophasis* (*Meg. Apoph.*), the reports on the Ophites and the report of the Ophians. These sources are taken from both of the main branches of Gnosticism, the Valentinian and the so-called 'Sethian' (which includes the Ophitic groups). The main difference between the symbol of the Tree in the Valentinian and the 'Sethian' branch of Gnosticism seems to be that the first is dominantly male formulated. In this article the different systems will be treated together. Quotations from Gnostic primary and secondary sources are made from W. Foerster, *Gnosis. A Selection of Gnostic Texts* (English translation), R. McL. Wilson (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972; and from *The Nag Hammadi Library in English*, J. M. Robinson (ed.), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977.

5 In the so-called 'Ophite Diagram', the Tree of Life was inscribed, but Origin's description of the diagram is not clear enough on this point to permit a reconstruction; cf. A. J. Welburn, 'Reconstructing the Ophite Diagram', *Novum Testamentum* 23:3 (1981), pp. 261–287. However, the formula 'And everywhere there, the Tree of Life, and the resurrection of the flesh from the Tree . . .', suggests 'that the form of the Tree had been imposed on the whole diagram', Welburn, 'The Identity of the Archons in the "Apocryphon Johannis"', *Vigiliae Christianae* **32** (1978), pp. 241–254.

6 *Hyp. Arch.* 89:17–90:2.

7 This is also the case in the related text, *Orig. World*. The Tree of Knowledge is a tree of preliminary knowledge, while the Tree of Life is the giver of immortal life at the end of time. Here the Tree of Knowledge is a female tree, while the Tree of Life is a male tree and connected with the coming of the perfect man.

8 *Ap. John* (II, I) 23:20–35.

9 See J. Frickel, 'Eine neue Deutung von Gen. 1, 26 in der Gnosis', *Ex Orbe Religionum. Studia Geo Widengren oblata*, Pars I, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972, pp. 413–423; J. Frickel, 'Ein Kriterium zur Quellenscheidung innerhalb einer Paraphrase', *Le Muséon* **85** (1972), pp. 427–450; B. Aland, 'Die Apophasis Megale und die simonianische Gnosis', *Theologie und Philosophie* **48** (1973), pp. 410–418.

10 Hippolyt, *Refutatio*, VI, 17, 7.

11 Cf. Homer, Od. X, 304–306.

12 The connection between oil and the Tree of Life has its roots in Judaism.
In *The Book of the Secrets of Enoch*, the olive tree stands at the side of the Tree of Life 'always discharging the oil of its fruit' (II Enoch VIII, 3–5, in R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudoepigrapha of the Old Testament*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, vol. II, p. 434). In the *Life of Adam and Eve*, Seth is sent to Paradise to receive oil of life from the Tree of Life to anoint the dying Adam (*Vita Adae et Evae*, 36 and *Apoc. Mos.* IX, 3, Charles, II, 143).
In Christian gnosticism it is said that Christ was anointed with oil taken from the Tree of Life, and that the believers will be anointed with this oil (Clement, *Recog.*, I, 45). *The Acts of Thomas* speaks of the sacramental oil as the 'power of the tree' (157). The oil is in this case connected with the cross, which presupposes an association between the cross and the Tree of Life (see A. F. J. Klijn, *The Acts of Thomas*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962, 284–285; 300). The Marcosians, a branch of the

Valentinians, had a redemption sacrament where the initiate is anointed with oil from the balsam tree. This soil is associated with the sweet savour which is above all terrestial things (Irenaeus, *Adv, haer.*, I, 21, 3).

13 *Gos. Phil.* 71:22–34; 74:1–13.

14 *Gos. Phil.* 75:10–13.

15 *Gos. Phil.* 57:22–28; 67:2–9; 74:12–25.

16 *Gos. Phil.* 73:9–19.

17 In contemporary Christian sources, the Tree of Life has also explicit baptismal connotations. In *Gos. Phil.*, the symbolism of water is not developed in connection with the Tree of Life, nor is it developed elsewhere in Gnosticism.

18 Origen, *Contra Celsum*, VI, 24–38. Translated with an Introduction and Notes by H. Chadwick, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

19 For a reconstruction of the diagram, see A. J. Welburn, 'Reconstructing the Ophite Diagram', *Novum Testamentum* **23:3** (1981), pp. 261–287.

20 Orig. *Contra Cels.* VI, 27.

21 The symbolic complex of Father/Son/Anointing is originally nourished from Judaism and from the king ideology: the king is adopted by Jahve. Anointing is a part of the ritual and the adoption formula says: 'Thou art my son, this day I have begotten thee' (Psalm 2, 7).

22 It is a peculiar feature of the Tree of Life that it is sometimes flanked by the Olive Tree. In *Gos. Phil.*, the Garden of Joseph the Carpenter contains the Tree of the Cross on which Jesus hung, the Tree of Life, which is in the middle of the Garden, and the Olive Tree from which 'we get the chrism, and from the chrism, the resurrection' (73:9–19). In *Orig. World*, Paradise contains the Tree of Immortal Life in the north, and at its side the Tree of Knowledge. The Olive Tree sprouted up after (110:2–111:8). The sacramental symbols belonging to both the Tree of Immortal Life and the Olive Tree are eschatological, and will be effectuated at the end of time: the Tree of Immortal Life will give life to the immortal saints, the Tree of Olives will purify kings and chief-priests of justice. In *Gos. Phil.*, the Tree of Life and the chrism stand in the context of spiritual begetting. The Tree of Olives is connected with the resurrection. It is thus possible to point out two related patterns of meaning associated with the Tree of Life and/or the Tree of Olives in Gnostic religion: the Tree of Life is a generative tree, and through its oil the Gnostic is born as a perfect son, but it is also a king- and priest-making tree and as such can be fused with the Tree of Olives and be perceived of as an eschatological tree. Thus three of the trees have developed a specific mythology, the Tree of Life, the Tree of Knowledge and the Tree of Olives. These trees are sometimes connected with sacraments, but the trees and the sacraments are not related to each other in a systematic manner: the sacraments are in different ways associated with the mythology of the different trees. This is in accordance with the fact that the form and the setting of the rituals varied, even within one Gnostic group. The hypothesis of a fixed connection between five trees in Paradise, mentioned in *Gos. Thom.* and five sacraments mentioned in *Gos. Phil.* is doubtful. (E. Segelberg, 'The Coptic-Gnostic Gospel according to Philip and its Sacramental System', *Numen* **7** (1960), p. 153 ff.)

23 *Ap. John* (II, 1) 22:9; 23:24–35.

24 *Pistis Sophia*, C. Schmidt (ed.), V. MacDermot (translation and notes), Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978, p. 349, cf. p. 247.

25 *Gos. Truth* 18:24–29; *Gos. Phil.* 55:6–14; 71:22–72:1; 73:8–15; 74:1–12. cf. R. McL. Wilson, *The Gospel of Philip*, London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. Ltd, 1962, pp. 156–157. cf. also note 12.

26 cf. I. S. Gilhus, 'Male and Female Symbolism in the Gnostic *Apocryphon of John*', *Temenos* **19** (1983), pp. 33–43.

27 *Gos. Phil.* 56:26–57:19.

28 H.-G. Gaffron, *Studien zum koptischen Philipposevangelium unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Sakramente*, Bonn: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, 1969, pp. 178–185.

29 *Gos. Phil.* 58:11–14.

30 cf. E. Pagels, 'Adam and Eve, Christ and the Church', in *The New Testament and Gnosis*, A. H. B. Logan and A. J. M. Wedderburn (eds), Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark Limited, 1983, pp. 168–169.

31 See the description in K. Rudolph, *Die Gnosis*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977, pp. 252–254.

32 Epiphanius, *Panarion*, 37, 5–6.

33 *Hyp. Arch.* 88:11; 89:17–90:12; *Orig. World* 115:31–33; 118:24–119:6.

34 *Panarion* 26,4 1–8, cf. also *Pistis Sophia* p. 381, *Jeu* p. 100.

35 The theory of fertilization through the female is in opposition to Aristotle's theory on the subject, but was part of the medical theory of the time. See B. H. Stricker, De Geboorte Van Horus, II, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968, pp. 121–179.

36 *Orig. World* 110:24–29.

37 *Ap. John* (II, 1) 23:30–31.

38 Especially in *Ap. John*, *Orig. World*, *Gos. Phil.*, *Tri. Trac.*, *Tri. Prot.*, and *Baruch.*

39 *Tri. Prot.* 44:20–29.

40 *Ap. John* (II, 1) 21:30–22:2. cf. BG 56:17–57:8; III 27:14–28:6; IV 33:11–34:5.

41 Hippolyt, *Refutatio* V, 26, 1–27, 5. The *Book of Baruch* has been analyzed in a dissertation, unfortunately for a greater audience, only in Norwegian. G. Steinsland, *Gud, Verden og Det Gode. En analyse av gnostikeren Justins gudsbegreper*, Bergen: University of Bergen, 1974.

42 *Ap. John* (II, 1) 22:9–21; 23:20–35.

43 Gilhus, 1983.

44 *Tri. Trac.* 106:18–31.

45 *Orig. World* 108:2–109:29.

46 *Orig. World* 109:30–110:1.

47 cf. Gilhus, 'Gnosticism—a Study in Liminal Symbolism', *Numen* **31** (1984), pp. 106–128.

48 For a structural approach to the two Paradises in *Orig. World*, see M. Tardieu, *Trois Mythes Gnostiques*. Adam, Éros et les animaux d'Égypte dans un écrit de Nag Hammadi (II, 5), Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1974, pp. 175–214.

49 *Gos. Phil.* 74:3–12.

50 *Gos. Phil.* 52:21–25.

51 This is clearly expressed in the *Testimony of Truth* which stresses the connection between the Pharisees and the scribes on the one hand and the archons on the other. The Law and defilement are combined and opposed to the light and purity. 'The Law commands (one) to take a husband (or) to take a wife and to beget, to multiply like the sand of the sea. But passion which is a delight to them constrains the souls of those who are begotten in this place, those who defile and those who are defiled, in order that the Law might be fulfilled through them. And they show that they are assisting the world; and they [turn] away from the light, who are unable [to pass by] the archon of [darkness] until they pay the last [penny]'. (30:2–17). Once carnal generation is seen as the chief symbol of the Law, the illicit practices of the Phibonites, reported by Epiphanius, fit into the symbolic structure. According to him, they dedicated an intercourse to the archon in each heaven making up a

total of 730 falls, taking into account both their descent and their ascent through the spheres (Epiphanius, *Panarion*, XXVI, 9, 6–9; cf. also Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* I, 25, 4; 31, 2). This is a special version of the connection between the different archons of the spheres and the different prescriptions and prohibitions of the Law (cf., Gilhus, 1984), but here in each case symbolized by the injunction to carnal generation. By the 730 falls everybody has received his due, and the spirit is absolutely free from the domination of the archons.

52 See, H. Leisegang, *Die Gnosis*, Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1955, pp. 275–276.

53 Hippolyt, *Refutatio*, V, 7, 27 f.; V, 26, 32–33.

54 H. A. Green, 'Ritual in Valentinian Gnosticism: a Sociological Interpretation', *The Journal of Religious History*, **12**(2), (1982), p. 109, note 5.

55 See especially his article, 'Methodological Remarks on the Study on Religious Symbolism', in Eliade and Kitagawa, *The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970, pp. 86–107.

56 Ibid. p. 94.

57 Ibid. p. 102.

58 cf. the discussion of Eliade's archetypal symbols in Antonio Barbosa da Silva, *The Phenomenology of Religion as a Philosophical Problem*, Uppsala: CWK Gleerup, 1982, especially pp. 197–231.

59 Eliade, 1970, p. 93.

60 Ibid., p. 98.

61 cf. *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1958, pp. 8–9.

62 Victor Turner, *op. cit.*, pp. 27 ff. Turner discussed ritual symbols in a living religion (the religion of the Ndembus). In this case the discussion is about symbols in a religion handed down only in texts. This probably causes a difference in the experience of the sensory level, but does not alter the structure of the symbols.

63 The first is 'condensation', i.e. condensation of many things and actions into one single form. The second is 'unification of disparate significata', i.e. a common theme interconnecting different meanings. The third is 'polarization of meaning'. The first two properties are well known for both historians of religions and psychologists, and clearly seen in Gnostic symbols.

64 Eliade claims that he uses *archetype* in a different sense than Jung. Eliade, *Cosmos and History: the Myth of the Eternal Return*, New York: Bollingen, 1959, pp. VIII–IX. cf. Barbosa da Silva's discussion of Eliade's use of Jung's concept of archetype, *op. cit.*, pp. 202 ff.; Turner, *op. cit.*, pp. 32 ff. cf. also B. R. Scharf, 'Freudianism Today and Some Anthropological Approaches to Religion', *Religion* **9**(1) (1979), pp. 157–181.

65 An interesting attempt is made by Stephen J. Reno, *The Sacred Tree as an Early Christian Literary Symbol*, Saarbrücken: Alfred Rupp, 1978.

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'FUNDAMENTALISM' CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC*

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This article seeks to answer the question whether the term 'fundamentalism' is an appropriate label for certain Islamic movements by undertaking a detailed comparison with Protestant Christian fundamentalism, for which the term was originally coined. After an effort to identify and characterize the two phenomena, a number of similarities and differences are discussed. Among the differences is the fact that the most obvious defining characteristics in each case (Biblical inerrancy for Protestants and political–social involvement for Muslims) are of little relevance to the other case. Among the similarities is a common opposition to 'modernism' and a tendency to stress what has been distinctive to the Protestant and Islamic traditions, respectively. The conclusion is that, while the two phenomena do have much in common, 'fundamentalism' is not an appropriate common label. The author prefers 'Islamic radicalism' for the Muslim case and tentatively suggests 'radical neotraditionalism' as a common label.

In recent years the term 'fundamentalism' has become one of the catchwords of both journalistic and scholarly writing about religion. Although the term originally referred to a particular set of Protestant Christian phenomena, we now hear especially of Islamic or Muslim 'fundamentalism', but also of Catholic, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh, Marxist and even agricultural 'fundamentalism'.[1] To what extent is such a broadened, 'generic'[2] use of the term justified? The purpose of this article is to explore this question with reference to Islamic developments by analysing the similarities and differences between Protestant and Islamic 'fundamentalism' to see whether they have enough in common to justify a common label, and then more briefly, whether 'fundamentalism' should be that label. To anticipate the conclusions, I shall suggest that they do, in a fairly complex fashion, have enough in common to justify a common label, at least for comparative purposes, but I have severe doubts whether that label should be 'fundamentalism'. First, however, we must attempt to identify and characterize, with at least some degree of precision, the groups which are being referred to.

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In the strictest historical sense, fundamentalism refers to a movement in American Protestantism arising out of a coalition of theologically conservative Evangelicals that came together about 1920 to struggle against tendencies commonly labelled 'Modernism' or 'Liberalism'.[3] The word 'fundamentalist' was coined in 1920 by Curtis Lee Laws, the editor of the Baptist *Watchman-Examiner*, and it is worth quoting part of what he wrote because it provides a usable definition of the term.

> We here and now move that a new word be adopted to describe the men among us who insist that the landmarks shall not be removed . . . We suggest that those who still cling to the great fundamentals and who mean to do battle royal for the fundamentals shall be called 'Fundamentalists'. By that name the editor of *The Watchman-Examiner* is willing to be called.[4]

A definition of Protestant fundamentalism can be built on two points made in the above statement. First, fundamentalists are people who hold to the 'fundamentals'. It has been common to speak of five such fundamentals and, although the lists vary slightly, they generally include the authority of Scripture, described in terms of 'inerrancy', 'infallibility' or 'plenary inspiration', the virgin birth of Christ, the substitutionary atonement, the bodily resurrection of Christ, and either his deity or his second advent.[5] For purposes of definition the 'inerrancy' of scripture is perhaps the most important,[6] although it and some of the others are best viewed as defences for a more basic religious vision and concern. This vision takes the sinfulness of man and his consequent need for supernatural redemption very seriously, believes that that redemption has been accomplished by Jesus Christ and is mediated to the individual by personal faith, stresses individual salvation and personal morality, and tends to have a 'low' view of the church and sacraments. The inerrancy of the Bible is important because it is through the Bible that we know of Christ and what he has accomplished, and anything less than inerrancy seems to call into question the authority of this witness.[7]

Secondly, fundamentalists are prepared to 'do battle royal' for these fundamentals. The fundamentalists of the 1920s achieved notoriety because of their very vigorous public campaigns against the 'modernists', especially on the issues of Biblical criticism and Darwinian evolution. These battles were waged mainly on two fronts: in the major denominations, especially the Baptists and the Presbyterians, where an effort was made to purify denominational agencies and schools of modernist tendencies, and in relation to the public schools, where the effort was made to ban the teaching of Darwinian evolution. The fundamentalists lost both battles in the 1920s and shortly retired to something of a cultural ghetto, where they effectively regrouped their forces and from which they have sallied forth quite prominently in the last decade in such movements as the Moral Majority.

The fundamentalists, in the strictest sense of the term, may be distinguished from two other groups, the conservatives and the evangelicals, who share much the same basic religious vision and concern, but may be a bit less strict on the specific 'five points' and are much less confrontational *vis-à-vis* the 'modernists'. The conservatives have generally had a greater concern for specific denominational issues than have fundamentalists and their unwillingness to risk splitting their churches was probably the main reason why the fundamentalists lost their battles in the major denominations.[8] Since about 1940 there has arisen out of fundamentalist circles a movement generally calling itself 'evangelical', which is more willing to enter into religious dialogue or cooperation with non-fundamentalists, is generally a bit more self-critical, and is sometimes willing to modify the strict fundamentalist position on such matters as Biblical inerrancy.[9] Evangelicals and conservatives are sometimes called fundamentalists by others and it seems that there is some justification for this broader use of the term for those evangelicals and conservatives who hold doctrinally to the fundamentalist 'five points', particularly Biblical inerrancy. Thus, I would be inclined to recognize two uses of the term in the Protestant context, a stricter (or more extreme) fundamentalism that is very confrontational and whose adherents in the United States generally call themselves fundamentalists, and a broader 'fundamentalism' that includes people who are less confrontational and generally do not accent the label fundamentalist, but share the fundamentalists' doctrinal convictions.[10]

In relation to the Muslim world, the term 'fundamentalist' has been used, mainly by Western observers, to designate a number of movements and tendencies in the present century calling for a strict implementation of Islamic norms and values (the *sharīʿah* or Islamic 'religious law') throughout all areas of Muslim society.[11] This has included the call for an 'Islamic state' which would bring all public law into conformity with the *sharīʿah*, and somewhat more recently a concern with such matters as the 'Islamicizing' of economics, education and dress codes. It has also involved a very strong opposition to the wholesale adoption of Western ways in Muslim society and, somewhat less markedly, opposition to the 'corruptions' of traditional Muslim society. In the Sunni world the two oldest and best known 'fundamentalist' groups have been the Muslim Brethren (*Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*), founded in Egypt in 1928, and the Jamaʿat-i Islami, founded in India in 1941. In relation to the Shiʿi world the term has been used for the present revolutionary government in Iran, which has its roots in the activities of the anti-constitutionalist *ʿulamā'* ('clergy') of the first decade of this century, clerical opposition to the secularizing actions of Reza Shah in the 1920s, and the activities of the Fedayan-i Islam and Ayatollah Kashani in the 1950s.[12]

I have come to prefer the label 'Islamic radicalism'[3] for what is here called Islamic 'fundamentalism', although for the time being, at least, I shall continue to use the latter term with quotation marks. Elsewhere, I have described it as an 'ideological orientation' and contrasted it with three other orientations, which may be labelled 'traditionalist', 'secularist', and 'modernist'.[14] The traditionalists, or conservatives, are those who have resisted the Westernizing tendencies of the last century or two in the name of Islam as understood and practised in their particular areas, and have been found particularly among the *'ulamā'*, the Sufi orders, and generally among the rural populations and lower classes. The secularists are those who have sought to clear the way for social reform by restricting religion to personal devotion and ritual (and possibly family law) and asserted the authority of 'reason' in public life, usually guided by Western precedents and Western-derived ideologies, especially nationalism. By contrast, modernists have insisted that Islam is relevant to all areas of life, public as well as private, but that traditional views and practices must be reformed in the light of the original sources of authority, the Qur'an and the Sunnah (the authoritative precedent of the prophet Muhammad and, for Shi'is, also the twelve Imams) and of contemporary conditions and needs. For modernists the *sharī'ah* applies to all of life, but they emphasize its flexibility and tend in practice to interpret it in terms of Western-derived ideas. 'Fundamentalists' also want to interpret Islam in terms of the original sources of authority in the light of contemporary needs, but they strongly object to the modernists' tendency to 'Westernize' Islam. For them the *sharī'ah* is indeed flexible and capable of development to meet changing needs, but interpretation and development must be done in a genuinely Islamic manner and not be a covert way of Westernizing. They also criticize many of the traditional ideas and practices, but even more they object to the tendency of many traditionalists to tolerate and even cooperate with secularizing governments in practice.

These characteristics are shared by Sunni and Shi'i 'fundamentalism'. Among the most important differences are the fact that Sunni 'fundamentalism' has historically grown out of the modernist reform movements, its leaders have generally been 'laymen', and it has been ambivalent toward the *'ulamā'*, whereas Shi'i 'fundamentalism' has historically grown out of traditionalist opposition to Westernization and been led by the *'ulamā'*.[15] 'Fundamentalists' have also differed on other matters. In their evaluation of the spiritual state of contemporary Muslim society, some have held that society as a whole has become apostate, but most have viewed only the leadership as apostate. In doctrine and organization, some have been more elitist and others more populist. Particularly important is the fact that some have been highly revolutionary in their methods, while others have been more gradualist, emphasizing the importance of educating society before imposing an 'Islamic order' and/or being willing to cooperate with non-fundamentalists at the tactical level.[16] In view of this last point, it may be appropriate to recognize stricter and broader senses of 'fundamentalism', somewhat corresponding to the stricter and broader senses recognized for Protestant fundamentalists.[17] In this case, 'fundamentalism' in the stricter sense would apply to those who are more revolutionary and less willing to cooperate with non-fundamentalists, while 'fundamentalism' in the broader sense would include those who are more gradualist and more willing to cooperate with non-fundamentalists tactically.

It will be convenient to compare and contrast Christian and Islamic 'fundamentalism' at three levels; an obvious level of similarities, a somewhat more profound level of very important differences, and a still deeper level of mixed and often subtle similarities and differences.

At the most obvious level, both groups are viewed as intolerant, extremist, fanatic, rigid, literalist, narrow-minded, reactionary, militant, and the like by their opponents, and are viewed as being such out of theologically conservative and, in particular, scripturalist religious motives. It is at this level that the label is used most often in the popular media, one presumes, but also, I think, in much scholarly writing.[18]

Looking below this obvious surface, we see quite a striking difference in the way the two movements are defined in their own contexts. The most important item in the definition of Christian fundamentalism, the 'inerrancy' of scripture, is utterly irrelevant to the Muslim case, as virtually all Muslims, including the 'secularists', view the Qur'an as 'inerrant'. Indeed, they view it as the direct and verbatim Word of God in a way not normally claimed for the Christian scriptures by Christian fundamentalists.[19] The Christian fundamentalists' religious concern with sin, salvation, etc., which I have suggested is 'defended' by the insistence on scriptural inerrancy, is of course explicitly rejected by Muslims, 'fundamentalist' and non-fundamentalist alike. On the other hand, the crucial point in defining Islamic 'fundamentalism', its strong political emphasis and its concern that religious prescriptions be implemented in all areas of social life, is irrelevant to defining Protestant fundamentalism, which can take highly political or fairly apolitical stances. In fact, even a politicized Christian fundamentalism such as that of Jerry Falwell would be secularist on the definition of secularism here used in the Muslim context.[20] Likewise, the individualist emphasis of Protestant fundamentalism contrasts with the social emphasis of Muslim 'fundamentalism'.

In addition, two other points of difference may be noted here. The term 'fundamentalist' was invented in the Christian context and is still used by many Christian fundamentalists, even though, to a considerable degree, it has become an outsider's term of oppobrium. By contrast, the term 'fundamentalist' it not only not used by Muslim 'fundamentalists', but has been derived from totally outside the Muslim cultural context, i.e. from the West. In fact, I know of no suitable and generally recognized word for 'fundamentalism' in Arabic, or in any other Islamic language.[21] In discussions in Arabic, 'fundamentalists' generally view themselves simply as true Muslims, while their opponents label them 'extremists' or 'fanatics'. Another point of difference is that, at least until recently, the term 'fundamentalism' for Christians has been used only in a Protestant context, whereas for Muslims it is used in both Sunni and Shi'i contexts. This point derives, of course, from the fact that the term was invented by and for Protestant Christians and only later applied to Muslims from the outside.

Probing a bit deeper, however, we find that the question of similarities and differences becomes more complex, but that some very interesting similarities may be discerned. The most obvious of these is the oppositional stance of both 'fundamentalisms', especially in their more extreme forms. Both are consciously opposed to something that may appropriately be labelled 'modernism'.[22] In the Protestant case, however, this 'modernism' has been generated from within the same culture that the fundamentalists share, whereas in the Muslim case the 'modernism' has come from outside the culture. As a result, American fundamentalism is marked by a greater degree of conservatism, correctly speaking, because it has an allegiance to those cultural elements that have continued from the period prior to the rise of modernism and that are viewed as relatively uncontaminated by it. For instance, American fundamentalists are generally quite nationalistic. For Muslim 'fundamentalists', on the other had, 'modernism' is a much more culturally alien phenomenon and represents a much more serious break in the cultural continuity of their community. This, along with the criticisms they have of traditional practices of their societies, means that for them it is much more a matter of radically reconstructing their societies and much less a matter of merely preserving and strengthening desirable elements within them than is the case with Protestant fundamentalism.[23] Islamic 'fundamentalism' can, and often does, use the language of radical Third World opposition to Western imperialism, especially cultural imperialism.[24] It is in fact one form of opposition to this imperialism, however much it may differ from Marxist or nationalist forms in its rhetoric and positive program. While Protestant fundamentalism tends to be highly nationalistic, Muslim 'fundamentalism' consciously rejects nationalism as a foreign ideology designed, among other things, to divide the Muslim community.[25]

As part of their oppositional stance, both Islamic and Protestant 'fundamentalists' display a conscious willingness to take openly 'unpopular' positions and see themselves as refusing to go along with current fads. Both have a certain minority consciousness, and it is common to hear among them that the 'true' Christians/Muslims number relatively few in their societies.[26] Combined with this, however, is a very real triumphalism which can take the form of confident assertions that a large number of the people are with them and can take real pleasure in evidences of popular support. The Moral Majority's claims for popular support, despite Falwell's premillenialist theology, would be a case in point on the Protestant side, while the pronouncements of the present regime in Iran could provide examples on the Muslim side.[27]

Another very important, and fairly obvious, point of similarity is that both 'fundamentalisms' claim to be the authentic expressions of their respective traditions; they claim to be the 'true' Christians or Muslims. In both cases, in my view, there is considerable historical justification to this claim, even though from a strictly historical point of view both may be accused of skewing their tradition, so to speak, to some degree. In both cases, I think, this skewing is primarily a result of their oppositional situation. For example, I do not suppose that Protestant fundamentalists would deny that love is a central Christian principle, yet it is never found among the fundamentalists' 'five points'. The reason would seem obvious. The principle of love has not been attacked by the modernists. Also, the fundamentalist insistence on the inerrancy of the Bible represents a hardening of the traditional Protestant view. It is hard to imagine Protestant fundamentalists describing the Epistle of James in Luther's words as 'an epistle full of straw'.[28] Still, it is certainly the case that the fundamentalists are closer to the mainstream of historic Christianity on this issue than their modernist opponents. It is the challenge of Biblical criticism that has hardened their position. Likewise, the politically conservative stance of most American fundamentalists has a lot to do with the more liberal positions commonly taken by modernists. Some characteristics of Protestant fundamentalism, such as its individualism and its heavy emphasis on the death (as opposed to the life and the resurrection) of Christ, reflect the particular tradition within Christianity that it comes out of. It is, after all, *Protestant*, and not merely Christian fundamentalism.[29]

On the Muslim side, 'fundamentalists' generally stress the political, social, and collective aspects of Islam even more than Muslims have traditionally done, and their view of Islam as a political, social, economic, etc., 'system' or 'order' is rather novel in relation to the historical tradition.[30] Here too, though, this can be seen as a hardening of traditional Muslim views of the relation between religion and society in response to modern challenges to the social role of religion. In earlier times Muslims could take for granted the relevance of religion to society in a way that they now cannot. Likewise, 'fundamentalists' are much more insistent than Muslims have traditionally been that the *whole* Shari'ah actually *be* implemented in *all* areas of life. Here, I think, a good part of the reason is the feeling that such traditional laxity is intolerable in the face of present Muslim weakness in the world at large and, indeed, that it is one of the main causes of this weakness.[31]

Out of this comes a common characteristic of the two 'fundamentalisms', which paradoxically accounts for their most obvious differences, i.e. that both Protestant and Islamic 'fundamentalisms' tend to stress those elements that are most distinctive of the religious traditions of which they are a part. In stressing the Bible, original sin, deity of Christ, and atonement, Protestant fundamentalism stresses some things that most obviously distinguish

Protestantism from other forms of Christianity. By emphasizing the Qur'an and Sunnah and social and political concerns, Muslim 'fundamentalists' likewise emphasize those aspects that have been most distinctive of Islam as a religion in contrast to others.[32] In both cases, the opposing modernist movements have tended to emphasize ethical values, such as love and justice, that are common to all major religions. The very fact that Christian fundamentalists tend to define themselves in terms of doctrinal matters, while Muslim 'fundamentalism' is mainly defined in political and social terms, reflects the fact that Christianity, of all the world religions, has the most strongly stressed doctrine, while Islam has been the most self-consciously political.[33]

The claim to authenticity is in both cases associated with a strong tendency to see matters in black-and-white terms and the claim to represent the one true way for all people. In both cases, however, this is at least slightly modified for most 'fundamentalists' by a recognition that at least some of their non-fundamentalist co-religionists are not completely beyond the pale. Even Bob Jones III recognizes that there are some true Christians in non-fundamentalist churches, although he urges them to come out of those churches.[34] Muslim 'fundamentalist' political programmes are mostly premissed on the belief that there are many in their societies who can be won over by the proper forms of persuasion, at least when the time is ripe, and many more who will in fact be willing to live under a 'fundamentalist' regime. I think it would be fair to say that both groups of 'fundamentalists' view many of their co-religionists as true Christians or Muslims who are somewhat muddled or lax in their thinking.[35]

The label 'literalist' is often attached to fundamentalists. As Barr has argued, this label rather misses the mark with Christian fundamentalists, because they may be willing to interpret some Biblical passages non-literally in order to defend inerrancy.[36] The same point, *mutatis mutandis*, applies to Muslim 'fundamentalists'.[37] I think it is fair to say, however, that in both cases 'fundamentalists' in general are more inclined than non-fundamentalists to opt for a literal interpretation. More important—and this may be the 'truth behind' the charges of literalism—both groups of 'fundamentalists' want to take literally, or at least very seriously, elements in the scriptures and traditions that their modernist opponents would either reject or reinterpret. Examples in the Christian case would be supernaturalism, original sin, and blood atonement. Examples in the Muslim case would be specific Qur'anic prescriptions (such as the much discussed punishments for theft and adultery), as well as the general emphasis on the political and social character of Islam. In both cases there is the sense that God has spoken quite clearly in Scripture and that the real question is not one of 'literalism' but whether humans are going to obey God or follow their own desires.[38] It is appropriate at this point to mention the anti-esoteric or anti-'hermeneutic' tendency of both Protestant and Sunni fundamentalism. Both tend to reject esoteric interpretations in favour of the plain sense of the text. In this Protestant fundamentalism is heir both to the Reformation and to Scottish Common Sense philosophy.[39] Anti-esotericism has been a less distinct tendency in Islam, but Sunni 'fundamentalism' is related to the Hanbali tradition, probably the least esoteric of the classical traditions, and its anti-esotericism is also related to its anti-Sufi tendency and to its 'lay' character. In Sh'i 'fundamentalism' the matter is somewhat different, because esotericism is much more deeply written into the Shi'i perspective and Shi'i 'fundamentalism' has stressed the leadership of the *'ulamā'*.[40]

Still another aspect of the concern for authenticity is a certain 'ecumenical' tendency of both forms of 'fundamentalism'. In both cases this has been related to the sense that when the fundamentals are under threat, true believers should forget secondary differences. Protestant fundamentalists of the 1920s de-emphasized distinctive denominational concerns and also the differences between pre-millenialism and post-millenialism, and the de-emphasis of denominational concerns, at least, continues to this day.[41] Shi'i 'fundamentalists' in Iran today definitely de-emphasize the differences between Sunni and Shi'i forms of Islam.[42] Sunni 'fundamentalists' are perhaps more inclined to be anti-Shi'i, or at least aggressively Sunni, but they do de-emphasize the traditional distinctions of *madhhab* (school of rite and law) among Sunnis.

A final aspect of the concern for authenticity is the fact that neither type of 'fundamentalism' likes to be associated in the public mind with the other. Christian fundamentalists have strongly objected to sharing a common label with the likes of Ayatollah Khomeini and the evidence suggests that Muslim 'fundamentalists' would be no more interested in sharing a common label with Bob Jones or Jerry Falwell.[43]

Both Protestant and Muslim 'fundamentalism' are not only concerned with authenticity, but may also be called 'reactionary' in a certain sense. Both consciously measure modern developments by standards drawn from the past and both, in some sense, would like to 'go back' to a past period. Also, interestingly, in both cases there are two periods in the past that are relevant, one quite far back and one relatively recent. In the Protestant case, the relevant periods are the period of the New Testament and the apostolic church, which is seen as determinative for all Christians, and the early to mid-19th-century, when in the view of many American fundamentalists, I think, the ideal of a Christian society was most closely approached.[44] For Muslim 'fundamentalists' the earlier period is the time of the prophet's state in Medina and, for Sunnis, that of the immediately succeeding caliphs. The later period for some would be the period of high cultural achievement during the Abbasid period (8th- to 11th-century C.E.), but for most it would probably be the period just before the onslaught of Western imperialism.[45] In neither case is there a desire simply to 'go back' to either of the earlier periods, but one suspects that 'fundamentalists' would like society, if it were possible, to go back to the later of the two past periods and follow a course of development from there which was different from the one actually followed in history. That is to say, they would like to go back to a point in history before their society made its modernist 'wrong turn'. As this is not strictly possible, the society must find some other path to the right road, but the appropriate image, I think, is that of the traveller who realizes that he has taken a wrong turn some way back. If he cannot actually retrace his steps, then he must perhaps cut cross country to find the right road. At the same time, however, there is also a strong sense in both 'fundamentalisms' that the state of society, even before the modernist 'wrong turn', was far from perfect and must be subject to criticism in the light of scriptural norms dating from the founding period of the religion.

A third general characteristic of both 'fundamentalisms' is their activism. Muslim 'fundamentalists' actively engage in educational and political activities designed to implement their vision of an Islamic society. Protestant fundamentalists are likely to stress the more individualistic activity of 'soul winning' but, at least in some cases, and quite prominently at present, they may be actively engaged in pressing their social views on the rest of society. Even when Protestant fundamentalists have been apolitical on matters relating to social justice that have concerned liberals, they have often been willing to use political channels to press their views on such matters as Sabbath observance, drinking, gambling, and sexuality. Both 'fundamentalisms' certainly reject the quietest tendencies in their traditions.

Still another point which they have in common is a fairly 'moralistic' or 'Puritanical' view of personal ethics (including a fairly strong 'Weberian' work ethic). Also, there is a strong sense that the well-being of society is highly dependent on personal morality. The details differ, of course. Protestant fundamentalists do not have their women cover up in the manner increasingly common in the Muslim world today, nor are they about to allow their men four wives, but they certainly expect dress that is modest by current Western standards. Both groups are very much conerned about traditional family values and the corrosive effects of modernity on these.

It is important to emphasize that both Christian and Muslim 'fundamentalism' are very modern in some important respects, and this must be one of the defining characteristics in both cases. Of course, the very fact that they are reacting to modern trends involves a certain degree of modernity, because the form of any reaction is to a considerable degree dictated by that against which it is reacting. An example of this is the fact, already noted, that 'fundamentalists' tend to skew their tradition in the direction of those doctrines and practices that are under attack. Beyond this, however, 'fundamentalists' have quite willingly accepted some of what 'modernity' has to offer, most notably its technology. It is a well known fact that fundamentalists in America have made much greater use of modern mass media to propagate their views than have the more liberal churches. In the Muslim world, movements such as the Muslim Brethren have made considerable use of both modern communications and modern organizational techniques. Khomeini's movement relied very heavily on such modern inventions as the cassette tape recorder before it came to power, and of course uses the best modern weapons it can obtain in its war with Iraq. It is probably accurate to say that the present regime in Iran is no less interested in industrialization than the previous regime, although it may differ in the manner, purposes, and pace of industrialization.[46]

There are also more subtle forms of modernization operative in both cases. Elsewhere I have argued that Islamic 'fundamentalism' is modern in its view of Islam as a 'system', in its at least partial acceptance of the 'myth of progress', and its 'Weberian' work ethic.[47] The situation of Protestant fundamentalists is more problematic on these points. To my knowledge, most Protestant fundamentalists do not view Christianity as a 'system' in quite the same way that some Muslim 'fundamentalists' do of Islam, and of course the 'Weberian' work ethic is part of the tradition out of which Protestant fundamentalists come and thus it does not mark a 'modern' step in their case. Many Protestant fundamentalists are also pre-millenialist and this involves an explicit rejection of the most relevant aspects of the 'myth of progress'.[48] Careful analysis could undoubtedly show that even pre-millenialists accept the 'myth of progress' in some significant ways, but here, as with the 'Weberian' work ethic, Protestant fundamentalist acceptance of progress would be more a continuation of the tradition from which it comes than a distinctly modern step. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in this and in other respects, such as its concern for 'plain truth', it is in its own way a child of the 18th-century enlightenment.[49] Also, it has been quite rightly observed that fundamentalists are generally very 'at home' and often quite successful in the modern world of technology, big business and high finances.[50] Also relevant to this point is the fact that both 'fundamentalisms' appear to have a strong appeal to people with a modern technical education. At a recent conference there was even talk of the 'engineering mentality' of fundamentalists.[51] I think this is true and part of the reason, perhaps, is that both Protestant and Muslim fundamentalism tend to view religion as involving 'hard facts' and proper techniques which are fairly straightforward but do demand competence in their application. That is, they tend to view religion in somewhat the way that the average person and the technician tend to view science.[52] Still another relevant matter is the orientation of both 'fundamentalisms' to literacy. Both emphasize individual and/or small-group study of scriptural and other texts, and rely heavily on tracts, pamphlets and books for propagating their views.[53]

Another aspect of the 'modernity' of 'fundamentalism' is the fact that social and psychological alienation resulting from certain aspects of modernity seems to be an important motivating factor in both cases. Marsden makes it clear that the Protestant fundamentalists of the 1920s were galvanized into action by the realization that what had, some 50 years earlier, been a predominant cultural consensus in America was no longer so, and suggests that fundamentalism is related to an Anglo-Saxon analogue of the immigrant experience. Muslim 'fundamentalists' tend to be urban dwellers with village backgrounds and, often, people whose expectations have been raised by modern experiences, such as Western-style education, but for whom those expectations have not been fulfilled.[54]

It may also be noted that both forms of 'fundamentalism' function on both a more intellectual and a more popular level. Although Protestant fundamentalism has often been viewed, and to some extent has been, a rural, small town, or Southern phenomenon, its origins were in relatively intellectual circles in the north-east. The origins of Sunni 'fundamentalism' have been in relatively well- and modern-educated reformist circles, while the leadership of Shi'i 'fundamentalism' has been among the traditionally well educated *'ulama'*, and it has not lacked supporters among the modern-educated groups. Unlike Protestant fundamentalism, however, Muslim 'fundamentalism' has been almost exclusively an urban phenomenon. This is, of course, because it is in the urban areas where the alien pressures to which it is reacting have been mainly felt. Both 'fundamentalisms' may be 'rabble rousing' in their methods, but both include a significant intellectual tradition.

Finally and briefly, but importantly, both 'fundamentalisms' find their main authority in a written Scripture, rather than in an authoritative clergy or priesthood, or in ritual and sacrament, or a distinctive subjective spiritual experience.[55]

It is now time to return to the question set at the beginning. Do Protestant fundamentalism and Muslim 'fundamentalism' have enough in common to justify a common label, and if so, is 'fundamentalism' suitable as such a label? If the material presented in the preceding pages is valid, I think we must agree that they do have enough in common to merit a common label. Both are reactions against a modernism which, claiming the authority of science and 'modernity', stresses reason over revelation as the source of all knowledge, de-emphasizes the supernatural, and tends to be both relativistic and universalist in ethics. Both make a strong claim to authenticity and stress the distinctive aspects of their respective religions. Both are strongly supernaturalist in theology and absolutist in ethics. Both are distinctively modern in a number of important respects. Most, perhaps all, of the differences can be ascribed to one of the two facts: (1) that each 'fundamentalism' emphasizes what is distinctive to its religious tradition, and (2) that in one case the challenge has originated within the fundamentalists' own culture and in the other case it has come from without. Of the major points of difference noted earlier, the radically different way in which the 'fundamentalisms' are defined within their own context is related to the first fact, and the absence of a recognized term for 'fundamentalists' among Muslims is related to the second fact. The fact that 'fundamentalism' is used for both Sunni and Sh'i Muslims, but only for Protestant Christians, may be related to both. Christianity is a more diverse tradition than Islam and only Protestants have the distinctive scriptural emphasis which I have suggested is characteristic of fundamentalism, whereas all Muslims have this emphasis. Also, because Islam has been under external cultural attack in modern times and Christendom has not, Muslims are more likely to feel the need to pull together *qua* Muslims and more likely to make similar responses to this challenge. The different attitudes toward nationalism and the myth of progress are related to both facts, while the different attitudes toward Western imperialism are, of course, related to the second. Thus, I think it is reasonable to speak here of a particular type of reaction to 'modernity' which takes somewhat different forms in different cultural settings.

Should we label this reaction 'fundamentalism'? Certainly both Christian and Islamic 'fundamentalists' are very much concerned for what they consider the 'fundamentals' of their respective faiths. Also, the term is already in increasingly common use. One objection that I see is its strong pejorative connotation in most contemporary academic and journalistic usage. However, the term was initially coined with a positive connotation, as we have seen, and still presumably has a positive connotation among those Christians who call themselves fundamentalists. Moreover, any word which would be coined in Muslim languages for Muslim 'fundamentalism' would certainly begin its time, at least, with a strongly positive connotation.[56] If 'fundamentalism' now has a pejorative connotation in Western academic and journalistic circles, it is surely because most academics and journalists very deeply oppose this phenomenon. Given this fact, whatever label we might invent it would certainly acquire a pejorative connotation in these circles if it caught on in general usage. Therefore, for all the problems that this pejorative connotation presents for understanding, particularly of the sort that those concerned with religious studies seek, I do not consider that it alone is sufficient reason for rejecting the term. When one adds to this, however, the rather specific cultural content implicit in the word 'fundamentalism' in Western usage the matter takes on a different aspect. While the differences between Protestant and Islamic 'fundamentalism' can be related either to more basic similarities or to their different historical circumstances, they are none-the-less very significant. No one who does not understand them can even begin to understand Islamic 'fundamentalism'. The combination of pejorative force and specific cultural content does, I fear, almost guarantee misunderstanding, particularly in journalistic usage. Finally, as I hope the reader is by now persuaded, the differences and similarities between the two 'fundamentalisms' are a matter of some subtlety, and a highly emotive term like 'fundamentalism' is a very poor vehicle for conveying such subtleties.

For these reasons, it would be better if alternative labels could be found for the Islamic phenomenon and for cross-cultural comparison. In my view, the word 'fundamentalism' is still usable for the Protestant phenomenon in the manner suggested earlier. For the Islamic phenomenon, as I have indicated, I prefer 'Islamic radicalism'. For cross-cultural comparison I have yet to come up with a term, and would welcome suggestions. At this point there is a further consideration that merits a passing mention. While there are undoubtedly phenomena in most of the major religious traditions today similar to the two 'fundamentalisms' here discussed, the scriptural orientation of these two 'fundamentalisms' is an important aspect of them and gives them a quality that is not likely to be found in otherwise similar developments in traditions where something other than a fixed written scripture is the focus of authority, e.g. among Catholics and many Hindus and Buddhists, and in certain senses also Jews.[57] So, probably, we need two terms, one for the scripture-based 'fundamentalism' and one for the broader phenomenon. Perhaps 'radical neotraditionalism' would serve for the latter.[58]

This is the ideal. From the practical point of view, the term 'fundamentalism' is in such common use that it may be beyond the power of academics to reverse it. Moreover, because I have not yet found suitable alternatives for some of its current usage, I am prepared to remain with the expedient adopted here, the use of the term in quotation marks, for cross-cultural comparisons and, in some cases, for the Islamic phenomenon.

NOTES

1 The term 'agricultural fundamentalism' is taken from an article in the *New York Times* of Sunday, July 28, 1985, entitled, 'The Third World: Back to the Farm' (Section 3, p. 8).

2 Both Martin Marty and George Marsden have used this term (Marty, 'Addition to the Dictionary', *Christian Century*, 31 July–7 August, 1985, p. 719; Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 228). It is of interest to the topic of this article that Marsden and, with qualifications, James Barr, authors of two of the most important works on Protestant fundamentalism, appear willing to extend the term to Muslims (Marsden, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–228; Barr, *Fundamentalism*, 2nd edition, London: SCM Press, 1981, p. 7).

3 In my characterization of Protestant fundamentalism I have relied particularly, though not exclusively, on Marsden's *Fundamentalism in American Culture*.

4 'Convention Side Lights', *Watchman-Examiner*, July 1, 1920, p. 834. cf. Marsden, *Fundamentalism*, p. 107 and David Rausch, 'Fundamentalist Origins', in

Fundamentalism Today, What Makes It So Attractive?, M. J. Selvidge (ed.), Elgin, IL: Brethren Press, 1984, p. 12. The term is rooted in the use of the word 'fundamentals' as the title of a series of writings (*The Fundamentals*) issued between 1910 and 1915 and in the name of the World's Christian Fundamentals Association, founded in 1919.

In this article I define both Christian and Islamic 'fundamentalism' insofar as possible, largely in terms of their own adherents' views of them, not in terms of their (supposed) social or political causes or effects. In my view we must always begin our analysis of any religious phenomenon with a serious effort to understand it from the insider's point of view, although of course we should not stop there. This is particularly important with phenomena as contentious as 'fundamentalism'. In my view this beginning is largely ignored in scholarly writing on Islamic 'fundamentalism'. The situation with Christian fundamentalism is better (witness both Barr and Marsden, *op. cit.*) but so far I have not seen any serious effort to compare the two 'fundamentalisms' that undertakes it.

5 The five points adopted by the Presbyterian General Assembly in 1910 and important in the later fundamentalist controversy were: (1) inerrancy of scripture, (2) the virgin birth, (3) the substitutionary atonement, (4) Christ's bodily resurrecton, (5) the authenticity of miracles (Marsden, *Fundamentalism*, p. 117; see also pp. 224, 262, note 30). Harry Emerson Fosdick, in his attack on the fundamentalists, singled out four points: (1) the virgin birth, (2) inerrancy of scripture, (3) a 'special theory of the atonement', (4) second coming of Christ ('Shall the Fundamentalists Win?', *The Christian Century*, June 8, 1922, pp. 713–714). Clarence McCartney, in his rebuttal, mentioned the same four and in effect added the deity of Christ ('Shall Unbelief Win? An Answer to Dr Fosdick', *The Presbyterian*, July 13, 1922, pp. 8–10, 26, and July 21, 1922, pp. 8–10). For other, slightly varied, lists see R. Quebedeaux, *The Young Evangelicals; Revolution in Orthodoxy*, New York: Harper & Row, 1974, p. 18; *The Fundamentalist Phenomenon*, J. Falwell (ed.), Garden City: Doubleday, 1981, p. 7; J. N. Moore, 'Fundamentalism and the Creation-Evolution Debate', in Fundamentalism Today, Selvidge (ed.), p. 120; Carl Henry, in *Spectrum of Protestant Belief*, Robert Campbell (ed.), Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1968, p. 85; Bob Jones III, *Biblical Answers to Bothersome Questions*, Greenville, s.c.: Bob Jones University Press, 1981, p. 28.

6 Barr presents good arguments for favouring 'inerrancy' over other possible terms (*Fundamentalism*, chapter 3) and his description of fundamentalism as 'a constellation of differing positions disposed around the centrality and inerrancy of the Bible' (ibid., p. 324) seems to be appropriate. Marsden notes that 'inerrancy . . . was to become the code word for much of the fundamentalist movement' (*Fundamentalism*, p. 56, cf. p. 5, 205, 228, but see also 224).

It is an interesting paradox that Curtis Lee Laws, who coined the term 'fundamentalism', was not a fundamentalist if strict 'inerrancy' is the criterion used (Marsden, *op. cit.*, pp. 107, 165, 168–169). Up to 1925, fundamentalism was a sufficiently broad coalition of theological conservatives so that 'inerrancy' would not cover them all, but in view of developments since that time it seems reasonable to make it a criterion for current discussion.

7 Barr has a good discussion of the relation of 'inerrancy' to the more basic concerns (*Fundamentalism*, pp. 11, 25–38). The point may be illustrated to some degree by the statements in *The Fundamentalist Phenomenon* that 'the deity of Christ is really the most essential fundamental of all' (p. 8), 'it is this love for Jesus that drives Fundamentalists . . . to cling to the truth of Scriptures . . . it is the Scripture that

has led them to their personal experiential relationship with the living Christ' (p. 9) and 'the ultimate and deciding factor in Fundamentalism was . . . the doctrine of Biblical inspiration and authority' (p. 76, cf. B. Jones Jr, in *Spectrum*, p. 29).

8 Marsden, *Fundamentalism*, p. 180–184. The oppositional connotation of the word 'fundamentalism' is illustrated by the fact that it was common opposition to aspects of 'modernism' that held the conservatives in the fundamentalist alliance for a time, and that when the limits beyond which they would not carry an oppositional stance were reached, they ceased to be fundamentalists in the strict sense.

9 That fundamentalists and evangelicals share the same basic doctrinal convictions seems commonly agreed upon by both sides, e.g. Quebedeaux, *Young Evangelicals*, p. 18, and *The Fundamentalist Phenomenon*, Falwell (ed.), pp. 7–8, 152, although at the extremes, what one writer contrasts as 'worldly evangelicals' and 'hyper-fundamentalists' (*Fundamentalist Phenomenon*, p. 168) the differences are quite significant and Bob Jones Jr has described Billy Graham, an evangelical, as 'doing more harm to the cause of Christ than any other man' (*Spectrum*, Campbell (ed.), p. 2, cf. p. 29; this book has a good presentation of the fundamentalist, evangelical and conservative, here called 'confessional', positions by representatives of each). Barr does not recognize evangelicals and fundamentalists as distinct groups, probably because he reflects the situation in Great Britain, but the distinction seems widely accepted in the United States.

10 While recognizing the evangelicals as a distinct development, Marsden suggests that the word 'fundamentalistic' is still useful to describe many of them (*Fundamentalism*, pp. 195, 228). He suggests that, in the 1970s, out of 40 million 'evangelicals' some 4 million would call themselves 'fundamentalists' (ibid., p. 228).

11 Unfortunately, while much used in current writing on the Islamic world, the term is rarely defined. It is certainly used less precisely than in discussions of Christian fundamentalism, and probably rather more broadly than I shall use it here. I think, though, that my use targets the groups that are the central concern of most current discussion.

Although it can be found earlier, the first considered use of the term of which I am aware is that by L. Binder in *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, New York: Wiley, 1964, pp. 41–42, but his characterization of it includes some factors that I would rather call 'modernist' (see below, and note 14). Possibly the clearest definition of the term is that given by J. Voll in *Islam, Continuity and Change in the Muslim World*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982, pp. 30–31. Voll, however, uses the term for a tendency found throughout Islamic history. As Christian fundamentalism is clearly a modern phenomenon, and because modern Islamic 'fundamentalism' has some distinctive traits *vis-à-vis* earlier forms of 'fundamentalism', it seems appropriate to limit our consideration to the modern phenomenon. Other terms that have been used are 'revivalism' and 'Mahdism'. Fazlur Rahman has used 'neo-revivalism' and 'neo-fundamentalism' for essentially the same range of phenomena I have in mind here (e.g. 'Islam: Challenges and Opportunities', in *Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge*, A. T. Welch & P. Cachia (eds), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979, pp. 315–330, and 'Roots of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism', in *Change and the Muslim World*, P. H. Stoddard, D. C. Cuthell and M. W. Sullivan (eds), Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981, pp. 23–35. See also the note 12.

12 A good account of these developments in Iran is Said Amir Arjomand, 'Traditionalism in Twentieth-century Iran', in *From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam*, Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), London: Macmillan, 1984, chapter 10. Two good studies of modern developments in the Middle East (including Pakistan) are John Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984, and Edwin Mortimer, *Faith and Power*, London: Faber & Faber, 1982. The term 'clergy' for *'ulamā'* is generally rejected by Sunnis, but in a very general sense it applies, so long as it is remembered that the *'ulamā'* are not priests.

13 This term has been used by Eric Davis in 'Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt', in *From Nationalism*, Arjomand, (ed.), chapter 7.

14 What appears here is a simplified summary of a more complex typology presented in a paper entitled 'Islam and Ideology: Towards a Typology' (*International Journal of Middle East Studies*, **19** (1987) 307–336). In the above paper, the types cited are 'secularism', 'modernism', 'radical Islamism', 'adaptationist neo-traditionalism', 'rejectionist neo-traditionalism', 'adaptationist traditionalism', and 'rejectionist traditionalism'. These are viewed both as ideal types and also as points on a two-dimensional spectrum, so that intermediate positions are allowed for. 'Islamic radicalism' a term which I prefer to 'fundamentalism', includes radical Islamism and rejectionist neo-traditionalism.

15 This and other differences between Sunni and Shi'i 'fundamentalism' have been extremely important in practice but, in my view, are less important in principle and for the purpose of this article. In 'Islam and Ideology' I have located Ayatollah Khomeini on the spectrum between radical Islamism and rejectionist neo-traditionalism, while describing the Indo-Pakistani Abul A'la Mawdudi (1903–79) and the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), two of the best known and most important Sunni 'fundamentalist' ideologues, as radical Islamists. Arjomand ('Traditionalism') prefers the label 'traditionalism' with some justification, but his article shows how the Shi'i traditionalist movement developed in a radical Islamist direction over the years. Patrick J. Ryan has suggested the term 'integralism' for the Iranian phenomena, by analogy with the Roman Catholic movement by that name and largely because of the role of the *'ulamā'* ('Islamic Fundamentalism: a Questionable Category', *America*, December 29, 1984, pp. 437–440), and this suggestion has some merit. Important as the role of the *'ulamā'* has been in Iran, however, it can be argued that the difference between Sunnis and Shi'is at this point is as much a result of historical 'accident' as of any essential difference between the Sunni and Shi'i forms of Islam. For the purpose of this article, the most significant difference that results from this is that Shi'i 'fundamentalism' represents less of a break with the on-going tradition than does *Sunni* 'fundamentalism', but even here it can be argued that the difference is one of degree rather than kind, and the range of attitudes is probably comparable to the range of attitudes toward the on-going tradition among Christian fundamentalists. In any case, there are significant similarities between Sunni and Shi'i 'fundamentalism' and these are of primary interest here.

16 For example, the Muslim Brethren in Egypt have been more populist and the Jama'at-i Islami in India and Pakistan more elitist. For some of the other variations, as reflected in Egypt in the 'old-line' Muslim Brethren and their more radical offshoots in recent years, see E. Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985. E. Davis, 'Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism', and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and

Preliminary Findings', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, **12** (1980) 423–453.

17 Marsden's statement that in the early 1980s 'fundamentalists seemed undecided as to whether they were living in Babylon or Israel' (*Fundamentalism*, p. 228) could be applied *mutatis mutandis* to the difference in Egypt at the same time between the 'old line' Muslim Brethren and the new more militant groups such as those responsible for the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat (see references in note 16).

18 Barr notes, 'Now fundamentalism is a bad word . . . suggesting narrowness, bigotry, obscurantism and sectarianism' (*Fundamentalism*, p. 2) and defends its use partly on the ground that these words may well be accurate and fair descriptions (ibid., pp. 3–4).

19 Christian fundamentalists are generally careful to stop short of a divine 'dictation' theory (Barr, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 289–293, e.g. Bob Jones Jr in *Spectrum*, Campbell (ed.), pp. 30–31) although in some contexts they can come quite close (e.g. Jones, *Biblical Answers*, pp. 4–5, cf. Marsden, *Fundamentalism*, p. 113, 122), while the mainstream of Islamic theology has very consciously insisted that the very words of the Qur'an, not just the ideas behind them, are divinely given. For this reason, Muslims have been somewhat reluctant to translate the Qur'an and do not consider any translation to be more than a very imperfect paraphrase, while Christian fundamentalists take for granted the validity of translations (Jones' comments on translations and paraphrases are interesting in this light, *Biblical Answers*, pp. 5–6). This difference has important implications at the ritual level that are beyond the scope of this article, but of which it is important to be aware (for a good, brief discussion of the ritual use of the Qur'an see F. M. Denny, *An Introduction to Islam*, New York: Macmillan, 1985, pp. 158–163). The matter is further complicated by the fact that for most Muslims authority lies not in the Qur'an alone, but in the Qur'an *and* the Sunnah (authoritative example of the Prophet and, for Shi'is, the Imams). From several points of view the Hadith (the reports which contain the Sunnah) are more to be compared to the Christian Bible than is the Qur'an. This includes the traditional conception of their inspiration ('*ismah* = 'protection', *viz.* from error) and the fact that they, far more than the Qur'an, are open to something like the 'higher criticism' of the Bible. While in modern times there have been those who would limit authority to the Qur'an (e.g. Colonel Qaddafi) I do not consider them 'fundamentalists' as the term is here used. On the other hand, the issues of the nature of Qur'anic inspiration or of Hadith criticism are not ones that particularly divide Islamic 'fundamentalists' from others; they would be more relevant, I think, to distinguishing 'traditionalists' from others.

20 Because the Moral Majority claims, at least, to be open to others than Christians and to be based on 'moral' rather than specifically 'Christian' concerns. Of the contemporary fundamentalist groups that I have heard of the one that seems most like Islamic 'fundamentalists' is the movement that calls itself 'Theonomy' or 'Christian Reconstruction' (see D. A. Rausch and D. E. Chismar, 'The New Puritans and Their Theonomic Paradise', *Christian Century*, August 3–10, 1983, pp. 712–715). The comparison is made complex by the fact that Protestant fundamentalism in America has its roots in a tradition that, until the early part of this century, thought in terms of America as a 'Christian nation' in a far fuller sense than is possible today. J. Blanchard's (1811–1892) statement 'the Law of God is the Law of the Land' (Marsden, *Fundamentalism*, p. 86) would certainly be worthy of Muslim 'fundamentalists'. It may be the case that the 'secularism' of one

like Falwell is to be seen more as an unavoidable adjustment to the realities of contemporary pluralist America than as a matter of basic principle, although in Falwell's case his premillenialism presumably also militates in a 'secularist' direction. Of course, the scripturalist character of Protestant fundamentalism is also a force for 'secularism' in this sense, because the Christian scripture was originally addressed to a group that had no prospect of political power, while the scripturalism of Muslim 'fundamentalism' is a force in the opposite direction, as the Qur'an was originally addressed to a group that was in the process of taking political power. In any case, Falwell clearly illustratees the point that Protestant fundamentalism cannot be *defined* in terms of its attitude to political power, because he was apolitical in the 1960s and highly political in the 1970s and 1980s, but was a fundamentalist in both periods.

21 There are some words that come close. *Salafiyyah* has been used both for a particular movement in the Arab world and as a generic term; in the latter usage it would cover all those here called 'fundamentalists', but in both usages it covers some whom I would prefer to call 'modernists'. Also, I do not know whether it is used among Shi'is. *Maktabi* is currently used in Iran to refer to one who supports the present regime there and would probably do very well for 'fundamentalist' in that context, but so far as I know it has never been used in this way in Arabic or among Sunnis. *Usuliyyah* has recently been coined in Arabic on the analogy of the English word 'fundamentalism' (*usūl* in Arabic may be translated 'fundamentals' and is a central Islamic religious term; see Hasan Hanafi, '*Al-harakah al-islāmiyyah al-muʿāsirah* (The Contemporary Islamic Movement)', *Al-Watan* (Kuwait), November 20, 1982; noted by H. R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985, p. 4, and picked up by Martin Marty in 'Addition to the Dictionary'). I have seen a little evidence that this term has caught on, but it has some other actual or potential meanings that may disqualify it from this usage. Furthermore, its coiner explicitly treats it as a synonym of *salafiyyah*, so that the term is slightly too broad and would seem otiose in Arabic. If the term were to catch on, it would be an interesting and subtle example of the 'cultural imperialism' that Islamic 'fundamentalists' struggle against.

22 Particularly if one uses this term, as is often the case, to cover both the 'secularists' and the 'modernists' mentioned above. In Arabic the usual terms have been *islāh* ('reform') or *tajdīd* ('renewal'), both of which could be applied to 'fundamentalists'; more recently I have heard the expression, 'enlightened' Muslims. The term has, however, been used for quite some time in English (e.g. C. C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933).

23 This is more true of countries such as Egypt and Pakistan, where a determined 'modernization' process began in the 19th-century and has penetrated quite deeply into society, than in a country such as Iran, where a determined 'modernization' process began only in the 1920s and has not penetrated so deeply. This is another reason why the 'fundamentalism' of Iran is more traditionalist than that of Egypt or Pakistan. By the same token, American Protestant fundamentalists today are presumably more 'radical' in this sense than those of the 1920s.

24 For example, the current 'fundamentalist' rulers of Iran have easily adopted the term *mustazifan* ('oppressed', 'disinherited', derived from the Qur'an) and *gharbzadegi* ('westoxication', 'weststruckness', 'xenomania'), both of which were coined by non-'fundamentalist' radicals [on the first see, for example, Arjomand,

'Traditionalism', p. 227, and on the second see, for example, B. Hanson, 'The "Westoxication" of Iran', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 15 (February 1983), 1–23]. cf. Mawdudi's description of Muslims as an 'International Revolutionary Party organized by Islam' (*Jihad in Islam*, International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1981, p. 5).

25 Here is one good example: 'The concept of nation-States is the very antithesis of the universal message of Islam'. (Mohammad Abdessalam Faraj, *Al-Jihad, The Forgotten Pillar*, English translation, Ottawa, Canada, nd., p. 64). The strong allegiance of 'fundamentalists' to the Islamic community, however, sometimes leads Western observers to speak of them as 'nationalistic'. Also, they may cooperate with nationalists at those times and places when the immediate task is to expel a colonial power. Insofar as nationalism is a positive doctrine, however, the above quotation is representative.

26 I have personally heard such comments from both Christian and Islamic 'fundamentalists'. For published examples see, for example, the following from B. Jones III, 'Taking up our cross daily and following Jesus will limit our circle of friends' or 'Ecumenicity is a religious fad of our day. In the minds of most people ecumenicity is good. In the mind of God, it is bad'. (*Biblical Answers*, pp. 14, 51.) Sayyid Qutb describes the true Muslims as 'a vanguard . . . marching through the vast ocean of Jahiliyyah (anti-Islamic ignorance/barbarism) which has encompassed the entire world'. (*Milestones*, English translation, Beirut and Damascus: Holy Koran Publishing House for the I.I.F.S.O., 1978, pp. 16–17, explanatory parentheses added).

27 For example, 'Liberalism in Reverse . . . Evangelicalism in neutral . . . Fundamentalism in Overdrive' (*The Fundamentalist Phenomenon*, Falwell (ed.), pp. 22, 24, 26) from the Christian side. On the Muslim side a good example is Khomeini's statement on the formal proclamation of the Islamic Republic in Iran, 'The First Day of God's Government' (*Islam and Revolution*, translated by H. Algar, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981, pp. 265–267). Something of the paradox of minority consciousness with triumphalism is suggested by the following from Falwell's camp: 'While . . Evangelicals have been trying to become "respectable by the world's standards", Fundamentalists, who could not care less about respectability, have suddenly recaptured the heart and spirit of the American religious community' (*Fundamentalist Phenomenon*, p. 26). Even where a marked premillenialism inhibits such a 'worldly' triumphalism, it is still present in the conviction that the ultimate course of events is in the hands of God and thus must vindicate the fundamentalist. In the case of Evangelicals I imagine that both the minority consciousness and the triumphalism are less marked, but I would be surprised to find them absent, especially among those who hold to Biblical inerrancy. On the Muslim side, Sayyid Qutb is convinced that the present small 'vanguard' (see previous note) has God's own truth and is following God's own system (see especially, but not exclusively, the chapters in *Milestones* entitled 'La Ilaha illa Allah—The Way of Life of Islam' and 'The Faith Triumphant', chapters 5 and 9); for this aspect of both Qutb and Khomeini, see W. Shepard, 'The Role of Islamic Fundamentalism', in *Religion's Response to Change*, J. M. Ker & K. J. Sharpe (eds), Auckland, New Zealand: The Auckland University Chaplaincy Publishing Trust, 1985, pp. 29–53. The triumphalism of Muslim 'fundamentalists' is somewhat more on a worldly plane, and the minority consciousness somewhat more derived from modern conditions, as distinct from the immutable plan of God, than is the case with Christian fundamentalism, especially in its premillenialist form, but the difference

is not absolute. In both cases the tension between minority consciousness and triumphalism can be found in the scriptures, and the differences between the Qur'an and the New Testament on this point are fairly well reflected in the differences between Muslim and Christian 'fundamentalism'.

28 Luther's Preface to the New Testament, *Martin Luther, Selections from his writings*, J. Dillenberger (ed.). Garden City, NY: Doubleday (Anchor), 1961, p. 19.

29 Actually, of course, the stress on the death of Christ represents a background somewhat broader than Protestant, because this is a characteristic Western Christian emphasis, while the individualism represents a somewhat narrower background, looking back to Pietist roots.

30 This applies more to those I would call 'radical Islamists' than to 'rejectionist neo-traditionalists' (see note 14). See, for example, W. Cantwell Smith's comments on Mawdudi [*Islam in Modern History*, New York: New American Library (Mentor), 1959, p. 236], and also my 'Islam as a 'System' in the Later Writings of Sayyid Qutb' (to be published in *Middle Eastern Studies*) and 'The Role of Islamic Fundamentalism' (*Religion's Response to Change*, pp. 33–34). The idea of Islam as a system can be found in the English translation, at least, of Khomeini's writings, though it is not so prominent as in Mawdudi or Sayyid Qutb (*Islam and Revolution*, pp. 43, 77, 137, 149).

31 Khomeini in his '*Vilayat-i Faqih*' translated as 'Islamic Government' in Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, pp. 27–166: particularly stresses that God's law must not only be known, but also be put into effective practice.

32 For an example of Christian awareness of this: '. . . the liberal attempt at reconciling Christianity with modern science has really relinquished everything distinctive of Christianity, so that what remains is in essentials only that same indefinite type of religious aspiration which was in the world before Christianity came upon the scene' (J. Gresham Machen quoted in *The Fundamentalist Phenomenon*, pp. 97–98). On the Muslim side see Shepard, 'Role', p. 33.

33 The point is important but needs to be nuanced somewhat. Sayyid Qutb in *Milestones*, for example, is at pains to stress that the Islamic 'vanguard' must be thoroughly grounded in the basic Islamic doctrines before undertaking revolutionary social and political action (see especially chapters 1–5). He limits himself, however, to the most basic Islamic doctrines ('There is no god but God' and 'Muhammad is the Apostle of God'), which he interprets in a strongly social and political sense. By contrast, the distinguishing doctrinal points of Christian fundamentalists, such as virgin birth and inerrancy, are much less central to the Christian position in general.

34 *Biblical Answers*, pp. 16, 41; cf. B. Jones Jr, in *Spectrum*, p. 89.

35 See, for example, B. Jones III: 'Many of you have believed the gospel and have been saved by the gospel. But with all the strange ideas that are spread abroad, you have become confused' (*Biblical Answers*, p. 21). cf. Sayyid Qutb's comments on his own previous views in *Milestones* (pp. 175–176). It is also worth noting that Christian fundamentalists are willing to recognize other forms of Christianity at least to the extent of accepting a distinctive label, such as 'fundamentalist' or 'evangelical'. Something similar is true of Muslim 'fundamentalists' insofar as they are willing to accept labels such as *salafi* or *maktabi* (cf. note 21 above). A representative of the Iranian government recently told me quite explicitly that a person can be Muslim without being *maktabi*. I think this willingness is less widespread among Muslim 'fundamentalists' than Christian fundamentalists, and it does not represent much of a compromise with pluralism in either case.

36 *Fundamentalism*, pp. 40–55.

37 For example, I think many Muslims would contest Sayyid Qutb's interpretation of *jāhiliyyah*; it has traditionally been understood to refer to the period of paganism, especially Arabian paganism, just prior to the coming of Islam, but for Qutb it is a moral and spiritual condition which occurs at all times and is particularly dominant today (see for example, Sivan's discussion in *Radical Islam*, pp. 22–28).

38 For example, Sayyid Qutb asks, quoting the Qur'an, 'Do you know better, or God?' (*Milestones*, p. 156) and 'Jahiliyyah . . . takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate . . . rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed' (ibid., p. 15); B. Jones III: 'Never judge things by what you see; judge what you see by what God's Word says about what you see' (*Biblical Answers*, p. 44).

39 Marsden, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 16, 110–112.

40 For a good example of esoteric interpretation from Khomeini, see his 'Lectures on Surat al-Fatiha' (*Islam and Revolution*, pp. 365–434). It is worth noting, however, that these were presented as television lectures, so that while the content is esoteric the presentation is quite 'exoteric'. Another point where Khomeini moderates Shi'i esotericism is where he distinguishes the special spiritual and cosmic status of the Imams from their governing function: the former are shared by no humans since their time, but the latter does not involve any knowledge that is not accessible to the *'ulamā'*, i.e. to purely human 'experts' (ibid, pp. 64–65 and footnotes). Thus, no strictly esoteric knowledge is necessary for governing according to the law of God.

41 See, for example, B. Jones III, *Biblical Answers*, p. 28; cf. Barr, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 20–22. Of course, extreme fundamentalists (and many less extreme ones) have no use for the ecumenical movement of the main line churches (e.g. *Biblical Answers*, pp. 51–55).

42 See, for example, Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, pp. 300–301; see also article 12 of the current Iranian constitution. Spokesmen for the present regime strongly reject the claim that theirs is a 'Shi'i' as distinct from an 'Islamic' revolution. This is not to deny that the revolution has had some distinctively Shi'i elements in practice. There have also been reports of persecution of some Sunni leaders in Iran. Whatever the actual practice, however, in theory, at least, the present government stresses the ties that bind Shi'i and Sunni.

43 On the Christian side see, for example, *The Fundamentalist Phenomenon*, p. 224, note 2, and E. Dobson, 'Fundamentalism—Its Roots', *New Catholic World*, Vol. 228, No. 1363 (Jan./Feb. 1985), p. 4. I have not seen a comparable comment by a Muslim I would consider a 'fundamentalist', but I have no reason to believe that 'fundamentalists' would differ from other Muslims on this matter. In my experience Muslims tend to respond to the term in one of two ways. Either they respond to the root meaning of the term and gladly accept it for all serious Muslims, or they respond to its pejorative connotations and reject its application to Muslims (for examples of both see *Islamic Fundamentalism*, K. B. Akhtar & A. H. Sakr (eds), Cedar Rapids, IA, 1982).

44 A point made clear by Marsden, e.g. 'Fundamentalists [in 1920] . . . wished to revive an evangelical theological consensus that had in fact been gone for at least a generation'. (*Fundamentalism*, p. 164, cf. pp. 11–12, 49-50, 124, 149–152, 161–164, 204–205, 211).

45 While it has been the general opinion among Muslims, and especially Shi'is, that some degree of decline occurred after the earliest period of Islam, Mawdudi,

Sayyid Qutb, and Khomeini all seem to hold that Islamic society went most seriously off the right track only under the influence of the West in modern times (e.g. Mawdudi, *The Islamic Law and Constitution*, K. Ahmad (ed. and translator), 5th edition, Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1975, p. 118; Sayyid Qutb, *This Religion of Islam*, English translation, I.I.F.S.O., 1402/1982, p. 66; Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*, pp. 48–49).

46 I have seen a number of issues of the *Tehran Times*, an English language daily that follows the government's line, between 11 April 1981 and 28 October 1985. On the second page one can quite often find articles about Iranian technological achievements.

It does not seem appropriate here to enter into the vast literature discussing such concepts as 'modernity' and 'modernization'. To some extent I am presuming here a commonsense definition of 'modern', but beyond that it seems to me that any viable scholarly definition of the term must include a positive orientation to modern technology. Indeed, much discussion of 'modernization' in relation to the Third World centres on the question of what personal attitudes and social structures are necessary for the successful adoption of modern technology (see, for example, A. Inkeles & D. H. Smith, *Becoming Modern*, London: Heinemann, 1974, chapter 2). Of course, mere involvement in modern technology, willy nilly, does not prove that one has 'modern' attitudes. A *positive* attitude toward it does, however, or at least must be considered one of the essential components of it. That 'fundamentalists' generally have such a positive attitude does seem to me to be the case, as is indicated below.

47 'The Role of Islamic Fundamentalism', pp. 37–38; 'Islam and Ideology'. See also note 30, above.

48 See, for example, Bob Jones Jr, in *Spectrum*, p. 36; B. Jones III, Biblical Answers, pp. 63–64.

49 Barr, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 272–275, 315; see also references in notes 39 and 52 of this article.

50 Barr, *Fundamentalism*, pp. 98–100. This point is well illustrated by Jamie Buckingham's *Power for Living*, 2nd edition (Arthur S. DeMoss Foundation, 1984), which begins with an illustration drawn from the launching of the space ship 'Columbia' and then moves to eight 'success stories', including four athletes, three businessmen, and Charles Coulson.

51 At the Congress of International Association for the History of Religion held in Sydney, Australia, in August, 1985, during the discussion of a paper on Fundamentalism by N. C. Nielsen. The prominence of engineers and people with similar technical training among Islamic 'fundamentalists' has been noted by more than one observer (see especially Davis, 'Ideology', p. 140–143, cf. Sivan, *Radical Islam*, pp. 118–119) and both J. Falwell and F. Schaeffer studied engineering at college (*Fundamentalist Phenomenon*, note 49).

52 The affinities between Christian fundamentalism and Newtonian science are made clear by Marsden (*Fundamentalism*, pp. 7–8, 14–17, 19–20, 55–62, 111–116) and Barr (*Fundamentalism*, pp. 90–97, 270–276, 315). For Islamic fundamentalism as a 'scientific' view, see Shepard 'Role', p. 33.

53 On the Muslim side, this is illustrated by an experience I had in Cairo, Egypt, in 1977. Visiting a mosque whose orientation appeared to be 'fundamentalist', I learned that they rejected the usual practice of having someone recite the Qur'an before Friday communal worship. Instead, each person studied it himself at this time.

54 *Marsden, Fundamentalism*, pp. 204–205; Sivan, *Radical Islam*, pp. 125–127, Davis, 'Ideology', pp. 143–145.

55 Even though the authority of the *'ulama'* plays a prominent role in Shi'i 'fundamentalism', this authority is based on their role as expert interpreters of the Qur'an and Sunnah.

56 *Salafiyyah* and *maktabi* have positive connotations, especially among those that so label themselves. *Usuliyyah* is coined from *usūl*, a venerable and very positive word in the traditional vocabulary of Islam. (cf. note 21, above.)

57 Although Jews have a Scripture, Orthodox Jews have related to it through the Talmud and other rabbinic learning and this, though written, has perhaps more the character of an ongoing tradition than a scripture. One can imagine two sorts of Jewish 'fundamentalism', one that would seek to go 'behind' the Talmudic tradition to the scripture and one that would be 'fundamentalist' in terms of the Talmudic tradition. Perhaps the Gush Emunim and the Neturei Karta, respectively, represent these alternatives. I can imagine both being called 'fundamentalist', although their positions on Zionism are diametrically opposed.

58 I have suggested in this article recently published in *The Christian Century* (January 1987, p. 86). There is a problem for me in this, however, because elsewhere I have used "neotraditionalism" in a slightly different way with reference to Islamic developments (see notes 14 and 15, above).

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SURVEY ARTICLE:

SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH MILLENARIANISM

Richard W. Cogley

This essay, which is not a review of recent scholarship, offers an overview of 17th-century English Protestant (especially Puritan) millenarianism. Its major point is that English millenarianism was above all else a pre-modern species of historiography. The essay begins with a discussion of the so-called 'last things', the historiographical categories through which Puritans made history intelligible. It then presents some case studies, in order to show how representative millenarians construed certain 'last things': the millennium, the Second Coming, the destruction of Antichrist, the conversion of the Jews and the conversion of the Gentiles, and the wrath of Satan. The essay concludes with a consideration of the 'last days', the time-span in which the 'last things' unfolded.

INTRODUCTION

The biblical books of Daniel and Revelation were not composed for the instruction of unborn generations. They were written to meet the specific and immediate needs of communities that awaited the termination of history. But because of the canonical status later conferred upon them, these two visions of the end became the possession of Christian posterity. Their inclusion in the Scripture has represented a challenge to Christians, for no other biblical books disclose so graphically God's agenda for the end of history. Through the ages many of the faithful have placed this agenda in one of two temporal locations. Some have believed that it will transpire in a distant epoch. Others have been convinced that it has started to unfold in time. Christians of the second sort—known in this essay as millenarians[1]—have been studied recently by many English and American scholars. Much of their attention has focused on 17th-century English Protestant (especially Puritan) millenarianism. No fewer than 12 studies, devoted wholly or in a large part to the subject, have appeared since 1969.[2] This body of secondary literature has improved our understanding of 17th-century English millenarianism in four respects.

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(1) The secondary literature has shown that millenarianism had a broader social and political base than earlier scholars had suspected. Millenarianism was not confined (as scholars once thought) to lower-class sectarians like the Ranters and to political revolutionaries like the Fifth Monarchy Men, but also existed, in more conservative versions, among university dons, reform-minded parliamentarians, non-conformist lecturers, and émigré preachers in Holland and in New England. The two monographs that first convinced historians that millenarianism belonged to the center of the Puritan movement no less than to its radical fringe were William Lamont's interpretation of the early Stuart and Interregnum periods, *Godly Rule*, and John F. Wilson's investigation of the Puritan preachers to the Long Parliament, *Pulpit in Parliament*. Since the publication in 1969 of these two books the millenarianism of the Puritan mainstream has become a profitable field for study.

(2) The secondary literature has revealed the inadequacy of an older view that saw millenarianism as a short-lived phenomenon, one that first appeared in the unsettled 1640s and 1650s, and vanished with the Restoration in 1660. This view has been challenged from both chronological directions: the narrative histories of Paul Christianson and Katharine Firth have traced the origins and development of English millenarianism from the time of the Reformation through to the early 1640s; and Frank Manuel's *The Religion of Isaac Newton* and Lamont's *Richard Baxter and the Millennium*, as well as the prospective conclusion of Bryan Ball's *A Great Expectation: Eschatological Thought in English Protestantism to 1660*, indicate that millenarianism continued to exist (albeit in diminished proportions) after the Restoration. It is now clear to historians that the 1640s and 1650s did not constitute the lifespan of millenarianism, only the heyday of it.

(3) The secondary literature has established that within English millenarianism there existed an astonishing diversity of opinion about the nature, the arrangement, and the chronology of the end-time events. This diversity is apparent in the accounts given by Christianson, Firth, and Ball, and also in Tai Liu's discussion of the Puritan divines in the 1640s and 1650s, in Christopher Hill's study of the figure of Antichrist in 17th-century England, and in a collection of essays edited by Peter Toon. Thus it is incorrect to think that English millenarians shared a single view of the millennium, or a similar doctrine of the second coming, or a common chronological framework.

(4) The secondary literature has demonstrated the limited applicability to English millenarianism of the social-scientific models for millenarianism that are used by Norman Cohn in his well-known study of the medieval period, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, and by Peter Worsley and Kenelm Burridge in their work on 'cargo cults' in Melanesia.[3] These models, which

at their most basic level view millenarianism as the world-inverting ideology of the disinherited, work well enough for the Diggers and other radical groups of the 1650s, the subjects of Hill's appropriately entitled study *The World Turned Upside Down*. But when regarded in its entirety, so that conservative constructions are taken into account, English millenarianism becomes too variegated an historical phenomenon to be interpreted adequately by these models.

These many studies have established the importance of millenarianism for an understanding of 17th-century England. Yet the volume and the detail of these studies can overwhelm a reader, particularly one of little previous acquaintance with English millenarianism. There exists no convenient introduction to the subject. This essay attempts to meet this need. The essay, which is cast as an anatomy of English millenarianism rather than as a review of recent scholarship about it, begins with a discussion of the end-time events, the so-called 'last things' that millenarians derived from the books of the Bible, most notably Daniel and Revelation; it then presents some case instances, in order to show how millenarians construed certain last things; it proceeds to a consideration of the 'last days', that period of past, present, and future time during which the last things occurred; and it concludes with a brief evaluation of 17th-century English millenarianism. The major point of the essay is that millenarianism was, above all else, an historiographical mode used by Englishmen to make history intelligible.

THE LAST THINGS

Three of the last things had been the perennial concern of the faithful ever since the inception of the Christian tradition: the second coming of Jesus Christ, the general or universal resurrection of the dead (sometimes termed the 'second resurrection'), and the last judgement. These three last things had compelling interest for the believer because of their bearing on his eternal fate. Even Christians who were not millenarians had their eyes on them, no matter how remote in time they considered them to be. The other last things, however, were ordinarily the concern only of millenarians. Into this category may be placed the millennium, the pouring of the seven vials of God's wrath, the blowing of the seven trumpets, the opening of the seven seals, the Battle of Armageddon, the slaying of the two witnesses, the destruction of Antichrist, the end-time 'wrath of Satan', the resurrection of the saints (the 'first resurrection'), and the conversion of the Jews and the conversion of the Gentiles. But these examples represent only a range of likely possibilities. Lists of last things differed from millenarian to millenarian, due in large part to the richness of the symbolism in the Books of Daniel and Revelation. On this as on other matters, much depended on the individual's interpretation of this lavish symbolism.

Seventeenth-century English millenarians characteristically arranged the last things in their sequential order of occurrence (last thing A, then last thing B, and so forth through the remainder of the list). They believed that the sequence, although not yet completed, had already started to unfold in history. After the sequence had run its full course through to the last judgement, history would cease, and God's chosen would then be received into eternal light and his enemies cast into everlasting darkness.

In order to know how far the sequence had advanced in history, millenarians had to determine which last things had occurred and which were in progress. It was only after they had made this determination that they were able to say which last things remained in the future. A millenarian might conclude, for example, that four vials of God's wrath had been poured; that the pouring of the fifth, the millennium, and the destruction of Antichrist were in progress; and that the remaining two vials, the second coming, the resurrection of the dead, and the last judgement belonged to the future.

Thus English millenarianism cannot be understood by assuming that it was concerned exclusively with the future, as if all the last things disclosed in the Bible were still to come. From the presumed point in time of the biblical authors, all of the last things were in the future. But from a 17th-century vantage point, some last things had passed, others were in progress, and the rest had yet to occur.

The belief that the last things were under way led millenarians to become preoccupied with history. Indeed, one of the chief features of English millenarianism was its retrospective orientation: millenarians had to study history in order to find the last things that were contained within it. The Second Civil War (1648–49) provides a good example. A given millenarian might say, when looking back on this event, that what happened at one level was that the parliamentary armies defeated Charles I in battle. He then might say that what happened at a deeper level was that a 'blow' towards the destruction of Antichrist was delivered. In reaching this conclusion, the millenarian was using a last thing (the destruction of Antichrist) to make an historical event (in this case, the Second Civil War) fully intelligible to him. He was practising a form of historiography.

This historiography carried with it certain assumptions about the relationship between Scripture, history, and interpretation. Millenarians thought that in the Bible God disclosed, largely through symbols, specific future historical events, the so-called last things. They did not believe that the biblical authors had a personal knowledge of the events in question. The historical circumstance as well as the end-time significance of these events could be ascertained only after their occurrence. Moreover, millenarians did not think that the historical agents to whom they attributed the accomplishment of last things were necessarily cognizant of the full meaning of their actions in God's master plan for history. We shall see shortly that millenarians sometimes took the initiative into their own hands, in order to bring last things to pass in history. In these cases the agents in question were indeed aware of the deeper significance. But millenarians did not believe that other historical agents were motivated in this self-conscious way. The deeper significance of their actions could be seen only in retrospect. Finally, 17th-century millenarians did not assume that historiography was immune from revision. They disputed many of the interpretations made by earlier millenarians, on the grounds that their predecessors lacked their historical perspective; and they were prepared, in response to recent events, to revise their own previous conclusions.[4]

For these reasons English millenarians imagined that they were uniquely positioned in time to identify last things in historical events. In making these identifications millenarians had considerable historiographical freedom. Yet their historiography was seldom arbitrary, although to our eyes it often appears to be such at first glance. For one thing, the events that millenarians selected as last things normally had historical significance in their own right—wars, persecutions, political changes, ecclesiastical reforms, theological innovations. More often than not, these events were drawn from Protestant history in its struggle with the Roman Antichrist, or else from medieval heterodoxy in its contest with the same redoubtable foe. Secondly, there were certain exegetical conventions that governed the reading of the symbolism in Daniel and Revelation. The scriptural figure of a woman, for example, represented the church, a beast symbolized an earthly kingdom or a ruler, a body of water stood for a people or a nation, and an angel represented a preacher of righteousness.[5] Thirdly, the events that the millenarian selected as last things usually corresponded to his ideology and/or his interests. This point has an important implication for modern historiography: the symbolism in Daniel and Revelation allowed (even compelled) the millenarian to interpret it in his own image, and consequently his handling of this malleable symbolism often provides modern historians with direct access to his ideology and interests.

Seventeenth-century millenarians located most last things in English history rather than in the histories of other nations. They looked to their own history because of a special kind of national self-understanding that they derived from the Elizabethans John Bale, John Foxe, and Thomas Brightman. The belief that England was the Elect Nation, which according to recent scholarship was absent in Bale and in Foxe but not in Brightman,[6] led 17th-century millenarians to assume that it was England's destiny to occupy center stage in the end-time drama. As a result they scrutinized past and present events at home, for they were convinced that by studying English history they could discern some of the choicest workings of the Lord's will for history. Thus 17th-century English millenarians imagined that they were uniquely positioned in space no less than in time.

English millenarians, moreover, were seldom content to stand back and passively observe the course of English history. They wanted to play a part in the end-time drama, and they used the last things to explain their participation. We might return, for purposes of illustration, to our earlier example of the Second Civil War. In 1650 a group of army millenarians issued a declaration about their decision of 1648 to renew the war against Charles. 'Being persuaded in our hearts that he and his monarchy was one of the ten horns of the Beast [i.e. of Antichrist]', they explained,

> we found our hearts extraordinarily stirred up by the Lord against the King, being abundantly satisfied in our judgements and consciences that we were called forth by the Lord to be instrumental to bring about that which was our continual prayer to God, *viz.*, the destruction of Antichrist . . .

'When God executes His justice upon malefactors', they concluded, 'let none go about to resist'.[7]

Discussions of millenarian activity often concentrate on this very period, the late 1640s and the 1650s, when radicalism was the order of the day. The saints' campaign against the sovereign powers in church and state, and their subsequent attempts to establish a new order in the ruins of the old regime, were accompanied by the extremist millenarianism of the Fifth Monarchy Men, the Diggers, the Quakers, the Ranters, and the Muggletonians. Because of the amount of work done by B. S. Capp, Hill, and others on the millenarianism of the Interregnum, our perceptions of English millenarian activity are often coloured with a fiery hue. Yet we must be wary, for when we survey the entire 17th-century situation, we see that millenarians were engaged in activities that were not radical in nature. These non-radical activities may be assigned to two general categories. First, an involvement in reform projects, specifically reform of the church, the government, the law, and the educational system. These projects, which were aimed primarily at eradicating the legacy of the Roman Antichrist in England, flourished in the early Stuart period, when the chosen instrument for reform was the Parliament. The bearing of reform-oriented millenarianism on the constitutional questions of the day testifies to its historical importance; however, those contemporary historians who have written about this type of millenarianism (Lamont, Wilson, Liu, and Trevor-Roper) hasten to add that because of its connection with the vexatious constitutional questions it must be carefully assessed. Secondly, an involvement in ecumenical projects, like the establishment of concerts of prayer and missionary associations, and the formation of plans for Protestant union. Though not confined to it, ecumenical projects were most prevalent in the Restoration period, when they attracted the interest of English Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Baptists, and also of their brethren in America and on the Continent.[8]

SOME CASE INSTANCES

The identification of last things varied from individual to individual, and from group to group. A sense of this variation can be given by considering how selected millenarians understood certain last things: the conversion of the Jews and the conversion of the Gentiles, the second coming, the destruction of Antichrist, the millennium, and the 'wrath' of Satan. We must not assume, however, that each instanced millenarian consistently maintained the point of view that is attributed to him in these examples. Seldom, in fact, did the individual hold to a single construction of last things with unwavering fidelity over time. Because he was endeavoring to understand history, he had to accommodate to its many changes. Thus he was prepared to weigh conclusions, to re-order the sequence, to re-identify last things, all in the hope of attaining a better understanding of the 'times'. This revisionism was most evident in the 1640s and 1650s, when momentous events that demanded to be made intelligible were transpiring at every turn.

The conversion of the Jews and the conversion of the Gentiles. Shortly before he ascended into heaven, Jesus Christ commissioned the infant church to preach the Word to all nations (Mark 16, Matthew 28). English millenarians considered the universal dispersal of the Gospel—the 'Great Commission'—a central aspect of the divine plan for history. They held that the spread of the Word had proceeded apace in the apostolic period, when the faithful disseminated Christian teaching throughout the Roman Empire; that it had been arrested in the Middle Ages, when the Lord permitted the Pope and the Turk to hold sway over much of the globe; and that it was to resume in the end-times, and continue until God's name filled all the earth.

Millenarians customarily divided the world's non-Christian peoples into the two biblical categories of Jews and Gentiles, and then listed the Jews' conversion and the Gentiles' conversion as distinct last things. Following Romans 11 and other texts, they often referred to the Jews' conversion as the 'Restoration of Israel'. Millenarians were convinced that, at the end of history, God would not cast his ancient people into the flaming pit, despite their wilful alienation from the Church. In his mercy he would forgive the Jews for their disobedience, bless them with the Gospel, and restore them to Palestine. Using a common Scriptural idiom, millenarians often termed the Gentiles' conversion the 'Fullness of the Nations'. They believed that in the vastness of his will, God had allowed many 'Nations' to lie in darkness for centuries. But in the glorious climax to history, he would give his Word to the 'Nations' and bring them out of darkness into light.

Most English millenarians assumed that these two massive end-time conversions would come about miraculously, when God poured forth his grace upon Jew and Gentile, and removed the scales from their eyes and the hardness from their hearts. Their anticipation of these miraculous spectacles, however, did not obviate missionary work on their part. They believed that the 'Great Commission' placed them under a present obligation to seek the conversion of non-Christian peoples. The proposed admission of Jews into England, in order to instruct them in the Gospel, was one example of their initiative. Missionary activity in America was another.

Although millenarians stood in agreement about these matters, they disagreed about two related points. The first pertained to sequential ordering. Some millenarians said that the mass conversion of the Jews would precede that of the Gentiles, while others endorsed the opposite point of view. The second concerned the classification of certain non-Christian peoples, particularly the New World Indians. One school of thought saw the Indians as Gentiles, and another identified them as the descendants of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel. The question of the Indians' origins, when viewed in conjunction with the issue of sequential order, became an important one for millenarians, who needed to know whether the Indians were of Jewish or Gentile ancestry in order to determine when the anticipated sequence of last things would advance to the time of their mass conversion.[9]

The second coming. The second coming of Christ (the 'Parousia') is one of the few last things that appears in a number of New Testament writings, and not just in the Book of Revelation. Several of these passages (e.g. Matthew 25) indicate that the returned Christ's pre-eminent task will be to execute the last judgement following the general resurrection of the dead. In one sense, the second coming was not a matter for debate in the 17th-century: after all, if Christ were to descend to earth in a chariot of fire and the dead rise from their graves and assemble before his throne, there would be no debating it by anyone. Nearly all English millenarians envisioned a literal Parousia of this nature, and accordingly assigned it to the future.

Contained within the consensus were two subordinate views held by minority bodies of millenarians. The first, known as the doctrine of the middle or 'bright' advent of Christ, originated with the medieval abbot Joachim of Fiore, who derived it from II Thessalonians 2:8. For those English millenarians who followed Joachim on this point, Christ's middle advent would fall at some juncture between first advent in the New Testament times and his climactic return on judgement day. In their minds the middle advent was not to be characterized by Christ's literal re-appearance;

rather, the advent was to be a specific manifestation of his power in proportions unprecedented on earth. The manner of this manifestation, however, was in the eye of its beholder, and because there were many beholders, diversity inevitably resulted. One millenarian might say that Christ would manifest his power in the rule of the saints; a second, in an uncorrupted church order; and a third, in the person of a contemporary leader. An important consequence of figurative interpretations such as these was that they did not require Englishmen to locate the middle advent in the future. For instance, a millenarian could point to an existing church order and identify it as the representation of Christ's middle advent. The second subordinate view was that of early Quakerism. The early Quakers (with the exception of James Nayler's followers, who for a time suspected that he was the returned Christ) accepted the doctrines of a literal second coming, the general resurrection of the dead, and the last judgement. Yet they diminished the future significance of these three last things by their adoption of what modern theologians and biblical critics call a 'realised eschatology'. From the Quaker point of view, true believers who have felt the reality of Christ's presence in their souls, who have been reborn from the law of sin and death, and who have received through the spirit assurance of salvation, have witnessed proleptically the second coming, the resurrection of the dead, and the last judgement.[10]

The destruction of Antichrist. Strictly speaking, the word 'Antichrist' appears only in the Johannine epistles. But through a well-established exegetical tradition, millenarians amalgamated into the figure of Antichrist other ill-defined scriptural figures, most notably the 'Beast' (Daniel 7, Revelation 7), the 'Scarlet Whore' (Revelation 17), and the 'Man of Lawlessness' (II Thessalonians 2). When English millenarians spoke of the 'Antichrist of prophecy', they had the Pope in mind, and sometimes the Turk as well. They normally delegated the destruction of the Turkish Antichrist to others, usually to the diaspora Jews, whom they expected to reassemble in Palestine (either just before or soon after their conversion) in order to campaign against the Turk. This expectation had its greatest plausibility in the late 1640s and early 1650s, when Englishmen learned that Menasseh ben Israel and other Jewish leaders were awaiting the imminent appearance of the messiah and the concomitant resettlement of Israel, and also in mid- to late-1660s, when reports of the Sabbatian excitement reached England.[11] In the case of the papal Antichrist, however, English millenarians were eager to deliver 'blows' of their own. Nevertheless they disagreed about the range of the target and about the nature of the weapons. We may look at six brief examples. One possible conclusion was that the figure of the papal Antichrist encompassed Catholic doctrines like transubstantiation, purgatory, and the veneration of the Host. More often than not, millenarians who reached this conclusion considered the dissemination of Protestant polemics a fitting 'blow to the Beast'. A second possibility was that Antichrist included papal appendages like the religious orders and the secular clergy. A number of millenarians reasoned that it did, and they advocated the passing of anti-Jesuit legislation and the winning of English Catholics to Protestant truth as appropriate counter-measures. A third was that Antichrist extended to Catholic nations such as France and Spain. This supposition had important consequences for foreign policy, especially during the Thirty Years War, when the Protestants of the Palatinate begged for relief from Catholic occupation. Englishmen, both within and without Parliament, argued that the destruction of Antichrist would be accelerated by English participation in the ongoing contest of nations. Another possible conclusion was that Antichrist embraced the Church of England, with its episcopal polity and Catholic ceremonial. Many millenarians believed so, and in their minds church reform had a special urgency, particularly during Laud's primacy. A fifth was that Antichrist included the person of Laud himself. Some Englishmen were certain that it did, all the more so after they learned that some of Laud's co-adjutors had declared that the Pope was not Antichrist. For some of these millenarians, the judicial murder of Laud was a 'blow to the Beast'. A final possibility was that Antichrist comprehended Charles I. There were millenarians who drew this conclusion, on the grounds that the Stuart had elevated Laud, married a Catholic princess, sponsored a Catholic court, and pursued a pro-Catholic foreign policy. This conclusion served as an impetus to civil war and, in time, to regicide.

The millennium. The word 'millennium' appears only in one passage in Scripture (Revelation 20). Millenarians often looked elsewhere in the Bible for the millennium under another name, most often to Revelation 21 and 22 (the 'new Jerusalem' and the 'new heaven and new earth') and to Daniel 7 (the 'kingdom of the saints of the Most High'). But like Revelation 20, these sister texts were sparse on millennial detail and, for this reason, the range of opinion about the millennium was extensive. There was no agreement, for instance, about its duration. Some millenarians took the word in its literal sense and posited a millennium of 1000 years duration; some specified shorter periods of time; some held that the millennium was to last forever; and some said that its length was known only to God. The temporal location of the millennium was another disputed matter. One school of thought placed the second coming before the millennium (a position that became known in the 19th-century as 'premillennialism'), and a second taught that the second coming would follow the millennium (in the 19th-century, 'post-millennialism'). Persons who endorsed the first view were obliged to assign the millennium to the future, while those who adopted the second often believed that it was in progress. The pre- and post-millennial options, however, did not exhaust the possibilities: certain millenarians were convinced that the millennium had already come and gone in history, and those millenarians who accepted the doctrine of the middle advent normally thought that the millennium commenced with the middle advent. A third area of disagreement concerned the nature of the millennium. We may conceive of the millennium as a period of terrestrial perfection, a time when men shall beat their swords into plowshares and the leopard lie down with the kid. An idyllic vision of the millennium did exist in the minds of some premillennialists, who imagined that following the second coming, the earth would be remade and the righteous restored to prelapsarian innocence. But idyllic visions were hardly normative in English millenarianism, even within its premillennialist wing. They were certainly not found in those 17th-century millenarians who stood in the so-called 'neo-Augustinian' tradition. For these millenarians, the millennium belonged to a past epoch (variously dated) that predated the corruption of the universal church by the papacy. Nor were such visions present in the writings of those millenarians who saw the millennium as the extension, on a wider scale, of an existing reality. Into the latter category may be placed many Independent preachers, who thought of the millennium as a period during which pure doctrine and pure worship flourished, and who believed that their 'gathered' churches exemplified the millennium; the Fifth Monarchy Men, who viewed the millennium as the rule of the saints in accordance with the laws of God, and who were once convinced that the Barebones Parliament heralded a broader millennial regime; and the Quakers, who regarded the millennium as an internal presence created by the fullness of the Holy Spirit, and who maintained that they were the first beneficiaries of this fullness. For each of these three groups, the existing reality in question clearly marked an improvement over the old order of things. But because of its this-worldly character, it was an improvement that fell short of terrestrial perfection.[12]

The 'wrath' of Satan. Revelation (20:10) discloses that, ultimately, Satan will be cast into 'a lake of fire and brimstone' and then 'tormented night and day for ever and ever'. Although the faithful were thus assured that God's inveterate enemy would get his recompense, they did not believe that he would go down without a struggle: Revelation (12:12) warned them that, before his final destruction, Satan would be stirring about 'in great wrath' because 'he knoweth that he hath but a short time'. Millenarians could use the notion of Satan's end-time 'wrath' to sustain themselves even under the worst of circumstances. Because they assumed that Satan's cunning knew no bounds, they could identify any kind of adversity as his desperate opposition. For example, a Fifth Monarchy Man might come to terms with the failure of the Barebones Parliament by saying that Satan had undermined its operations; an Independent divine, when confronted with contention within the 'gathered' churches, might conclude that the arch-fiend had planted strife; and an army millenarian, having taken up the sword to deliver a 'blow' to the Beast, might attribute a Royalist victory to Satan's intervention. Moreover, by carrying this reasoning further, millenarians were able to derive a palpable advantage from adversity. They believed that Satan's wrath must increase the closer he came to his doom. As the Independent divine Thomas Goodwin put it, 'the Devil, the shorter his time is, the more he rages'. Thus millenarians could say that mounting adversity was a sign that Satan was hastening all the more rapidly towards his ineluctable fate. And with the end of the darkness in sight, they could look ever more blissfully towards the light.[13]

THE 'LAST DAYS'

Using some interchangeable biblical phraseology, millenarians called the time span in which these and the other last things took place, the 'last days' or the 'latter days' or the 'end of days'. We may be surprised to learn that these 'days' were more like centuries. The millenarian often thought that they had commenced long before his birth, and that they might continue well after his death. For this reason, we must not imagine that 17th-century English millenarians characteristically believed that the sequence of last things went from start to finish in short order. The only Englishmen who did believe this were certain radicals of the 1650s. Most millenarians, however, thought that the last things were spread out over a considerable stretch of past, present, and future time. In their minds the so-called 'end of history' was a protracted affair.

Even though they maintained that the 'days' were of long continuance, millenarians did not think that all 'days' were of equal significance. They believed that the early part of the sequence (e.g. the first few vials, some preliminary 'blows' to Antichrist, Satan's initial 'wrathful' stirrings) had occurred on widely-separated occasions over the course of several past centuries. These early last things were cues from God that the 'days' had commenced. But as the 'days' advanced, the pace accelerated: 'blows' accumulated, Satan's 'wrath' increased, vials were poured at shorter intervals, the millennium began, the second coming hastened. Consequently 17th-century millenarians were convinced that their portion of the 'days', although not necessarily the final portion, was the fullest one yet witnessed.

A millenarian was able to specify the point at which the 'days' began. All he needed to do was determine which last thing had been the initial one to appear in history. For example, if he chose the first vial, and if he thought that it had been poured by John Wycliffe in his attack on the doctrine of transubstantiation, he was in a position to say that the 'days' had begun in the late 1370s and early 1380s (when Wycliffe was mounting his attack).

English millenarians believed that the 'last days' would continue until the final last things (ordinarily the second coming, the resurrection of the dead, and the last judgement) had taken place. Some millenarians were reluctant to speculate about when these or other outstanding last things would appear. Their motto was that 'the prophecies were not given to make men seers', and they said that all remaining last things would occur 'in God's season' or 'when God wills'. Other millenarians were less reticent, and ventured tentative chronologies for future last things ('around 1655', 'by 1670', 'not before 1690'). But even these less reticent sorts acknowledged that the future was known only to God, and they were always careful to point out that their's were 'merely human reckonings'.

The uncertain duration of the 'days' in the minds of millenarians has three consequences for our understanding of English millenarianism. First, it helps to explain how an Englishman was able to go from young adulthood to ripe old age without relinquishing the belief that the 'days' were upon him. His construction of last things probably changed over the course of his lifetime, but his root conviction that the 'days' were under way, persisted. Second, it facilitates our grasp of an important aspect of millenarian behaviour. Because the millenarian thought that the 'days' were open-ended, he had to provide for the future security of his family and himself. Hence he did such things (if he had the means) as send his sons to the university, offer long-term loans, entail his estate, make advantageous matches for his daughters, and invest his dividends. Third, it helps to account for the fact that millenarianism was the possession of several generations of Englishmen. The belief that the 'last days' were in progress could be passed on to the next generation, no matter how differently it construed the last things.

CONCLUSION

Once it had taken hold of an Englishman, the belief that the last things were unfolding in history was unlikely ever to leave him. He was always able to adjust the last things to history, effectively eliminating their falsification by the circumstances of history. For instance, if he encountered adversity, he could attribute it to Satan's 'wrath'; if he set out to accomplish a last thing and failed, he could look for a supernatural agent to accomplish it miraculously; if he once thought of Cromwell as God's champion and then came to think of him as God's foe, he could conclude that the Lord Protector had allied with Antichrist; if he believed in 1653 that the millennium was the rule of the saints on earth, he could decide, after the restoration of the Stuarts in 1660, that the millennium was spiritual instead, and then locate it inside his own heart; and if he went to his death without witnessing the second coming, he could say that he was 'but one untimely born'.

To our modern minds, all this is merely making the facts fit the theory, which is more than enough reason for us to question the value of the theory. But as several recent scholars of millenarianism remind us, our canons of rationality are not those that obtained in the 17th-century. Millenarians lived in an age that assumed that supernatural forces held dominion over history. As Bernard S. Capp has observed,

> Rationality is a very subjective concept. The modern belief that it is synonymous with explanations based upon scientific materialism is valid only for the present age. By such a definition, indeed, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a whole must stand condemned. Though science was making great advances, the influence of the supernatural on human affairs was accepted almost universally, by educated and ignorant alike.[14]

Consequently it was not difficult for millenarians to see the hand of God, or that of Satan, at work in past and present events; and it was not hard for them to imagine the future re-appearance of Jesus Christ on earth and the ensuing resurrection of the dead. Seventeenth-century Puritanism, moreover, was an intensely biblical subculture, one that regarded the Scripture, including the Books of Daniel and Revelation, as an inerrant and all-sufficient guide for human affairs. The Bible, Bryan Ball has written,

> . . . was authoritative not only in its record of the past and in its guidance for the present life and doctrine of church and believer but equally in its pronouncements of future consummation.[15]

The millenarian's conviction that in due course all of the prophetic 'pronouncements of future consummation' would be fulfilled in history was based on more than his simple faith in the all-sufficiency of the Scripture. To his way of thinking it also rested on demonstrable precedent, for New Testament history had vindicated the truthfulness of another set of prophetic biblical pronouncements, the ones that pertained to the coming messiah. Finally, the 17th-century was a time of political, economic, and religious crisis. Millenarianism appealed to Englishmen, Paul Christianson has explained, because its inherent dualism brought clarity to this chaos:

> . . . English Protestants of our period viewed the actions of their fellow human beings through polarized spectacles. They believed that transcendent forces of good and evil strove to control the universe and linked each individual to one side or the other, whether or not he exercised a choice in the matter.

Millenarianism was then able to provide Englishmen with the assurance that they were aligned with the transcendent power that eventually would be victorious.[16]

There can be little doubt that the 17th-century Englishman's belief in supernatural causation, his uncritical acceptance of the Bible, and his need for a dualistic ideology help to explain why millenarianism was a plausible, indeed a rational, creed for him. But to these three considerations must be added a fourth, the importance of which is overlooked (or perhaps taken for granted) in the scholarship about millenarianism. This fourth consideration was the unprecedented magnitude, in the mind of the millenarian, of recent historical events: the Reformation, the Marian persecution, and the defeat of the Armada; the accession of the first two Stuarts, the Thirty Years War, and the rise of Laud; the civil wars, the destruction of the inherited order, and the Interregnum; the Restoration, the enactment of the Clarendon Code, and the catholicizing policies of the second two Stuarts. No matter what his vantage point in time, the 17th-century millenarian could not help but conclude that events of such magnitude had to have a deeper meaning in God's plan.

To explain these events the English millenarian looked to the Books of Daniel and Revelation. There is no question that over the course of his lifetime he took many liberties with the last things, often pulling them out of the Bible as so many rabbits out of a hat. The point to remember is this: he kept using them. They served him well, for he turned to them again and again to make history intelligible, no matter how untoward his circumstances. His refusal to surrender the last things suggests not only their versatility, but also their explanatory power. What one scholar has written of a somewhat different, but equally durable, historiographical tradition seems also true of 17th-century English millenarianism. 'It survived', he writes, 'not by chance but by merit, because it was compelling enough in content and flexible enough in form to invite adaptation'.[17]

This essay has stressed the historiographical nature of English millenarianism. In these pages the term 'millenarian' has referred to any 17th-century Englishman who used the last things as historiographical categories through which he derived the full intelligibility of history. This definition has been preferred over narrower ones that limit the term to persons who awaited an imminent second coming, or who engaged in socially and politically radical activities, or who believed in a future millennium. The problem with restrictive definitions like these is not simply that they fail to comprehend the diversity of opinion and the range of activity that recent scholarship has brought to light about 17th-century English millenarianism. At a more basic level, such definitions direct attention away from what was the common objective of all Englishmen who believed that the last things were unfolding in time: the need to understand history.

NOTES

1 The words 'millenarianism', 'millennialism', 'chiliasm', 'apocalypticism', and 'eschatology' all pertain in some sense to Christian beliefs and assumptions about the termination of history. There is no academic agreement about the meanings of these terms. In the interests of clarity, only two of them are used in this essay: 'millennium' (or 'millennial') and 'millenarian' (or 'millenarianism'). These words come from different, though related, roots, and they are employed in different, though related, ways. The 'millennium' is only one component of 'millenarianism'. The other terms do not appear in this paper, unless they happen to be found in a quotation or in a title.

2 The 12 works are Bryan W. Ball, *A Great Expectation: Eschatological Thought in English Protestantism to 1660*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975; Bernard S. Capp, *The Fifth Monarchy Men: a Study in Seventeenth Century English Millenarianism*, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972; Paul K. Christianson, *Reformers and Babylon: English Apocalyptical Visions from the Reformation to the Eve of the Civil War*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978; Katharine R. Firth, *The Apocalyptic Tradition in Reformation Britain, 1530–1645*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979; Christopher Hill, *Antichrist in Seventeenth-Century England*, London: Oxford University Press, 1971, and *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution*, New York: Viking Press, 1972; William M. Lamont, *Godly Rule: Politics and Religion, 1603–1660*, London: MacMillan, 1969, and *Richard Baxter and the Millennium*, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979; Tai Liu, *Discord in Zion: the Puritan Divines and the Puritan Revolution, 1640–1660*, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973; Frank E. Manuel, *the Religion of Isaac Newton: the Freemantle Lectures*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974; Peter Toon (ed.), *Puritans, the Millennium, and the Future of Israel: Puritan Eschatology, 1600–1660*, Cambridge: James Clarke and Company, 1970; and John F. Wilson, *Pulpit in Parliament: Puritanism during the English Civil Wars, 1640–1648*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969. To this list might be added Richard Bauckham's study of an earlier period, *Tudor Apocalypse: Sixteenth Century Apocalypticism, Millennarianism [sic] and the English Reformation: from John Bale to John Foxe and Thomas Brightman*, n.p.: The Sutton Courtenay Press, n.d. [1978].

Three helpful books published before 1969, the year that marked the appearance of the seminal studies of Lamont and Wilson, are Geoffrey Nuttall, *The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946, and *Visible Saints: the Congregational Way, 1640–1660*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957; and V. N. Olsen, *John Foxe and the Elizabethan Church*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. Two lengthy essays by Hugh R. Trevor-Roper also deserve mention: 'Three Foreigners: the Philosophers of the Puritan Revolution', and 'The Fast Sermons of the Long Parliament', in *The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Religion, the Reformation, and Social Change*, New York: Harper and Row, 1968, pp. 237–293, 294–344.

3 Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages*, 1957; revised edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970; Peter Worsley, *The Trumpet Shall Sound: A Study of 'Cargo' Cults in Melanesia*, New York: Schocken Books, 1968; and Kenelm Burridge, *New Heaven, New Earth: a Study of Millenarian Activities*, New York: Schocken Books, 1969.

4 Discussions of these matters may be found in Ball, pp. 55–88, and in W. Sibley Towner, 'Were the English Puritans "the Saints of the Most High"?: Issues in the "Pre-critical" Interpretation of Daniel Seven', *Interpretation* **37** (1983), pp. 46–63.

5 Ball, p. 69.

6 Olsen, Firth, and Bauckham have shown that Bale and Foxe were Protestant internationalists who assigned to England no special status in God's eyes. They add that some modern scholars (most notably William Haller) are guilty of following the lead of 17th-century millenarians and tracing the Elect Nation idea back to the two Elizabethans. Olsen, pp. 36 f.; Firth, pp. 107 f.; 252; and Bauckham, pp. 12 f. Haller, *Foxe's Book of Martyrs and the Elect Nation*, London: Cape, 1963.

7 'A Declaration of the Army now in Scotland' [1650], in J. P. Kenyon (ed.), *The Stuart Constitution: Documents and Commentary*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1966, pp. 325–327.

8 For ecumenical millenarianism, see Lamont's book on Baxter and Trevor-Roper's discussion of John Amos Comenius, Samuel Hartlib, and John Dury in his essay 'Three Foreigners'. See also James A. de Jong, *As the Waters Cover the Seas: Millennial Expectations in the Rise of Anglo-American Missions, 1640–1810*, Kampen, J. H. Kok, 1970, pp. 34–115, *passim*.

9 Fuller treatments may be found in de Jong, pp. 34–78; Toon, 'The Question of Jewish Immigration', in Toon (ed.), pp. 115–123; and Richard W. Cogley, 'John Eliot and the Origins of the American Indians', *Early American Literature*, 21 (1986–87) 210–225.

10 The importance of the doctrine of Christ's middle advent is underscored in Theodore Dwight Bozeman's *To Live Ancient Lives: the Primitivist Dimension in Puritanism*, in press, the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, VA. For Joachim's legacy in early modern England, see Marjorie Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy in the Late Middle Ages: A Study in Joachimism*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969, pp. 488 f, 499 f. Discussions of early Quaker millenarianism may be found in Ball, p. 195–210, and in T. L. Underwood, 'Early Quaker Eschatology', in Toon (ed.), pp. 91–103.

11 For fuller discussions, see J. Van Den Berg, 'Eschatological Expectations Concerning the Conversion of the Jews in the Netherlands During the Seventeenth Century', in Toon (ed.), pp. 137–153, and Gershom Scholem, *Sabbatai Sevi: the Mystical Messiah*, R. J. Zwi Werblowsky (translator), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973, pp. 153 f, 332–354, *passim*, 546–549.

12 For the 'premillennialists' and the 'neo-Augustinians' in question, see Ball, pp. 158, 161–164; for the Independent divines, see Wilson, pp. 222–230, and Nuttall, *Visible Saints*, pp. 143—162; for the Fifth Monarchy Men, see Capp, pp. 157–194; and for the Quakers, see note 9 above.

13 One student of millenarianism has termed for his general aspect of it 'the afflictive view in progress'. James West Davidson, *The Logic of Millennial Thought: Eighteenth Century America*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977. The quotation is found in Ball, p. 218.

14 Capp, p. 16.

15 Ball, p. 25.

16 Christianson, p. 5.

17 Sacvan Bercovitch, *The Puritan Origins of the American Self*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1975, p. 186.

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REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTES

Frank Whaling (ed.), *Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Religion: Vol. I, The Humanities* (ix + 492 pp., 1984); Vol. II, *The Social Sciences* (ix + 302 pp., 1985), Berlin, Mouton.

This two-volume reference work is presented as a 'sequel' to J. Waardenburg's *Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion* published as volumes I and II in this same Mouton series (*Reason and Religion*). The work is meant to complement the 'story' of the academic study of religion in its development up to 1945 implicit in the selections of representative scholars in the field gathered together by Waardenburg. The substance of these volumes does not, however, comprise select passages from key authors in 'religious studies', that being virtually impossible given the extensive development of the field since 1945. Nor do these volumes present a unified historical narrative of that 'further development' of religious studies. Rather, they contain the reflections of a 'team' of scholars, each summarizing the character of the study of religion within the framework of various sub-disciplines, so to speak, that constitute that study. It is the aim of the editor (and most of the authors, it appears) not only to indicate the variety of legitimate research interests in religious studies, but also to show how that variety of approaches interrelate, or, at least, can be integrated so as to constitute a kind of unified theory of the nature of the study of religion. It soon becomes evident to the reader, however—and reluctantly admitted by the editor—that even with this two-volume assault on the problem there is no single paradigm for the study of religion even within sight let alone within our grasp. What unity does appear to exist derives more from the hopes expressed by the editor than from the substance of the essays.

Volume I is focussed on 'the humanities', i.e. on approaches to the study of religion that, as Whaling puts it in the introductions to the two volumes, transcend the positivism of the scientific approach to religious phenomena by means of the intuitive insight 'that the study of religion has to do with man' (I: 25, 26; II: 12). In the introduction to the first volume, Whaling attempts to highlight the contrasts between the classical and contemporary periods in the study of religion and enunciates some general methodological claims that seem to constitute a set of assumptions for all the authors. Five essays follow which cover the historical and phenomenological approaches to the study of religion (U. King), the comparative study of religion (F. Whaling), the study of religious texts and myth (K. Bolle), the scientific study of religion in its plurality (N. Smart), and the global context of the contemporary study of religions (F. Whaling).

U. King's essay is more than merely descriptive. It is a polemical essay that argues for a historical and phenomenological study of religions that is more than a narrow, empirical approach to the phenomenon. Such an 'empirical positivism', as she calls it, jeopardizes the autonomy of 'religious studies' and is, moreover, inadequate to its subject matter. Her review of the methodological debates amongst historians and phenomenologists over the last 40 years, however, is thorough and stimulating.

F. Whaling's first essay—on comparative religions—is also polemical in that it attempts to argue for a complementarity between religious studies and theology and, consequently, takes a militant stand against all methodologically atheistic and agnostic approaches in religious studies. He then reviews a variety of comparative approaches giving most attention to the phenomenological typology of M. Eliade. Fleeting mention is made of anthropological and sociological approaches to comparative religion by scholars like C. Lévi-Strauss and J. Wach and comparative historical approaches of scholars such as S. G. F. Brandon, G. Parrinder, and R. Pettazoni amongst others. Whaling sees comparative religion as 'the cement holding together the separate bricks of the religious studies building' (I: 280) although it is itself a plurality of approaches and not a single methodological model.

K. Bolle's 'Myth and Other Texts' proceeds to review the literature in this sector of the field under the assumption that myth is the cornerstone of religion and, therefore, that the study of myth is of primary significance in the study of religions. Bolle shares the general attitude towards science already expressed by King and Whaling, although he is distinctly less sanguine about the importance of theology to the study of religion. He then examines myth perceived from an existentialist perspective in the work of M. Lienhardt and M. Eliade and reviews the phenomenological and morphological treatments with reference to the work of G. van der Leeuw, W. Kristensen and others. The structuralist perspective, especially in C. Lévi-Strauss, is seen simply as 'uncritically positivistic'.

N. Smart's essay differs significantly from the others in scope, style and tone. His essay constitutes an argument on behalf of a scientific study of religions, but a pluralistic scientific approach. It attempts to retain the demarcation between 'religious studies' and theology, yet also argues for the inclusion of values within the description of religious phenomena provided by the 'scientist'. In this regard he applauds the 'creative hermeneutic' of M. Eliade while yet expressing reservations regarding the possible theological bias that such a hermeneutic might contain.

Smart's essay is considerably shorter than the others and is not a review of the literature or developments in a particular sector of the field of religious studies, nor does it, like the others, provide a bibliography. Moreover, it is expanded upon by Whaling in the form of 'an additional note' on the relationship of the philosophy of science to the study of religion that reiterates his attack on the 'positivistic' study of religion and pleads for an increased role for hermeneutics.

Volume I is brought to a conclusion in a further essay by Whaling on 'the global context' of the study of religion 'within the whole spectrum of human knowledge' (I: 394) and hurriedly reviews the work of influential non-Christian or non-Western scholars related to this field. Their work, however, is invariably tinged, if not subfused, with apologetic religious tones if not outrightly theological in intent. Given Whaling's understanding of the nature of religious studies their inclusion here is not incongruous.

Volume II focuses attention on 'the social sciences' in the study of religion, with particular attention given to psychology (D. M. Wulff), sociology (M. Hill, G. Kehrer and B. Hardin), and anthropology (A. Jackson, J. Oosten and W. van Beek). The essays here are much more straightforward reviews of developments in the study of religion within these academic provinces than those in volume I, although several of them make their sympathies for the framework provided by Whaling crystal clear.

Wulff's essay, after a brief introduction that notes the neglect, and even disparagement, of the field of the psychology of religion, attempts to set out present-day trends in the literature in America, Germany and France. He then reviews some of the fundamental issues involved, such as the choice of basic interpretive categories to be used, the question of truth, the role of the faith of the investigator and, especially, the tension between descriptive and explanatory approaches in the discipline. The essay concludes with a review of issues of method and research techniques in the field.

M. Hill's essay is an attempt to assess whether or not the insights of the social theorists have helped to integrate the mass of empirical data about religion. Hill reviews styles of sociological studies in North America, France and Britain. In looking at the trends in the field he restricts his attention to two main perspectives: the approach emphasizes issues of power and social change and sees religion as a source of social and psychological integration.

The accompanying essay by Kehrer and Hardin reviews the sociological field in terms of four main positions: structural-functionalism, conflict theory and evolutionary schemes, Marxism and the Frankfurt School, and system theory.

Anthony Jackson reviews the literature of social anthropological approaches to the study of religion. Unlike the first two authors in this volume, Jackson grinds no philosophic-methodological axes. His is not a critique of the discipline, but rather 'only a review of work published in the field of religion' (II: 181) and that under the topics of primitive modes of thought, the communication of thought and feeling, the theory and practice of religion, and, finally, ancillary ritual practices. His disclaimers in the introduction, it should be noted, provide wise methodological counsel.

Jarich Oosten's essay on cultural anthropology and the study of religion again takes up the stance used by earlier authors here and in volume I. He then reviews the literature in light of his understanding of religion as a cultural order that gives significance to other dimensions of culture, looking both at 'the theoretical level of religion' and 'the practice of religion'.

The final essay by Wouter van Beek—'Cultural Anthropology and the Many Functions of Religion'—does not fit the mould of its predecessors. Van Beek examines the trends and literature of the discipline, however, under the rubrics of religion and personality, religion and socialization, religion and social organization, religion and conflict and religion and the ecosystem.

Given the character of these volumes as a reference work about contemporary approaches to religious studies, it is appropriate that a review give substantial indication of its contents. Considering the general methodology implicit in the majority of the essays and the philosophic-methodological framework to the essays provided by the editor, an equal amount of time might well be given to critique. (Such a critique has been ably provided by R. Segal in his review in *Zygon*, 21: 2, 1986; pp. 271–275.) The lopsided treatment of recent methodological debates has resulted in the less than fair treatment of a host of scholars concerned to see the study of religion wholly independent of theological and religious concerns. Serious issues requiring debate are simply glossed over as if without problem. The very distinction between 'the humanities' and 'the social sciences', for example, rests on highly questionable assumptions that remain entirely implicit. There is no discussion, that is, of what simultaneously distinguishes the social sciences from the natural sciences and from the humanities. Despite these shortcomings, however, the individual essays will be useful to all students of religion for their reviews of the vast and diverse literature of 'religious studies' in its plurality. As a reference work these volumes make a valuable contribution; as a philosophic-methodological statement regarding the field they leave much to be desired. The aim of the volumes in that latter regard, unfortunately, considerably impairs their value as an overview of this field of research and scholarship.

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Roy Wallis and Steve Bruce, *Sociological Theory, Religion and Collective Action*. Belfast, The Queen's University, 1986, xi + 395 pp.

Among the many battles which new religious movements have incited there is one between sociologists who are content to use reductionist models to interpret their appearance and growth and those whose interests in historical-empirical detail not only preclude such models of interpretation but also necessitate the inclusion of believers' accounts in their explanations. Taking the latter position, Wallis and Bruce, in the first article in this collection, present moral and methodological arguments which reflect one end of the now deeply entrenched extremes of the positivist debate in sociology. The authors characterize their approach to the explanation of collective action as 'cautious interpretive sympathy, ontological egalitarianism, and explanatory symmetry' (p. 5).

Not surprisingly, structural-functional theories of action come under attack, because in presenting an overly deterministic account of action, they 'routinely discount what actors have to say about their own actions' (p. 11). Instead, the authors promote a 'sympathetic' sociological explanation which, ideally, consists 'in demonstrating the actors' beliefs, [the] motives and procedures by which these beliefs were adduced, and describing the situation or circumstances, as perceived by the actor, which provided the context or occasion for this cognitive activity . . .' (p. 19). Yet, wishing to avoid the charge of accepting accounts at face value and aware of the believers' evaluations contained therein, the authors also claim that 'how actors describe *and justify* their actions is normally a major element in our explanation of them' (p. 20).

The status of the actor's account in the authors' explanation is nonetheless variable. For Wallis and Bruce it remains a matter of historical and empirical investigation to determine in each case the relationship between the actor's account of the causes of their action and the actual causal path of an action. That the sociologist rather than the believer is bound to arrive at the *actual* causal explanation is due, argue the authors, to the sociologist's professional concerns which differ from the actor's proclivities: (1) 'actors are primarily concerned with living and not explaining', (2) 'Actors' explanations typically arrive at a point of satisfaction earlier', (3) 'Actors are preoccupied primarily with the personal rather than the general' (pp. 31–32). In all of the above, the reverse is true for sociologists. Thus, what Wallis and Bruce are unwilling to claim on the basis of ontological superiority, they claim on the basis of occupational expertise.

What is less obvious are the defined limits of that occupational expertise. When the authors aver that 'What must be recognized is that our beliefs and intentions can be variously located within our consciousness', may be relegated to the background of consciousness', or 'repressed beyond the threshold of consciousness', the method whereby sociologists would elevate them to explanatory data is not clearly defined. The authors seem to retreat into a fairly conventional, if perhaps arbitrary, 'verstehen' model of interpretation of which Weber would have approved. Thus, 'the underlying motivational story', which lies repressed from individual or group consciousness is to be revealed through the sociologist's reading of amassed historical and biographical data, a reading that is not only informed by the insights of social movement analysis and interactionist theory, but is also guided by the caveats of redaction analysis.

Perhaps 'retreat' is an unfair characterization of the authors' direction, for its demanding course requires an acquaintance with the nitty-gritty of religious groups that is frequently misinterpreted if not altogether missing from structural-functional accounts. Hence, the authors' dissatisfaction with Stark and Bainbridge's cyclical model of religious economies which explains the emergence of new religious movements as a response to the failure of secularized religion to offer spiritual compensations for the hardships experienced in life. Accepting that this is a likely explanation for some religious motivation, Wallis and Bruce nevertheless argue that the aggregate data used by Stark and Bainbridge are inadequate to prove either (1) that those who embraced supternaturalist belief systems did so out of dissatisfaction with secularized ones, or (2) that availability for recruitment was matched in any significant way by the joining of new religious movements.

Their criticisms of the Stark and Bainbridge theory of religion both at the theoretical and methodological levels, in fact, resemble those which typically have been launched against deprivation theories. The crux of the matter for Wallis and Bruce is that sociologists must accept the possibility that actors will concern themselves with the transcendent because they are socialized to do so. Their critique of Stark and Bainbridge's theory of religion finally amounts to a rejection of all such general theories on the grounds that, in not proceeding from an intimate knowledge of the 'cultural context' of religious groups and their members, the theories gloss over their diverse trajectories and their different definitions of what are legitimate and logical expectations in life.

The remaining chapters evince the varied fruits of the authors' 'middle, commonsense course', and contain articles on a range of contemporary religious movements and theoretical issues. In one article on Ian Paisley and two on the Children of God, the authors re-evaluate and build upon Weber's concept of charisma. Accepting as definitive charisma's *innovatory*, even anarchic, character, Wallis and Bruce argue that Ian Paisley does not meet the criterion of charismatic leader since he 'displays a constant awareness of the need to present himself as part of an honoured tradition' and retreated to a traditional posture when his pronouncements were met with 'incredulity' from his followers. On the other hand, Moses David Berg, leader of the Children of God, is shown to have been a conscious constructor of arbitrary and unpredictable change, a tactic that not only prevented institutionalized authority structures from being established, but also rid the group of members who were unprepared to show total commitment to him. While the authors concluded that such leaders are clever manipulators rather than madmen, the point is moot, because, as the authors well know and have argued before, the consequences of an action cannot be taken for its intention.

In a section on New Religious Movements and the Cure of Souls, the authors pursue the course of argument begun in their critique of Stark and Bainbridge's theory, in particular its claim that the spiritualization of therapeutic groups was a consequence of their failure to provide effective as compensations for hardships experienced in life. By taking into account the diffuse nature of the human potential movement, its epistomological individualism, and the fluidity of its membership structure, Wallis and Bruce argue for a natural evolution to a hierarchic division between the majority of less committed and the coterie of very committed members. The professionalization of the latter ensued as a means of controlling the effects of epistomological individualism by legitimating and entrenching authority. Spiritualization, on the other hand, was partly a reaction to this 'instrumentalization', but could also and equally have flowed from other stimuli, such as 'the success or failure of aspects of the enterprise which required explanation and remedy at some deeper (or higher) level' (p. 185). Their examination of this change in the Rajneesh Movement combines these observations and earlier ones on the nature of charisma, to show that the spiritualization and increasing exclusivity of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh's message effectively 'shook out' the less committed, while it re-enforced his charismatic authority.

The last section of this book, 'Conservative Protestant Politics', might have been more valuably placed in a volume devoted to the topic, as its relation to the foregoing chapters is somewhat undeveloped. The theoretical concern in these comparative historical studies of Protestants in Ireland, South Africa, America, and Scotland is to identify factors which have contributed to Protestants' varying success, as a group, at wielding political power in society. The factors identified include the type of institutionalized political process and the peculiar historical conditions which rendered Protestants a 'threatened elect'. Theology plays a role as well, and in the case of Ireland and South Africa, the Calvinist notion of the elect, and the consequent underemphasis of missionary efforts, further isolated the group and fostered religious orthodoxy. Militant Protestants in Scotland, however, failed to mobilize support around the 'threat' of the Irish Catholic immigrants successfully, because the population here was small, and the Protestant culture was sufficiently pluralistic, even secularized, to remain largely untroubled by it.

Comparative historical studies are especially valuable for theory building, and this section suggests the potential for such in the currently news-worthy conjunctions of religion, ethnicity, and politics. Yet, at this stage, it is only potential, and the posited relationships are too much a part of the particular 'action stories' to emerge as testable hypotheses that would be more accessible to the wider sociological community.

Overall, the impact of this volume is diminished by the previous publication of almost half of its articles. The addition of a subject index would have contributed to its value as a text.

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